Vought’s F-8 Crusader, Part 4: Navy Fighter Squadrons

220 Pages·1990·42.204 MB·English

by  Steve Ginter

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IUNITED STATES NAVY F-8 CRUSADER FIGHTI
CONTRIBUTORS 95. VSF-86, Gators.
95. VF-91,Red Lightnings.
AL BAZER, ROGER BESECKER, JIM 97. VF-103, Sluggers.
BURRIDGE, WILLIAM BRABANT, BEN 100.VF-111, Sundowners.
BURGER, BILL CRIMMINS, RON 109.VF-124, Crusader College.
DOWNEY, JOHN ELLIOn (NAVAL AVI
118.VF-132, Peg Leg Petes.
A~IONHISTORY), HARRY GANN, TED
119.VF-141, Iron Angels.
GOLDSTONE, JOEL GRIGGS, MIKE
121.VF-142, Fighting Falcons.
HATFIELD, DOM HAYES, BOB HOGAN,
124.VF-154, Grand Slammers / Black
GENE HOLMBERG, CLAY JANSSON,
Knights.
WILLIAM T. LARKINS, ROBERT LAW
SON, T. MATSUZAKI, DAVE MENARD, 131. Confessions of an early Sader
BARRY MILLER, JOHN (CRASH) MIOT Raiderby John Miottel, VF-154.
TEL, STEPHANE NICOLAOU, STEVE 139.VF-162, Hunters.
PACE, RON PICCIANI, DON PRIEST, LI 145.VF-174, Hell Razors.
ONEL PAUL, DAVE OSTROWSKI, FRED 150.VF-191, Satan's Kittens.
INTRODUCTION ROOS, ART SCHOENI, DON SPERING, 157.VF-194, Red Lightnings.
BOB STOLLOF, WILLIAM SWISHER
169.VF-201, Hunters.
TOMMY THOMASON, NICK WILLIAMS:
This book provides brief squadron 171.VF-202, Superheats.
~.O. "BUZ" WARFIELD, STAN WYCK
histories and extensive color and 172.vF-211 (first VF-211), Checker
OFF, USMC, USN AND VOUGHT.
markings for Navy F-8 fighter squad tails.
rons. This book differs from previous 175.VF-211 (second VF-211), Figh
TABLE OF CONTENTS
books in that the aircraft's develop ting Checkmates / MiG Killers.
ment and testing was covered in Part 184.VF-214, Checkmates.
PAGE TOPIC
One ofthis four-part F-8 series. Naval 185.VF-301, Devil's Disciples.
3. Employment ofthe F-8E, 1968.
Fighters NumberSixteen is 114pages 186.VF-302, Stallions.
8. F-8 VIETNAM DATA.
andcovers the F-8's development and 187.VF-661, Firefighters.
SQUADRONS:
testing, foreign users and the F8U-3. 190.VF-662 (VF-11A1).
9. VU-1, Unique Antiquer's.
Authored by Steve Pace it retails for 191.VF-672 (VF-31B2).
10. VC-1, Blue Aliis.
$15.95. Naval Fighters Number Sev 191.VF-673 (VF-31B3).
11. VU-2, Blue Tails.
enteen is 66 pages and covers the 192.VF-701 (VF-124D1), Hunters.
12. VC-2, Blue Tails.
Navy and Marine RF-8 photo Crusad 193.VF-703 (VF-53D2), Superheats.
14. VF(AW)-3, Blue Nemesis.
er squadrons. It retails for $10.95. 195.VF-931 (VF-34W1).
15. VX-3.
Naval Fighters Number Eighteen is 66 197.VF-932 (VF-33W2, VF-34W2).
19. VX-4, Evaluators.
pages and covers the Marine F-8 198. Naval AirTest Center NATC.
23. VU-4, Dragon Flyers.
fighter squadrons. It retails for$10.95. 204. Naval Test Pilot School, TPS.
24. VC-4, Dragon Flyers.
205. Flying Brothers.
26. VU~5, Workhorse Of The Fleet.
DEDICATION: 206. Naval Weapons Center, China
27. VC-5, Checkertails.
TO LCDR GREG CRAIGMILES Lake.
