Toward a Consensus on Military Service. Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on Military Service

337 Pages·1982·5.068 MB·English

by  Andrew J. Goodpaster and Lloyd H. Elliott (Auth.)

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I b w a r da
Consensus
on Military
Service
Report of the Atlantic
Council's Working Group
on Military Service
Andrew J. Goodpaster
Lloyd H. Elliott
Co-Chairmen
J. Allan Hovey, Jr.
Rapporteur
Foreword by Kenneth Rush
Pergamon Press
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Printed in the United States of America
"Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to
direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first."
John Jay, 1788
The Federalist
"The terror of the Roman arms added weight and dignity to the moderation of
the emperors. They preserved the peace by a constant preparation for war."
Edward Gibbon, 1776
The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire
"The citizenry in general, and American youth in particular, must be given a
better idea of what U.S.national interests are, of how U.S. foreign and domestic
policies are designed to support those interests, and of the role that the military
institution serves to protect those interests."
Martin Binkin, 1980
Military Manpower in the 1980s: Issues and Choices
List of Figures
4.1. Military Manpower Procurement and Male Youth Population 79
4.2. Blacks as a Percentage of Active-Duty Enlisted End Strengths 92
4.3. Distribution of Enlisted Accessions According to Race 93
4.4. Career Reenlistment and Retention 100
5.1. Selected Reserve End Strengths 117
5.2. Educational Attainment of Selected Reserve NPS Accessions 121
5.3. Selected Reserve NPS Accessions by Mental Category 122
5.4. Strength Trends in the Individual Ready Reserve 125
7.1. Army Accessions with Some College 155
7.2. Army Cat. I and Cat. II Accessions 155
7.3. Army Below-Average Accessions 157
7.4. Black Representation in the Army Enlisted Force 157
7.5. Army First-Term Attrition Rates 159
7.6. Army First-Term Enlistees—Percent Married 159
List of Tables
3.1. Shortfall in Army Requirements 58
3.2. Shortfall in Army Requirements 59
3.3. Shortfall in Army Requirements 59
3.4. Defense Manpower: The Baseline Force 61
4.1. Recruiting Performance: Enlistments versus Objectives 83
4.2. Enlistment End Strengths: Actual versus Programmed 84
4.3. Total Defense Personnel 85
4.4. Quality of Enlisted Accessions 88
4.5. Qualification and Participation Rate for Category I-III Males:
by Race 94
4.6. Unemployment Rate for Male 16- to 19-Year-Olds by Race 95
4.7. Distribution of Male Enlisted Accessions by SMSA ZIP Codes
Ranked According to Average Family Income 97
4.8. Enlisted Personnel Turnover Rates 102
4.9. Defense Manpowers Costs by Source 104
A-4.1. Percentages of White Preinductees and All Army Applicants
For Enlisted Classified as Category I-III 110
A-4.2. Method for Calculating Revised Category IVs 111
5.1. United States Air Force Selected Reserve Strength 118
5.2. Marine Reserve Requirements 118
5.3. Navy Reserve Requirements 119
5.4. Army Manning History 120
5.5. Educational Status 122
5.6. Test Score Categories 123
5.7. Black Representation 124
5.8. IRR Strengths 126
5.9. Potential for Army IRR Demand 129
6.1. GI Bill Cost Estimates with Citizen-Soldier Track 142
7.1. Army Trained Manpower Requirements versus Assets 168
7.2. Active Army Enlisted Nonprior Service Recruit Quality
Distribution as Measured by Mental Grouping and
Educational Level 170
7.3. Army High-Technology Trends as Indicated by Cost 171
7.4. Army Attrition Losses 173
7.5. Army PMVF Enlistment Options 183
8.1. Active Duty and Ready Reserve Personnel Strength,
Selected Years: 1950-1980 204
8.2. Annual Inductions to Achieve Steady-State of 150,000
IRR Conscripts after Four Years, by MSO 214
List of Tables xi
8.3. An All-Volunteer Force and a Pre-Vietnam-Like Draft
in Steady-State Analysis: An Illustrative Comparison of Effects
on DoD Enlisted Force 222
8.4. Fiscal Year 1981 Nonprior Service Accessions
by Racial/Ethnic Groups 225
All-10.1. Defense Manpower: The Baseline Force 312
All-10.2. Active Army Enlisted Nonprior Service Recruit Quality
Distribution Measured by Mental Groupings and
Educational Level 313
AII-10.3. Army AVF Enlistment Options 314
Foreword
The Atlantic Council, now in its twenty-second year, is a bi-partisan edu-
cational organization which conducts programs to promote understanding
of major international security, political and economic problems affecting
the United States and its allies, foster informed public debate on these issues,
and make policy recommendations to the Executive and Legislative branches
of the U.S. Government, as well as to appropriate international organiza-
tions. On behalf of the Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council I want to
congratulate General Andrew J. Goodpaster and Dr. Lloyd H. Elliott, co-
chairmen of the Council's Military Service Working Group, Dr. J. Allan
Hovey, Jr., rapporteur, and each of the Working Group members for the
utility as well as the excellence of their assessment of U.S. military man-
power problems and prospects today, and for the years ahead. The subject
is critical to the security of the United States and its allies, both in terms of
the credibility as well as the capability of Western defense.
The bi-partisan panel of experts recommends that President Reagan's ad-
ministration prepare the American people for the probable resumption of
the military draft sometime during this decade. Concluding that the require-
ments of security are unlikely to be met indefinitely by the present all-volun-
teer force, the 18-month study meanwhile proposes a generous new peace-
time "GI Bill" of educational benefits to attract additional recruits. These
