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religions Article The Thomistic Dissolution of the Logical Problem of Evil EdwardFeser DepartmentofSocialSciences,PasadenaCityCollege,Pasadena,CA91106,USA;[email protected] Abstract:Inhisbook‘IsaGoodGodLogicallyPossible?’,JamesSterbaarguesthattheexistenceof muchoftheeviltobefoundintheworldislogicallyincompatiblewiththeexistenceofGod.Idefend theThomisticviewthatwhenoneproperlyunderstandsthenatureofGodandofhisrelationshipto theworld,thisso-calledlogicalproblemofevildoesnotarise.WhileSterbahasrespondedtothe versionoftheThomisticpositionpresentedbyBrianDavies,Iarguethathisresponsefails. Keywords:problemofevil;theodicy;ThomasAquinas;JamesP.Sterba;BrianDavies IstheexistenceofGodlogicallycompatiblewiththeexistenceofevil? Oristherea strictcontradictionbetweenthetwo? The“logicalproblemofevil”istheproblemfacing thetheistofshowingthattheappearanceofcontradictionisillusory. J.L.Mackiefamously (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:1)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:1) arguedthatthecontradictionisreal,sotheproblemcannotbesolvedandtheismisrefuted.1 (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7) AlvinPlantingaiswidelythoughttohaveshownthatMackiewaswrong,sothemostthat Citation: Feser,Edward.2021.The theatheistcanaimforisan“evidentialargumentfromevil”accordingtowhichthereality ThomisticDissolutionoftheLogical ofevilmakesGod’sexistenceimprobablebutnotimpossible.2 JamesSterbahasrecently ProblemofEvil.Religions12: 268. arguedthatMackiewasrightafterall,oratanyratethatPlantingaandothershavefailed https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12040268 toshowotherwise.3 CentraltohisargumentistheassumptionthatGodisobligatedto obeymoralimperativessuchasthe“PaulinePrinciple”thatwemayneverdoevilthat AcademicEditor:JamesSterba goodmaycomeofit. IfGodexisted,Sterbaclaims,hewouldbeviolatingthisprinciple byeitherwillingorpermittingevilforthesakeofagreatergood,andthereforebeless Received:20February2021 thanperfectlygoodhimself. Indeed,inlightoftheevilthatactuallyexistsinourworld,he Accepted:9April2021 wouldbe“moreimmoralthanallofourhistoricalvillainstakentogether.”4 Published:13April2021 Inthispaper,Iwillexplainwhy,fromaThomisticpointofview,theso-calledlogical problem of evil (and, for that matter, the evidential problem of evil) cannot arise.5 For Publisher’sNote:MDPIstaysneutral theThomist,whenoneproperlyunderstandswhatGodisandwhatmoralityandmoral withregardtojurisdictionalclaimsin agents are, it simply makes no sense to think of God as less than perfectly good or as publishedmapsandinstitutionalaffil- morallyobligatedtopreventtheevilthatexists. The“problem”restsonacategorymistake. iations. ThereasonshavenothingessentiallytodowiththeargumentsofPlantingaandcompany, which I will not be defending. They do have to do with considerations raised by the ThomistphilosopherBrianDavies,towhomSterbahasresponded.6 ButwhileIagreewith thesubstanceofDavies’viewsandwillbedefendinghimagainstSterba, Iwilllargely Copyright: © 2021 by the author. befocusingonThomisticconsiderationsotherthantheonesthatSterbaaddresseswhen Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. replyingtoDavies. This article is an open access article AquinasandtheThomistictraditiontowhichhisthoughtgaverisehave,ofcourse, distributed under the terms and beenextremelyinfluentialinthehistoryoftheologyandphilosophyofreligion,andthat conditionsoftheCreativeCommons alonemakesitworthwhiletoconsiderhowtheproblemofevillooksfromtheThomist’s Attribution(CCBY)license(https:// pointofview. ButIhastentoemphasizethatthemainideasIwillbeexpoundingbyno creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/). meansreflectmerelythatparticularpointofview. Onthecontrary,thoughsomeofmy 1 (Mackie1955). 2 Cf.(Plantinga1977).The“evidential”versionoftheproblemofevilisfamouslypresentedby(Rowe1979). 3 (Sterba2019). 4 Ibid.,p.192. 5 ForasurveyofThomisticwritingontheproblemofevil,seechapter5of(Shanley2002). 6 Cf.(Davies2006).SterbarespondstoDaviesinchapter6of(Sterba2019). Religions2021,12,268.https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12040268 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Religions2021,12,268 2of17 formulationswillbedistinctivelyThomistic,theoverallpicturereflectsthebroadtradition ofclassicaltheism,whichhasancientrootsinAristotelianismandNeo-Platonism; was developedinmedievaltimesbyAnselm,Aquinas,andotherScholasticsintheChristian context, Maimonides and others in the Jewish context, and Avicenna and others in the Islamiccontext;anddeeplyinformstheteachingoftheRomanCatholicChurch,Eastern Orthodoxy, andtheearliestProtestantReformersalike. Inotherwords, theconception of God and his relationship to the moral order that I will be presenting is, historically speaking,themainstreamposition. AsDavieshasinseveralplaceslamented,muchcontemporaryphilosophyofreligion, whetheratheistortheist,presupposesaverydifferentandexcessivelyanthropomorphic conception of God that he has labeled “theistic personalism.”7 That is certainly true of recentdiscussionoftheproblemofevil,andofSterbaandPlantingaalike. Foritisonly when we attribute to God features that can intelligibly be said to belong only to finite agentsthatitcanseemappropriateeithertoattackordefendhismoralvirtue. Thatisnot becauseGodislessthanamorallygoodperson,butpreciselybecauseheisinfinitelymore thanthat. 