29. VU-7, Utron Seven.
209. Pacific Missile Range / Naval
31. VC-7, TALLYHOers.
Anyone having photos or other infor Missile Center / Pacific Missile Test
33. VU-8/VC-8, Red Tails.
mation on this or any other naval or Center.
35. VU-10, Proud Pelicans.
marine aircraft, may submit them for 214. Naval Air Test Facility (SI), NAS
36. VC-10, Challengers.
possible inclusion in future issues. Lakehurst.
39. VF-11, Red Rippers.
Any material submitted will become 215. Naval Air Development Center,
43. VC-13, Figthn' Saints.
the property of NAVAL FIGHTERS NADC, NAS Johnsville.
44. VF-13, Night Cappers.
unless prior arrangement is made. In 215. Thunderbird Aviation F-8K.
48. VF-24, Checkertails.
dividuals are responsible for security 216. Fleet AirGunnery Unit, FAGU.
56. VF-26, Sundowners.
"Gclearance of any material before sub 217. F-8 Production List.
r,ml.ssl.on. ISBN 0-942612-19-1 57. VF-32, Swordsmen.
63. VF-33, Tarsiers. FRONT COVER, 1958 silk painting of
I~Steve Ginter, 1754 Warfield Cir., Simi
64. VF-43. LTJG W. J. MioHel's F8U-1 over mount
Valley, California 93063
65. VF-51,Screaming Eagles. Fuji. INSIDEFRONTCOVER: VF-53 F-8J
,I-,
-.&Allrights reserved. Nopartofthispublica 74. VF-53, Iron Angels. 149195aboardthe Bon Homme Richard
in 10-70. (Barry Miller); VF-84 F8U-2
JI.<:? tion may be reproduced, stored in a 82. VF-62, Boomerangs. aboard the Independence on 9-24-59.
retrievalsystem, ortransmittedin anyform 87. VFP-63, Eyes Of The Fleet.
(USN); VF-103 F-8Caboard the Forrest- ..
~ by any means electronic, mechanical or 90. VSF-76, Fighting Saints.
al in 5-64. (USN); VF-162 149710 F-8H
~ otherwise withoutthe writtenpermissionof 91. VF-84, Vagabonds / Jolly ROgers.
aboard t)l.9 S.hangri-La in 6-70. (Barry
thepublisher. 1990 Steve Ginter 94. VT-86, Sabre Hawks. Mf1Ml1)
2
SOUTHEAST ASIAN EMPLOYMENT OF THE F-8E, 1968
A.) AIR WING F-8 STRIKE TACTICS tate scheduling. The armament west of Vinh Son (18°5TN/105-55E).
configuration as reflected above was The barrier concept was also em
The F-8was used as afighter and used almost exclusively. Great em ployed when hard targets were not
as a bomber. The primary mission phasis was placed on ground and assigned to the strike aircraft and
however, was assigned to air superi flight checking of the missile and gun several sections were conducting
ority and daily mission scheduling system. A missile maximum detection recce missions over various routes
reflected this priority. Attack missions range test was completed on all hops and asingle F-8 sectionwas unableto
were assigned only after all fighter and records maintained on each air provide close escort for all strike
commitments had been met. The or craft to reflect the status ofthe missile aircraft.
der for priority of mission assignment and aircraft armament system. Aircraft After all aircraft were feet wet
was asfollows: guns were fired out on a scheduled TARCAP rendezvoused with assigned
1.) COMBAT basis and preventive maintenance tanker aircraft (usually the EKA-3B
a.) BARCAP &Condition CAP conductedto keepthem in good order. assigned the dual role of ECM/tanker,
b.) TARCAP, MiGCAP, and The APQ-94 reliability was high and otherwise a KA-4), refueled to a mi
FORCE CAP. routine BARCAP/FORCECAP Tactics numum of 4500 Ibs. and checked in
c.) Armed weather recce and were predicated on its utilization. with the MiGCAP control ship for as
pointtarget bombing. 1.) SPECIFIC FIGHTER TAC signment as MiGCAP.
