Unlocking the Brain: Volume 2: Consciousness

737 Pages·2013·6.547 MB·English

by  Georg Northoff

Unlocking the Brain

Unlocking the Brain
VOLUME II: CONSCIOUSNESS
GEORG NORTHOFF
1
3

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Northoff , Georg.
Unlocking the brain / Georg Northoff .
p. ; cm.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 978–0–19–982698–8 (alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–19–982699–5 (alk. paper)
I. Title.
[DNLM: 1. Brain—physiology. 2. Brain Mapping—psychology. 3. Cognition—physiology. 4. Neural
Pathways—physiology. 5. Neuropsychiatry. WL 335]
612.8—dc23
2012029357

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

List of Figures for Volume II vii
Preface x i
Introduction I: Brain and Its Intrinsic Features x v
Introduction II: Consciousness and Its Intrinsic Features  xlvii
PART V: SPATIOTEMPORAL CONTINUITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS 1
13. Midline Regions and the “Stream of Consciousness” 5
14. Slow Cortical Potentials and “Width of Present” 27
15. Temporal Nestedness and “Duration Bloc” 48
16. Functional Connectivity and “Inner Space Consciousness” 68
17. Glutamate, GABA, and “Inner Time and Space Consciousness” 91
PART VI: SPATIOTEMPORAL UNITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS 119
18. Resting-State Activity and Prephenomenal Unity 123
19. Gamma and Phenomenal Unity 1 46
20. “Neurosocial Activity” and “Environment–Brain Unity” 172
21. Unity and Subjectivity 203
22. U nity and Subjectivity in Schizophrenia 2 29
PART VII: SPATIOTEMPORAL ORGANIZATION AND CONSCIOUSNESS 247
23. Resting-State Activity and Self-Specifi city 251
24. Self-Specifi city and Self-Perspectival Organization 278
vi CONTENTS OF VOLUME II
25. Resting-State Activity and Preintentional Organization 328
26. Neurophenomenal Evidence—Dreams and Mind Wandering 369
27. Neuropsychiatric Evidence—Schizophrenia and Depression 391
PART VIII: SPATIOTEMPORAL QUALITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS 409
28. Resting-State Activity and Qualia 413
29. Rest–Stimulus Interaction and Qualia 439
30. Neuronal Transfer and Qualia 461
31. Subcortical Regions and Qualia 486
32. Body and Qualia 509
Epilogue: Keyholes in the Brain’s Door to Consciousness 531
Appendix 1: Brain and Consciousness 5 35
Appendix 2: Brain and Time 549
Appendix 3: Brain and Unity 5 63
Appendix 4: Brain and Self 579
References 5 89
Index 623
LIST OF FIGURES FOR VOLUME II

