Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect IN Collected Works of Spinoza

43 Pages·1985·8.156 MB·English

by  Spinoza, Curley (ed, trans)

Treatise on the Emendation
of the Intellect
EDITORIAL PREFACE
THE Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TdlE), a short, difficult,
but fascinating discourse on method, was first published in Spinoza's
Opera posthuma in 1677. But as the editors of that collection tell us in
their preface, both its style and its content show it to be one of Spi-
noza's earliest works. If the reference in Letter 6 to a "whole short
work" (integrum opusculum) is indeed to this treatise, as scholars have
generally assumed,t then a draft of it must have existed at least by
early in 1662, and quite likely Spinoza wrote it before that."
Various forward references in Spinoza's notes to this treatise indi-
cate that at some stage of his work on it Spinoza conceived it as intro-
ductory to another work, to be called (perhaps) Philosophy, a work
which would have discussed in a systematic way topics in philosoph-
ical theology (11129, n. z), philosophy of mind (II115, n. o), epistemol-
ogy (II114, nn. k and I), ethics (II/6, n. a; II17, n. b; II/8, n. c), and
perhaps much else (of. II19, n. d). Some of the references suggest a
work more like the Short Treatise than the Ethics,3 and Gebhardt argued
that the "short work" referred to in Letter 6 was a two-part work,
with the TdlE as a methodological prolegomenon to the more system-
atic KV. According to Gebhardt (I1407), the Latin original of the KV
was already in existence when Spinoza began writing the "Idle around
the time of Letter 6. But if what I have suggested above is correct (see
n. 2), then Gebhardt must be wrong at least about the date of com-
position of the TdlE. Mignini would argue that Gebhardt is wrong
also in thinking that the TdIE ~i, as an integral part of the short work
Spinoza describes his opusculum as being devoted to the question "how things began
to be and by what connection they depend on the first cause ... and also on the
emendation of the intellect." This strongly suggests that our "IdlE was part of the
opusculum. But Mignini has cast doubt on this. See the annotation at IV/36/13.
z I would be inclined to say earlier than Letter 2 at least, i.e., before September 1661,
for reasons suggested in the annotation at 11/9112. Cf. Mignini 2, 106. If, as Mignini
thinks, the TdiE is earlier than the KV, and if, as he also thinks, the first draft of the
KV was written around the middle of 1660 (see Mignini !, 239), then the TdlE would
have been written a good deal earlier than the spring of 1662.
' Notably 11129, n. z. On the other hand, some of the things promised in the forward
references do not appear in our version of the KV any more than ~ey do in E, e.g.,
the extended discussion of wealth foreshadowed in II/6, n. a.
EA RLIEST WORKS
Spinoza refers to in Letter 6. Emphasizing the incompleteness of our text of
the TdIE, he contends that it could not have been correctly described in Letter
6 as having been composed and that it is earlier than the KV, not merely in
date of composition, but also in the stage of the development of Spinoza's
thought that it represents.4 If Mignini's arguments for the priority of the TdIE
are not conclusive, he has, I think, at least established that there is no reason
to regard the KV as the earlier work.s So at this stage the position would seem
to be that, if the TdlE is not in fact earlier that the KV, it was probably written at
about the same time as the KV and as an introduction to it.
In its importance for the study of the development of Spinoza's thought, the
Treatise on the Intellect invites comparison with Descartes' Regulae. Both are
early, unfinished works that show the direction of their author's thought at a
formative stage, that indicate the problems concerning him and the solutions
he was inclined toward. Both discuss certain important themes more fully than
does any work their author later published. But both works also need to be
read with the conseiousness that the lines of thought presented in them may
not have proved ultimately to be satisfactory to the author.