2.) COMBAT SUPPORT TICS. Every attempt was made to b.) BARCAP.
a.) Photo escort. utilize standard doctrine. Daylight op 1.) Mission. The mission of
b.) Logistics. erations stressed visual lookout and the BARCAP is the protection of all
night operations stressed the utiliza friendlyforces overthe Gulf ofTonkin.
B.) AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION tion ofthe radar and mutual protection Red Crown was the primary control
FOR MISSIONS ASSIGNED ARE measures. ship for BARCAP on UHF button 14,
STATED BELOW:
a.) TARCAP. Fighter aircraftwere frequency 281.9 MHZ. Station assign
assigned to'accompany all strikes ment subsequent to the termination of
MISSION ORDNANCE
which proceeded North of 18°40'N bombing North of 190 N is 050 radial
1.) DayTARCAP, BAR 2AIM-9D
during daylight hours. The TARCAP 20-60 miles from TACAN channel 26
CAP, MiGCAP, FORCE
rendezvoused with the strike group located on the PIRAZ ship at 19°37'N
CAP PHOTO ESCORT.
normally at Hon Mat Island at an alti 106°4TE. BARCAP's were never as
2.) Night FORCECAP, 1AIM-9D
tude of 14-18,000feet and proceeded signed additional missions, were
BARCAP, MiGCAP. 1AIM-9C
with the strike group to the target, normallykeptfeet wet, andwere notto
3.) Armed Reece/Coastal 4 LAU-10
maintaining close escort throughout be usedfor intercepts of MiG'sthat did
Reece (download to two 4MK-82
the ingress and egress phase of the not threaten surface forces orsupport
LAU-10 when wind over
strike. Standard operating procedure aircraft overthe Gulf ofTonkin.
deckis 30 kts or less)
provided for elements of the strike Occasionally the BARCAP station
4.) Weather Reece Night 2AIM-9D
group to separate and conduct recon was expanded so that special mission
Day forecast good weather 2 LAU-10
of prescribed highway/waterway seg Air Force flights (in particular COM
Dayforecast bad weather 2/4AIM-9D
ments after completing initial strikes BAT APPLE) were provided close
5.) Strike. 4MK-82
against Traffic Control Points (TCP). escort atthe northeastern extremityof
6 MK-81
TARCAP was provided for all ele theirtracks. This placed the BARCAP
2MK-83
ments operating North of 18°40'N up to 110 miles on the 065 radial of
6.) Flak Suppression 4 CBU-24
specifically providing protection channel 26.
4 LAU-10
against "pop up" enemy aircraft oper 2.) PROCEDURES. BARCAP
6 MK-81
ating inthe same general locale. Upon were launchedfirst and recovered last
4 MK-117
completion of initial TARCAP assign due to the nature of their mission. An
4 MK-82
ment and after all strike aircraft were expeditious rendezvous was required
feet wet, the fighters joined the Iron regardless of weather conditions in
C.) FIGHTER TACTICS
Hand and RESCAP attack aircraft and order to effect an early on-station re
provided close escort during their lief. Rules required that the relieving
The basic loose deuce formation
recce phase orestablished abarrierin CAP must be North 01°19 15'N, under
stressing section integrity was used
the general locale of recce operations. radar control and positive radio com
for all fighter roles. Squadron flight
Since CVW-5 was assigned the municationwith Red Crown before the
schedules reflected the practice offly
Northern Traffic Control Area (TCA) on-station section could proceed to
ing "teams" on all hops. The squadron
this TARCAP barrier was generally ward homeplate. When relief was
tactical organization was utilized and
oriented roughly parallel to 19°N and effected, the off-going section re
rare exceptions were noted wherein
flown between the coast at Phu Dien turned to homeplate as expeditiously
individual sections were split to facili-
Chau (1goN) and the Song Ca north- as possible using section random
3
radar letdown if the weather did not train GCI controllers and keep pilots 19°N, the MiGCAP would be vectored
allowforCase Irecovery. current on AI techniques and termi immediately toward a position to en
Tanking was provided for all nology. Night FOPCECAP commit gage. Whenever there was a second
BARCAP hops. Normally, one KA-4 mentswere utilizedto best advantage section of fighters available, they
was provided and 1500 lbs. of fuel in the training ofcontrollers and in pilot would be vectored into a3-4 mile trail
was given to each fighter midway refresher hops. position on the lead aircraft.