conclusions represent a substantial consensus on the part of some fifty-five
prominent Americans in education, the professions, the armed services,
business, labor, high government service, and youth from both political
parties, listed on pages xix-xxii.
Given the rising costs of higher education, the report states, this new "GI
Bill" should attract growing numbers of college- or trade school-bound mid-
dle-class Americans who would find a temporary diversion from the world
of school or work tolerable and perhaps even welcome. The cost of the pro-
gram would be minimal at most and might even be zero. I personally believe
that the proposed enlistment options would be good for the armed services,
good for American colleges and universities, and good for the individuals
choosing to take part.
The report, the latest in the Atlantic Council's series of Policy Papers on
security issues, specifically emphasizes the necessity of adequate conven-
tional forces to deter armed aggression and reduce the risks of a nuclear
confrontation between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Noting
xiv Foreword
that manpower is a key element in adequate conventional forces, the report
welcomes the fact that in fiscal years 1981 and 1982 the All-Volunteer Force
recovered from previous years and essentially achieved its recruitment goals
for both quality and quantity. The report notes, however, that American
military active-duty strength at the beginning of the 1980s is at its lowest ebb
since 1950. Some increase in force size may become necessary (and some has
been programmed) in coming years, and it will have to be obtained from a
diminishing manpower pool. Economic recovery and a consequent drop in
unemployment could further reduce the numbers of qualified young people
who might enlist. It remains to be seen, the report warns, whether the recent
improvements in recruitment can be maintained under such conditions.
Moreover, higher quality of manpower becomes ever more essential with
the growing sophistication of weaponry.
The purpose of adequate conventional forces, both active and reserve, in
terms of their quality as much as their quantity, is to forestall the coercive
threat of aggression, credibly deter such aggression, and, if necessary, com-
bat it. The bottom line for the U.S. today is that our military manpower read-
iness and capability are not fully adequate to fulfill this mission. Unless we
abdicate our role as leader and principal defender of the West, we cannot
change that mission; we must, therefore, improve our capability and readi-
ness. The problem is just that simple. And just that dangerous. The cure,
however, as the reader will discern in the following pages, is not simple at
all. The good news is that a cure is possible, indeed likely, if we follow the
careful prescriptions recommended by the Atlantic Council's Working
Group. Moreover, the cure is not costly, in either fiscal or political terms.
It does require a significant reorientation of our manpower priorities,
and a good deal of public education. This book is a fine start toward both
objectives.
KENNETH RUSH
Chairman, Board of Directors
The Atlantic Council of the
United States
Preface
This book examines the experience and prospects of the nation's peace-
time military volunteer force. Chapter 10 (the Policy Paper) offers a broad
range of recommendations designed both to strengthen that force and to
prepare the way, should circumstances require it, for a resumption of com-
pulsory military service.
Winston Churchill is reported to have remarked that "Democracy is the
worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried
from time to time." It is in one sense a weakness of democracies that impor-
tant changes of policy must have the tacit consent if not the express ap-
proval of the people. One pays —willingly, gratefully—a price in delay of
action, in the public airing of error, and in the organized chaos of contro-
versy. But it is a great strength of democracy that policy thus achieved has
behind it the unique power of the consensus of a free people. The United
States today needs a broader and deeper consensus on the West's strategic
position and on the role and needs of the military services in deterring war
and protecting our vital interests. We believe the findings and recommenda-
tions in this book can help point the country in that direction.
We are fortunate to have had the benefit of an extremely well qualified
Working Group to explore these issues. Their names appear following this
Preface. Chapter 10 seeks to record the consensus that emerged from many
hours of discussion and correspondence among a group of informed and
thoughtful Americans. Not all the Working Group participants agree with
everything in that chapter, of course, and a variety of comments and dis-
senting opinions are recorded in the notes or in Appendix I, as appropriate.
We should also add that the views expressed are those of the Military Ser-
vice Working Group and not necessarily those of the Atlantic Council as a
whole.
Nine working papers written by 11 members of the Working Group, to-
gether with successive drafts of the Policy Paper prepared by our Rappor-
teur, provided the basis for our deliberations over the past 18 months. All
of these working papers and the Policy Paper are published here.
The Working Group was privileged to discuss these chapters and a draft
of the Policy Paper with additional participants in a Regional American As-
sembly held at Air lie House, Virginia, March 11 to 14,1982. The conference
was cosponsored by the American Assembly at Columbia University and the
Atlantic Council with the support and encouragement of the Ford Founda-