Thomas Reid and ‘The Way of Ideas’

307 Pages·1989·15.74 MB·English

by  Roger D. Gallie (auth.)

THOMAS REID AND 'THE WAY OF IDEAS'
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES
Editors:
WILFRID SELLARS, University of Pittsburgh
KEITH LEHRER, University ofA rizona
Board of Consulting Editors:
JONATHAN BENNETT, Syracuse University
ALLAN GIBBARD, University of Michigan
ROBERT STALNAKER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ROBERT G. TURNBULL, Ohio State University
VOLUME 45
THOMAS REID
AND
'THE WAY OF IDEAS'
by
ROGER D. GALLIE
University of Leicester, United Kingdom
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
DORDRECHT / BOSTON I LONDON
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Gallie.RogerD.
Thomas Reid and "the way of ideas" / by Roger D. Gallie.
p. c~. -- (Philosophical studies series; 45)
Bibliography: p.
Inc 1u des index.
1. Reid. Thomas. 1710-1796. 1. Title. II. Series: Philosophical
studies series; v. 45.
B1537.G34 1989
192--dc20 89-15400
ISBN-13: 978-94-010-7599-2 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-2436-9
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-2436-9
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE xi
INTRODUCTION xiii
CHAPTER I: INVESTIGATING OUR MENTAL POWERS
1.1 Hume: Thinking versus feeling
1.2 Reid: Conception versus sensation 4
1.3 Laws of our constitution and epistemologically prior 9
principles
1.4 How to arrive at laws of nature 12
1.5 Scientific study of the mind? 18
CHAPTER II: THE IDEAL HYPOTHESIS
2.1 Ideas as objects of perception 21
2.2 Perception and impressions on the mind 26
2.3 Perception by way of perceiving images 29
2.4 Is the table we see an image? 33
2.5 The role of sensation in perception 36
VI TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER III: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROLE OF
PERCEPTION
3. 1 Is there fallacy of the senses? 44
3.2 The appearance of objects to the eye 48
3.3 Reliance on the senses 52
CHAPTER IV: THE CONSTITUENTS OF REALITY
4.1 The testimony of the senses and the world of material 61
bodies
4.2 Primary versus secondary qualities 67
4.3 Colour versus shape 71
4.4 Are there other minds than mine? 75
4.5 An intelligent Author of Nature? 83
CHAPTER V: WHAT WORDS SIGNIFY
5.1 Locke's theory of signification 91
5.2 What proper names and general words signify according to 95
Reid
5.3 Individual and general conceptions 101
5.4 Whether proper names signify attributes 104
TABLE OF CONTENTS vii
5.5 The variety of objects of conception 107
5.6 Conceiving the real and the unreal 111
5.7 Attributions to conceivable individuals 116
5.8 Things objectively in my mind 122
CHAPTER VI: ACTIVE POWER
6. 1 Knowingly giving rise to new actions 130
6.2 Locke on active power 132
6.3 Reid's account of active power 135
6.4 Difficulties within Reid's account 137
6.5 Divine prescience and active power 141
6.6 Is every future event already determined? 145
6.7 Moral attributions and active power 149
CHAPTER VII; CAUSALITY
7. 1 Concerning some criticisms of H ume' s view of the causal 154
principle
7.2 No proof of the causal principle available within Hume's 156
philosophy
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS
7.3 Past instances and the uniformity of nature 158
7.4 Presupposition and the authority of experience 161
7.5 Reid's notion of cause 165
7.6 Wisdom, prudence and causal law 169
CHAPTER VIII: IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY
8. 1 The sameness of a person 172
8.2 Amnesia and the same person 176
8.3 The Brave Officer paradox 179
8.4 The sameness of plants and artefacts 184
8.5 What is found on entry into the self 192
8.6 Consciousness and awareness of self 196
8.7 Memories and personal identity 199
CHAPTER IX: OF COMMON SENSE AND FIRST
PRINCIPLES
9. 1 How to detect first principles 208
9.2 First principles and modes of argument 218
9.3 Our faculties are not fallacious 223
TABLE OF CONTENTS ix
9.4 The first principles to be employed in the investigation of 227
the mind
9.5 Accounting for beliefs 232
9.6 First principles and judgments 237
9.7 Providential Naturalism 240
NOTES 244
BIBLIOGRAPHY 265
INDEX 281
PREFACE
This book is meant to serve as an introduction to the philosophy of
Thomas Reid by way of a study of certain themes central to that
philosophy as we find it expounded in his extensive and influential
published writings. The choice of these themes inevitably reflects
philosophical interests of the author of this book to some extent but a
main consideration behind their selection is that they are extensively
treated by Reid in response to treatments by certain of his predecessors
in an identifiable tradition called by Yolton 'The Way ofIdeas'.
My interest in Reid's philosophy was first awakened by the brilliant
writings of A.N. Prior, and in particular by Part II of his posthumous
'Objects of Thought' called 'What we think about' together with his
suggestion that Reid was a precursor of Mill on the signification of
proper names. It is my hope that the standard of exegesis and of
discussion throughout the book, and especially in the case of these
topics, is a not unworthy tribute to that thinker.
The reader will not fail to notice my continual advertance to the
writings of John Locke. This is of course because in my judgement
Locke so often sets the scene for Reid's discussions on topics, and quite
often indeed tentatively reaches conclusions like those that Reid comes
to favour after due consideration, even though Reid sometimes
characterises him as one of his benighted predecessors. Accordingly I
have not hesitated to quote at what I regard as appropriate length from
Locke, and for similar reasons from Hume; and later on Arnauld and
Leibniz suffer from this kind of exposure as well, although to a much
lesser degree.
It is now time to express further acknowledgments. It will,
hopefully, be clear from my text, as well as from my index and
bibliography, that I have derived benefit from the writings of many
others who have taken the trouble to study some of the themes in Reid
covered in this book. In particular I mention Keith Lehrer, Godfrey
Vesey, Gareth Evans, David Norton, John Yolton, Timothy Duggan,
Louise Marcil-Lacoste and Richard Routley. Nor should the name of
Selwyn Grave be omitted from such a list even if I often depart from the
views expressed in his clear and comprehensive work 'The Scottish
Philosophy of Common Sense'. And now for acknowledgment of quite
other sources of benefit.
Encouragement and support may well be academic intangibles but
all the more important for that. Without them this enterprise would not
have been brought to completion by this author. Here I must thank
Professor A.J. Ayer for reading versions of two chapters and making
encouraging comments before I dared submit them to any publisher.
And then lowe a great debt to Dr. Melvin Dalgarno for putting me in
touch with crucially important items in the Reid literature that were
and, alas, still are difficult to obtain, and for his continuing
encouragement from an even earlier stage in this enterprise. Perhaps I
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