through the cycle. Bingo fuel states d.) MiGCAP.One section of fight TACTICS. The loose deuce sec
were considered when tanking was ers was assigned as MiGCAP during tion was used·exclusively and all
not available or an undue delay was any cycle when strike aircraft were available fighters were vectored in
experienced in on-station relief. operating north of 18°40'N. The MiG pairs toward the engagement area.
Section loose deuce formation CAP would be placed under the Run-in altitudes were kept as low as
was used exclusively during daylight control of the strike support ship possible, 1000-1500 feet, to remain
VFR conditions. Night or IFR forma (SSS). They would hold "feet wet" at belowthe enemy radar screen. Run-in
tions were normally 4-5 mile radar an altitude of 20-25,000 and maintain
trail, or close tactical wing if the radar a barrier patrol oriented along the
was inoperative. Radio discipline was coastline adjacentto the operating ar
continuously monitored to eliminate ea. When the MiG threat developed
the divulgence of importanttactical in and MiGs had penetrated south of
formation to enemy electronic sys
A VF-211 F-8E is being positioned on
tems. Fuel states and steer times the starboard catapUlt ofthe USS Han
were always given using the base al cock (CVA-19) prior to an armed recce
titude code of the day. Information mission. 4 LAU-10 Zuni launchers are
concerning the status of weapons loaded on the"y"fuselage racks.(USN)
system, missile system orgun system
was relayed either by hand signals or
by KY-28 cipher.
The BARCAP was occasionally
double cycled to maintain constant
coverage on station. In order to
achieve realistic utilization of the
BARCAP under these situations, a
minimum of 5000 lbs. of fuel per F-8
was required. In all cases, but partic
ularly at night; stringent fuel man
agement was observed with trade-off
between maximum endurance and
high performance. An average fuel
flow of 3000 pounds per hour (PPH)
while on-station provided the compro
mise. It was policy to always com
pletelyfill aircraftwith liquid oxygenfor
each launch, thus being ready for a
double cycle.
BARCAP flying, by its nature, is
hours and hours of pure boredom in
terspersed with moments of sheer
exhilaration orterror. Pilots were con
tinually reminded not to get com
placent during the hours of boredom
or careless during the exhilaration
phase as Ho's boys were constantly
figuring outways to bag you.
c.) FORCECAP. The mission of
FORCECAP was similar to BARCAP
except the assigned control ship
varied each day. Each carrierwas as
signed daily FORCECAP missions
and information concerning the con
trolling unit. Whenever possible,
FORCECAP hops were utilized to
4
speed was maintained between endeavorto give agood set-up on the USS Oriskany (CVA-34) based F·8E
550-600 kts. When engaged, maxi MiGs, speGifically, put our CAP be zooms toward Tiger Island, off the
mum lookout doctrinewas required as tween 3 and 9 o'clock 1-3 miles aft of coast of North Vietnam. Tiger Island
was a transfer point for supplies from
anytime there were MiGs at twelve the MiGs. In order to prosecute the
North Vietnam to the Viet Cong in the
o'clock there were also MiGs at six intercept with as little penetration as
south.(USN via BarryMiller)
o'clock. The AIM-9D missile per possible intothe area of operationsfor
formed approximately 60% satisfac our strike aircraft, the fighter must
torily when it was fired "in envelope". necessarily be vectored toward the tively reduced the area of friendly
Continued stress was placed on enemy aircraft. However, to reduce fighteroperations by one half.
