What is Fascism and Why?

357 Pages·1931·23.196 MB·English

by  Sillani, Tomaso (ed.)

^/ILFE MAGNA PARENS FRUGUM
SATURN!A TKLLUS MAGNA V1RUM
WHAT IS FASCISM
AND WHY?
Tomaso Sillani
/ he Arntf ana the Ducc
^/ILFE MAGNA PARENS FRUGUM
SATURN!A TKLLUS MAGNA V1RUM
/ he Arntf ana the Ducc
WHAT IS FASCISM
AND WHY?
EDITED BY
TOMASO SILLANI
(LA RASSEGNA ITALIANA)
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1931
INTRODUCTION
ITALY AS COLLABORATOR IN WORLD PEACE
This volume demonstrates the tremendous effort which Italy through
the work of Fascism, its laws and the institutions created and perfected
by it, has made, and continues to make, in all fields of civil activity.
Its several chapters, which constitute genuine documents written by
men ofthe greatest authority and responsibility, describe how the Ital
ian State has been legally transformed, what is the nature of its cor
porative arrangement, on what financial bases the strengthening ofthe
nation proceeds, what are the developments of agriculture, of land re
clamation, ofindustry, of communications in Italy and her colonies, how
the regime fights for the solution of the demographic problem and for
the betterment of the race, how it works in the field of culture, schools,
education of the young, in what way it provides for the development
of the Kingdom - in short, it illustrates how imposing is the mass of
public works which bear the sign of the fasces and which will be num
bered in the future among the most eloquent testimonials of this period
of Italian history.
Naturally, of all the undertakings which the Fascist regime fosters,
coordinates, and promotes, there are recorded here only those ofessential
importance and original stamp, to be considered almost as the lineaments
of the new Italy. But they are organic and definitive and from them is
derived the now evident character of all Fascist policy; the peaceful de
velopment ofItaly, in open contrast withthe biassedlegends which depict
her as dominated by a dream of dangerous adventures, which even
denounce as menaces to world peace the words she pronounces or the
steps she takes inbehalfofthe elementarynecessities ofher own existence
and defence. Truth can be hidden but not suppressed; it is now begin
ning to appear in full lucidity.
In fact, (among the nations ofthe world, Italy is the one which, in
proportion to her rank as a great Power andherright of equality with
the greatest Powers, makes the smallestexpenditurefor armaments. She
has always sought with sincere and dignified consistency, not only to
establish peaceful relations with the peoples to whom her own interests
are most directly linked, but also to contribute, as--^4ll--beri?hown-below,
to the pacification of Europe, after the tragic events of the Great Wax)
How could she act otherwise? When a nation carries out internally
the incessant work ofwhich this volume represents the grandiose propor
tions, and dedicates to that work the greatest part of its financial re
sources and energies, it can certainly have neither thetime northe mater
ial possibility of thinking about preparing or making a chimerical war.
^Italy's international relations, as expressed by the organic develop
ment ofher foreignpolicy, are throeinperfectharmonywiththe character
and development of her domestic policy. }It is therefore of primary
6 What is Fascism and why?
importance, in presenting this volume to foreigners, that her foreign
policy be methodically recorded, so that it may be seen to what extent
this runs parallel to the internal policy of peaceful improvement and
fall development of the soil and national resources, as well as the form
ation of a pacific spirit in the new generations.
-"""*" On its advent to power, Fascism found Italy's international posi
tion weakened and compromised bythe Governments which had preceded
it, and European international relations greatly disturbed and menaced
by violently conflicting influences in the first uneasy period of the ap
plication of the peace treaties.
With unwavering firmness, in the space of a little more than eight
years, Fascist policy, dictatedby Mussolini, has led Italy from the ruinous
state ofthe post-war period to the overcoming of that diffidence which
accompaniedit; to the adjustment ofuncertaininternational relations; to
the attainment ofprestige, and financial and political autonomy. Conse
quently Italy, maintaining a position of the first rank among the great
Powers, has been able to develop together with them an efficacious
pacific policyinthe face ofthe greatest problems ofinternational politics.
Thus having reached an ever-increasing liberty of action, Fascist
policy began to take a leading part in solving the grave questions that
demanded world settlement in the period following the War. It has
been at hand during each of the phases of the long Franco-German con
troversy; it has shared in the systematizetion of the financial problems
arising out of the peace treaties, and has devoted its own efforts to
the policy of peace, participating with a loyal spirit in the meetings at
Geneva and in the various disarmament conferences, and giving its own
original stamp to the creation of the project of Pan-Europe. By the
Lateran Agreements it secured the inestimable gift of religious peace for
the Italian people.