1. TheNaturalOrder Hereistheexecutivesummary:ForThomistsandotherclassicaltheists,Godisutterly distinct from the natural order of things, creating and sustaining it in being ex nihilo whilebeinginnowayaffectedbyitinturn. Butthe“logicalproblemofevil”implicitly presupposesthatGodishimselfpartofthenaturalorder,oratleastcausallyrelatedtoitin somethinglikethewaythatentitieswithinthatorderarerelatedtooneanother. Hence,the “problem”restsonacategorymistake,sotoexposethemistakeistodissolvetheproblem. Naturally, this needs spelling out. Let us begin with the Thomistic account of the naturalorder.8 Thefirstthingtosayisthatthisordercomprisesacollectionofinterrelated substances,eachwithitsowndistinctiveessenceornature,andmanifestingpropertiesand causalpowersgroundedinthoseessencesornatures. Forexample,sulfurisasubstance, which,byvirtueofitsessence,isyellowincolorandhasapowertogenerateflame,which istriggeredwhenthesulfurisheated. Atreeisasubstancewhich,byvirtueofitsessence, sinksrootsintotheearthsoastostabilizeitandtakeinwater,growsleavesandbark,and carriesoutphotosynthesis. Abeaverisasubstancewhich, byvirtueofitsessence, has iron-richteeth,usesthemtognawatandfelltrees,andthenusesthewoodfromthetrees tobuilddamnsandshelters. Theseareexamplesofphysicalsubstances,whichinThomisticmetaphysicsaretaken to be composites of form and matter.9 Matter is what individuates physical substances, tyingdowntheessencedefinitiveofanaturalkindtoaparticularindividual,time,and place. Formiswhatorganizesthemattersothattheresultingsubstanceoperatesinthe waycharacteristicofthingsofthatkind. Forexample,thereistreenessconsideredasan abstractuniversal,andthereistheconcreteparticulartreestandingattherearleftofmy backyard, the concrete particular tree standing in my neighbor’s front yard, and so on. Though having treeness in common, these concrete particulars are distinct individuals becausetheyareassociatedwithdifferentbitsofmatter. Thatthematterconstitutesatree ineachcaseratherthansomeotherkindofthingisduetoitshavingtakenontheformor organizationalstructurecharacteristicoftrees. Form, matter, and causal powers are in turn analyzed by the Thomist in terms of the notions of actuality and potentiality. Matter considered in abstraction from form is 7 Forexample,in(Davies2021),chapter1.ThoughDaviesdoesnotusethelabelin(Davies2006),theisticpersonalismistheviewhehasinmind whencriticizingtheideasofphilosopherslikeRichardSwinburneatpp.52–54,59–62,and93–95ofthatbook. 8 Foradetailedexpositionanddefenseofthemetaphysicalideasdiscussedinthissection,seechapter2of(Feser2009),andforanevenmoredetailed expositionanddefense,see(Feser2014b). 9 Thomistsalsoholdthatthelargercreatedorderincludesincorporealsubstances—namelyangels,conceivedofascreaturesofpureintellect.But sincethepointsIwanttomakedonotstrictlyrequireadiscussionofangels,andsincethispaperislongenoughasitis,Iwillputthetopicto oneside. Religions2021,12,268 3of17 merelypotentiallyatree,orabeaver,orsulfur. Theformittakesonactualizesoneofthese potentials,resultinginaphysicalsubstanceofaspecifickind. Thepowerscharacteristic ofthatsubstanceare,inturn,themselvespotentialities,andtheycanbeofeitheranactive orpassivesort. Anactivepotentialityisacapacitytoaffectotherthings,suchassulfur’s capacitytoburnotherthingswhenignited,orabeaver’scapacitytodamageorfellatree. Apassivepotentialityisaliabilitytobeaffectedbyotherthings,suchasatree’sliabilityto befelledorabeaver’sliabilitytobekilledbyapredator. Potentialities of either kind always involve a teleology or directedness of at least a rudimentary sort, where this directedness is toward ends or outcomes that reflect the distinctiveessenceofthethingwhichhasthepotentiality. Sulfurisbyvirtueofitsnature directedoraimedtowardgeneratingflamewhentherighttriggeringconditionsarepresent. Atreeisbyvirtueofitsnaturedirectedoraimedtowardsinkingrootsintotheground andgrowingleavesandbark. Abeaverisbyvirtueofitsnaturedirectedoraimedtoward gnawingattrees,fellingthem,andthenusingthemtoconstructdamsandshelters. The matterofwhichanyphysicalsubstanceiscomposedisdirectedoraimedtowardtaking ontheformofadifferentkindofsubstancewhentheconditionsareright. Forexample, thematterthatmakesupatreeisdirectedoraimedtowardbecomingashwhenflameis appliedtoitlongenough,towardbecomingdryanddeadwoodwhenthetreeisfelled, towardbecomingnutritivematerialwhenanorganismlikeatermiteingestsit,andsoon. A law of nature, in