The Thomistic Dissolution Of The Logical Problem Of Evil, E Feser

2021·0.22 MB·English

by  Edward Feser

religions
Article
The Thomistic Dissolution of the Logical Problem of Evil
EdwardFeser
DepartmentofSocialSciences,PasadenaCityCollege,Pasadena,CA91106,USA;[e-mail]
Abstract:Inhisbook‘IsaGoodGodLogicallyPossible?’,JamesSterbaarguesthattheexistenceof
muchoftheeviltobefoundintheworldislogicallyincompatiblewiththeexistenceofGod.Idefend
theThomisticviewthatwhenoneproperlyunderstandsthenatureofGodandofhisrelationshipto
theworld,thisso-calledlogicalproblemofevildoesnotarise.WhileSterbahasrespondedtothe
versionoftheThomisticpositionpresentedbyBrianDavies,Iarguethathisresponsefails.
Keywords:problemofevil;theodicy;ThomasAquinas;JamesP.Sterba;BrianDavies
IstheexistenceofGodlogicallycompatiblewiththeexistenceofevil? Oristherea
strictcontradictionbetweenthetwo? The“logicalproblemofevil”istheproblemfacing
thetheistofshowingthattheappearanceofcontradictionisillusory. J.L.Mackiefamously
(cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:1)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:1) arguedthatthecontradictionisreal,sotheproblemcannotbesolvedandtheismisrefuted.1
(cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)
AlvinPlantingaiswidelythoughttohaveshownthatMackiewaswrong,sothemostthat
Citation: Feser,Edward.2021.The theatheistcanaimforisan“evidentialargumentfromevil”accordingtowhichthereality
ThomisticDissolutionoftheLogical ofevilmakesGod’sexistenceimprobablebutnotimpossible.2 JamesSterbahasrecently
ProblemofEvil.Religions12: 268. arguedthatMackiewasrightafterall,oratanyratethatPlantingaandothershavefailed
https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12040268 toshowotherwise.3 CentraltohisargumentistheassumptionthatGodisobligatedto
obeymoralimperativessuchasthe“PaulinePrinciple”thatwemayneverdoevilthat
AcademicEditor:JamesSterba
goodmaycomeofit. IfGodexisted,Sterbaclaims,hewouldbeviolatingthisprinciple
byeitherwillingorpermittingevilforthesakeofagreatergood,andthereforebeless
Received:20February2021
thanperfectlygoodhimself. Indeed,inlightoftheevilthatactuallyexistsinourworld,he
Accepted:9April2021
wouldbe“moreimmoralthanallofourhistoricalvillainstakentogether.”4
Published:13April2021
Inthispaper,Iwillexplainwhy,fromaThomisticpointofview,theso-calledlogical
problem of evil (and, for that matter, the evidential problem of evil) cannot arise.5 For
Publisher’sNote:MDPIstaysneutral
theThomist,whenoneproperlyunderstandswhatGodisandwhatmoralityandmoral
withregardtojurisdictionalclaimsin
agents are, it simply makes no sense to think of God as less than perfectly good or as
publishedmapsandinstitutionalaffil-
morallyobligatedtopreventtheevilthatexists. The“problem”restsonacategorymistake.
iations.
ThereasonshavenothingessentiallytodowiththeargumentsofPlantingaandcompany,
which I will not be defending. They do have to do with considerations raised by the
ThomistphilosopherBrianDavies,towhomSterbahasresponded.6 ButwhileIagreewith
thesubstanceofDavies’viewsandwillbedefendinghimagainstSterba, Iwilllargely
Copyright: © 2021 by the author.
befocusingonThomisticconsiderationsotherthantheonesthatSterbaaddresseswhen
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
replyingtoDavies.
This article is an open access article
AquinasandtheThomistictraditiontowhichhisthoughtgaverisehave,ofcourse,
distributed under the terms and
beenextremelyinfluentialinthehistoryoftheologyandphilosophyofreligion,andthat
conditionsoftheCreativeCommons
alonemakesitworthwhiletoconsiderhowtheproblemofevillooksfromtheThomist’s
Attribution(CCBY)license(https://
pointofview. ButIhastentoemphasizethatthemainideasIwillbeexpoundingbyno
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/). meansreflectmerelythatparticularpointofview. Onthecontrary,thoughsomeofmy
1 (Mackie1955).
2 Cf.(Plantinga1977).The“evidential”versionoftheproblemofevilisfamouslypresentedby(Rowe1979).
3 (Sterba2019).