Time and again, the various stages through which this policy haa
passed have revealed the singleness of purpose competing them and
the spirit that inspired the whole - a strong sense ofnational dignity
together with a realistic grasp of facts - a spirit sincerely devoted to
that peace which in the world today is tho indispensable condition for
common salvation and for the conquest of a better future.
The very first years of Fascist foreign policy,had been occupied with
the liquidation ofthe past, abstaining meanwhile from any conduct which
might have compromised the unstable European order. The aim was
" "
to obtain that certainty in the political field and that liberty of
aacuttioonnowmhyi.chIanlosnheorcto,ulidt pwearsmiat ptohleicfryeeofde"vebalsoipcmesnetttolefmFeanstc.is"t political
Thus one of the first acts of the Fascist government was that of
solving the burning question of Fiume, the complex problem which the
preceding Governments had left till then unsolved, Italy, by the accord
Introduction (Italy as collaborator in World Peace) 7
reached with. Jugoslavia, was able to annex the city of Fiume, while
Jugoslavia was assured a secure outlet for her export commerce through
the concessionofafiftyyearlease ofone ofthe principal docks, modernly
equipped. ^The Fiume accord was completed by a pact ofItalo-Jugoslav
friendship, signed at Rome January 17, 1924. Fascist Italy hoped that
this would end the tension of political relations between Italy and Jugo
slavia and create between the two countries an atmosphere ofreciprocal
understanding and peaceful collaborationinthe great movements toward
peace.
Today, at a distance of seven years from the signing of the Pact of
Rome, one is perhaps led to conclude that the generous vision ofthe Fa
scist Government has not always found a response or complete under
standing on the part of Jugoslavia. It is certain that the authorities
of the neighbouring State have shown themselves little disposed to use
the port establishments at Fiume, for the dock leased to Jugoslavia has
been little or not at all utilized by her trade while,in the political field,
the treaty of friendship has not brought all the fruits which could and
should be expected from it.
Nevertheless, the agreements signed at Rome January 17, 1924, by
settling the territorial question, have ended a dispute which had lasted
for more than five years, causing anxiety in all the chancelleries of
Europe, and constituted a grave disturbing element in the relations
between the two neighbouring countries. The Pact of Rome has thus
been one of the most significant acts of Fascist foreign policy and must
be considered as a success of essential value for the cause of peace.
Convinced that Adriatic peace was a condition indispensable to Euro
pean peace, the Fascist government proposed to remove the possibility
of disturbance on the Albanian chess-board. Its policy, on an obvious
foundation of reason, has thus been directed toward giving internal se
curity to Albania, guaranteeing its government a period of tranquillity
and peace, and assisting in the development ofits economic resources.
The two Tirana Pacts of 1926 and 1927 have established the basis
on which Albania, with Italy's loyal support, is rapidly taking her place
among civilized nations. The last Albanian revolution occurred a week
No
before the conclusion of the first Tirana Pact; since its signature,
vember 22, 1926, Albania has at last experienced that internal harmony
which has permitted her to advance towardprosperity. Five years have
passed in unbroken calm; and the progress of the country in all fields
- economic, cultural, and technical demonstrates that, thanks to Ital
ian policy, in the place of a former element of European preoccupation,
there is now a new element of Adriatic and international peace.
One may say that France has followed a single policy since the
GreatWar-that of attemptingto obtain security againstthe renewal of
the German menace through guarantees fromthe other Powers. Boththe
8 What is Fascism and why?
hope ofthe Rhine frontier and the British-American guarantee promised
by Wilson and Lloyd George, having failed, France embarked upon the
strongpolicy ofintransigent application of the letter ofthe Treaties, and
decided to occupy German territory. At this stage of the controversy,
Europe's desire for peace acquired an importance at least equivalent to
the direct interests of the two contendents. Therefore, the right of in
tervention on the part ofthe signatories ofthe Versailles treaty assumed
the aspect ofa genuine dutyfrom whichno Power guaranteeing the peace
of Europe could think of withdrawing itself. Britain, now more closely
bound to France by virtue of the recent peace, proceeded to occupation
in a lesser degree, but in line with the French and Belgians. Italy, less
closely bound, was able to strike the happy compromise ofbeing present,
as was essential, at an event where the near future of Europe might
be settled, while holding in reserve the trump card of her position as
a balancing factor; and thus resolved to send a mission of experts,
through whom she gave evidence ofparticipation in events,whileactually
abstaining from military sanction.