For example, some have argued that in this treatise Spinoza has not fully
emancipated himself from Descartes on the distinction between will and
intellect,+ and it seems clear that he does tend to confuse mind and intellect.7
1 would argue that the discussion of the four kinds of knowledge is not clearly
thought out.s And Joachim has suggested that ' Mignini contends that the
teaching of the KV is closer to that of E than is the teaching of the TdlE in
regard to the following topics: the nature of the intellect and the doctrine of
method, the theory of the kinds of knowlodge, the nature of fictions, the will,
final causation and perfection. "['his is not the place for a discussion of his
arguments, but I will observe that my own attempt to study the development of
Spinoza's thought about truth (Curley 9), an attempt made before I was aware
of Mignini's work, would have proceeded more smoothly had I adopted his
chronology.
s This, essentially, is the judgment of M. Matheron, in a recent review of
Mignini's work (Bulletin de I'Astociation des Amis de Spinoza, no. 10, 1983):
"Si les arguments positifs avanc~s par Mignini, bien qu'ils donnent beaucoup ~
penser, ne sont peut-être tout ~ fair convaincants (personellement j'avoue
hésiter encore sur ce point), ses arguments néga.
tifs, en revanche, sont décisifs: nous admettions tous comme allant de sol,
parce qu'on nous I'avait enseign~, que le C.T.[i.e., KV] &ait ant~rieur au TRE
[i.e., Tdl~l, et Mignini démontre qu'il n'y avait t cela a~olument aucune raison!"
+ See Joachim 2, 59, and cf. Mignini 2, 140. Joachim construes this as a
survival of Cartesian doctrines advocated in the KV. Mignini, it seems, regards
it as evidence of the priority of the TdlE to the KV. I myself am not satisfied
with the evidence that Spinoza adopts the ('artesian distinction between will
and intellect either in the TdlE or in the KV. For example, it seems to me that §
78 of the TdlE effectively anticipates Spinoza's critique of the Cartesian
doctrine of suspense of judgment in E IIP49S. And I take it that KV II, xiv, also
criticizes the (:artesian distinction, though on different grounds.
" See the annotation at 11/9/12. ' See Curley 2~ ef. Joachim 2, 24-33.
THE EMENDA TION OF THE INTELLECT
the whole work may have been intended only to present a popular,
imprecise exposition of Spinoza's thought on these topics.9
The most important question, perhaps, is whether the whole con-
cept of method, as Spinoza here presents it, is not incoherent, and so
doomed to failure, to On the one hand, the truth is supposed to require
no sign, and having a true idea is supposed to be sufficient to remove
doubt (§ 36); on the other, the method is supposed, among other things,
to teach us what a true idea is, and how to distinguish it from other
perceptions (§ 37).
But whatever reservations we may have about the doctrine of this
work, it is clear that in the main it continued to satisfy Spinoza for
some years. A letter to Bouwmeester in 1666 (Letter 37) repeats some
of the Treatise's main themes--that the intellect, unlike the body, is
not subject to chance, external causes, but has the power of forming
clear and distinct ideas; that it is necessary above all to distinguish
between the intellect and the imagination (this being identified with
distinguishing between true ideas and all the rest, the false, fictitious
and doubtful). And an interchange with Tschirnhaus in 1675 (Letters
59 and 60) indicates that Spinoza had communicated something similar
to him informally, and had given Tschirnhaus some reason to expect
that before long he would publish his treatise on method.
Naturally, then, there have been a variety of suggestions as to why
the Treatise never was published in Spinoza's lifetime. The editors of
the Opera posthuma remark that the importance of the topic, the deep
contemplations and extensive knowledge it required, made Spinoza's
progress with it very slow. Appuhn suggests that Spinoza broke off
the composition because he could not see any satisfactory solution to
the problems raised at the end (§§ 102-103, 106-110), and that he did
not return to finish it because he came to think it more important to
concentrate on his other works on moral and political philosophy (the
Ethics, the Theological-Political Treatise, and the Political Treatise). Koyr~,
on the other hand, tends to emphasize the difficulty raised in § 46 (see
the note to II11811-2). Ironically, Joachim's excellent commentary on
this work itself remained unfinished at his death because he was una-
ble to resolve to his satisfaction the problem of how Spinoza meant to
conclude the Treatise.
if the character of this work as unfinished, highly problematic, and
only posthumously published invites comparison with Descartes' Re-
gulae, the apparently autobiographical character of the opening see-
Cf. Joachim 2, 89-90.
lo So Joachim argues at any rate. Cf. Joachim 2, 102-111.
EARLIEST WORKS
tions equally invites comparison with the Discourse on Method. The
tone of the two works is quite different, of course. The dissatisfaction
Descartes presents as leading him to philosophy is with the uncertainty
of the learning that had been imparted to him as a student. Spinoza's
dissatisfaction is with the insufficiency of the ends men commonly
pursue.