knowing the envelope of the missile the probability of allowing a second The necessity for continuing the
and setting up the shooting situation enemy fighter section to be vectored intercept vector to engagement with
correctly in order to get a kill. Maxi to the six o'clock position of friendly out regard to "boundaries", ratherthan
mum use was made of the VHF fighters and to enhance ourcapability making an initial thrust toward the en
jamming capabilities of the EA-6A and of cutting the enemy off from sure re emy aircraft and turning away cannot
the EKA-3Bfrom aposition just offthe treat to the north of 19°, the intercept be overemphasized. A "break-off"turn
beach. vector was delayed until such action at distances less than eighteen miles
The fighter pilots aggressively will make these eventualities more will prove fatal to the friendlyfighters.
went after the MiGs avoiding any certain. A second MiGCAP section Close liaison with the controlling
known SAM or flak trap enroute. The under a separate controller could be ship (SSS) was maintained through
most successful attacks were high used to guard the six o'clock of the prebriefed tactics and extensive de
speed slashing attacks keeping speed first MiGCAP section by trailing at ap briefs of the engagements. This
high and at all times maintaining the proximately five miles. Experience liaison and the subsequent under
criteriafor offensive maneuvering. showed that controllers had difficulty standing of the problems associated
CONTROL PROCEDURES. The in holding a second MiGCAP section with fighter engagements as regards
environmentwhich surroundsthe U.S. in this optimum position and that usu fuel and tanking requirements, clear
fighter pilot, Le., over enemy territory, ally the vector to intercept presented ing six o'clock and positioning F-B
vectored against a superior enemy friendly fighters atthe twelve o'clockof fighters for visual acquisition were
GCI system, SAM, and AAA threat, at least one section of enemy fighters meaningful in attempting to prosecute
and an equally aggressive enemy even though the lead section of desired tactics. This liaison empha
fighter pilot, requires the ultimate co friendly fighters was able to gain an sized the importance of feeding all
ordination between the controller and immediate offensive. The MiGs and known information regarding bandits
the pilot. CAP aircraft must be given their controllers appeared to aim for from any sourceto engaging fighters.
positive vectors to interceptthe MiGs. this sandwiching tactic, knowing that Superiority of numbers was not
The controller must assume aggres theywere favorably set upfor it with a achieved by the combination of MiG
sive, positive control and must sanctuary to the north which effec- 17s and 21s at any time. On several
5
occasions sections of MiGs were held mendations on the execution of strike mission.
on friendly radars trailing egressing flights into his assigned area of re g.) IRONHAND ESCORT. The
F-8s. Whenever possible, additional sponsibility. Ordnance was expended practice of escorting Ironhand config
fresh fighters with sufficient fuel and on assigned point targets ortargets of ured A-4s with F-8 fighters was
armament should be positioned to opportunity. With the advent of good utilized to release more A-4 aircraftfor
provide cover for disengaging fighters weather in the target areas, Weather primary strike missions when the re
who will be low on fuel and ammuni Recce missions were combined with quirements existed. This provided
tion. Tankers were held as close as TARCAP missions in fighter config additional visual lookout protection to
possible to the beach and vectored ured aircraft. Weather information and
toward spent fighters to expedite recommendations were passed back VF-211 F-8J, updated F-8E, flying sur·
fueling. to the force either prior to orfollowing veillance over a Chinese Communist
e.) PHOTO ESCORT. The mis escort of strike aircraft on their Hung Chi classmerchantship.(USN)
sion was performed using a fighter
configured aircraft as escort to the
RF-8G. Typical profile of the mission
was a climb to 15,000' to 20,000',
rendezvous, and then proceed to the
coc;st-in point using the mapping scale
ofthe APQ-94for accurate positioning
in event of bad weather. Most mis
sions were flown between 5,000 and
6,000 feet with the F-8 flying a loose
deuce position. It is important to em
phasize staying away from the trail
position on the RF-8G as any under
lead by enemy gunners would put the
escort in the line of fire. The escort is
assigned the responsibility of calling
allflak, SAM's, and breakturns as the
photo pilot is normally occupied with
navigation and photography. Since
mostphotographic runs were made at
500 to 600 kts., the escort often re
quired tanking upon going feet wet. A
typical profile would require tanking of
1,000 to 1,500 Ibs. in order to meet a
1+30 time cycle. The primary mission
ofthe escort in countering an airthreat
is defensive in nature and the fighter
must remain with the photo Crusader
unless he is required to separate in
orderto prevent attack.