Thomist metaphysics, is essentially a description of the way a physicalsubstancewilltendtooperategivenitsnatureoressence. Forexample,tosaythat itisalawofchemistrythatsulfurgeneratesflamewhenheatedisaroundaboutwayof sayingthatgiventhenatureoressenceofsulfur,ithasapowerofgeneratingflamewhich willbetriggeredwhenitisheated. Tosaythatitisalawofphysicsthatanobjectatrest willstayatrestandanobjectinmotionwillremaininmotionunlessactedonbyanoutside force(Newton’slawofinertia)isaroundaboutwayofdescribinghowaphysicalobjectwill tendtomoveornotmovegivenitsnatureoressence. Andsoon. Otherlawsdescribehow systemsofphysicalsubstancesbehave. Forexample,Kepler’slawsofplanetarymotion describehow,byvirtueoftheirnatures,physicalsubstancesofacertainmasswillbehave relative to one another when they are in proximity to each other. Thus, the natures or essencesofthings,whichunderlaytheirpropertiesandpowersandthusdeterminethe waystheytendtobehavewhenthosepowersaremanifested,aremetaphysicallymore fundamentalthanlaws. Goodness or badness as general features of the world are, on this account, to be analyzedintermsofhowfullyasubstanceactualizesthepotentialswhich,givenitsnature, itneedstoactualizeinordertobeaflourishinginstanceofitskind. Forexample,atree’s natureaimsordirectsittowardsinkingrootsintotheground,growingbarkandleaves, carryingoutphotosynthesis,andsoon. Totheextentthatatreerealizestheseends,itisa goodtreeinthesenseofagoodspecimenofthetreekind. Totheextentthatitfailstorealize them(due,say,totermitedamage,ordisease),itisabadtreeinthesenseofadefective specimen. Sometimeswhatisgoodforonekindofphysicalsubstance,givenitsnature,willbe badforanotherkind,givenitsdifferentnature. Forexample,itisgoodforbeaverstognaw atandfelltrees. Theycannotflourishasthekindsofthingstheyarewithoutdoingso. But obviously,theirdoingsoisnotgoodfortrees. Now,anaturalorderwithbothbeaversand treesinithasmorekindsofgoodnessinitthananaturalorderwithoutboth. Hence,an increaseintheamountofgoodnessintheworldcaninsomecasesentailalsoanincrease incertainkindsofbadnessasanecessaryconcomitant. Religions2021,12,268 4of17 2. TheMoralOrder Obviously,sofar,noneofthishastodowithgoodnessorbadnessinthemoralsense. Rather, I am describing more general kinds of goodness or badness of which, for the Thomist,distinctivelymoralgoodnessandbadnessarespecies.10 Thisbringsustohumanbeings,whosenatureoressence,accordingtoThomism,is toberationalsocialanimals. Weareakindofanimalbecauseamongourpowersarethose characteristicofanimals—takinginnutrients,goingthroughagrowthcycle,reproducing ourselves,takingininformationabouttheworldviasensoryexperience,beingprompted toactionbyappetites,andhavingthecapacityforlocomotionorself-movement. Weare rationalanimalsinsofaras,unlikeotheranimals,wecanformabstractconcepts,putthese conceptstogetherintopropositions,andreasonlogicallyfromonepropositiontoanother. A byproduct of these rational powers is will or rational appetite, which is the capacity to be moved to action by what reason apprehends to be good (as opposed to by mere sensoryinputorbypleasureortheavoidanceofpain). Ifathirstydogseeswater,itsthirst willpromptittodrinkunlessthereissomecountervailingimpulse,suchasafeelingof feargeneratedbythesightofanapproachingpredator. Asanimals,humanbeingswill alsobeinfluencedbysuchappetites—but,ontopofthat,willbeablerationallytoassess the situation and, if they judge it to be best to do so, to override the stronger appetite thatwouldhavedeterminedwhatanon-rationalanimalwoulddo. Thiscapacitytobe guidedbyreasonratherthansensationandappetitealoneiswhatconstitutesthefreedom ofthewill. Now,aswithotherphysicalsubstances,whatisgoodorbadforusisdeterminedby ournatureandthepowersthatnaturegivesus,andistobeanalyzedintermsofwhat eitherfacilitatesorfrustratestherealizationoftheendstowardwhichthosepowersare aimed or directed. For example, as rational creatures our minds are aimed or directed towardknowledge, soitisgoodforustoacquireknowledgeandbadforustoremain ignorantorfallintoerror. Asanimals,weneedfoodofacertainkindandamountinorder tobehealthy,soitisgoodforustoeatsuchfoodandbadforustohaveeithertoolittleof itortoeattoexcess. Andsoon. Theseareobjectivefactsratherthanmattersofpersonal tasteorsocialconvention. Thatignoranceandgluttonyarebadforusisnolessobjectively truethanthathavingdamagedrootsorinsufficientwaterisbadfortrees. Moralityentersthepicturebecause,unliketrees,wecanknowwhatisgoodorbad forusandchoosetoactaccordingly. Atreethatfailstosinksufficientlydeeprootsinto thegroundisnotamorallybadtree,becauseitneitherknowsnorcanchoosewhatitdoes. Butahumanbeingcanknowthatitisbadtodeceiveoneselfortobeaglutton,andcan choose either to avoid self-deception and gluttony or to engage in them. An action is morallygoodwhenitisconsistentwiththerealizationoftheendstowardwhichournature directsus,andmorallybadwhenitfrustratestherealizationoftheseends. Apersonwho