Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers: A Comparative Study of the Post-Cold War Era

234 Pages·2019·4.83 MB·English

by  Marinko Bobić

WHY MINOR POWERS
RISK WARS WITH
MAJOR POWERS
A Comparative Study of
the Post-Cold War Era
Marinko Bobić
First published in Great Britain in 2019 by
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Contents
List of Tables and Figures iv
List of Abbreviations v
About the Author vii
Acknowledgements viii
1 Introduction 1
2 In Search of a Theory of Minor Powers in Interstate 17
Asymmetric Conflict
3 Pathways to Conflict Using Qualitative Comparative 41
Analysis (QCA)
4 Iraq: Military Confrontation with the United States 69
and its Thirty-Three Allies
5 Moldova: Military Confrontation with Russian Forces 103
6 Serbia: Military Confrontation with NATO 137
7 Conclusion: Dealing with Complexity, Defeat and 169
Beliefs
Endnotes 189
References 193
Index 217
iii
List of Tables and Figures
Tables
3.1 Truth table of hypothetical values for QCA 43
3.2 National capability scores in asymmetric dyads 51
3.3 Truth table showing logical combinations that have 56
empirical support
3.4 Consistency and coverage scores of the presence and 57
absence of all five conditions when the outcome is present
3.5 Intermediate solution for conflict choice 58
3.6 Consistency and coverage scores of the presence and 60
absence of all five conditions pertaining to the negated
outcome (non-conflict)
3.7 Intermediate solution for a choice of non-conflict 61
Figures
3.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions 44
3.2 Pathways that show three types of combinations that 58
influence a minor power to choose conflict
iv
List of Abbreviations
AB anomalous beliefs (condition)
CCMs configurational comparative methods
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINC Composite Index of National Capability
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
COW Correlates of War (project)
DC domestic crisis (condition)
EU European Union
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FPCD Christian Democratic Popular Front (Moldova)
FS foreign support (condition)
GDP gross domestic product
GK Gagauz Khalky (also known as the Gagauz-Khalky
People’s Movement)
GNP gross national product
IMF International Monetary Fund
INUS Insufficient but Necessary part of a configuration which
is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient
IIR individually irrelevant (case)
IR International Relations
JUL Yugoslav United Left
KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee
for State Security)
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
MASSR Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
MIDs militarised interstate disputes
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCR neoclassical realist/realism
ND New Democracy (Serbia)
NGO non-governmental organisation
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
v
WHY MINOR POWERS RISK WARS WITH MAJOR POWERS
OSTK Ob’edinennyi Soyuz Trudovykh Kollektivov (Council
of Workers) (Moldova)
PMR Russian acronym for Dniester Moldavian Republic
PR public relations
QCA qualitative comparative analysis
RCC Revolutionary Command Council
RS regime stability (condition)
SDF Syrian Democratic Forces
SPO Serbian Renewal Movement
SPS Socialist Party of Serbia
SRS Serbian Radical Party
SUIN Sufficient but Unnecessary part of a configuration that
is Insufficient but Necessary for the outcome
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN United Nations
VJ Vojska Jugoslavije (Yugoslav Army)
WOO window of opportunity (condition)
vi
About the Author
Marinko Bobić is a Lecturer on the Master’s programme in International
Relations and Diplomacy at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs,
Leiden University. He holds a PhD degree in International Studies from
the University of Trento, Italy, as well as an MSc in International Relations
and Diplomacy from Leiden University, Netherlands.
Marinko’s scholarly interests focus on state strategy, geopolitics, conflict
and resources, organised crime and unrecognised states. He has published
a book on Russia’s strategies in handling its territorial disputes, an article
on transnational organised crime and terrorism, as well as several book
chapters on: the persistence of the Italian mafia; revisiting world-systems
analysis in understanding development; insurgencies, civil wars and
international support; and great power configurations in the Balkans.
In the past Marinko has worked both for governmental and non-