Of course scholars have doubted whether these opening passages
should be taken as strictly autobiographical (just as they have doubted
the accuracy of Descartes' account of his life in the D~ourse). As Koyr6
remarks (Koyr6 2, xix), the theme de vero bono et de contemptu mundi
is as old as the world itself. Various Stoic authors (e.g., Marcus Aurelius
and Seneca) have been cited. And Elbogen calls attention to the work
of a medieval Jewish author, Shem Toy Falaquera, whose Ha-Mevak.
kesb similarly offers knowledge as the path to salvation. However that
may be, it remains, as Koyr6 also remarks, highly significant that
Spinoza should begin a treatise on method by reflecting on the true
good.
The paragraph numbers in brackets are those introduced by Bruder and
are included for ease in making and following references. Lettered
footnotes are Spinoza's, numbered footnotes are mine. I have adopted
the lettering of Gebhardt's edition, though (even allowing for differences
in the Latin alphabet) it is not entirely consecutive.
o
NOTICE TO THE READER1
Tm s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect etc., which we give you
here, kind reader, in its unfinished [NS: and defective] state, was writ-
ten by the author many years ago now. He always intended to finish
it. But hindered by other occupations, and finally snatched away by
death, he was unable to bring it to the desired conclusion. But since
it contains many excellent and useful things, which--we have no
doubt--will be of great benefit to anyone sincerely seeking the truth,
we did not wish to deprive you of them. And so that you would be
aware of, and find less difficult to excuse, the many things that are
still obscure, rough, and unpolished, we wished to warn you of them.
Farewell.
' By the editors of the Opera postburaa.
THE EMENDA TION OF THE INTELLECT
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect
III5
and on the way by which it is best directed
5
toward the true knowledge of things
[1] Av'rER experience had taught me that all the things which regu-
larly occur in ordinary life are empty and futile, and I saw that all the
things which were the cause or object of my fear had nothing of good
or bad in themselves, except insofar as [my] mind was moved by them,
I resolved at last to try to find out whether there was anything which
would be the true good, capable of communicating itself, and which
alone would affect the mind, all others being rejected--whether there
was something which, once found and acquired, would continuously
give me the greatest joy, to eternity.
[2] I say that I resolved at last--for at first glance it seemed ill-advised
to be willing to lose something certain for something then uncertain.
I saw, of course, the advantages that honor and wealth bring, and that
I would be forced to abstain from seeking them, if I wished to devote
myself seriously to something new and different; and if by chance the
greatest happiness lay in them, I saw that I should have to do without
it. But if it did not lie in them, and I devoted my energies only to
acquiring them, then I would equally go without it.
[3] So I wondered whether perhaps it would be possible to reach
my new goal---or at least the certainty of attaining it--without chang-
ing the conduct and plan of life which I shared with other men. Often
I tried this, but in vain. For most things which present themselves in
life, and which, to judge from their actions, men think to be the high-
est good, may be reduced to these three: wealth, honor, and sensual
2 The translation of this title is disputed. The Latin for the main title is Tractatus de
Intellectus Emendatione, the Dutch Handeling van de Verbetering van't Verstant. Joachim (2,
I) argued that no English term could reproduce the exact implications of the Latin, but
recommended "Purification of the Intellect" as rightly suggesting a project of restoring
the intellect to its "natural perfection, by eliminating from it . . . ideas which are not
its own but have come to it from an external source." DeDengd's criticism of Joachim
(I. 50-57), while rightly pointing out that the Dutch version cannot plausibly bear that
meaning, gives insufficient weight to § 16. Eisenberg (3) argues that no term can repro-
duoe the exact implications of the Latin, since Spinoza's phrase has no exact implica-
tions. At the time of writing this work Spinoza inconsistently conceived of the intellect
both as inherently pure and as needing purification. He did not clearly distinguish
between the mind, which cannot he entirely freed of external influences, and the intel-
lect, which has no need to be. No translation will solve such difficulties.
The subtitle in the NS reads: "and at the same time of the means of making it
perfect."
EARLIEST WORKS
pleasure.3 The mind is so distracted by these three that it cannot give
the slightest thought to any other good.
[4] For as far as sensual pleasure is concerned, the mind is so caught
up in it, as if at peace in a [true] good, that it is quite prevented from
thinking of anything else. But after the enjoyment of sensual pleasure
is past, the greatest sadness follows. If this does not completely
engross, still it thoroughly confuses and dulls the mind.