habituallyperformsactionsoftheformerkindhasamorallygoodcharacter,andaperson whohabituallyperformsactionsofthelatterkindamorallybadcharacter. Virtuesandvicesconcernspecificrespectsinwhichaperson’scharactermightbe morallygoodorbad. Forexample,apersonwhoseeatinghabitsareconducivetogood healthandwhodoesnotpursuethepleasuresofthetableinamannerthatleadstoneglect ofmoreimportantneedsexhibits,atleasttothatextent,thevirtueoftemperance. Aperson whohabituallyovereatsorobsessesoverfoodtotheneglectofhighergoodsexhibitsthe viceofgluttony. Now,becausewearesocialanimals,whatisgoodorbadforusisalsodeterminedin partbyourrelationstootherhumanbeings. Forexample,likeothersexuallyreproducing animals,weareaimedordirectedbynaturetowardmatingwithmembersoftheopposite sex,andwetherebyproduceoffspringwhoarehelplessformanyyearsafterbirth. They needastablesource,notonlyofmaterialprovision,but—sincetheyareimmaturerational animals—ofdisciplineandinstructioninwhatisusefulandgoodforthem. Suchbiological 10 Fordetailedexpositionanddefenseofthemoraltheorydiscussedinthissection,seechapter5of(Feser2009),and(Feser2014a). Religions2021,12,268 5of17 factsarethefoundationofthefamilyasanaturalinstitution,andpartofwhatisgoodfor usbynatureistofulfillourroleswithinthefamily. Forexample,afatherisdirectedor aimedbynaturetowardprovidingmateriallyandmorallyforthefamilyhehasplayeda roleinbringingintobeing. Totheextentthathedoesso,heexhibitsagoodmoralcharacter, and to the extent that he fails to do so he exhibits a bad moral character. Children are directedbynaturetowardobeyingthereasonableinstructionsoftheirparents,andexhibit goodorbadmoralcharactertotheextenttheyhabituallydosoorfailtodoso. Andsoon. Therearelargersocialformationstoo—localcommunities,nations,theinternational order—andwhatisgoodorbadforusisalsoinpartamatterofhowwerelatetomembers ofallofthesesocialorders. Rightsanddutiesofvariouskindsfollowfromthedifferent kindsofrelationswebeartotheseothermembers. Forexample,sinceafatherisbynature directedtowardprovidingforandinstructinghischildren,theyhavearighttohavetheir fatherprovideforandinstructthem,andthefatherhasarighttotheobediencefromhis childrenthatheneedsinordertodothosethingseffectively. Andhethereforehasaduty toprovidethesethingsforthemandtheyhaveadutytoobeyhim. Naturallawinthemoralsensehastodowiththeprinciplesforactionthatfollowfrom thesevariousfactsaboutournature. FortheThomist,ourintellectshaveastheirnatural endknowledgeofthetruthaboutthings,includingthetruthaboutwhatisgoodforus given our natures. The will, meanwhile, has as its natural end the pursuit of what the intellecttakestobegood. Hence,aproperlyfunctioningintellectandwill—andthusan agentwhoisthinkingandactingrationally—willgraspwhatisinfactgoodforusandseek topursueit. Forexample,suchanagentwillseethatignoranceandgluttonyarebadfor us,andthuswillchoosetoavoidthesethingsandtocultivatethevirtuesthatwillfacilitate doingso. Thatdoingsoismorallygoodforusisamatterofnaturallawinsomethinglike thewaythatsinkingrootsintothegroundandtakinginwaterthroughthemisgoodfora treeasamatterofphysicallaw. Inadditiontotheprinciplesofnaturallawthatreasontellsusweoughttopursue, therearehumanlaws—thedirectivesoflawmakers—towhichwecanbebound. Buteven thesearegroundedinthenaturallaw. Forexample,inorderproperlytoprovideforand instructhischildren,afatherhastobeabletoissuevariousdirectives,someofwhichgo beyondwhatcanbeknownfromnaturallaw. Whenhetellsthemthatitisbadforthemto hiteachotherandthattheyoughtthereforetorefrainfromdoingso,heissimplycalling totheirattentionsomethingthat,hadtheysufficientuseofreasonandknowledge,they wouldseetobetrueasamatterofnaturallaw. Butwhenhetellsthemthattheyhaveto dotheirhomeworkbeforedinnertime,heis,asitwere,issuingapieceoflegislationthat goesbeyondanythinginnaturallaw. Thatdoesnot, however, makesuchadirectivea merearbitrarywhim. Onthecontrary,giventhatitismotivatedbyfactsaboutthenature ofchildrentogetherwithfactsaboutthecontingentconcretecircumstancesinwhichthe familyfindsitself,ithasaperfectlyreasonableandobjectivebasis. Andthattheyneed, fortheirflourishing,directivesofthiskindfromtheirfatherentailsthatchildrenought toobeythemnolessthantheyoughttoobeythoseprinciplesmoredirectlygroundedin naturallaw. Itgoeswithoutsayingthatallofthisraisesmanyquestionsandrequireselaboration andvariousqualifications. WorkingoutthedetailsiswhatmoraltheoryintheThomistic natural law tradition is about. The point for present purposes is simply to explain in a general way how morality is grounded in the natural order of things. Indeed, the moral order is a part of the larger natural order. Human beings are bound by natural lawandhumanlawinthewaysthattheyarebecausetheyarephysicalsubstancesofa certainnaturalkind,andcannotflourishquaspecimensofthatkindwithoutobedienceto theselaws. 