4 Ibid.,p.192.
5 ForasurveyofThomisticwritingontheproblemofevil,seechapter5of(Shanley2002).
6 Cf.(Davies2006).SterbarespondstoDaviesinchapter6of(Sterba2019).
Religions2021,12,268.https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12040268 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions
Religions2021,12,268 2of17
formulationswillbedistinctivelyThomistic,theoverallpicturereflectsthebroadtradition
ofclassicaltheism,whichhasancientrootsinAristotelianismandNeo-Platonism; was
developedinmedievaltimesbyAnselm,Aquinas,andotherScholasticsintheChristian
context, Maimonides and others in the Jewish context, and Avicenna and others in the
Islamiccontext;anddeeplyinformstheteachingoftheRomanCatholicChurch,Eastern
Orthodoxy, andtheearliestProtestantReformersalike. Inotherwords, theconception
of God and his relationship to the moral order that I will be presenting is, historically
speaking,themainstreamposition.
AsDavieshasinseveralplaceslamented,muchcontemporaryphilosophyofreligion,
whetheratheistortheist,presupposesaverydifferentandexcessivelyanthropomorphic
conception of God that he has labeled “theistic personalism.”7 That is certainly true of
recentdiscussionoftheproblemofevil,andofSterbaandPlantingaalike. Foritisonly
when we attribute to God features that can intelligibly be said to belong only to finite
agentsthatitcanseemappropriateeithertoattackordefendhismoralvirtue. Thatisnot
becauseGodislessthanamorallygoodperson,butpreciselybecauseheisinfinitelymore
thanthat.
1. TheNaturalOrder
Hereistheexecutivesummary:ForThomistsandotherclassicaltheists,Godisutterly
distinct from the natural order of things, creating and sustaining it in being ex nihilo
whilebeinginnowayaffectedbyitinturn. Butthe“logicalproblemofevil”implicitly
presupposesthatGodishimselfpartofthenaturalorder,oratleastcausallyrelatedtoitin
somethinglikethewaythatentitieswithinthatorderarerelatedtooneanother. Hence,the
“problem”restsonacategorymistake,sotoexposethemistakeistodissolvetheproblem.
Naturally, this needs spelling out. Let us begin with the Thomistic account of the
naturalorder.8 Thefirstthingtosayisthatthisordercomprisesacollectionofinterrelated
substances,eachwithitsowndistinctiveessenceornature,andmanifestingpropertiesand
causalpowersgroundedinthoseessencesornatures. Forexample,sulfurisasubstance,
which,byvirtueofitsessence,isyellowincolorandhasapowertogenerateflame,which
istriggeredwhenthesulfurisheated. Atreeisasubstancewhich,byvirtueofitsessence,
sinksrootsintotheearthsoastostabilizeitandtakeinwater,growsleavesandbark,and
carriesoutphotosynthesis. Abeaverisasubstancewhich, byvirtueofitsessence, has
iron-richteeth,usesthemtognawatandfelltrees,andthenusesthewoodfromthetrees
tobuilddamnsandshelters.
Theseareexamplesofphysicalsubstances,whichinThomisticmetaphysicsaretaken
to be composites of form and matter.9 Matter is what individuates physical substances,
tyingdowntheessencedefinitiveofanaturalkindtoaparticularindividual,time,and
place. Formiswhatorganizesthemattersothattheresultingsubstanceoperatesinthe
waycharacteristicofthingsofthatkind. Forexample,thereistreenessconsideredasan
abstractuniversal,andthereistheconcreteparticulartreestandingattherearleftofmy
backyard, the concrete particular tree standing in my neighbor’s front yard, and so on.
Though having treeness in common, these concrete particulars are distinct individuals
becausetheyareassociatedwithdifferentbitsofmatter. Thatthematterconstitutesatree
ineachcaseratherthansomeotherkindofthingisduetoitshavingtakenontheformor
organizationalstructurecharacteristicoftrees.
Form, matter, and causal powers are in turn analyzed by the Thomist in terms of
the notions of actuality and potentiality. Matter considered in abstraction from form is
7 Forexample,in(Davies2021),chapter1.ThoughDaviesdoesnotusethelabelin(Davies2006),theisticpersonalismistheviewhehasinmind
whencriticizingtheideasofphilosopherslikeRichardSwinburneatpp.52–54,59–62,and93–95ofthatbook.
8 Foradetailedexpositionanddefenseofthemetaphysicalideasdiscussedinthissection,seechapter2of(Feser2009),andforanevenmoredetailed
expositionanddefense,see(Feser2014b).
