Transformative Use of Copyright Material

227 Pages·2009·1.36 MB·English

Transformative Use
of Copyright
Material
Nicolas Suzor BinfTech LLB
LLM Thesis, QUT School of Law
Preface i
Table of Contents
Chapter I. Introduction.................................1
1.Executive summary................................................................. 1
2.Outline of thesis...................................................................... 2
3.Methodology........................................................................... 4
4.Terminology........................................................................... 5
Chapter II. Desirability of transformative use
.......................................................................7
1.Autonomy.............................................................................. 9
2.Diversity............................................................................... 14
3.Simulacra............................................................................. 16
4.Allowing transformative speech as a normative principle............. 24
Chapter III. Legal restrictions on
transformative use....................................... 25
1.Remixing and sampling of music.............................................. 25
(a)Remixing......................................................................... 25
(i)A prominent example – mashups..................................... 28
(b)Sampling......................................................................... 29
(c)Remixing and sampling of other media................................ 33
(d)Fan-created music videos.................................................. 35
(e)Moral rights..................................................................... 35
2.The Panel............................................................................. 37
(a)The definition of 'broadcast'............................................... 37
(b)What is a 'substantial part' of a broadcast?.......................... 40
(c)How do the fair dealing exceptions apply?............................ 44
(d)The ramifications of The Panel for transformative use............ 48
3.Marvel v NCSoft.................................................................... 49
(a)Primary liability in Australia............................................... 51
(b)Secondary liability in Australia............................................52
4.Machinima............................................................................ 56
ii Preface
Chapter IV. The theoretical justification for
copyright in transformative works................60
1.The reification of copyright...................................................... 60
2. The utilitarian economic justification of copyright...................... 64
(a)Limits of the economic justification..................................... 66
(i)Deadweight loss............................................................ 67
(ii)Administration and transaction costs in inputs.................. 70
(iii)Inputs into non-market or public goods........................... 71
(iv)Rent-seeking............................................................... 73
(v)Over-investment in the creation of intellectual property..... 74
(vi)Difference in value....................................................... 77
(b)Commons critique............................................................ 79
(i)The comedy of the commons...........................................80
(ii)The tragedy of the anticommons.....................................83
(iii)The commons of transformative use and the information
semicommons.................................................................. 86
(c)The economic justification in relation to transformative works.88
3.Hegelian personality............................................................... 89
(i)Separation of economic and moral rights.......................... 91
(ii)Distinction between personal and fungible property........... 93
(iii)Personality theory and transformative use of creative works
...................................................................................... 94
4.Lockean labour / desert.......................................................... 96
(a)'Labour' .......................................................................... 96
(b)The 'no harm' proviso....................................................... 98
(c)The 'no waste' proviso..................................................... 101
(d)Labour theory and transformative uses.............................. 105
5. Social planning theory......................................................... 108
(a)Social planning theory and transformative use.................... 110
6.Reconciling the theories – the interests served by copyright.......114
Chapter V. How should the law reflect the
theory?.......................................................116
1.'Substantial Part'..................................................................116
(a)Defining the contours of a substitutability test.................... 126
(b)Substitutability and market harm caused by lost licensing
potential............................................................................ 128
(c)Application of a substitutability test................................... 135
2.Fair dealing......................................................................... 137
(a)Fair dealing for the purposes of criticism or review.............. 138
(b)Fair dealing for the purposes of parody, pastiche, and
caricature?......................................................................... 145
(c)A distinction between parody and other uses...................... 146
(d)The fallacy that fair dealing provides certainty at the expense of
flexibility........................................................................... 149
(e)The inflexibility of fair dealing........................................... 150
3.Fair use.............................................................................. 151
(a)Fair use and transformative works vs the extended
substantiality tests.............................................................. 153
Preface iii
(i)Fair Use in Australia..................................................... 158
4.Moral rights......................................................................... 161
(a)Attribution and the right to not be falsely attributed............ 162
(b)The right of integrity....................................................... 164
(i)When will a use be derogatory?..................................... 164
