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305 Pages·2012·2.29 MB·English

Abstract  
This  dissertation  raises  a  question  regarding  the  relationship  between  the  
condition  of  the  body,  moral  virtue,  and  human  flourishing.  Our  main  objective  is  
to  reconstruct  Aquinas’s  theological  understanding  of  corporeal  infirmity  in  order  
to   depict,   in   broad   outline,   a   Thomistic   theology   of   disability   and   cognitive  
impairment.   A   prominent   concern   in   this   investigation   is   to   understand,  
according  to  Aquinas,  the  significance  of  the  body  in  the  perfection  of  human  
activity  towards  the  realization  of  our  natural  and  supernatural  end,  as  well  as  the  
implications  of  Aquinas’s  view  with  respect  to  persons  who  have  a  profound  and  
utterly  debilitating  cognitive  impairment.  
Remarks  on  disability  and  impairment  are  found  throughout  Aquinas’s  
Summa  Theologica  and  his  treatise  De  Malo.  Although  Aquinas  did  not  compose  an  
ex  professo  theological  tract  on  ‘disability,’  the  integral  and  systematic  character  of  
what  he  says  about  these  matters  implicates  the  whole  of  his  thought  and,  in  
particular,  his  moral  theology.  In  his  Summa,  Aquinas  brings  together  careful  
scriptural  exegesis,  patristic  and  medieval  sources,  as  well  as  the  best  philosophy  
of  his  day.  The  result,  with  respect  to  our  theological  understanding  of  corporeal  
infirmity,   is   an   innovative   and   far-­‐‑reaching   depiction   of   a   properly   Christian  
understanding  of  these  matters.    
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In  the  experience  of  corporeal  infirmity,  we  are  confronted  with  a  question  
that  pertains  directly  to  the  proper  object  of  moral  theology.1  Regrettably,  there  
remains  a  notable  lacuna  in  contemporary  Aquinas  studies  and  Thomistic  moral  
theology  on  the  topics  of  disability  and  cognitive  impairment.  In  particular,  the  
vulnerability  of  human  beings  to  the  evil  (malum  poenae)  of  corporeal  infirmity  
and  the  moral  significance  of  profound  affliction  has  received  very  little  attention.  
We  intend  that  the  interpretive  work  of  this  investigation  in  the  theology  and  
philosophy  of  Aquinas  will  help  address  that  lacuna.  
We  can  describe  the  relevance  of  this  project  to  the  work  of  Thomistic  
moral  theology  in  stronger  terms.  Aristotle’s  great  insight  was  to  understand  that  
any  description  of  the  good  life  and  the  happy  life  of  the  human  being  cannot  be  
separated  from  an  account  of  how  that  life  is  possible  for  the  kind  of  beings  that  
we   are,   i.e.,   the   biological   constitution   of   the   rational   animal.   Aquinas  
appropriated  that  Aristotelian  thesis  and  revised  it  in  the  light  of  the  Christian  
doctrine  of  creation.  So  conceived,  integral  to  moral  reasoning  in  the  Thomistic  

1  For  Aquinas,  the  question  of  happiness  is  the  principle  concern  of  all  morality.  To  be  happy  
is  to  live  a  good  life,  which  is  the  life  of  moral  virtue.  Affirming  that  basic  judgment,  Servais  
Pinckaers,  O.P.,  remarks  that  “if  the  idea  of  happiness  is  the  initial  consideration  in  moral  
theology,  the  place  of  suffering  will  be  obvious,  for  it  is  precisely  the  reverse  of  happiness.  
Suffering  will  then  be  an  element  of  moral  theology  from  the  very  start…[the]  banishment  of  
the  consideration  of  suffering  from  ethics  is  an  outgrowth  of  a  rationalistic  conception  of  the  
human  person.”  Servais  Pinckaers,  The  Sources  of  Christian  Ethics  (Washington,  D.C.:  Catholic  
University  of  America  Press,  1995),  25.  
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theological   tradition   is   the   ability   to   account   for   how   faithful   discipleship,  
Christoformic  virtue,  and  cruciform  love  are  possible  for  the  kind  of  beings  that  
we  are,  i.e.,  our  creaturely  constitution:  mortal  rational  animals  made  in  the  image  
of  God.    