9 Thomistsalsoholdthatthelargercreatedorderincludesincorporealsubstances—namelyangels,conceivedofascreaturesofpureintellect.But
sincethepointsIwanttomakedonotstrictlyrequireadiscussionofangels,andsincethispaperislongenoughasitis,Iwillputthetopicto
oneside.
Religions2021,12,268 3of17
merelypotentiallyatree,orabeaver,orsulfur. Theformittakesonactualizesoneofthese
potentials,resultinginaphysicalsubstanceofaspecifickind. Thepowerscharacteristic
ofthatsubstanceare,inturn,themselvespotentialities,andtheycanbeofeitheranactive
orpassivesort. Anactivepotentialityisacapacitytoaffectotherthings,suchassulfur’s
capacitytoburnotherthingswhenignited,orabeaver’scapacitytodamageorfellatree.
Apassivepotentialityisaliabilitytobeaffectedbyotherthings,suchasatree’sliabilityto
befelledorabeaver’sliabilitytobekilledbyapredator.
Potentialities of either kind always involve a teleology or directedness of at least a
rudimentary sort, where this directedness is toward ends or outcomes that reflect the
distinctiveessenceofthethingwhichhasthepotentiality. Sulfurisbyvirtueofitsnature
directedoraimedtowardgeneratingflamewhentherighttriggeringconditionsarepresent.
Atreeisbyvirtueofitsnaturedirectedoraimedtowardsinkingrootsintotheground
andgrowingleavesandbark. Abeaverisbyvirtueofitsnaturedirectedoraimedtoward
gnawingattrees,fellingthem,andthenusingthemtoconstructdamsandshelters. The
matterofwhichanyphysicalsubstanceiscomposedisdirectedoraimedtowardtaking
ontheformofadifferentkindofsubstancewhentheconditionsareright. Forexample,
thematterthatmakesupatreeisdirectedoraimedtowardbecomingashwhenflameis
appliedtoitlongenough,towardbecomingdryanddeadwoodwhenthetreeisfelled,
towardbecomingnutritivematerialwhenanorganismlikeatermiteingestsit,andsoon.
A law of nature, in Thomist metaphysics, is essentially a description of the way a
physicalsubstancewilltendtooperategivenitsnatureoressence. Forexample,tosaythat
itisalawofchemistrythatsulfurgeneratesflamewhenheatedisaroundaboutwayof
sayingthatgiventhenatureoressenceofsulfur,ithasapowerofgeneratingflamewhich
willbetriggeredwhenitisheated. Tosaythatitisalawofphysicsthatanobjectatrest
willstayatrestandanobjectinmotionwillremaininmotionunlessactedonbyanoutside
force(Newton’slawofinertia)isaroundaboutwayofdescribinghowaphysicalobjectwill
tendtomoveornotmovegivenitsnatureoressence. Andsoon. Otherlawsdescribehow
systemsofphysicalsubstancesbehave. Forexample,Kepler’slawsofplanetarymotion
describehow,byvirtueoftheirnatures,physicalsubstancesofacertainmasswillbehave
relative to one another when they are in proximity to each other. Thus, the natures or
essencesofthings,whichunderlaytheirpropertiesandpowersandthusdeterminethe
waystheytendtobehavewhenthosepowersaremanifested,aremetaphysicallymore
fundamentalthanlaws.
Goodness or badness as general features of the world are, on this account, to be
analyzedintermsofhowfullyasubstanceactualizesthepotentialswhich,givenitsnature,
itneedstoactualizeinordertobeaflourishinginstanceofitskind. Forexample,atree’s
natureaimsordirectsittowardsinkingrootsintotheground,growingbarkandleaves,
carryingoutphotosynthesis,andsoon. Totheextentthatatreerealizestheseends,itisa
goodtreeinthesenseofagoodspecimenofthetreekind. Totheextentthatitfailstorealize
them(due,say,totermitedamage,ordisease),itisabadtreeinthesenseofadefective
specimen.
Sometimeswhatisgoodforonekindofphysicalsubstance,givenitsnature,willbe
badforanotherkind,givenitsdifferentnature. Forexample,itisgoodforbeaverstognaw
atandfelltrees. Theycannotflourishasthekindsofthingstheyarewithoutdoingso. But
obviously,theirdoingsoisnotgoodfortrees. Now,anaturalorderwithbothbeaversand
treesinithasmorekindsofgoodnessinitthananaturalorderwithoutboth. Hence,an
increaseintheamountofgoodnessintheworldcaninsomecasesentailalsoanincrease
incertainkindsofbadnessasanecessaryconcomitant.