The mind is also distracted not a little by the pursuit of honors and
wealth, particularly when the latter' is sought only for its own sake,
because it is assumed to be the highest good. [5] But the mind is far
more distracted by honor. For this is always assumed to be good
through itself and the ultimate end toward which everything is
directed.
Nor do honor and wealth have, as sensual pleasure does, repentance
as a natural consequence. The "more each of these is possessed, the
more joy is increased, and hence the more we are spurred on to
increase them. But if our hopes should chance to be frustrated, we
experience the greatest sadness. And finally, honor has this great
disadvantage: to pursue it, we must direct our lives according to other
men's powers of understanding — fleeing what they commonly flee
and seeking what they commonly seek.
[6] Since I saw that all of these things stood in the way of my working
toward this new goal, indeed were so opposed to it that one or the
other must be given up, I was forced to ask what would be more
useful to me. For as I say, I seemed to be willing to lose the certain
good for the uncertain one. But after I had considered the matter a
little, I first found that, if I devoted myself to this new plan of life, and
gave up the old, I would be giving up a good by its nature uncertain
(as we can clearly infer from what has been said) for one uncertain
not by its nature (for I was seeking a permanent good) but only in
respect to its attainment.
[7] By persistent meditation, however, I came to the conclusion that, if
only I could resolve, wholeheartedly,4 [to change my plan of life], I
' ! could explain this more fully and distinctly, by distinguishing wealth that is sought for its own sake, or
for the sake of honor, or for the sake of sensual pleasure or for the sake of health and the advancement
of the arts and sciences. But I reserve this for its own place; such an exact investigation is not
appropriate here.
The choice of this particular trinity is probably influenced by Aristotle. Cf. the Nicomachean Ethics I, 4,
and the Short Treatise II, v, 6.
' "Modi possera penituss deliberare." Deliberare can mean 'to deliberate' and most translators have
given us something like "If only I could reflect thoroughly Ion the matter]." But deliberare can also mean
'to decide as a consequence of deliberation' and ! follow Koyr~ in thinking that to be the meaning here.
When Spinoza comments on this phrase in § 10 it seems clear that he thinks of his difficulty as more
volitional than intellectual.
Cf. E IVPI4.
THE EMENDA TION OF THE INTELLECT
would be giving up certain evils for a certain good. For I saw that I
was in the greatest danger, and that I was forced to seek a remedy
with all my strength, however uncertain it might be--like a man suf-
fering from a fatal illness, who, foreseeing certain death unless he
employs a remedy, is forced to seek it, however uncertain, with all
his strength. For all his hope lies there. But all those things men or-
dinarily strive for, not only provide no remedy to preserve our being,
but in fact hinder that preservation, often cause the destruction of
those who possess them,b and always cause the destruction of those
who are possessed by them.5
[8] There are a great many examples of people who have suffered
persecution to the death on account of their wealth, or have exposed
themselves to so many dangers to acquire wealth that they have at last
paid the penalty for their folly with their life. Nor are there fewer
examples of people who, to attain or defend honor, have suffered most
miserably. And there are innumerable examples of people who have
hastened their death through too much sensual pleasure.
[9] Furthermore, these evils seemed to have arisen from the fact that
all happiness or unhappiness was placed in the quality of the object to
which we cling with love. For strife will never arise on account of
what is not loved, nor will there be sadness if it perishes, nor envy if
it is possessed by another, nor fear, nor hatred--in a word, no dis-
turbances of the mind. Indeed, all these happen only in the love of
those things that can perish, as all tl~e things we have just spoken of
can do.
[10] But love toward the eternal and infinite thing leeds the mind
with a joy entirely exempt from sadness.~ This is greatly to be desired,
and to be sought with all our strength.
b These things are to be demonstrated more accurately.
s The NS has: "often cause the destruction of those who possess them (if one may
speak thus), and always of those who are possessed by wealth." It seems likely that the
parenthesis is an addition by the translator and bears on the notion of being possessed
by wealth.