(A)The Carmina Burana case........................................ 164
(B)Foreign moral rights authorities................................ 167
(ii)The 'reasonableness' defence........................................170
(iii)Moral protection from commodification.......................... 176
(A)Extending the moral right of integrity to protect against
commodification..........................................................179
(iv)'substantial part' and the moral right of integrity............ 184
(c)The right of withdrawal.................................................... 186
5.Constitutional limits..............................................................187
(a)Section 51(xviii)............................................................. 187
(b)Implied guarantee of free political speech.......................... 189
(i)An implied defence based on freedom of speech...............189
(ii)Reading copyright law by the light of free speech............ 191
6.Compulsory licensing ........................................................... 193
7.Voluntary open access licensing............................................. 195
Chapter VI. Conclusion............................. 200
1.Recommendations................................................................ 200
(a)The definition of 'substantial part' in the economic rights......201
(b)Fair dealing.................................................................... 201
(c)Fair use......................................................................... 201
(d)Moral rights................................................................... 202
(e)Constitutional limits........................................................ 203
(f)Compulsory licensing....................................................... 203
(g)Voluntary licensing .........................................................204
2.Substantiality illustrated - which uses should be allowable?........204
(a)Examples...................................................................... 205
3.Conclusion.......................................................................... 207
Chapter VII. Bibliography.........................208
1.Articles........................................................................... 208
2.Cases............................................................................. 215
3.Books............................................................................. 218
4.Submissions.................................................................... 219
5.Reports ..........................................................................220
6.International conventions.................................................. 220
7.Statutory materials.......................................................... 221
iv Preface
The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to
meet requirements of an award at this or any other higher education
institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains
no material previously published or written by another person except
where due reference is made.
Nicolas Suzor 13/01/06
1

Chapter I. Introduction
1. Executive summary
This thesis concerns the ability of individuals to engage in transformative
use of copyright expression without the permission of the copyright
owner. Transformative use refers to the use of existing expression as an
input into the creative process, resulting in the creation of new
expression that, while still embodying elements of the original work, is
original in its own right. This type of creativity is beneficial for society
and should be encouraged. Individuals should have the ability to express
themselves, and participate in the interpretation of their culture.
My enquiry has shown that Australian law does not facilitate
transformative use. Many forms of transformative expression are not
currently permissible without the express permission of the copyright
owner. Copyright theory, however, is not in accordance with such a
prohibition on transformative use. I will suggest some legislative and
judicial reforms to Australian copyright law that can have the effect of
encouraging transformative expression, while at the same time providing
an economic incentive to invest in creative expression and protecting the
legitimate interests of creators in their works.
The primary modification I suggest is that the definition of 'substantial
part' in the Coypright Act 1968 (Cth) should be read, in accordance with
the interests served by copyright, to allow a consideration of the
context in which copyright material is taken. The seeds of such an
approach are present in modern judicial interpretations; the discussion
that follows attempts to show how such an approach accords with
copyright theory, and why it should be preferred by the judiciary. Firstly,
with respect to the economic rights, transformative uses of copyright
material which are not substitutable for the original expression should
not be found to reproduce a substantial part of the original. Secondly,
questions of substantiality in the moral rights should be interpreted to
protect authors from unreasonable commodification of their works. To
2 Introduction
the extent to which it is unclear how the right of integrity applies to the
context in which a work is used, as opposed to the modification of the
work itself, I submit that it should be interpreted such that authors have
a right to object to the commercial association of their work with a
position, product, or service against their will.
Alternatively, I submit that legislative reform to include an open ended
defence to copyright infringement could provide much needed flexibility
in the Australian system. Such a defence could draw primarily on the US
'fair use' defence, but certain limitations of the US defence could be
overcome in an Australian context. Again, as the theory shows, the
primary consideration for infringement of the economic rights in
transformative uses should be the degree to which the transformative
use is substitutable for the original.
Finally, I submit that the reasonableness defence to infringement of the
moral right of integrity should be read in such a way as to ensure that
the personal interests of authors does not interfere with the legitimate
self-expression of future authors. I will show that the theory does not
support moral rights to the exclusion of either the ability of future
authors to self-actualise. The operation of the reasonableness defence
should be clarified to ensure that the legitimate interests of both past
and future creators are recognised.