Religions2021,12,268 4of17
2. TheMoralOrder
Obviously,sofar,noneofthishastodowithgoodnessorbadnessinthemoralsense.
Rather, I am describing more general kinds of goodness or badness of which, for the
Thomist,distinctivelymoralgoodnessandbadnessarespecies.10
Thisbringsustohumanbeings,whosenatureoressence,accordingtoThomism,is
toberationalsocialanimals. Weareakindofanimalbecauseamongourpowersarethose
characteristicofanimals—takinginnutrients,goingthroughagrowthcycle,reproducing
ourselves,takingininformationabouttheworldviasensoryexperience,beingprompted
toactionbyappetites,andhavingthecapacityforlocomotionorself-movement. Weare
rationalanimalsinsofaras,unlikeotheranimals,wecanformabstractconcepts,putthese
conceptstogetherintopropositions,andreasonlogicallyfromonepropositiontoanother.
A byproduct of these rational powers is will or rational appetite, which is the capacity
to be moved to action by what reason apprehends to be good (as opposed to by mere
sensoryinputorbypleasureortheavoidanceofpain). Ifathirstydogseeswater,itsthirst
willpromptittodrinkunlessthereissomecountervailingimpulse,suchasafeelingof
feargeneratedbythesightofanapproachingpredator. Asanimals,humanbeingswill
alsobeinfluencedbysuchappetites—but,ontopofthat,willbeablerationallytoassess
the situation and, if they judge it to be best to do so, to override the stronger appetite
thatwouldhavedeterminedwhatanon-rationalanimalwoulddo. Thiscapacitytobe
guidedbyreasonratherthansensationandappetitealoneiswhatconstitutesthefreedom
ofthewill.
Now,aswithotherphysicalsubstances,whatisgoodorbadforusisdeterminedby
ournatureandthepowersthatnaturegivesus,andistobeanalyzedintermsofwhat
eitherfacilitatesorfrustratestherealizationoftheendstowardwhichthosepowersare
aimed or directed. For example, as rational creatures our minds are aimed or directed
towardknowledge, soitisgoodforustoacquireknowledgeandbadforustoremain
ignorantorfallintoerror. Asanimals,weneedfoodofacertainkindandamountinorder
tobehealthy,soitisgoodforustoeatsuchfoodandbadforustohaveeithertoolittleof
itortoeattoexcess. Andsoon. Theseareobjectivefactsratherthanmattersofpersonal
tasteorsocialconvention. Thatignoranceandgluttonyarebadforusisnolessobjectively
truethanthathavingdamagedrootsorinsufficientwaterisbadfortrees.
Moralityentersthepicturebecause,unliketrees,wecanknowwhatisgoodorbad
forusandchoosetoactaccordingly. Atreethatfailstosinksufficientlydeeprootsinto
thegroundisnotamorallybadtree,becauseitneitherknowsnorcanchoosewhatitdoes.
Butahumanbeingcanknowthatitisbadtodeceiveoneselfortobeaglutton,andcan
choose either to avoid self-deception and gluttony or to engage in them. An action is
morallygoodwhenitisconsistentwiththerealizationoftheendstowardwhichournature
directsus,andmorallybadwhenitfrustratestherealizationoftheseends. Apersonwho
habituallyperformsactionsoftheformerkindhasamorallygoodcharacter,andaperson
whohabituallyperformsactionsofthelatterkindamorallybadcharacter.
Virtuesandvicesconcernspecificrespectsinwhichaperson’scharactermightbe
morallygoodorbad. Forexample,apersonwhoseeatinghabitsareconducivetogood
healthandwhodoesnotpursuethepleasuresofthetableinamannerthatleadstoneglect
ofmoreimportantneedsexhibits,atleasttothatextent,thevirtueoftemperance. Aperson
whohabituallyovereatsorobsessesoverfoodtotheneglectofhighergoodsexhibitsthe
viceofgluttony.