OP: "Sed amor erga rem aeternam, & infinitam sol~ laetitih pascit animum, ipsaque
omnis tristitiae est expers'; NS: "Maar de liefde tot d'eeuwige cn oneindige zaak voed de
geest lmargin: mens] met blVschap alleen, en is van alle droefheit uitgesloten." The
translation of this important passage is disputed. Joachim (2, 18, n.4) notes that various
translators have rendered it as if it were the love that was exempt from sadness (which
makes the Latin ungrammatical, but is what the Dutch implies), lie, however, sees here
a foreshadowing of the doctrine that God is exempt from sadness. (I.e., ipta refers not to
amor, but the eternal and infinite thing.) This is possible, both grammatically and
philosophically, but Joachim surely goes too far when he contends that this
interpretation is necessary to explain why love for God feeds the mind with unmixed joy.
Appuhn, Koyré, and Caillois all take ipsa to refer to laetitia, an alternative Joachim does
not discuss, and to my mind the one most likely.
EA RLIEST" WORKS
But not without reason did ! use these words If only I couM resolve
in earnest/For though I perceived these things [NS: this evil] so clearly
in my mind, I still could not, on that account, put aside all greed,
desire for sensual pleasure and love of esteem.
[1 1] I saw this, however: that so long as the mind was turned toward
these thoughts, it was turned away from those things, and was think-
ing seriously about the new goal. That was a great comfort to me. For
l saw that those evils would not refuse to yield to remedies. And
although in the beginning these intervals were rare, and lasted a very
short time, nevertheless, after the true good became more and more
known to me, the intervals became more frequent and longer---espe-
cially after I saw that the acquisition of money, sensual pleasure, and
esteem are only obstacles so long as they are sought for their own
sakes, and not as means to otl~er things. But if they are sought as
means, then they will have a limit, and will not be obstacles at all.
On the contrary, they will be of great use in attaining the end on
account of which they are sought, as we shall show in its place.
[12] Here I shall only say briefly what I understand by the true
good, and at the same time, what the highest good is. To understand
this properly, it must be noted that good and bad are said of things
only in a certain respect, so that one and the same thing can be called
both good and bad according to different respects. The same applies
to perfect and imperfect. For nothing, considered in its own nature,
will be called perfect or imperfect, especially after we have recognized
that everything that happens happens according to the eternal order,
and according to certain laws of Nature.
[I 3] But since human weakness does not grasp that order by its own
thought, and meanwhile man conceives a human nature much stronger
and more enduring* than his own, and at the same time sees that
nothing prevents his acquiring such a nature, he is spurred to seek
means that will lead him to such a perfection. Whatever can be a
means to his attaining it is called a true good; but the highest good is
to arrive,--together with other individuals if possible---at the enjoy-
ment of such a nature. What that nature is we shall show in its proper
"Mod~ possera seri~ deliberare." In referring back to 1116121 Spinoza does not in fact
quote himself exactly.
g Wendel and Cassircr thought it necessary to emend this passage so that it would
read: "man conceives a nature much stronger than his own human nature." But I find
Gebhardt's arguments against this conclusive (ll/J22-J23). The text as it stands is sup-
ported by the NS and paralleled by passages both in the Short Treatise (11,4; 1/60121ff.)
and the Ethics (IX:, Pref.. 111208). I~o)'rg (2, 98-99) is right to remark that the passage is
a difficult one on any reading, but his comments do not seem to me to stress sufficiently
the necessity both of man's conceiving such a stronger nature and of his striving to
attain it.
THE EMENDA TION OF THE INTELLECT
place: that it is tile knowledge¢ of the union that the mind has with
the whole of Nature?
[14] This, then, is the end I aim at: to acquire such a nature, and
to strive that many acquire it with me. That is, it is part of my hap-
piness to take pains that many others may understand as I understand,
so that their intellect and desire agree entirely with my intellect and
desire. To do this it is necessary,dfirst to understand as much of Na-
ture as suffices for acquiring such a nature; next, to form a society of
the kind that is desirable, so that as many as possible may attain it as
easily and surely as possible.
[15] Third, attention must be paid to Moral Philosophy and to In-
struction concerning the Education of children. Because Health is no
small means to achieving this end, fourthly, the whole of Medicine
must be worked out. And because many difficult things are rendered
easy by ingenuity, and we can gain much time and convenience in
this life, fifthly, Mechanics is in no way to be despised.
