Table Of ContentOUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2018,SPi
Transparency and Self-Knowledge
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2018,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2018,SPi
Transparency and
Self-Knowledge
Alex Byrne
1
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3
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OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2018,SPi
Preface
This book sets out and defends a theory of how one knows about one’s mental
life—a theory of self-knowledge, as philosophers use that term. The basic idea is
that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a
certain worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in
M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) Mental
statesarein this sense transparent:self-knowledgeisachieved by attending toa
corresponding tract of the world, not by taking an inward glance at one’s own
mind. Although written primarily for a philosophical audience, it is as much
an exercise in theoretical psychology as in philosophy. After an introduction in
Chapter1,rivalapproachestoself-knowledgearecriticallyexaminedinChapters
2and3.Anykindoftransparencyapproachfacesaseeminglyintractableobstacle,
thepuzzleoftransparency,whichisthetopicofChapter4.Thepositiveaccount
getsgoinginChapter5,andisextendedtoawidevarietyofmentalstatesinthe
remainingthreechapters.Readersfamiliarwiththeissuesmaywishtostartwith
thesecondhalf,butthebookhasbeendesignedasalongcontinuousargument.
Some of what follows has been reworked from previous papers: “Introspec-
tion,” Philosophical Topics 33 (2005); “Perception, recollection, imagination,”
PhilosophicalStudies148(2010);“KnowingthatIamthinking,”Self-Knowledge,
ed. A. Hatzimoysis, Oxford University Press (2011); “Knowing what I want,”
ConsciousnessandtheSelf:NewEssays,ed.J.LiuandJ.Perry,CambridgeUniversity
Press (2011); “Transparency, belief, intention,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society Supplementary Volume (2011); “Review essay of Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking
My Mind,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2011); and “Knowing
whatIsee,”IntrospectionandConsciousness,ed.D.SmithiesandD.Stoljar,Oxford
UniversityPress(2012).Ithankthepublishersforpermissiontousethismaterial.
In this book, single quotation marks (and sometimes italics) are used to
mention expressions (‘MIT’ contains three letters); double quotation marks are
usedforquotedmaterialandas“scare”quotes.
Philosophy is a collaborative enterprise, and many friends and colleagues
contributed to the theory set out here, mostly by vigorously objecting to it with
scantregardformyfeelings.Theyaretoblamefortheabsurdlengthoftimeithas
takenmetofinishthisbook.Still,asBobStalnakerisfondofsaying(quotingIris
Murdoch),inphilosophyifyouaren’tmovingatasnail’spaceyouaren’tmoving
at all. In random order, thanks are due to Louise Antony, Ralph Wedgwood,
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2018,SPi
viii PREFACE
Dick Moran, Josh Dever, Frank Hofmann, Chris Hill, Bertil Strömberg, Declan
Smithies, Kati Farkas, Ole Koksvik, JeeLoo Liu, Frank Jackson, Heather Logue,
LloydHumberstone,SallyHaslanger,HilaryKornblith,NicholasAsher,Andrew
McGonigal, Jonathan Schaffer, André Gallois, John Broome, Mohan Matthen,
NedHall,BrendanBalcerak-Jackson,SusannaSchellenberg,JohnSutton,Judith
Thomson, Mark Sainsbury, Eric Schwitzgebel, John Hawthorne, Brit Brogaard,
CasparHare,SarahMcGrath,RichardHolton,JuliaMarkovits,SteveYablo,Rae
Langton, Bob Stalnaker, Nico Silins, Becko Copenhaver, David Sosa, David
Hilbert, Jay Shaw, Cian Dorr, Susanna Siegel, Jennifer Nagel, Mark Johnston,
Jim van Cleve, David Chalmers, Sylvain Bromberger, Benj Hellie, Mike Roche,
AlvinGoldman,TimCrane,MartinDavies,RussHurlburt,PeterPagin,Michael
Tye, Fiona Macpherson, Ed Minar, Ned Block,Julia Markovits,Pär Sundström,
Nick Shea, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Houston Smit, Daniel Stoljar, Michael Brat-
man,MagdalenaBalcerak-Jackson,TomKelly,EdMares,ThomasNagel,David
Eng, François Recanati, Tim Williamson, Josh Schecter, Amy Kind, Sandra
Woloshuck, Fred Dretske, Jeremy Goodman, Adam Leite, Brie Gertler, Chris
Peacocke,JohnSchwenkler,KieranSetiya,SarahPaul,andLaurenAshwell.