Now,becausewearesocialanimals,whatisgoodorbadforusisalsodeterminedin
partbyourrelationstootherhumanbeings. Forexample,likeothersexuallyreproducing
animals,weareaimedordirectedbynaturetowardmatingwithmembersoftheopposite
sex,andwetherebyproduceoffspringwhoarehelplessformanyyearsafterbirth. They
needastablesource,notonlyofmaterialprovision,but—sincetheyareimmaturerational
animals—ofdisciplineandinstructioninwhatisusefulandgoodforthem. Suchbiological
10 Fordetailedexpositionanddefenseofthemoraltheorydiscussedinthissection,seechapter5of(Feser2009),and(Feser2014a).
Religions2021,12,268 5of17
factsarethefoundationofthefamilyasanaturalinstitution,andpartofwhatisgoodfor
usbynatureistofulfillourroleswithinthefamily. Forexample,afatherisdirectedor
aimedbynaturetowardprovidingmateriallyandmorallyforthefamilyhehasplayeda
roleinbringingintobeing. Totheextentthathedoesso,heexhibitsagoodmoralcharacter,
and to the extent that he fails to do so he exhibits a bad moral character. Children are
directedbynaturetowardobeyingthereasonableinstructionsoftheirparents,andexhibit
goodorbadmoralcharactertotheextenttheyhabituallydosoorfailtodoso. Andsoon.
Therearelargersocialformationstoo—localcommunities,nations,theinternational
order—andwhatisgoodorbadforusisalsoinpartamatterofhowwerelatetomembers
ofallofthesesocialorders. Rightsanddutiesofvariouskindsfollowfromthedifferent
kindsofrelationswebeartotheseothermembers. Forexample,sinceafatherisbynature
directedtowardprovidingforandinstructinghischildren,theyhavearighttohavetheir
fatherprovideforandinstructthem,andthefatherhasarighttotheobediencefromhis
childrenthatheneedsinordertodothosethingseffectively. Andhethereforehasaduty
toprovidethesethingsforthemandtheyhaveadutytoobeyhim.
Naturallawinthemoralsensehastodowiththeprinciplesforactionthatfollowfrom
thesevariousfactsaboutournature. FortheThomist,ourintellectshaveastheirnatural
endknowledgeofthetruthaboutthings,includingthetruthaboutwhatisgoodforus
given our natures. The will, meanwhile, has as its natural end the pursuit of what the
intellecttakestobegood. Hence,aproperlyfunctioningintellectandwill—andthusan
agentwhoisthinkingandactingrationally—willgraspwhatisinfactgoodforusandseek
topursueit. Forexample,suchanagentwillseethatignoranceandgluttonyarebadfor
us,andthuswillchoosetoavoidthesethingsandtocultivatethevirtuesthatwillfacilitate
doingso. Thatdoingsoismorallygoodforusisamatterofnaturallawinsomethinglike
thewaythatsinkingrootsintothegroundandtakinginwaterthroughthemisgoodfora
treeasamatterofphysicallaw.
Inadditiontotheprinciplesofnaturallawthatreasontellsusweoughttopursue,
therearehumanlaws—thedirectivesoflawmakers—towhichwecanbebound. Buteven
thesearegroundedinthenaturallaw. Forexample,inorderproperlytoprovideforand
instructhischildren,afatherhastobeabletoissuevariousdirectives,someofwhichgo
beyondwhatcanbeknownfromnaturallaw. Whenhetellsthemthatitisbadforthemto
hiteachotherandthattheyoughtthereforetorefrainfromdoingso,heissimplycalling
totheirattentionsomethingthat,hadtheysufficientuseofreasonandknowledge,they
wouldseetobetrueasamatterofnaturallaw. Butwhenhetellsthemthattheyhaveto
dotheirhomeworkbeforedinnertime,heis,asitwere,issuingapieceoflegislationthat
goesbeyondanythinginnaturallaw. Thatdoesnot, however, makesuchadirectivea
merearbitrarywhim. Onthecontrary,giventhatitismotivatedbyfactsaboutthenature
ofchildrentogetherwithfactsaboutthecontingentconcretecircumstancesinwhichthe
familyfindsitself,ithasaperfectlyreasonableandobjectivebasis. Andthattheyneed,
fortheirflourishing,directivesofthiskindfromtheirfatherentailsthatchildrenought
toobeythemnolessthantheyoughttoobeythoseprinciplesmoredirectlygroundedin
naturallaw.
Itgoeswithoutsayingthatallofthisraisesmanyquestionsandrequireselaboration
andvariousqualifications. WorkingoutthedetailsiswhatmoraltheoryintheThomistic
natural law tradition is about. The point for present purposes is simply to explain in
a general way how morality is grounded in the natural order of things. Indeed, the
moral order is a part of the larger natural order. Human beings are bound by natural
lawandhumanlawinthewaysthattheyarebecausetheyarephysicalsubstancesofa
certainnaturalkind,andcannotflourishquaspecimensofthatkindwithoutobedienceto
theselaws.
