Validation Models of Adversary behavior Jing Zhang, Jun Zhuang, University at Buffalo 1 • Validating Models ooff AAddvveerrssaarryy BBeehhaavviioorrss ! • Should models be validated? YES! ! • Can models be validated? Sometimes… ! • How would models be validated? ! • Based on real scenario; ! • With/without data ! • Thought Experiments, Expert opinion, Interviews ! • Validation Exercises, Simulation, Case Studies ! SSuummmmaarryy 2 Introduction • Hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent on ! homeland security since September 11, 2001. • Numerous models have been developed to study the ! strategic interactions between defenders and adversaries. • Unfortunately, few if any models have yet been validated ! using empirical data, limiting the application of those &)$ ''((""++$$ models in practice. ')$ ')"+$ *+$ *'"%$ *'"+$ ')$ **"#$ *)"*$ ('"($ /*)$ . (!"&$ - ()"!$ (#"#$ + , *+,()$ %%"&$ %'"!$ ) ( %&%)$ $ !!!!""##$$ # " !!)$ #)$ 3 )$ !))!$ !))%$ !))($ !))*$ !))'$ !))&$ !)),$ !))+$ !)#)$ !)##$ !)#!$ !)#%$ !)#($ !)#*$ !)#'$ 0%12' Conferences on validating models of adversary behavior 4 Conference word clouds 5 Model Validation Exercises • Dataset I: Time Series Data for Terrorist Events ! • This dataset contains time series data for the annual ! number of terrorist incidents and the annual number of fatalities from terrorist attacks from 1981 to 2014. 6 • Dataset II: Terrorism Consequences and Counterterrorism ! Investments for US Urban Areas • This dataset gives counter-terrorism information on 47 US ! major urban areas. 7 Sample results: Total UASI funding against Incidents 1800 18 1600 16 1400 14 1200 12 1000 10 800 8 600 6 400 4 200 2 0 0 New York, NY Chicago San Francisco Washington, DC Los Angeles-Long Beach Philadelphia, PA-NJ Boston, MA-NH Houston Newark, NJ Seattle-Bellevue-Everett Jersey City Detroit Las Vegas, NV-AZ Oakland, CA Orange County, CA Cleveland San Diego Miami, FL Minneapolis-St.Paul, MN-WI Denver Baltimore Atlanta Dallas St. Louis, MO-IL Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA Phoenix-Mesa San Jose otte-Gastonia-RockHill, NC- Kansas City, MO-KS Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI New Haven-Meriden, CT Buffalo-Niagara Falls Pittsburgh Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN pa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater New Orleans Columbus, OH Indianapolis Sacramento Louisville, KY-IN Orlando Memphis, TN-AR-MS Albany-Schenectady-Troy Richmond-Petersburg San Antonio Baton Rouge Fresno harl Tam C Total funding Total Incidents Correlation of UASI funding to incidents experienced by a city is 0.69 by the end of 10 years 8 Initially (2004) the correlation is 0.18 • Dataset III: Target Type and Attack Type: Terrorist Preferences ! • This dataset provides the annual number of terrorist incidents and the ! annual number of fatalities from terrorist attacks during 1991-2014, broken down into different attack types and different target types. 9 • Dataset IV: Effectiveness of Security Countermeasures on ! Critical Infrastructure • This hypothetical dataset provides the dollar amount spent by 25 ! critical infrastructures on security countermeasures in 2010, ranging from $0 to $497,500, with a total of $3.52 million. 10
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