Moreover—and  here  are  the  stronger  terms  mentioned  above—no  moral  
theology  can  pretend  to  any  measure  of  seriousness  if  it  does  not  account  for  how  
discipleship,  Christoformic  virtue,  and  cruciform  love  is  possible  for  the  created  
rational   animal   while   contingently   and   unequally   bearing   the   corporeal   wounds   of  
original  sin.  Specifically,  grace  restores  and  heals  what  was  lost  at  the  fall  (original  
justice),  but  baptism  does  not  immediately  heal  the  wounds  of  original  sin  in  our  
bodies  (our  trust  in  Christ  entails  the  hope  of  bodily  resurrection).  Yet,  Christ  calls  
us  to  discipleship,  virtue,  and  love  as  we  await  the  restoration  and  healing  of  our  
wounded  bodies  in  the  consummation  of  glory.  On  this  understanding  of  the  
human  predicament,  our  present  concern  is  to  provide  a  theological  account  of  
what  it  means  for  the  created  rational  animal  to  flourish  with  respect  to  its  natural  
and  supernatural  ends,  even  as  it  continues  to  bear  the  corporeal  wounds  of  
original  sin.    
The  four  chapters  of  this  dissertation  are  divided  into  two  parts.  Part  1  
(chapters   2   and   3)   is   concerned   with   Aquinas’s   understanding   of   the   first  
perfection  or  creaturely  integrity  of  the  human  being.  The  objective  is  to  depict  
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Aquinas’s  account  of  the  human  being  by  showing  how  he  made  use  of  Aristotle  
and  Augustine.  Towards  that  end,  chapter  2  focuses  on  Aristotle’s  metaphysical  
biology   and   his   account   of   human   defect;   Aquinas’s   Augustinian   doctrine   of  
creation;  and  Aquinas’s  appropriation  and  subversion  of  Aristotle’s  account  of  
‘defective   human   beings.’   Of   particular   importance   in   chapter   2   is   Aquinas’s  
engagement  with  the  forms  of  irrational  human  behavior  described  in  Aristotle’s  
Nicomachean  Ethics  and  Aristotle’s  theory  of  natural  slavery  outlined  in  Book  1  of  
the  Politics  (i.e.,  despotic  rule  over  an  essentially  defective  human  being  who  is  
incapable  of  discursive  reasoning).    
Special  attention  is  given  to  the  precise  metaphysical  defect  of  the  ‘slave  by  
nature,’  as  distinct  from  other  forms  of  human  defect  on  Aristotle’s  terms.  We  
show  how  Aquinas  subverts  Aristotle’s  notion  of  natural  slavery  (by  rejecting  the  
possibility   of   essential   defect),   while   revising   Aristotle’s   phenomenological  
description  of  the  natural  slave’s  dispositional  dependency  under  the  moral  logic  
of   merciful   care   for   vulnerable   and   dependent   persons.   Specifically,   Aquinas  
stipulates   the   moral   imperative   to   counsel   and   protect   human   beings   who  
variously  and  unequally  ‘lack  the  use  of  reason’  due  to  an  extraordinary  injury  of  
the  cognitive  faculties.    
In  chapter  3  we  focus  on  Augustine’s  account  of  the  image  of  God  and  the  
mind   (mens);   Aquinas’s   appropriation   and   development   of   Augustine   on   the  
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activity  of  the  imago  trinitatis;  Aquinas’s  understanding  of  the  rational  soul  as  the  
substantial  form  of  the  body;  and  the  incorruptible  aptitude  of  the  rational  soul  to  
image  God  by  knowledge  and  by  love.    
Part  2  (chapters  4  and  5)  treats  Aquinas’s  understanding  of  the  second  
perfection  or  orderly  operation  of  the  human  being,  and  the  effects  of  original  sin  
upon  that  activity.  The  objective  is  to  depict  Aquinas’s  account  of  the  purpose  and  
perfection  of  the  human  being  and  to  do  so  by  showing  how  he  went  beyond  
Aristotle  and  Augustine.  Chapter  4  describes  Aquinas’s  understanding  of  the  
operational  limitations  unequally  experienced  by  particular  human  beings  as  a  
consequence  of  original  sin.  We  address,  according  to  Aquinas,  how  the  second  
perfection   of   the   human   being   in   operation   came   to   be   wounded,   and   we  
formulate  a  metaphysical  account  of  evil  suffered  (or  affliction).  From  that  basis,  a  
typological  sketch  of  corporeal  infirmity  and  cognitive  impairment  on  Aquinas’s  
terms   is   provided.   The   purpose   of   this   systematic   overview   is   to   reconstruct  
Aquinas’s  theology  of  disability  and  cognitive  impairment,  to  show  its  internal  
coherence,  and  to  indicate  points  of  significance  from  the  aspect  of  our  creaturely  
dignity  and  creaturely  destiny.    
