Virtual Selves, Real Persons: A Dialogue across Disciplines

347 Pages·2009·2.28 MB·English

by  Richard S. Hallam

V irtual Selves, Real Persons
H ow do we know and understand who we really are as human beings?
The concept of ‘the self’ is central to many strands of psychology
and philosophy. This book tackles the problem of how to define per-
sons and selves and discusses the ways in which different disciplines,
such as biology, sociology and philosophy, have dealt with this topic.
Richard S. Hallam examines the notion that the idea of the self as
some sort of entity is a human construction and, in effect, a virtual
reality. At the same time, this virtual self is intimately related to the
reality of ourselves as biological organisms. Aiming to integrate a con-
structionist understanding of self with the universalising assumptions
that are needed in natural science approaches, this text is unique in
its attempt to create a dialogue across academic disciplines, while
retaining a consistent perspective on the problem of relating nature
to culture.
R ichard S. Hallam is Visiting Professor of Psychology at the Univer-
sity of Greenwich. His career has combined teaching, research and
professional practice in clinical psychology, and he is the author of
C ounselling for Anxiety Problems (1992) and Anxiety: Psychological Per-
spectives on Panic and Agoraphobia (1985).
V irtual Selves, Real Persons
A Dialogue across Disciplines
R ichard S. H allam
C A M B R I D G E U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S
C ambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi
C ambridge University Press
T he Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK
P ublished in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
w ww.cambridge.org
I nformation on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521509893
© R ichard S. Hallam 2009
T his publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
F irst published 2009
P rinted in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
L ibrary of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
Hallam, Richard S.
Virtual selves, real persons : a dialogue across disciplines / Richard S. Hallam.
p. cm.
ISBN 978-0-521-50989-3 (hardback) 1. Self. I. Title.
[DNLM: 1. Self Concept. 2. Self Psychology. BF 697 H182v 2009]
BF697.H2347 2009
126–dc22
2009009883
I SBN 9 78-0-521-50989-3 hardback
C ambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or
accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to
in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such
websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
C ontents
A cknowledgements page vi
P art I A constructionist framework for person and self
1 T he main themes: virtual selves, mind–body
dualism and natural science 3
2 C onceptualising self 21
3 G eneric persons and selves 55
4 M ultiplicity within singularity 78
5 S ense-of-self: the first-person perspective 94
6 S elf in historical explanation 111
7 S elf as historically positioned and narrated 121
P art II P erson and self in science
8 P hilosophy’s legacy to a science of self 145
9 S elf in mind and brain 159
1 0 S elf, person as agent and natural causation 191
1 1 S elf in child development 215
1 2 S elf in human evolution 231
1 3 L oose ends and split hairs 267
B ibliography 314
I ndex 331
v
A cknowledgements
I am grateful to everyone who commented, or promised to comment,
on sections of the manuscript including Mike Bender, Sophie Hallam,
Chris Lee and Clare Penney. A special thanks to Mary Boyle, Roger
Marsden, Kieron O’Connor and Graham Richards who all helped me
to raise my game. Finally, I would like to pay tribute to Ted Sarbin who
was an inspiration to so many.
vi
Part I
A constructionist framework
for person and self
For I tried to expose the falsity or uncertainty of the propositions
I was examining by clear and certain arguments [ … ] and I never
encountered any proposition so doubtful that I could not draw from it
some quite certain conclusion, if only the conclusion that it contained
nothing certain.
Réne Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes
(Cambridge University Press 1985)
1 T he main themes : v irtual selves,
mind–body dualism and natural science
T here is nothing more intriguing than one’s own ‘self’. Yet there is also
nothing more opaque than the process of reflecting on self. It is a famil-
iar mental activity, sometimes involving great effort. But whether this
effort produces results is uncertain. Long deliberation may be followed
by an impulse to act that flies in the face of one’s own good counsel.
Despite doubts of this nature, most people who reflect on the matter
have a strong desire to be in charge of themselves, however difficult the
task and uncertain the outcome. Self, in western society, has become
a central idea. It is the focus of an endless number of popular and aca-
demic books. Since the seventeenth century, it has become attached as
a prefix to an increasing number of words, such as self-esteem. In sum,
self is central to our beliefs, and in this important area of our life we do
not want to be led – by authority, dogma, or false prophets. It is a jour-
ney we take alone whether or not we find ourselves surrendering control
to others. It is widely supposed that we have to find ourselves.
T he theme running through this book is that our common-sense
idea of self as some sort of entity is a human construction, in effect, a
virtual reality. This perspective is by no means original. Berrios and
Marková ( 2003: 9) interpret St Augustine (354–430) as meaning by
self ‘a metaphorical or virtual space within which theological models
of responsibility, guilt and sin could be played out’. Over the centur-
ies, however, belief in the existence of the self as an entity has become
firmly entrenched, and it is an integral part of our view of the cosmos.
The point of stressing that self is a human construction is to suggest
that, as an idea, it is not inevitable. I will view it as a feature of the his-
torical and cultural circumstances in which we live. As such, it is closely
related to concepts of the person. However, I will also be arguing for
the biological reality of persons and the need to reconcile scientific with
folk perspectives.
T his topic is such a slippery one conceptually that I will try to be
clear and consistent in my use of terms. I will refer to our intimate
knowledge of self as the ‘sense-of-self’. This is what we feel and know
3