f.) ARMED RECCE/WEATHER
REeCE. All armed/weather recce
flights were conducted on an "as
needed" basis. CTF-77 established
the basic weather recce requirements
for each carrier and these flights were
assignedto the fighter squadrons. The
aircraft were configured to carry either
2LAU-10or4 MK-82 so asto perform
an effective armed coastal recce mis
sion while satisfying the requirements
of weather reporting. Specific require
ments for weather reporting were
assigned by Strike Center prior to
launch. The pilot was normally re
quiredto relaythe weatherbackto the
ship at the earliest opportunity and, in
addition, be prepared to make recom-
6
the pouncer aircraft and provided
fighter cover when conducting pounc
er missions in a MiG threat area. The
responsibilities on the F-8 escortwere
to provide additional electronic pro
tection to the Ironhand aircraft by
continuously maintaining the two
plane ALFA formation. The fighter es
cort assumed the leader was always
"on the gages" and called out all flak,
SAMs, MiGs and even friendly aircraft
that posed a threat to the section.
Should an engagement with enemy
aircraft become inevitable, the Iron
hand leaderwould pass the leadto the
F-8 fighter escort. The fighter would
maneuverto defeat the attack as soon
as possible and then resume the pri
VF-111 F-8D147056firing aZuni over Vietnam in 1965,while attachedto Midway.
mary mission of providing cover for
the SAM suppressor. The tactical ma
neuvering performed by the F-8 must
stress defense against the MiG threat
as the F-8/A-4 were not compatible to
offensive tactical maneuvering. Of pri
mary importance, however, is that the
strike force will be without needed
protection until the pouncer section
can reassume its primary mission of
SAM suppression.
h.) BOMBER ROLE. The basic
delivery techniques for the F-8 strike
aircraft was a 45° dive angle with a
5,000 foot AGL release. F-8 bombers
were utilizedin South Vietnam or Laos
under FAC control. At the onset of
good weather in the North, the F-8s
were assigned point targets in areas
of responsibility after meeting all other
•
commitments. When the active MiG
threat South of 20°N commenced all
F-8 assets were utilized in the fighter
role.
D.) NORTH VIETNAMESE MiG
TACTICS sitioning, the MiG-17 penetrated 19°N VF-24 F-8J (updated F-8E) drops MK-83
heading generally 160-180 at 6-8,000 bombs in April 1972.(USN via B.Miller)
During the month of May and June, feet and about 550 kts. lAS. The performance to zoom up out of range
the tactical employmentofthe NVN air MiG-21s would leave their holding and proceed back north of 19°N.
defense system settled down into point and proceed southwest at low The MiG-17 seemed more willing
somewhat of a predictable pattern. altitude to the general area of Vinh to stay and fight. They were normally
When the MiG-17/21s were launched Son. The scheme apparently was to configured with drop tanks, and no
out of Bai Thuong, the composition close control the MiG-17 toward any missiles, and attacked with their can
was normally 2 MiG-17s and 2 friendly aircraft in the area to engage non. A MiG-17 engagement was
MiG-21s. The MiG-17s proceeded and to be bait for the low section of characterized by a high speed low al
south toward 19°Nat an airspeed of .5 MiG-21s. The attack technique used titude, turning fight utilizing afterburner
IMN and aaltitude of 6-8,000feet. The by the MiG-21 was to gain a position to the maximum by both F-8s and
MiG-21sproceededwest to the border below and behind the friendly aircraft. MiGs. The MiG pilots seemed ag
of NVN and Laos and then south to a Fromthis attack position, the MiG-21s gressive, but were reluctant to utilize
holding point located generally at would execute one missile firing pass, their aircraft to its full advantage orto
19°08'N/104°50'E. Fromthis initial po- disengage and use their airspeed and enterinto vertical maneuvers.