I admit to having a strong feeling of knowing that this list is incomplete; my
thanks and apologies to those omitted. I am also grateful to the National
EndowmentfortheHumanities,theAustralianNationalUniversity,theUniver-
sityofKonstanz,and(inparticular)MITforinvaluableresearchsupport.
ThreeinsightfulandconscientiousreadersforOUP—oneofwhomturnedout
tobeBrieGertler—effectedmanyimprovementstothepenultimatemanuscript.
I am grateful to them, to Sally Evans-Darby for copyediting, to Ari Koslow for
preparing the index, and (of course) to Peter Momtchiloff. My brother Felix,
whosebreadthoftalentneverceasestoamaze,suppliedthecoverart.
Ireceivedadifferentsortofhelp,essentialtotheexistenceofthefinalproduct,
from many dedicated and caring professionals at the Massachusetts General
Hospital, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, and the Dana-Farber Cancer Insti-
tute.Iamespecially indebtedtoMattKulke,KeithLillemoe, PeterMueller,and
RalphWeissleder.
Finally,wegettotheobligatorypartwheretheauthor’sfamilyaresingledout
fortheirloveandforbearance.Onlythistime,Ireallymeanit.
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2018,SPi
Contents
1. ProblemsofSelf-Knowledge 1
1.1 Self-knowledge 1
1.2 Transparency 2
1.3 Privilegedandpeculiaraccess 4
1.3.1 McKinseyandRyle 4
1.3.2 Privilegedaccess 5
1.3.3 Peculiaraccess 8
1.3.4 Theindependenceofprivilegedandpeculiaraccess 9
1.3.5 PeculiaraccessandMcKinsey’spuzzle 10
1.3.6 Empiricalwork 11
1.4 Economy,inference,detection,unification 14
1.5 Self-knowledgeasaphilosophicalproblem 16
1.6 Preview 22
2. InnerSense 24
2.1 Introduction 24
2.2 Againstinnersense 26
2.2.1 Theobjectperceptionmodelandthebroadperceptualmodel 26
2.2.2 Objection1:innersensecan’tdetectextrinsicproperties
(Boghossian) 29
2.2.3 Objection2:innersenseislikeclairvoyance(Cassam) 31
2.2.4 Objection3:innersenseisincompatiblewithinfallibility 33
2.2.5 Objection4:innersenseisincompatiblewithself-intimation 37
2.2.6 Objection5:innersenseleadstoalienatedself-knowledge(Moran) 38
2.2.7 Objection6:innersensecannotexplainfirst-personauthority
(Finkelstein) 40
2.2.8 Objection7:thedeliverancesofinnersensearenotbaseless
(McDowell) 42
2.2.9 Objection8:innersenseimpliespossibilityofself-blindness
(Shoemaker) 43
2.3 Residualpuzzlesforinnersense 48
3. SomeRecentApproaches 50
3.1 Introduction 50
3.2 Davidsononfirst-personauthority 50
3.3 Moranonself-constitutionandrationalagency 57
3.4 Bar-On’sneo-expressivism 62
3.4.1 Simpleexpressivism 63
3.4.2 Twoquestions,oneanswer 64
3.4.3 Immunitytoerrorthroughmisidentificationandmisascription 66
3.4.4 Neo-expressivismandtheasymmetricpresumptionoftruth 70