[16] But before anything else we must devise a way of healing the
intellect, and purifying it, as much as we can in the beginning, so that
it understands things successfully, without error and as well as pos-
sible.'° Everyone will now be able to see that I wish to direct all the
sciences toward one end" and goal, viz. that we should achieve, as we
have said, the highest human perfection. So anything in the sciences
which does nothing to advance us toward our goal must be rejected as
useless---in a word, all our activities'and thoughts are to be directed
to this end.
[17] But while we pursue this end, and devote ourselves to bringing
, These things will be explained more fully in their place.
d Note that here I take the trouble only to enumerate the sciences necessary for our
purpose, without attending to their order.
In the sciences there is only one end, toward which they must all be directed.
o If this is taken, as it may be, to mean "knowledge that man is a part of nature, and
sublect to its umversal laws, then the doctnne is very Stole. Cf. Marcus Aurehus,
Meditations, Vll, 9-13; X,6. But the passage is also one which, more than any other
perhaps, encourages the interpretation of Spinoza as a mystic.
,o That the intellect requires purification (expurgatio) is a Baconian doctrine. Cf. the
Nottum Organm (Bacon, I, 139 = IV, 27). For healing (raedendt) the NS has simply
"impro,,ing" (verbeteren). Eisenberg (3, 175) argues that passages like this one are symp-
tomatic of a tendency to confuse the intellect with the mind "at least during much of
the time that he wrote the treatise." And since, in Letter 2 (IV18-9), Spinoza is quite
critical of Bacon for not distinguishing the intellect from the mind, and for supposing
that the intellect is deceived by its own nature, it seems likely that, by the time of
writing that letter (September 1661), Spinoza would have regarded passages like this as
unsatisfactory. Note that in that letter Spinoza criticizes Bacon for comparing the in-
tdlect to an uneven mirror (cf. Bacon, I, 164). A similar comparison occurs in the
purification of the intellect passage cited above, except that there it is the mind that is
compared to an uneven mirror. See also Miguini 2, 106.
EA RL IES T WORKS
the intellect back~1 to the right path, it is necessary to live. So we are
forced, before we do anything else, to assume certain rules of living
as good:
1. To speak according to the power of understanding of ordinary
people, and do whatever does not interfere with our attaining our
purpose. For we can gain a considerable advantage, if we yield as
much to their understanding as we can. In this way, they will
give a favorable hearing to the truth.
2. To enjoy pleasures just so far as suffices for safeguarding our
health.
3. Finally, to seek money, or anything else, just so far as suffices
for sustaining life and health, and conforming to those customs
of the community that do not conflict with our aim.
[18] Having laid down these rules, I come now to what must be
35 done first, before all else: emending~-" the intellect and rendering it
I1/10 capable of understanding things in the way the attainment of our end
requires. To do this, the order we naturally have requires me to sur-
vey here all the modes of perceiving which I have had up to now for
affirming or denying something without doubt, so that I may choose
the best of all, and at the same time begin to know my powers and
the nature that ! desire to perfect.
[19] If I consider them accurately, I can reduce them all to four13
main kinds:
1. There is the Perception we have from report or from some
conventional sign. 14
2. There is the Perception we have from random experience,Is
that is, from experience that is not determined by the intellect.
~' Latin: "intelkctura . . . redigamus." NS: "bet verstant . . . te brengen." But the lan-
guage of purification in the preceding paragraph seems to justify the suggestion of re-
turning to an original state of rectitude.
,z NS: "zuiveren," purify.
" NS: "three"; but it goes on to enumerate four kinds, as the OP does. Gebhardt
thought this might naturally he explained on the assumption that in an earlier draft of
the Treatise Spinoza had divided the kinds of 'knowledge' into three (as in the Short
Treatise and the Ethics) rather than four. He also took it as evidence that the Dutch
translation was made, not from the text of the Opera postbuma, hut from an independent,
earlier manuscript, in which revisions were not consistently carried out. For counter-
argument see Mignini 2, 126-127.
~" On the translation here, and on the classification generally, see Joachim 2, 24-33,
and Curley 2, 25-59.
,s As Joachim notes, this passage echoes one in Bacon, Novum Organura I, 100 (Bacon,
1,203 [ = IV, 95]). He also calls attention to aphorisms 25, 70, and 105. Perhaps Bacon's
influence is also to be seen in Descartes' Regalae, AT X, 427.