3. DivineCausality Now,wheredoesGodfitintothispicture? Theansweristhathedoesnotfitintoitat all. Heisnomoreapartofthenaturalorder—andthusnomorepartofthemoralorder Religions2021,12,268 6of17 thatisasegmentofthenaturalorder—thananauthorispartofanovelorthanapainteris partofapainting. Rather,heisthenecessarypreconditionoftherebeinganynaturalorder atall,justasanauthoristhenecessarypreconditionoftherebeinganynovelatallanda painterisanecessarypreconditionoftherebeinganypaintingatall. Andconceivingof Godonthemodelofanaturalsubstanceislikeconceivingofanauthorasanadditional characterinanovel,orconceivingofapainterasoneoftheimagesinapainting. Thatthereisindeedsomethingstandingoutsidethenaturalorderasitsnecessary precondition,andthatthissomethinghasadivinenature,isarguedforbytheThomistin variousways.HereIwillsummarizeonlytheideasmostrelevantforpresentpurposes.11 In additiontothemetaphysicalcomponentsofphysicalsubstancesalreadyreferredto—form, matter, causal powers, etc.—the Thomist posits two most fundamental parts: a thing’s essenceanditsexistence. Supposeyoudescribe,forsomeonewhohasneverbeforeheard ofanyofthem,theessenceofalion,theessenceofaTyrannosaurusRex,andtheessence ofaunicorn. Supposeyouwentontotellhimthat, ofthesethreecreatures, oneexists, oneusedtoexistbuthasgoneextinct,andanotherneverexistedbutispurelylegendary. Andsupposeyouaskedhimtotellyouwhichwaswhich,basedonhisnewknowledge oftheiressences. Evenifyourdescriptionoftheessencesofthesethingswascomplete andthepersonyouweredescribingthemtohadflawlessunderstandingandpowersof deduction,hewouldbeunabletotellyou. ThisillustratestheThomisticthesisthatthe existenceofanaturalsubstanceissomethingdistinctfromitsessence. Ifitwerenot,then perfectknowledgeofthelatterwouldaffordknowledgeoftheformer. FortheThomist,anessenceconsideredbyitselfisatmostonlypotentiallypartofthe naturalorder. Thatexistenceisaddedtoanessenceiswhatactualizesthispotential. Now, lionsarehereandnowpartofthenaturalorder,whileTyrannosaurusesusedtobepartof itbutnolongerare,andunicornsneverwere. Thatentailsthatexistenceisbeingaddedto theessenceoflions,butnottotheessencesofTyrannosaurusesorunicorns. Andwhatever isaddingitmustbedoingsohereandnowandatanymomentatwhichlionsexist,and notjustatthemomenttheyfirstcameintobeing. Fortheessenceandexistenceofalion remaindistinctpartsofitnownolessthantheywerebeforelionswerearound. Something must,inotherwords,beconservingorsustaininglionsinexistencehereandnowandat everymomentatwhichtheyexist. Now, if what is doing this were some cause which itself has an essence distinct from its existence, then it too would need a conserving cause, and we would have an explanatoryregress. Sucharegresscanterminateonlyinsomethingthatcanconserve thingsinexistencewithoutitselfhavingtobeconservedinexistence,somethingthatcan actualizetheotherwisemerelypotentialexistenceofotherthingswithoutitselfhavingto beactualized. TheThomistarguesthatwhatcanfunctionasanultimateconservingcause ofthissortcanonlybesomethinginwhichthereisnodistinctionbetweenitsessenceand itsexistence—somethingwhoseveryessencejustisexistence,soitneednothaveexistence addedtoit. Itwouldhavetobesomethingdevoidofanypotentialityforexistencestanding in need of actualization, but instead be already entirely actual. To use the traditional Aristotelian-Thomisticjargon, itwouldbeactuspurus(“pureactuality”)andipsumesse subsistens(“subsistentbeingitself”). Now,whatistrueoflionsistrueofeverythingelse—sulfur,trees,beavers,human beings, and every other substance to be found in the natural order. With each of these things,itsessenceandexistencearedistinct,andthuswitheachofthem,itcancontinue inbeingaspartofthenaturalorderonlyinsofarasexistenceiscontinuallyimpartedto itbythatwhichispureactualityandsubsistentbeingitself. Thomistsalsoarguethat,on analysis,therecaninprinciplebeonlyonethingthatispureactualityandsubsistentbeing itself. So,itisthesameoneconservingcausethatissustainingtheentirenaturalorderin beingateverymoment. 11 Fordetailedexpositionanddefenseofthetheologicalideasdiscussedinthissectionandthenext,seechapter3of(Feser2009),andforanevenmore detailedexpositionanddefense,see(Feser2017). Religions2021,12,268 7of17 Thomistsalsoarguethatanythingthatispureactualityandsubsistentbeingitself musthaveanumberoffurtherattributes. Forexample,itmustbeimmutable,giventhe Aristotelian-Thomisticanalysisofchangeastheactualizationofpotentiality. Forsinceit ispurelyactualandwithoutpassivepotentiality,itcannotbechanged. Similarly,itmust be immaterial, given the Aristotelian-Thomistic analysis of matter as the potentiality to takeonform. Itmustbeeternalinthesenseofbeingaltogetheroutsideoftime,givenits immutabilitytogetherwiththeAristotelian-Thomisticanalysisoftimeasthemeasureof change. Itmustbesimpleornon-compositegivenitspureactualitytogetherwiththefact thatanythingcomposedofpartswouldhavepotentialityinneedofactualization(insofar asitwouldnotexistunlessitspartsarecombined). Itmustexistofnecessityratherthan contingentlygiventhatitispureactualityandsimpleornon-composite,togetherwiththe