governmental organisations, providing practical policy analysis, scenario
analysis, crowdsourced consultancy, supervision and management of war-
games. He speaks fluent English and Serbian-Croatian-Bosnian.
vii
Acknowledgements
Writing my first book based on my PhD topic has been challenging,
and at times I have pushed myself to the very limits. Everyone who has
embarked on a researcher’s journey knows that accomplishment is never
done alone – we all need some help – and to truly reach where I am today,
I have many friends, colleagues, and even strangers to thank. I wish to
thank my sister Barbara, and my parents, for their patience, understanding,
encouragement and support throughout this process. They truly helped
me in maintaining one pillar in reality, forced me to have a degree of life
balance, and ultimately saved me from losing touch with people I care
about the most.
In addition, I wish to thank Filippo Andreatta for helping me network
and gain feedback on the initial ideas behind this book. Three other
people have had an extensive role in helping me write this book,
Emanuele Castelli and Tyson Chatagnier from Fondazione Bruno Kessler
(FBK), and Barbara Vis from Vrije Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam. Along
many stages of my research, I am also very thankful to Wolfgang Wagner,
Paolo Foradori, Jona Linde, Mariken van der Velden, Gijs Schumacher,
Dieuwertje Kuijpers, Fiona Stewart and Kristen Traynor, among others.
At the School of International Studies, University of Trento, I am
deeply indebted to all the guests, students, professors and staff. Special
mention goes to Professor Jens Woelk, Professor Stefano Schiavo, Mark
Beittel and Maria Rosaria Astarita, who have always been there to
assist, but also motivate me when completion seemed so far away. My
colleagues and friends at the School of International Studies were also
there, sometimes involuntarily, reading parts of this book. They also
deserve to be mentioned.
Finally, many thanks to my colleagues at the Institute of Security and
Global Affairs, Leiden University, where I was provided with time to
complete this book, including, but not limited to, Madeleine Hosli,
Jaroslaw Kantorowitcz, Jan Melissen, Ramon van der Does, Ramesh P.
Ganohariti and Vanessa Newby. I hope to be able to have an opportunity
to repay all the wonderful people who have helped lift me to this point
in life.
viii
1
Introduction
Between 1864 and 1870, Francisco Solano López, President of Paraguay
at the time, led his nation into a war against three powerful neighbours,
Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, in what became known as the Paraguayan
War, or the War of the Triple Alliance. The result of the war was
catastrophic for Paraguay; 85 per cent of its population was killed, its
victorious opponents imposed fines, and 142,450 km2 of territory was
lost, an area nearly the size of Florida in the USA. Just as the Paraguayan
nation itself perished in a bloodbath, so, too, did its leader who refused to
surrender even when it was clear that he had lost (C.Q. Schneider, 2009:
3). For some, he soon became a hero, a symbol of defiant minor powers
fighting for their rights. Others, however, saw him as a stubborn man
consumed by his desire for greatness, pointing out that he had studied in
France and was an avid admirer of Napoleon. While it is puzzling as to
why López made such a tragic decision, it is even more puzzling that he
was the one who initiated the conflict. Indeed, anything other than a loss
would have been a surprising outcome.
Almost a century and a half later, in 2008 precisely, Mikheil Saakashvili,
President of Georgia at the time, also led his small nation into a war against
a vastly more powerful neighbour, Russia. The conflict became known as
the Russo–Georgian war. Just like in the Paraguayan War, the weaker side
lost. Luckily, because modern militaries are quicker and more accurate,
Georgia escaped without serious consequences to the livelihood of its
people. Georgia did, however, allow its enemy to reach the capital city,
Tbilisi, and lost two problematic, separatist regions: Abkhazia and South
Ossetia (Nichol, 2009: 14–15; Cherkasova, 2010: 2). Again, Saakashvili’s
legacy was divided between those who characterised him as a hero for
standing up to a threatening major power, and those who considered
him a reckless leader who had lost significant parts of the country. Not
surprisingly, some studies have devoted their attention to analysing the
case of Georgia and its war against Russia (Cherkasova, 2010).
1