Warriors and Wizards: the Development and Defeat of Radio-Controlled Glide Bombs of the Third Reich PDF
Preview Warriors and Wizards: the Development and Defeat of Radio-Controlled Glide Bombs of the Third Reich
WARRIORS and W ARDS IZ Bollinger_WarriorsWiz_P6.indd 1 7/21/10 2:34:33 PM Bollinger_WarriorsWiz_P6.indd 2 7/21/10 2:34:33 PM WARRIORS and W ARDS IZ The Development and Defeat of Radio-Controlled Glide Bombs of the Third Reich Martin J. Bollinger Naval Institute Press Annapolis, Maryland Bollinger_WarriorsWiz_P6.indd 3 7/21/10 2:34:33 PM Naval Institute Press 291 Wood Road Annapolis, MD 21402 © 2010 by Martin J. Bollinger All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bollinger, Martin J., 1958- Warriors and wizards : the deployment and defeat of radio- controlled glide bombs of the Third Reich / Martin J. Bollinger. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59114-067-2 (alk. paper) 1. Guided bombs—History—20th century. 2. World War, 1939-1945—Aerial operations, German. 3. Germany. Luftwaffe— History. I. Title. UG1282.G8B65 2010 940.54’4943—dc22 2010017194 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 First printing Bollinger_WarriorsWiz_P6.indd 4 7/21/10 2:34:33 PM Contents List of Tables and Illustrations vii Acknowledgments ix Introduction: “Wellsian Weapons from Mars” xiii one Egret Explodes 1 two Development of German Glide Bombs 9 three Death of a Battleship and Crisis at Salerno 25 four Early Warnings from Agents and Analysts 41 five False Hope: Initial Countermeasures Development 52 six II./KG 100’s Struggles in the Mediterranean 60 seven Transition Time: KG 40 and the He 177 73 eight I ntelligence Work Leads to Improved Electronic 89 Defenses nine Stalemate at Anzio and on the Convoy Routes 101 ten Lessons Learned, Moves, and Countermoves 122 eleven Last Gasps: The Invasions of France 145 twelve How Effective Were the Glide Bombs 167 and Electronic Countermeasures? Epilogue 193 Appendix: Ships Sunk or Damaged with Glide Bombs 207 Notes 209 Selected Bibliography 247 Index 257 Bollinger_WarriorsWiz_P6.indd 5 7/21/10 2:34:33 PM Bollinger_WarriorsWiz_P6.indd 6 7/21/10 2:34:33 PM Tables and Illustrations Tables table 11.1. C ommanders of Primary Luftwaffe Glide-Bomber 147 Units table 12.1. L uftwaffe Claims for KG 100 Glide-Bomb Hits and 168 Near Misses Through 30 April 1944 table 12.2. L uftwaffe Claims for Ships Sunk or Severely Damaged 168 by KG 100 Glide Bombs Through 30 April 1944 table 12.3. S hips Sunk or Damaged with Hs 293 or Fritz-X 171 Glide Bombs table 12.4. D efensibility of Ships Sunk or Damaged by Hs 293 176 and Fritz-X Glide Bombs table 12.5. S ummary of Allied Jamming Technologies Deployed 185 Against Kehl-Strassburg System Graphs graph 12.1. S uccess Rates for Glide-Bomb Attacks by Individual 173 Luftwaffe Group graph 12.2. D istribution of Glide-Bomb Launches by Time of 174 Day graph 12.3. G lide-Bomb Success Rates: Day vs. Dusk vs. Night 174 Attacks graph 12.4. S uccess Rates in Glide-Bomb Attacks by Luftwaffe 174 Group Over Time graph 12.5. M onthly Attrition of II./KG 100 Glide-Bombing 177 Aircraft Bollinger_WarriorsWiz_P6.indd 7 7/21/10 2:34:33 PM viii Tables and Illustrations graph 12.6. M onthly Attrition of III./KG 100 Glide-Bombing 178 Aircraft graph 12.7. M onthly Attrition of II./KG 40 Glide-Bombing 178 Aircraft graph 12.8. D oppler Shift of Reflected Kehl Control Signal vs. 183 Aircraft Height and Distance graph 12.9. R eflected-Path Kehl Signal Difference vs. Aircraft 183 Height and Distance graph 12.10. G lide-Bomb Attack Effectiveness by Campaign and 187 Jamming Technology graph 12.11. G lide-Bomb Hits and Near Misses Over Time by 188 KG 100 Using Hs 293 graph 12.12. S ummary of Glide-Bomb Effectiveness vs. Jamming 190 Technology Map Selected Locations of Glide-Bomb Bases and Attack Sites xx Bollinger_WarriorsWiz_P6.indd 8 7/21/10 2:34:33 PM Acknowledgments The author is very thankful for the professionalism and graciousness of many who labor quietly to maintain accurate historical records in national archives and other organizations. These individuals include Janet Delude (Rohna