factthatathingiscontingentonlyifithaspotentialityinneedofactualizationandpartsin needofcombining. A further Thomist thesis about the relationship between the natural order and its conservingcauseisthattheformerdependsateverymomentonthelatterforitsoperation nolessthanforitsexistence. Naturalsubstanceshavetheircausalpowerinasecondaryor derivativeway—likeastickwhichcanmoveastoneonlyinsofarasitisusedbyahand todoso,oranelectricmotorwhichcanmovethewheelsofacaronlyinsofarasitdraws powerfromabattery. Hence,withoutdrawingcausalpowerfromtheirconservingcause ateverymomentatwhichtheyoperate,naturalsubstanceswouldbeasinertasastick thatthehandhasdroppedtothegroundorthemotorthathasbeendisconnectedfromits battery. Sinceallpossiblecausalpowerderivesinthiswayfromtheconservingcauseof things,thatcausecanalsobesaidtobeomnipotent. WhatIhavebeensummarizingherearetheDoctrineofDivineConservation,according to which the natural order could not continue in being for an instant without God’s continuallysustainingit;andtheDoctrineofDivineConcurrence,accordingtowhichnatural substancescannotexercisetheircausalpowerevenforaninstantwithoutGod’sconcurring orcooperatingwiththatexercise. Itisonlyinlightofthesedoctrinesthatwecancorrectly understandwhatThomists,andclassicaltheistsingeneral,meanwhentheycharacterize GodasFirstCauseofthenaturalorder. Theydonotprimarilymean“first”inthetemporal senseofhavinggottentheuniversegoingattheBigBang. Tobesure,mostclassicaltheists thinkthatGoddidindeedcausetheworldtobeginatsometimeinthepast,butsome thinkthattheworldhasalwaysbeenherewithoutbeginning. Allclassicaltheistsagree, however,thatwhetherornotthenaturalorderhadabeginningintime,themoreimportant pointisthatitcouldnotpersistinbeingwithoutdivineconservation,andthatthatisthe fundamentalwayinwhichGodiscreatororcauseoftheworld. WhenspeakingofGod asFirstCause,theyalsodonotmean“first”asopposedtosecond,third,fourth,etc. The numberofmembersinacausalsequenceisnotwhatisatissue. Whattheymeanisthat Godhascausalpowerinaprimaryratherthansecondaryway.Thatistosay,whereasnatural substanceshavecausalpoweronlyinsofarastheyborroworderiveitfromsomethingelse, Godhascausalpowerinabuilt-inorunderivedway. FortheThomist,onlywhatispure actualitywithnopotentialityrequiringactualizationcanbesuchacauseinanabsoluteor unqualifiedsense. Because his causal power is of this unqualifiedly primary kind, and because he is immutable,immaterial,eternal,andsimpleornon-composite,God’scausalityisradically unlikethatofnaturalsubstances. Whenanaturalsubstancebringsanotherintobeing,it doessobytransformingpreexistingmaterials. ButthatisnothowGodcausesthenatural ordertoexist,becauseinthiscase,anythingthatcouldserveaspreexistingmaterialisitself amongthethingsbeingcaused. Whenanaturalsubstancebringsaboutaneffect,itworks throughparts(suchasthehandyouusetomoveastick)anditselfundergoeschangeover timeasitdoesso(aswhenyourarmflexesandchangespositionwhenmovingthestick). Nothinglikethishappenswithdivinecausality,sinceGodisnon-composite,immutable, andeternal. Whenanaturalsubstanceexercisescausalpower,itdoessoinaccordance withthelawsofnaturethatdescribeitscharacteristicmodeofbehaving. ButGodisnot Religions2021,12,268 8of17 governedbylawsofnature,sincethoselawsarethemselvespreciselyamongthethingshe causesincreatingthenaturalorderthatthelawsdescribe. Forthesereasons,theThomistholdsthatthelanguageweusewhendescribingGod andhiscausalrelationshiptotheworldmustbeunderstoodinananalogicalway,where analogyisamiddlegroundsortofusagelyingbetweentheunivocalandequivocaluses ofterms. Bywayofillustrationoftheidea,considerhowwespeakofthenumber3as beinglargerthan2,asstandingbetween2and4,asnearerto1thanitisto10,andsoon. We areusingtermsthatusuallydescribespatialrelationships,butwearenotusingthemin thatsensewhendescribingnumbers,whichdonotexistinspace. Butwearenotusing theminanentirelyunrelatedorequivocalwayeither. Though3’sstandingbetween2and 4isnotexactlythesamesortofthingasyourhouse’sstandingbetweenyourneighbor’s houses,itisanalogoustothat. Notethatanalogicallanguageofthesortinquestionhereis notmetaphorical. 3reallyisliterallybetween2and4. Itisjustthat“between”isnotused inanidenticalorunivocalsensewhenwedescribenumbersandwhenwedescribehouses. “Cause”andrelatedtermsare,fortheThomist,tobegivenananalogicalinterpretation whenappliedtoGod. God’scausingthenaturalorderisanalogoustoahumanbeing’s buildingahouseormakingasculpture,butitisveryfarfrombeingexactlythesamesort ofthingasthat,givendivineimmateriality,immutability,eternity,simplicity,etc. Indeed, muchofwhatwehavetosayaboutthedivinenatureisalongthelinesofapophaticor negativetheology—sayingwhatGodisnot,howradicallyhediffersfromthenaturalorder heconservesinbeing. Now,manytheologicalerrors,notonlyonthepartofskepticsbutalsoonthepartof naïvereligiousbelievers,derivefromafailuretokeepinmindpointsliketheonesIhave beenmaking. Forexample,skepticsandnaïvebelieversalikeoftenconceiveofGodand