Chapter  5  describes  how  those  who  ‘lack  the  use  of  reason’  participate  in  
the  sacramental  life  of  the  Church  (principally  through  Baptism  and  Eucharist).  In  
particular,   we   treat   Aquinas’s   understanding   of   the   condition   amentia  
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(‘mindlessness’),  where  a  person  ‘lacks  the  use  of  reason’  due  to  a  profound  and  
utterly  debilitating  impairment  of  particular  corporeal  and  cognitive  faculties.  We  
provide  an  account,  on  Aquinas’s  terms,  of  the  moral  implications  of  a  profound  
cognitive  impairment  on  the  order  of  amentia.  Our  interest  is  the  way  Christians  
afflicted  with  amentia  can,  on  Aquinas’s  view,  participate  in  the  life  of  the  Church  
and  live  the  virtues.    
Specifically,  just  as  the  acquired  virtues  dispose  and  enable  a  person  to  act  
in  accordance  with  the  light  of  natural  reason,  which  is  proportionate  to  human  
nature;   in   the   light   of   grace   and   consequent   of   baptism,   the   infused   virtues  
dispose  and  enable  a  person  to  act  in  a  ‘higher  manner’  and  toward  ‘higher  ends,’  
in   relation   to   a   ‘higher   nature’—which   is   our   progress   toward   the   perfect  
participation   of   the   blessed   in   the   divine   nature.   On   Aquinas’s   terms,   the  
consummation  of  grace  and  infusion  of  supernatural  virtue  at  baptism  can  be  
understood  to  capacitate  someone  who  completely  ‘lacks  the  use  of  reason’  with  
supernatural   knowledge   and   a   supernatural   principle   of   self-­‐‑movement.   So  
capacitated,  there  is  no  reason  to  deny  that  a  person  afflicted  with  an  amentia-­‐‑like  
condition  could  be  graced  to  realize  a  meritorious  magnanimity  in  knowledge  
and  love  of  God.    
Likewise,   on   Aquinas’s   terms,   there   is   good   reason   to   believe   that   in  
baptism  persons  with  profound  and  utterly  debilitating  cognitive  impairments  
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are   capacitated   for   Christian   friendship—even   as   they   remain   incapable   of  
performing  the  acts  ordinarily  associated  with  Christian  friendship.  That  is  to  say,  
although  profoundly  impaired,  through  baptism  a  person  with  an  amentia-­‐‑like  
condition  is  capable  of  the  kind  of  friendship  that  is  only  possible  for  creatures  
endowed  with  an  immortal  and  incorruptible  rational  soul.  It  is  a  friendship  
based  on  the  fellowship  of  our  deepest  happiness,  which  is  the  consummation  of  
grace;  where  our  creaturely  likeness  to  God  according  to  image  (by  knowledge  
and   by   love)   precedes   and   causes   a   supernatural   likeness   that   we   share   as  
members  of  the  Body  of  Christ.  
Beginning  with  a  thorough  description  of  the  human  being  and  corporeal  
infirmity,  on  Aquinas’s  terms,  and  in  light  of  his  main  influences,  it  is  possible  to  
reconstruct  his  account  of  cognitive  impairment  as  such,  its  moral  implications,  
and   the   moral   significance   of   profound   bodily   affliction   in   the   Christian  
understanding  of  the  good  life.  The  goal  is  to  bring  to  light  the  doctrinal  and  
moral   integrity   of   what   Aquinas   says   about   physical   disability   and   cognitive  
impairment—he   says   quite   a   lot—and,   subsequently,   to   make   reasonable  
inferences  on  those  matters  where  he  is  silent.    
Fate  is  not  destiny.  Saint  Thomas  Aquinas  helps  us  recognize  our  fate—we  
who  are  or  who  will  soon  become  weak,  disabled,  and  cognitively  impaired—in  
the  light  and  the  hope  of  the  Divine  consummation  of  nature,  grace,  and  glory.  He  
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