What Do Philosophers Do?: Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy

265 Pages·2017·1.56 MB·English

by  Penelope Maddy

i
WHAT DO PHILOSOPHERS DO?
ii
THE ROMANELL LECTURES
The Romanell- Phi Beta Kappa Professorship, first awarded in 1983, was
established by an endowment from Patrick and Edna Romanell. Patrick
Romanell, a Phi Beta Kappa member from Brooklyn College, was H. Y.
Benedict Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas, El Paso. The Phi
Beta Kappa Society administers the Professorship, which takes the form of
three lectures given each year by a distinguished philosopher, at his or her
home institution, on a topic important to an audience beyond professional
philosophers. This intent of this series is to publish the results of those lec-
tures in affordable and accessible editions.
Published in the Series
What Do Philosophers Do?
Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy
Penelope Maddy
iii
WHAT DO
PHILOSOPHERS DO?
Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy
Penelope Maddy
1
iv
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Penelope Maddy 2017
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress
ISBN 978–0 –1 9–0 61869–8
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
v
For J. S. P.
spinner of make- believe
vi
vii
CONTENTS
Preface  ix
Introduction  1
I. The Dream Argument  7
1. Descartes on dreaming  7
2. Stroud on dreaming  18
3. Stroud versus Austin  40
II. The Argument from Illusion  73
1. The argument  74
2. Shortcomings of the argument  92
3. Why is the argument so appealing?  109
4. From the argument to skepticism  141
5. Back to dreaming  150
viii
Contents
III. The Cure and Beyond  157
1. Moore  158
2. Wittgenstein  176
3. Beyond  201
Appendix A: The Infinite Regress of Justification  221
Appendix B: The Closure Argument  229
Bibliography  235
Index  245
viii
ix
PREFACE
This book is an attempt to knit together two themes: an investi-
gation of the arguments for radical skepticism about our knowl-
edge of the external world, and an examination of the merits and
interrelations of various ways of doing philosophy. The two skep-
tical arguments that receive the most attention are the Dream
Argument and the Argument from Illusion; for completeness,
the Infinite Regress of Justification and the Closure Argument
are touched on in two short appendices. The methods consid-
ered are Commonsense Philosophy, in the person of the Plain
Man; Naturalism, in the person of the Plain Inquirer (known
in [2007], [2011], and [2014] as the Second Philosopher);
Conceptual Analysis; Ordinary Language Philosophy (as prac-
ticed by J. L. Austin); and Therapeutic Philosophy (as practiced
in different ways by Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein). Though