hisrelationtothenaturalorderonthemodelofa“godofthegaps.”Thatistosay,they thinkthatthewayargumentsforGod’sexistenceworkisbyidentifyingsomeunusual phenomenonforwhichwehavenotyetfoundanaturalexplanation,andthenappealingto specialdivineactiontofillthisexplanatorygap. Thestandardcriticismofsucharguments is to note that they stand at the mercy of scientific advance, with God having less and lesstodothemoreexistinggapsinexplanationarefilledbyfurtherresearchinphysics, chemistry,andsoon. The“godofthegaps”approachisindeedfeeble,butithasnothingtodowiththe argumentsofThomistsandotherclassicaltheists. Theyarenottryingtofillexplanatory gaps within the natural order studied by science, but rather explaining what empirical scienceitselfpresupposesbutcannotaccountfor—namely,thefactthatthereisanynatural orderatallinthefirstplace. The“godofthegaps”approachislikesupposingthattosay thatapaintingpresupposesapainteramountstopositinganas-yetunseenpersonlurking somewhereintheimage(“Where’sWaldo?”style),orthattosaythatanovelpresupposes anauthoramountstopositingacharacterinthestorywhosomehowescapedthereader’s noticeonafirstreading. Itisacategorymistake,restingonaconflationoftheprimary causalityuniquetowhatispureactualityandsubsistentbeingitselfwiththesecondary causalitycharacteristicofnaturalsubstances. 4. DivineGoodness Now,asimilarfallacy,Iamclaiming,underliestheso-calledlogicalproblemofevil. Toseehow,though,alittlemorestage-settingisrequired. Letusnotefirstthat,despite everythingsaidsofaranddespiteDavies’aptemphasisondistinguishingclassicaltheism fromwhathecalls“theisticpersonalism,”Thomistsandotherclassicaltheistsdonotregard Godasimpersonal. Onthecontrary,Thomistsandmostclassicaltheistswouldattribute intellectandwilltoGod,andthesearethepropertiescharacteristicofpersons. Forthe Thomist, whatever is in an effect must in some manner preexist in its cause, and since Godisthecauseofanypossiblerealityotherthanhimself,theessencesornaturesofall thepossiblethingshemightcreatemustinsomewayexistinhim. Thetraditionalway classicaltheistshaveunderstoodthisisintermsofthethesis—famouslyassociatedwith Religions2021,12,268 9of17 St. Augustine and adopted by Aquinas—that such essences exist in God in a manner analogoustohowideasorconceptsexistinanintellect,andfunctionasthearchetypes byreferencetowhichGodcreates. GiventhefurtherThomisticthesisthatwillfollows uponintellect,ifthereissomethinginGodanalogoustointellect,theremustalsobeinhim somethinganalogoustowill. Hereaselsewhere,though,itisabsolutelycrucialtokeepinmindtheThomistview thatthetermswepredicateofGodmustbeunderstoodinananalogicalratherthanunivocal way. God’s intellect and will are no more like ours than his causality is like ours. For example,Goddoesnotcometoknowthingsorengageinanysortofreasoningprocess, becausethatwouldentailchange,andheisimmutableandeternal. WhatGodknowshe knowsinasingleeternalact;andsinceheispurelyactualandthuswithoutpotentiality needingactualization,hisknowledgeandwisdomareperfect. God’smannerofknowing thenaturalorderdoesnotinvolveanysortofobservationofit,becausehedoesnotneedto be(norindeedcanbe,givenhisimmutability)affectedbyanythingdistinctfromhimselfin ordertoknowit. Rather,heknowsthenaturalorderbyknowinghimselfasthecauseofit, justasanauthorknowsthestoryhehaswrittenbyvirtueofknowinghisownmind. Given divinesimplicity,wecannotattributedistinctthoughtstoGod;rather,whatheknowshe knowsinsomethinglikeasingleintellectualact. Andsoon. Godisnotimpersonal,but neitherishelikeahumanperson. ThetroublewithwhatDaviescallstheisticpersonalismisthatitmodelsGodprecisely onhumanpersons,insomethinglikethewaythat“godofthegaps”theoriesmodelGod onsecondarycausesoperatingwithinthenaturalorder. ItconceivesofGodasundergoing changeandthereforebeingintime,ascausallyaffectedbythenaturalorder,ascoming to know that order by observing it, and so on. To be sure, like classical theism, it also thinks of God as immaterial and omnipotent. But given its deviations from classical theism,itneverthelessreducesGod’spowerandindependencefrommattertosomething comparabletowhatweseeinthegodsoftheancientpantheons. GodbecomeslikeZeus orOdin,orlikeacharacterfromamodernsuperherocomicbookormovie. (DavidBentley Hartaptlycharacterizestheisticpersonalismas“monopolytheism”—committedtoaview of the divine nature that differs little from that of polytheists except that it reduces the membership of the pantheon down to one.12) Theistic personalism unwittingly makes ofGodjustanotherpartofthenaturalorder,albeitthemostpowerfulpart—notlikean author at all, but merely a character in the novel who has superpowers, and not like a painterbutmerelythemoststrikingimageinthepainting. ThisisthecontextwithinwhichtounderstandthesenseinwhichGodisgood,and Davies’objectiontocharacterizingGodasa“moralagent.”13Thefirstthingtosayisthat theThomistcertainlydoesconceiveofGodasgood,indeedassupremelygood. ForasI