7
F-8 VIETNAM DATA
VIETNAM F-8 FIGHTER SQUADRON CARRIER DEPLOYMENTS
CVW·2 CVW-19
03-06-65to 11-23-65 VF-111 F-8D 4XXlNE MIDWAY 01-28-64to 11-21-64 VF-191 F-8E 1XXlNM BON HOMMERICHARD
CVW-5 VF-194 F-8C 2XX/NM
04-14-64to 12-15-64 VF-51 F-8E 1XX/NF TICONDEROGA 04-21-65to01-13-66 VF-191 F-8E 1XXlNM BON HOMMERICHARD
VF-53 F-8E 2XX/NF VF-194 F-8E 2XX/NM
09-28-65to05-13-66 VF-51 F-8E 1XX/NF TICONDEROGA 10-15-66to05-29-67 VF-191 F-8E 1XX/NM TICONDEROGA
VF-53 F-8E 2XX/NF VF-194 F-8E 2XX/NM
01-05-67to07-22-67 VF-51 F-8E 1XXlNF HANCOCK 12-27-67to08-17-68 VF-191 F-8E 1XX/NM TICONDEROGA
VF-53 F-8E 2XX/NF VF-194 F-8E 2XXlNM
01-27-68to 10-10-68 VF-51 F-8H 1XXlNF BON HOMMERICHARD 04-16-69to 11-17-69 VF-191 F-8J 1XXINM ORISKANY
VF-53 F-8E 2XX/NF VF-194 F-8J 2XX/NM
03-18-69to 10-29-69 VF-51 F-8J 1XXlNF BON HOMMERICHARD 05-14-70to 12-10-70 VF-191 F-8J 1XXINM ORISKANY
VF-53 F-8J 2XX/NF VF-194 F-8J 2XXlNM
04-02-70to 11-12-70 VF-51 F-8J 1XXlNF BON HOMMERICHARD 05-14-71 to 12-18-71 VF-191 F-8J 1XXlNM ORISKANY
VF-53 F-8J 2XXlNF VF-194 F-8J 2XX/NM
CVW-B 06-05-72to03-30-73 VF-191 F-8J 1XX/NM ORISKANY
03-05-70to 12-17-70 VF-111 F-8H 1XXlAJ SHANGRI-LA VF-194 F-8J 2XX/NM
VF-162 F-8H 2XXlAJ CVW-21
CVW-10 10-21-64to05-29-65 VF-24 F-8C 4XX/NP HANCOCK
05-11-67to 12-30-67 VF-111 F-8C 1XX/AK INTREPID VF-211 F-8E 1XXlNP
DET 11 11-10-65to08-01-66 VF-24 F-8C 4XX/NP HANCOCK
06-04-68to02-08-69 VF-111 F-8C 1XX/AK INTREPID VF-211 F-8E 1XXlNP
DET 11 01-26-67to08-25-67 VF-24 F-8C 4XX/NP BON HOMMERICHARD
CVW-15 VF-211 F-8E 1XX/NP
12-07-64to 11-01-65 VF-154 F-8D 4XX/NL CORALSEA 07-18-68to03-03-69 VF-24 F-8H 4XX/NP HANCOCK
CVW-16 VMF(AW) VF-211 F-8H 1XX/NP
04-05-65to 12-16-65 -212 F-8E 1XXlWD ORISKANY 08-02-69to04-15-70 VF-24 F-8H 2XX/NP HANCOCK
VF-162 F-8E 2XX/AH VF-211 F-8J 1XXlNP
05-26-66to 11-16-66 VF-111 F-8E 1XXlAH ORISKANY 10-22-70to06-02-71 VF-24 F-8J 2XXlNP HANCOCK
VF-162 F-8E 2XX/AH VF-211 F-8J 1XXlNP
06-16-67to01-31-68 VF-111 F-8C 1XXlAH ORISKANY 01-07-72to 10-03-72 VF-24 F-8J 2XX/NP HANCOCK
VF-162 F-8E 2XXlAH VF-211 F-8J 1XX/NP
02-01-69to09-18-69 VF-111 F-8H 1XX/AH TICONDEROGA 05-08-73to01-08-74 VF-24 F-8J 2XX/NP HANCOCK
VF-162 F-8J 2XX/AH VF-211 F-8H 1XX/NP
MIG KILLS
PILOT & SQUADRON & DATE AIRCRAFT, WEAPON & CARRIER
CDR. Harold L. Marr, VF-211, 6-12-66 F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS HANCOCK
LT. Eugene J. Chancy, VF-211, 6-21-66 F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9/20-mm, USS HANCOCK
L1. (JG) Phillip V. Vampatella, VF-211, 6-21-66 F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS HANCOCK
CDR. Richard M. Bellinger, VF-162, 10-9-66 F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS ORISKANY
CDR. Marshall O. Wright, VF-211, 5-1-67 F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
CDR. Paul H. Speer, VF-211, 5-19-67 F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
LT. (JG) Joseph M. Shea, VF-211, 5-19-67 F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