2. Outline of thesis
This thesis begins with the assumption that transformative use of
existing expression is beneficial for society. The second chapter briefly
considers the basis for that assumption, canvassing benefits to
autonomy, democratisation of speech, and the importance of allowing
individuals to interact with their environment, even if that environment
is heavily constructed from copyright expression. This chapter argues
that enlarging the number and range of speakers and increasing the
flexibility of meaning provides benefits for democratic social discourse.
This argument is then extended further, to the principle that social
discourse can only legitimise the exercise of power in a democracy if the
dominant expression is able to be deconstructed; and, that one of the
most effective ways to deconstruct the hegemony of expression is to
Introduction 3
permit individuals to engage in the modification of meaning through
transformative use of that expression. Finally, this chapter concludes
with the argument that if society is largely constructed through
copyright expression, but copyright material is removed from the realm
of available inputs into creative expression, individuals can become
alienated through the loss of the ability to interact with and represent
their environment.
The third chapter considers some recent examples of transformative
uses which have been restrained through the effect of copyright law,
drawing attention to the fact that the ability to engage in transformative
re-expression is virtually non-existent in Australia. The examples cover
areas of remixing and sampling of music, appropriation of television
1
broadcasts as seen in The Panel, questions of copyright liability for
roleplaying with characters from popular culture in Massively Multiplayer
Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs), and the use of computer games
as an engine for creativity in the animation genre called 'Machinima'.
This chapter also introduces the current state of Australian copyright
law, as a platform from which advances can be proposed in Chapter
Five.
Chapter Four considers the theoretical basis upon which copyright law
rests, in order to determine the proper extent of the power of authors
and copyright owners to prevent transformative use of their expression.
The first theory considers the utilitarian justification of copyright, that
copyright law provides the necessary economic incentives required for
creativity. The second theory is derived from Hegelian personality
theory, that an author has a personal moral interest in the work that he
or she creates, as an extension of the author's self. The third theory
considered is the Lockean labour/desert justification of intellectual
property, that a person who exerts themselves to create original
expression from the commons deserves a property interest in that
expression. Finally, these theories are reconciled, as far as they are
able, to provide some guiding principles for the application of copyright
law to transformative works. In cases of conflict, the approach that
1 Network Ten Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 273;
TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd (No 2) (2005) 145 FCR
35.
4 Introduction
maximises social and democratic interests prevails.
Chapter Five takes the principles enunciated in Chapter Four, and
attempts to apply them to copyright law in Australia. This chapter
argues for change to specific areas of copyright law to better
accommodate the theory on transformative use. Firstly, this chapter
argues that the definition of 'substantial part' should be broadened to
take into consideration the context within which copyright material is
reused before it is deemed infringing. This approach is preferred on the
basis that it both accords with common law principles and allows
Australian copyright law to evolve without necessitating legislative
intervention. This chapter also argues that the fair dealing defences
should provide a broader interpretation of 'criticism', 'review', and
'news', in order to better accommodate transformative use, or,
alternatively, that an express legislative exception for parody,
caricature, and pastiche, is introduced. In the event that modifying the
definition of 'substantial part' is not acceptable, this chapter argues in
the alternative that a broad, open-ended fair-use style defence to
copyright infringement be introduced. Finally, the extent of the moral
right of integrity is considered, with a view to both limiting the ability of
authors to object to the expression of new authors, and also increasing
the protection that authors receive from commodification of their work.
The final chapter provides a summary of the principles and
recommendations discussed in this thesis. It is hoped that this thesis can
provide a useful guide to courts and policy makers in understanding the
theoretical basis upon which copyright law exists, and the extent to
which the theory requires greater accommodation for transformative use
of existing expression. The legislative and judicial advances presented
are intended to provide a sound balance between necessary protection
of the interests of authors and publishers on the one hand, and those of
future authors on the other.
3. Methodology
This research has been carried out from a number of primary legislative
and judicial materials, and a large range of academic writings. Extensive
use has been made of online reference tools and legal databases, and