haveindicated,goodness,fortheThomist,istobeanalyzedintermsoftheactualizationof thepotentialsthatathing’snaturedirectsittowardactualizing,andbadnessintermsof thefailuretoactualizethem. ButGodispureactuality,withnounactualizedpotentiality. Hence,heisperfectlygood.Tobesure,unlikeotherthings,heisalsodevoidofpotentialities thatwouldhaveneededactualizationinthefirstplace,butthatentailsmoreinthewayof goodnessratherthanless. IfitisgoodtoactualizeapotentialforX,itisbetterstillneverto havebeenmerelypotentiallyX,butalwaystohavebeenactuallyX. AsBarryMillerhassuggested,adivineperfectionasclassicaltheismunderstandsitis tobeunderstoodasakindoflimitcaseratherthanalimitsimpliciter.14 Alimitsimpliciter differsonlyindegreefromotherinstancesofthattowhichitisthelimit. Forexample,the speedoflightisthefastestspeedatwhichaphysicalobjectcantravel,butitdiffersonlyin degreefromlowerspeeds. Bycontrast,alimitcasediffersabsolutelyfromtheinstancesto whichitisalimit,ratherthanindegree. Forexample,aspeedof0km/sisnotalowest 12 (Hart2013,p.127). 13 (Davies2006,p.92). 14 (Miller1996,pp.7–10). Religions2021,12,268 10of17 speed,becauseitisnotaspeedatall. Still,thewaysthatthedifferentdegreesofspeed areorderedpointtothislimitcase. Divinegoodnesstoocanbethoughtofasalimitcase (though,unlikeaspeedof0km/s,asamaximumratherthanaminimum). Thedegreesof goodnesstobefoundinthenaturalorderpointtoit,notasahighestdegreeintheseries, butratherassomethingoutsidetheseriesonwhichtheseries’membersconvergeandcan onlyeverapproximate. Alternatively,divinegoodnesscanbethoughtofasakindofparadigmcase.Aparadigm caseisnotmerelyoneinstanceofakindamongothers,butratherthestandardbyreference to which something counts as a member of the kind. For example, the standard meter in Paris was not merely one meter alongside the others, but the standard by reference towhichanythingelsecountedasameter. Or,totakeabetterexample(becauseitdoes notinvolvehumanconvention),Plato’sFormoftheGoodisnotmerelyoneinstanceof goodnessalongsidetheothers, butratherthestandardbyreferencetowhichanything countsasgood. Fortheclassicaltheist,divinegoodnessislikethat. Itnomoremakessense tothinkofGodaslessthanperfectlygoodthanitdoestothinkoftheFormoftheGoodas lessthanperfectlygood,ortothinkofthestandardmeteraslessthanameterlong. Now, this is one obvious respect in which divine goodness is not like the moral goodnessexhibitedbyhumanbeings,whichdoescomeindegrees. Butthereareother respects. For example, human goodness involves possession of moral virtues such as courage,whichisthedispositiontodotherightthinginthefaceofdanger,andtemperance, whichinvolvesmoderationinindulgenceofone’sappetites. SinceGodcannotpossibly beindangerandhasnoappetites, hecannotintelligiblybesaidtopossessvirtueslike courageandtemperance. Moregenerally,Godisnotsubjecttothenaturallaw,anymore thanheissubjecttophysicallaws. Thenaturallawisgroundedinhumannature, just asphysicallawsaregroundedinthenaturesofphysicalsubstancesmoregenerally. As thecauseofhumanbeingsandofphysicalsubstancesingeneral,andthusasthecauseof theveryexistenceofthenaturallawasoftheexistenceofphysicallaws,hecanhardlybe governedbyit. By no means does this entail, however, that God could by fiat make just anything morallyobligatory,suchastorturingbabiesforfun. For,again,whatisgoodorbadfor humanbeingsisdeterminedbytheiressenceornature. Giventheessenceofhumanbeings, it cannot possibly be good for them to torture babies for fun, so a world in which this ismorallyobligatoryislikeaworldwithroundsquares—notonethatevenGodcould create. (PerhapsGodcouldmakecreaturesofsomekindforwhichtorturingbabiesfor funwouldbegood,buttheywouldnotinthatcasebehuman,becausesuchathingcould notbegoodforsomethingwithournature.) So,tosupposethateitherthereexistssome moralstandardindependentofGodthathedidnotcreate,orhecouldcommandjustany oldthingbyfiat—thestandardEuthyphrodilemmascenario—is,fortheThomist,afalse choice. Nothingatallcanexist,includingthenaturallaw,unlessGodcreatesit. Butatthe sametime,if hecreateshumanbeings,andthusthenaturallawthatgovernsthem,then whathecommandsisconstrainedbywhatitistobeahumanbeing. SinceGodjustissubsistentbeingitselfandthelawofnon-contradictionis,forthe Thomist,simplyareflectionoftheverynatureofbeing,God’screatingthingsinaccordance withthislawisultimatelytobeanalyzedasamatterofhiscreatinginaccordancewithhis ownnature. Andhisdoingsoentailsthatthereisasenseinwhichhecreateswithperfect justice,thoughthereisanothersenseinwhichtheconceptofjusticenomoreappliesto Godthanthenotionsofcourageortemperancedo. Traditionally,adistinctionisdrawn betweentwomaintypesofjustice. Commutativejusticehastodowithjusticeintheways thatmembersofacommunitydealwithoneanotherwithregardtorespectingproperty rights,honoringcontracts,andthelike. Distributivejusticehastodowiththewaythata rulerensuresthatthosewhoareunderhisorherauthorityreceivewhatisduetothem. Now,asAquinasargues,thenotionofcommutativejusticedoesnotatallapplytoGod,