The period of sanctions was soon outlived. Economically disadvan
tageous and politically dangerous, since a progressive isolation was be
coming manifest as Britain withdrew her support, and resistance and
rancour were being re-kindled in Germany, the policy of sanctions gra
dually diminished in value until conditions developed which rendered
possible an alteration of the course.
Finally convinced that Britain had ended her dispute with Germany
and was returning to her traditional policy of maintaining a balance of
power on the continent, France was constrained to seek in a new policy
of accords that security which was no longer possible through a policy
of sanctions. At the same time the possibilities of a direct understand
ing were facilitated by the almost simultaneous appearance of the Cartel
in France and the Labour Party in England, ofthe parallel development
of democratic institutions in Germany and the first approaches between
French and German industries ofthe Rhine and Ruhr.
Germany cordiallywelcomed this tendency toward a direct under
standing, and thus a new phase in Franco-German relations was begun.
In this phase, Italy sought to become, as she had planned, one of the es
sentialelements inthe eventual Franco-German accordwhich was to con
stitute the point ofdeparture for any successivedevelopmentofEuropean
politics. Italy's clear policy had successful issue, and she became one of
the guarantors ofthe Locarno pacts of 1925 and ofThoiry of 1926, with
rights and duties equivalent to those of Great Britain. The moral posi
tion which she assumed at the side of Great Britain, between the two
major European contendents, had a value which surpassed the actual
content of the stipulated accords.
The Franco-German understanding did notlast as long as was hoped
Introduction (Italy as collaborator in World Peace) 9
in the beginning, but Italy's new prestige outlived it and assured her
steady ascent from a position little less than humiliatingto one ofrecog
nized parity, in fact and in right, with the other great Powers.
Throughthe LocarnopactsGermanyobtained admission totheLeague
of Nations and introduced there the anti-Versailles policy which had pre
viously developed outside. Thus was closed the period of exclusion of
thisgreatnationfrominternationalsociety. Italynowproposedtwoobjec
tives: a better regulation ofreparations, with their annulmentasthe ulti
mate ideal; and the gradual disarmament of the Allies, as provided in
the Covenant of the League. At the same time, the gradual receding of
the war years, the hard experience and disappointments resultingfromthe
frequent change of political methods and ideals, the diffusion of a sense
of solidarity among peoples interested in attaining a balance indispen
sable to economic recovery and political and social security - to the
-
very conservation of western civilization itself all contributed to direct
international political forces toward the same problems with which the
new German policy was concerned. Thus the whole recent phase of in
ternational politics has hinged on a double aspect of the problem of re
construction: the settlement of international financial relations, and the
realization of disarmament.
In the recent period ofinternational politics, Italy has had the merit
of formulating the solution of problems which time and necessity have
finally led all the Powers to accept: for problems of a financial nature,
the connexion between debts and reparations, with the tendency toward
the progressive reduction of all burdens; and for the political problems,
disarmament accepted as the basis for the attainment ofsecurity, in con
trast with the current conception which, subordinating disarmament to
security obtained by means of the guarantees of conventions, creates
the vicious circle of so-called pacific measures which arouse distrust and
rancour and necessitate an increase rather than a reduction of arma
ments.
Italy's policy has therefore been preeminent in the last years, which
havesuccessively broughtabouttheDawesPlan,theadjustmentofseparate
war debts, the Young Plan and the creation ofthe Bank of International
Settlements; and, in the political field, the signing of the Kellog Pact,
the agreements between Italy and the Vatican, the London Conference
fornaval disarmament,theprojectofPan-Europe and, finally,the Franco-
Italian naval accord of 1931.
While Italy saw her thesis gradually predominate in the develop
ment ofeachinternational problem, she was evolving atthe same time her
own particular policy ofpeace and concluding treaties of friendship and
collaboration with other States, more actively than any other European
nation. Among these treaties, of special importance is that with Soviet
10 What is Fascism and why?
Russia, marking the first real recognition ofthatnew political force (1), to
which it extends the invitation of collaboration which may have incalcu
lable effects in the future; and the treaty with Turkey and Greece in
1928, clearingthehorizonatatimewhenanancient anddangerous rivalry
seemed to be reviving in the Mediterranean. By virtue ofItaly's timely
intervention, a dissension which threatened grave repercussions in the
Balkans and the Near East was replaced by a political and economic
collaboration which benefitted all Europe.