LT. CDR. Bobby C. Lee, VF-24, 5-19-67 F-8C/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
L1. Phillip R. Wood, VF-24, 5-19-67 F-8C/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
LT. ODR. Marion H. Isaacks, VF-24, 7-21-67 F-8C!MiG-17, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
LT. CDR. Robert L. Kirkwood, VF-24, 7-21-67 F-8C/MiG-17, 20-mm, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
LT. CDR. Ray G. Hubbard, Jr., VF-211, 7-21-67 F-8E/MiG-17, Zuni/20-mm, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
LT. Richard E. Wymall, VF-162, 12-14-67 F-8E(MiG-17, AIM-9, USS ORISKANY
CDR. Lowell R. Myers, VF-51, 6-26-68 F-8H/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
LT. CDR. John B. Nichols, VF-1~1, 7-9-68 F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9/20-mm, USS TICONDEROGA
CDR. Guy Cane, VF-53, 7-29-68 F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
LT. Norman K. McCoy, Jr., VF-51, 8-1-68 F-8H/MiG-21, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
L1. Anthony J. Nargi, VF-111, 9-19-68 F-8C/MiG-21, AIM-9, USS INTREPID
Two probables were scored: Two probableswere scored:
CDR. Harold L. Marr, VF-211, 6-12-66 F-8E/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS HANCOCK
LT. (JG) Phil Dempewolf, VF-24, 7-21-67 F-8C/MiG-17, AIM-9, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
Note: Five F-8C's eleven F-8E's and two F-8H's gotthese eighteen official MiG Kills. VF-211 got 7,
VF-24got4, VF-51 andVF-162 got 2each and VF-53, VF-111 and VF-191 got 1each.
An unofficial MiG kill occured 23 may 1972when an F-8J from VF-211 on boardthe USS HANCOCK
downed a MiG-17 withoutfiring ashot.
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FLEET UTILITY SQUADRON ONE, VU-1 UNIQUE ANTIQUERS I
VU-1 was originally commis Island was home forthe entire squad
sioned as VJ-1 on 5 October 1925 at ron. Afterthe Pearl Harborattackon 7
NAS San Diego. The squadron December 1941 VJ-1 provided utility
fulfilled the missions of aerial photog servicesthroughout the Pacific.
raphy, simulated attacks, target
towing and aerial and anti-aircraft On 31 July 1944 the squadron
moved to NAS Moffett Field, Califor
gunnery training. The squadron also
nia, where it was redesignated Utility
participated inthe Alaskan Aerial Sur
Squadron One (VU-1) on 15 Novem
veys of 1926 and 1934.
ber 1946. Then on 30 April 1949VU-1
was decommissioned.
In September 1939, a VJ-1 de
tachment moved to Ford Island, Pearl
VU-1 was re-established at NAS
Harbor, Hawaii. By June 1940 Ford
Barbers Point, Hawaii, on 20 July
1951 where the squadron provided
fleet utility services until redesignated
Fleet Composite Squadron One
(VC-1) on 1July 1965.
~
VU-1 F8U-1 145383 at NAS Point Mugu
on 10-21-62. Wide tail stripe and wing
tip stripewere red. (Swisher)
Five F-8Asand three DF-8Asfrom VU-1
flyoverthe Pacific in 1964,note red tail
and wing tips and location of the wing
codes. (StanWyckoff)
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