Association), Dori Glaser (Destroyer-Escort Sailors Association), Joel K. Harding (Association of Old Crows), Jonathan D. Jeffrey (Western Kentucky University), David Lincove (Ohio State University), Ed Marolda (recently retired from the U.S. Naval Historical Center), David W. McComb (Destroyer History Foundation), Nate Patch (U.S. National Archives and Records Association), Janice Schulz (Naval Research Laboratory), Katharina Schulz (Archiv Deutsches Museum), David R. Stevenson (American Society of Naval Engineers), and Ron Windebank (HMS Newfoundland Association). The staff at the UK National Archives were extremely skillful and helpful, as was Sebastian Remus, a professional researcher skilled in the ways of the Freiburg-based Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv. F F F This research was facilitated greatly by the support and cooperation of other more-accomplished authors in this field, including Ulf Balke, Nick Beale, David Bruhn, Henry L. de Zeng, Jan Drent, Chris Goss, Manfred Griehl, Greg Hunter, Carlton Jackson, Wolfgang-D. Schröer, and Theron P. Snell. Others who maintain an active interest also contributed greatly, including Franck Allegrini, Ed Hart, and Shamus Reddin. Al Penney of the Bollinger_WarriorsWiz_P6.indd 9 7/21/10 2:34:33 PM x Acknowledgments Canadian Navy was especially helpful in sorting out the development of British glide-bomb countermeasures. The genre of naval and aviation history is well served by amateur and professional researchers who maintain, interpret, and make available data relevant to this story. Many of them are active participants in Internet-based forums that permit easy and effective transmittal of data, insight, and criti- cism. Two of these forums—Warsailors.com and 12oclockhigh.net—were employed extensively here. Thanks in particular to Brian J. Bines, Hans Houterman, Doug Kasunic, Jerry Proc, and Derek James Sullivan The author is also grateful to the veterans of this year of “warriors and wizards” who provided him with their time and insight. This includes sev- eral participants in the battles in air and sea: Roy W. Brown (convoy UGS-40), Kenneth C. Garrett (HMCS Algonquin), Russell Heathman (HMCS Matane), Jack Hickman (Operation Dragoon), Ian M. Malcolm (SS Samite), and Charles C. Wales (USS Lansdale). This group includes scientists who fought their own battle over the electromagnetic spectrum: J. T. Doyle (RCN St. Hyacinthe) and William E. W. Howe (Naval Research Laboratory). Several family members of these warriors contributed to this effort, includ- ing K. C. Dochtermann (grandson of Luftwaffe pilot Hans Dochtermann), Chip Gardes (son of USS Herbert C. Jones captain Alfred W. Gardes Jr.), Rick Heathman (son of HMCS Matane crewman Russell Heathman), and Rainer Zantopp (son of Luftwaffe pilot Hans-Joachim Zantopp). Through their efforts I came to know more about the real people involved in this story. Thanks in particular to Chip for tracking down and sharing his father’s per- sonal files and his fascinating life story. Two noted scholars in the field, Dr. Richard P. Hallion and Norman Polmar, acted as valued mentors to the author and graciously lent him their personal files on this subject that they had each accumulated over the years. Additional valuable assistance during the preparation of the manuscript was received from Anne Doremus, Declan Murphy, and Nic Volpicelli. Editors Adam Kane and Alison Hope were greatly helpful in turning tortured ideas and prose into clear and readable material. The author is especially grateful to Dr. Allan Steinhardt, a former chief scientist with the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and an expert in radar, radios, and electronic warfare. Dr. Steinhardt, a former col- league of the author, contributed his valuable expertise in analyzing both the Kehl-Strassburg radio-guidance system and the Allied countermeasures. The author would also like to recognize an individual without whom this effort would never have been undertaken: author Rick Atkinson. It was Atkinson’s Bollinger_WarriorsWiz_P6.indd 10 7/21/10 2:34:33 PM
The list of books you might like