I-1: Comparison between pancreas and brain x xvi
I-2: Intrinsic features and predispositions xxx
I-3a-c: Intrinsic features of the brain and consciousness xxxi
I-4a: Coding hypothesis of consciousness (CHC) x xxviii
I-4b: Coding hypothesis of consciousness (CHC) x xxix
II-1a-c: Multidimensional view of consciousness xlviii
II-2: From neural predispositions of consciousness (NPC) to neural correlates
of consciousness (NCC) l viii
II-3a-c: Concepts of consciousness and neural coding l xi
II-4a and b: Phenomenal features of consciousness and the brain l xix
II-5: Plan and overview of the book lxxvii
13-1: Fluctuation of neural activity in cortical midline regions 1 0
13-2a-c: Low-frequency fl uctuations and temporal continuity 1 3
13-3: Neural activity during prospection into the future 16
13-4a and b: Frequency fl uctuations and temporal extension 2 0
13-5: Low-frequency fl uctuations and the “stream of consciousness” 24
14-1: Integration of information by slow cortical potentials 30
14-2a-d: Diff erent encoding strategies 3 5
14-3a-d: Diff erence-based coding and local temporal continuity 3 9
14-4a-d: Neuronal mechanisms of the “width of present” 43
15-1: Temporal pattern of neural activity during the absence of consciousness 5 2
15-2a and b: Temporal nestedness and consciousness 55
15-3a and b: Temporal nestedness and “global” temporal continuity 59
15-4a-d: Neuronal predispositions of the “duration bloc” 62
16-1a-c: Spatial propagation of neural activity during
the absence of consciousness 72
16-2a-c: Transregional interaction and spatial continuity 76
16-3a-c: Spatial continuity and “inner space consciousness” 82
16-4: Neuronal mechanisms of spatiotemporal continuity of neural activity 8 7
17-1a and b: Glutamate and “inner space consciousness” 1 00
17-2: Metabolism and GABA-A receptors in vegetative state 106
17-3a and b: GABA and temporal continuity of neural activity 1 07
17-4a-c: GABA and consciousness 110
viii LIST OF FIGURES FOR VOLUME II
17-5a-c: GABA, glutamate, and “inner time consciousness” in depression 114
18-1: Prediction of perceptual consciousness by the preceding resting-state activity 1 27
18-2: Resting-state activity and its “spatiotemporal window of opportunity” 129
18-3a and b: “Ideal” and “worst” phases in resting-state activity 133
18-4a-e: “Resting-state–based hypothesis of prephenomenal unity” 138
19-1a: Early phase changes during consciousness 149
19-1b: Frontal cortical involvement during consciousness 153
19-2: Timing of neural activity and diff erent forms of unity 156
19-3a-c: “Continuity-based hypothesis of phenomenal unity” 1 65
20-1a: Natural statistics and phase locking 176
20-1b: Natural statistics and phase locking 179
20-2a and b: Interaction between diff erent subjects’ brains and the generation
of “neurosocial activity” 1 90
20-3: Characterization of the environment-brain unity 1 97
20-4a-c: “Environment–brain-based hypothesis of prephenomenal unity” 199
21-1a and b: Unity and consciousness 2 06
21-2a-g: Brain and subjectivity 213
22-1a-c: Encoding hypothesis in schizophrenia 2 35
22-2a and b: Diff erence-based coding in schizophrenia 239
22-3: Volatile environment–brain unity and unstable neural diff erences
in schizophrenia 2 42
22-4: Unity and subjectivity in healthy and schizophrenic subjects 2 44
23-1a: Self-specifi city and anterior cortical midline regions 255
23-1b: Overlap between self-specifi city and high resting-state activity in
anterior midline regions 2 59
23-2a and b: Neuronal mechanisms of self-specifi city 2 61
23-3a: Lack of deviation of fi ring rates in subgenual cortex during self-specifi c
stimuli from resting-state fi ring rates 265
23-3b: Prediction of stimuli’s degree of self-specifi city by the gamma
power in the preceding resting state 267
23-3c: Stimulus–rest interaction for self-specifi city in subcortical and cortical
midline structures 269
23-4a and b: Matching hypothesis of self-specifi city 2 71
23-1: Comparison between the two- and three-fold anatomical characterizations
with regard to meta-analytic results from self, familiarity and other. 256
24-1a: Neural activity during self-specifi city of emotions 284
24-1b: Interaction between self-specifi city and emotion processing 285
24-1c: Neural activity during self-specifi city in reward circuitry 2 87
24-1d: Comparison between internally and externally guided
decision making 289
24-2a-e: Self-specifi city and other functions 291
24-3: Temporal continuity and self-specifi city 305
24-4a and b: Bilateral interaction between self-specifi city and point of view 310
24-5a and b: Relationship between point of view, self-perspectival organization,
and perspectives 318
25-1: Neural activity during internal and external awareness in the resting state 3 34
25-2a-d: Relationship between midline and lateral networks 3 37
2 5-3a and b: Constitution and designation of content 3 43
25-4a and b: “Easy” and “hard” cases 347
LIST OF FIGURES FOR VOLUME II ix
25-5a-d: “Point of view–based hypothesis of directedness” 354
25-6: Brain and intentionality 3 63
26-1a-e: Neuronal mechanisms of dreams 375
26-2a and b: Neural activity during mind wandering 382
26-3a and b: Neuronal mechanisms of mind wandering 3 86
26-4: Neural balance and phenomenal balance 3 89
27-1: Basic disturbance of the self in schizophrenia 3 96
27-2a: Neural and phenomenal abnormalities in depression 4 00
27-2b: Neural and phenomenal abnormalities in depression 405
28-1: Functional connectivity in vegetative state 416
28-2a-c: Eff ective connectivity in vegetative state 4 18
28-2b: Eff ective connectivity in vegetative state 4 19
28-2c: Eff ective connectivity in vegetative state 4 20
28-3a-c: Biophysical spectrum hypothesis of consciousness 425
28-4a-c: Diff erence-based coding hypothesis of consciousness 433
29-1: Stimulus-induced activity in vegetative state 4 41
29-2a: Neural activity during passive self-specifi c stimuli and prediction
of consciousness in vegetative state 444
29-2b: Neural activity during active self-specifi c task and prediction
of consciousness in vegetative state 445
29-3a-e: Rest–stimulus interaction and consciousness 449
30-1a and b: “Transfer hypothesis” of qualia 4 67
30-2a-d: Neurophenomenal hypotheses of qualia 471
30-3a and b: “Explanatory gap” in “resting state-based approach to qualia”
(a) and “stimulus-based approach to qualia” (b) 4 83
31-1a and b: Diff erence-based coding in subcortical regions 4 89
31-2a: Subcortical activity during personally relevant emotional stimuli
in vegetative state 493
31-2b: Subcortical activity during personally relevant emotional stimuli
in vegetative state 494
31-3a and b: Comparison between subcortical and cortical regions 501
31-4: Regions, functions, and qualia 5 07
32-1: Neural activity during interoceptive awareness 5 13
32-2: Eff ects of insula lesion on interoceptive awareness 518
32-3: Modulation of neural activity in the insula by GABA 5 22
32-4: Neural mechanisms of interoceptive awareness 524
32-5: Concepts of perception and interoception 5 27
A1-1: Diff erent methodological approaches in the investigation of consciousness 536
A1-2a and b: Comparison between the Information Integration Th eory (IIT) and
the neurophenomenal approach 544
A2-1: Diff erent accounts of time 553
A3-1: Content- versus mode-based concept of consciousness 5 68
A3-2: Concept of unity in diff erent contexts 573
A4-1: Content- versus process-based concept of the self 583
A4-2: Self-relatedness and brain-relatedness 5 86