Values and the Reflective Point of View: On Expressivism, Self-knowledge and Agency

162 Pages·2006·1.51 MB·English

by  Robert Dunn

VALUES AND THE REFLECTIVE POINT OF VIEW
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Values and the Refl ective Point
of View
On Expressivism, Self-Knowledge and Agency
ROBERT DUNN
The University of Sydney, Australia
© Robert Dunn 2006
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording
or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
Robert Dunn name has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,
1988, to be identifi ed as the author of this work.
Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company
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Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Dunn, Robert
Values and the refl ective point of view : on expressivism,
self-knowledge and agency
1.Values 2.Refl ection (Philosophy) 3.Agent (Philosophy)
I.Title
121.8
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Dunn, Robert, 1949-
Values and the refl ective point of view : on expressivism, self-knowledge, and agency /
Robert Dunn.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 0-7546-5412-5 (hardback : alk. paper)
1. Values. 2. Practical reason. 3. Expressivism (Ethics) I. Title.
BD232.D798 2006
121’.8–dc22
2005034563
ISBN-13: 978-0-7546-5412-4
ISBN-10: 0-7546-5412-5
Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall.
Contents
Preface vii
Acknowledgments ix
1 Values and Refl ection 1
2 Moral Psychology and Expressivism 7
3 Self-knowledge, Truth and Value 37
4 Perverse Agency 61
5 Two Mistakes about Practical Reasoning 83
6 What’s Wrong with the Sensible Knave? 107
Appendix: Making Sense and Mental Partitions 133
Bibliography 143
Index 149
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Preface
I owe a special debt of thanks to two philosopher friends. The fi rst is André Gallois.
Over the years I have had the privilege of participating in many enjoyable and
searching discussions with André about the themes that I take up in the present essay.
This is especially so in the case of self-knowledge, the topic under consideration in
Chapter 3. I had the opportunity to talk over my ideas on self-knowledge and the
fi rst-person point of view with André as he was developing his own account – now
published as The World Without, The Mind Within. These discussions sharpened
my thinking about the issues, and my debt, in the present essay, to André’s way of
conceiving of the modes of self-knowledge will be evident.
The second philosopher and friend to whom I owe a special debt of thanks is
David Simpson. In innumerable conversations David has engaged with me about
almost every issue that I discuss in the present essay – as well as about many others.
These conversations have been invaluable and have kept the philosophy alive and
fun to pursue.
I would also like to pay tribute to the various authors whom I discuss. Their ideas,
and the arguments they advance for them, have largely shaped my preoccupations
in this discussion. I would especially like to note, in this connection, Simon
Blackburn’s work. Several years ago I wrote a book on weakness of will in which I
defended cognitivism about values – that is, the thesis that values are simply beliefs.
The present essay marks a change in view. It includes a defense of a version of
expressivism about values – with a focus on the moral psychology of the matter.
Blackburn in his writings, more than anyone, has persuaded me that expressivism
is the best naturalistic approach within the theory of value. This is something of a
heresy in some parts of the philosophical world in Australia.
In the period 2000–2004, Michael Smith invited me to attend several Moral
Psychology Workshops at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian
National University. I would like to thank Michael for the invitations and to register
the benefi t that I derived from these pleasant and stimulating occasions, which
coincided with the period during which I was writing the book. Of particular benefi t
was a Workshop where Michael Bratman conducted some seminars on his work on
identifi cation. The debt I owe to Bratman’s contribution to the theory of identifi cation
will be evident from Chapter 4.
Robert Dunn
Sydney, February 2006
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Acknowledgments
Permission to quote extracts from the following published material is gratefully
acknowledged: Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998); Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, ed. Onora
O’Neill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Michael Smith, The
Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), and J. David Velleman, The Possibility
of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Material from the following published articles by the author has been incorporated
into the present essay and is reproduced here with permission from the original
publishers: ‘Two Theories of Mental Division,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72
(1994): 302–16; ‘Knowing What I’m About To Do Without Evidence,’ International
Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (1998): 231–52; ‘Is Satan a Lover of the Good?,’
Ratio 13 (2000): 13–27; ‘Moral Psychology and Expressivism,’ European Journal
of Philosophy 12:2 (2004): 178–98.