Universals (Central Problems of Philosophy)

193 Pages·2001·0.64 MB·English

by  J. P. Moreland

Universals
J. P. Moreland
Central
Problems of
Philosophy
General Editor
John Shand
Universals
Central Problems of Philosophy
Series Editor: John Shand
This series of books presents concise, clear, and rigorous analyses
of the core problems that preoccupy philosophers across all
approaches to the discipline. Each book encapsulates the essential
arguments and debates, providing an authoritative guide to the
subject while also introducing original perspectives. This series of
books by an international team of authors aims to cover those
fundamental topics that, taken together, constitute the full breadth
of philosophy.
Published titles
Free Will
Graham McFee
Forthcoming titles
Action Paradox
Rowland Stout Doris Olin
Analysis Perception
Michael Beaney Barry Maund
Artificial Intelligence Relativism
Matthew Elton & Michael Wheeler Paul O’Grady
Causation and Explanation Rights
Stathis Psillos Jonathan Gorman
Knowledge Scepticism
Michael Welbourne Neil Gascoigne
Meaning Truth
David Cooper Pascal Engel
Modality Value
Joseph Melia Chris Cherry
Ontology
Dale Jacquette
Universals
J. P. Moreland
© J. P. Moreland, 2001
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention.
No reproduction without permission.
All rights reserved.
First published in 2001 by Acumen
Acumen Publishing Limited
15a Lewins Yard
East Street
Chesham
Bucks HP5 1HQ
www.acumenpublishing.co.uk
ISBN: 1-902683-22-6 (hardcover)
ISBN: 1-902683-23-4 (paperback)
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from
the British Library.
Designed and typeset by Kate Williams, Abergavenny.
Printed and bound by Biddles Ltd., Guildford and King’s Lynn.
Contents
Preface and acknowledgements vii
1 The problem(s) of universals 1
2 Extreme nominalism and properties 23
3 Moderate nominalism and properties 50
4 Minimalist realism: Wolterstorff’s kinds and
Armstrong’s properties 74
5 Traditional realism: properties are abstract objects 97
6 Traditional realism: issues and objections 114
7 The individuation of particulars 140
Notes 158
Bibliography 170
Index 181

Preface and
acknowledgements
This book is a study in analytic ontology with a focus on issues and
options at the core of the problem of universals. The problem of
universals is actually a cluster of related issues central to debates
among extreme nominalists, moderate nominalists and advocates
of various forms of realism about the ontological status of proper-
ties. The book is intended to be an introduction to the topic and I
have aimed the level of exposition at upper level undergraduates,
graduate students and professional philosophers, and I believe the
book should be of value to all three groups. Given the intended
audience, the book is an introduction, not in the sense of being
aimed at beginning students in philosophy, but in the sense of seek-
ing to focus on the most important issues central to the subject
matter. Because of this focus and space limitations, I have of neces-
sity refrained from addressing certain topics in the study of
universals that have been prominent in the past ten years, specifi-
cally: the relationship between higher and lower order universals;
the relationship between universals and causation, laws of nature
and scientific explanation; the use of moderate (especially trope)
nominalism to do work in various areas of philosophy. As interest-
ing as these topics may be, those who study them bring to their
reflections positions on the more fundamental topics about
universals. And, often, philosophers who discuss these current
issues seem unfamiliar with or inadequately appraised of important
distinctions and arguments at the core of those more fundamental
topics. For these reasons, I have chosen to focus in this book on
those subjects that have been of perennial importance to the study
viii UNIVERSALS
of universals. There is a gap in the recent literature in these areas on
which I focus, and I have tried to make a contribution to filling
that gap.
Several people have been instrumental in helping me with this
project. I want to thank Dan Yim and Joshua Blander for their
encouragement to undertake the book. I am grateful to Paul Copan
for informing me about the series to which my book contributes,
and I have been helped greatly in the manuscript preparation by
Lisa Vasquez and Robert Garcia. My two editors, John Shand and
Steven Gerrard, have been an absolute delight to work with.
Finally, my philosophical mentor, Dallas Willard, and my
colleagues in philosophy at Biola University have played a special
role in my own philosophical development, and it is a joy for me to
acknowledge them in this way.
J. P. Moreland
11111 The problem(s) of universals
Along with the metaphysics of substance, the problem of universals
is the paradigm case of a perennial issue in the history of philoso-
phy. The problem of universals is actually a set of related issues
involving the ontological status of properties. Prima facie, it would
seem that properties exist. Indeed, one of the most obvious facts
about the world is that it consists of individual things that have
properties and that stand in relations to other things.1 It would also
seem that several objects can have the same property; for example,
several things can possess the same shade of red. But both the exist-
ence and nature of properties have long been a matter of dispute
and the problem of universals is the name for the issues central to
this debate.
Those who accept the existence of universals have appealed to a
number of phenomena to make their case (e.g. the meaningfulness
of language, the lawlike nature of causation, the inter-subjectivity
of thinking, our ability to classify and recognize new entities,
gradation and the need for perfect standards or ideal paradigms).
However, historically, the problem of universals has been mainly
about the “One and Many” (a.k.a. “One over Many”, “One in
Many”), which involves giving an account of the unity of natural
classes. To illustrate, consider the following words: RED, RED,
BLUE. How many words are in the sequence? Two answers seem
possible: either two or three words. There would seem to be two
word types and three word tokens, where a type is a kind of word
that can be instanced in different places and a token is a specific
instance of a type. If we form a set containing the first two tokens,