International financial policy hinges on two associated questions:
the systematization of international debts, and the settlement of repara
tions dueto the Allies. After the indecisive period ofsanctions following
the treaties of peace, the first step toward the settlement of financial
problems was made by the adoption of the Dawes Plan which, although
it left undecided the amount and duration of payments, had the merit
of a first definition of terms and a determination of sanctions in a
manner more favourable to Germany.
Inthisfirst period,Italyhad alreadyofferedtothe cause of European
peace the greater part of her financial benefits derived from the treaties,
by conceding a moratorium to her principal debtors - Austria, Hungary
and Bulgaria. In regard to Austria, above all, the Italian sacrifice had
been heavy, considering that it was precisely on the Austrian debt that
the greater proportion of Italy's quota of reparations was based.
In practice, the Dawes Plan functioned satisfactorily for a period of
fouryears,permittingthegradualestablishmentinEuropeofneweconomic
and political conditions which were instrumental in further lightening
international financial encumbrances. In addition, the accords between
the three Western Powers and America, and between Italy, France and
Britain themselves, greatly reducing the debts and scaling them over
a long period ofyears, thus making possible an eventual parallel reduction
ofthe German debts; the increasing recognition on the part ofthe victors
that the transfer of riches constitutes for the creditor, if not a danger,
atleastaneconomicbenefit small incomparisonwithwhathadbeenexpec
ted; the removal from the spirit of war, and the prevailing conviction
of the absolute necessity for a reconstructive peace that would benefit
all, prepared the ground for a reconsideration of the financial obligations
resulting from the war.
The Conference of the Hague assembled in the summer of 1929 for
the purpose of adopting a settlement ofreparations which could be sub
stituted for the Dawes Plan. Inspired as it was by the concept offurther
reduction of transfers under the title of reparations, and of a precise
definition ofthe terms and quotas, its conclusions marked a decisiveItal-
withou(t1)cTohncereBtreitciosnhtetrnetat-y,aalmtehroeugahffpirremcaetidoinngofItaalyp'rsincbiyplea wofeekt,hewLaasbjoaurbaCraebirneectogonintiiotns
coming to power.
Introduction (Italy as collaborator in World Peace) 11
ian diplomatic success - a tactical success in the negotiations, and a
final political success in so far as the Young Plan accepted the old
"
Italian thesis, Mussolini's true prophetic foresight" of the relationship
between debts and reparations. In the Young Plan, in fact, a clear
distinction is made between the sums due from Germany as reimburse
ment for war debts and those due as actual reparations. Thus these
latter will no longer be due inthe last twenty-two years ofthe duration
of the pact, while theformer willcontinue until theinter-allied debts are
extinguished.
The creation of the Bank of International Settlements, provided for
by the Hague accords of 1930 in which the Young Plan was adopted,
made a visible connection between financial policy and the general ques
tion ofworld peace, thus giving evidence ofthe unification of all tenden
cies directed toward the political and financial reconstruction of Europe.
To the policy of disarmament, which in recentyears had become th&
backbone ofinternational politics, Italy has given her fullest cooperation]
I
\anticipating events in her characteristic mannerofconsidering problems.
While in the rest of Europe there still prevailed the severity ofthe first
narrow interpretation of the treaties, Italy adopted the policy offriendly
collaborationwithherenemies ofthewar, concludedaccordswithHungary,
brought military control in Austria and Hungary to an end, sacrificed
all or almost a1! of the sum due to her, in orderto reach the internation
al agreement of the Hague in 1929, and was the first to disseminate,
through the words ofthe Head ofthe Government, the idea that it would
be of universal benefit to re-examine the onerous conditions dictated by
the spirit of war and incorporated in the Treaties of 1919.
As in the financial field, with her principles of the interdependence
of debts and reparations and of the necessity of proceeding toward the
ideal annulment of financial claims which tend to perpetuate the dangers
ofwar, so inthe parallelfield ofdisarmament,Italy's principles have been
affirmed in the progressive development of international policy. The
Italian thesis of the relativity and interdependence of armaments, and
the principle she constantly kept in mind of reduction and not mere
limitation, have now orientated the policy ofall States inthe most recent
phase of the disarmament problem.
Even before the London Conference of 1930, Italy had proclaimed
the essential lines of her policy of peace, in the formula of Mussolini:
"
Any level of armament, even the lowest, as long as it be unsurpassed
by any other continental nation." In London this thesis was made more
precise by the proposals for the abolition of capital ships, the eventual
correlative abolition of submarines, and for a naval holiday until 1936
in the construction of large ships permitted by the Washington treaty.
And it was due to Italian diplomatic initiative, which did not abate its
efforts during the course ofthe year 1930, no less than to the increasing