3. DivineCausality
Now,wheredoesGodfitintothispicture? Theansweristhathedoesnotfitintoitat
all. Heisnomoreapartofthenaturalorder—andthusnomorepartofthemoralorder
Religions2021,12,268 6of17
thatisasegmentofthenaturalorder—thananauthorispartofanovelorthanapainteris
partofapainting. Rather,heisthenecessarypreconditionoftherebeinganynaturalorder
atall,justasanauthoristhenecessarypreconditionoftherebeinganynovelatallanda
painterisanecessarypreconditionoftherebeinganypaintingatall. Andconceivingof
Godonthemodelofanaturalsubstanceislikeconceivingofanauthorasanadditional
characterinanovel,orconceivingofapainterasoneoftheimagesinapainting.
Thatthereisindeedsomethingstandingoutsidethenaturalorderasitsnecessary
precondition,andthatthissomethinghasadivinenature,isarguedforbytheThomistin
variousways.HereIwillsummarizeonlytheideasmostrelevantforpresentpurposes.11 In
additiontothemetaphysicalcomponentsofphysicalsubstancesalreadyreferredto—form,
matter, causal powers, etc.—the Thomist posits two most fundamental parts: a thing’s
essenceanditsexistence. Supposeyoudescribe,forsomeonewhohasneverbeforeheard
ofanyofthem,theessenceofalion,theessenceofaTyrannosaurusRex,andtheessence
ofaunicorn. Supposeyouwentontotellhimthat, ofthesethreecreatures, oneexists,
oneusedtoexistbuthasgoneextinct,andanotherneverexistedbutispurelylegendary.
Andsupposeyouaskedhimtotellyouwhichwaswhich,basedonhisnewknowledge
oftheiressences. Evenifyourdescriptionoftheessencesofthesethingswascomplete
andthepersonyouweredescribingthemtohadflawlessunderstandingandpowersof
deduction,hewouldbeunabletotellyou. ThisillustratestheThomisticthesisthatthe
existenceofanaturalsubstanceissomethingdistinctfromitsessence. Ifitwerenot,then
perfectknowledgeofthelatterwouldaffordknowledgeoftheformer.
FortheThomist,anessenceconsideredbyitselfisatmostonlypotentiallypartofthe
naturalorder. Thatexistenceisaddedtoanessenceiswhatactualizesthispotential. Now,
lionsarehereandnowpartofthenaturalorder,whileTyrannosaurusesusedtobepartof
itbutnolongerare,andunicornsneverwere. Thatentailsthatexistenceisbeingaddedto
theessenceoflions,butnottotheessencesofTyrannosaurusesorunicorns. Andwhatever
isaddingitmustbedoingsohereandnowandatanymomentatwhichlionsexist,and
notjustatthemomenttheyfirstcameintobeing. Fortheessenceandexistenceofalion
remaindistinctpartsofitnownolessthantheywerebeforelionswerearound. Something
must,inotherwords,beconservingorsustaininglionsinexistencehereandnowandat
everymomentatwhichtheyexist.
Now, if what is doing this were some cause which itself has an essence distinct
from its existence, then it too would need a conserving cause, and we would have an
explanatoryregress. Sucharegresscanterminateonlyinsomethingthatcanconserve
thingsinexistencewithoutitselfhavingtobeconservedinexistence,somethingthatcan
actualizetheotherwisemerelypotentialexistenceofotherthingswithoutitselfhavingto
beactualized. TheThomistarguesthatwhatcanfunctionasanultimateconservingcause
ofthissortcanonlybesomethinginwhichthereisnodistinctionbetweenitsessenceand
itsexistence—somethingwhoseveryessencejustisexistence,soitneednothaveexistence
addedtoit. Itwouldhavetobesomethingdevoidofanypotentialityforexistencestanding
in need of actualization, but instead be already entirely actual. To use the traditional
Aristotelian-Thomisticjargon, itwouldbeactuspurus(“pureactuality”)andipsumesse
subsistens(“subsistentbeingitself”).
Now,whatistrueoflionsistrueofeverythingelse—sulfur,trees,beavers,human
beings, and every other substance to be found in the natural order. With each of these
things,itsessenceandexistencearedistinct,andthuswitheachofthem,itcancontinue
inbeingaspartofthenaturalorderonlyinsofarasexistenceiscontinuallyimpartedto
itbythatwhichispureactualityandsubsistentbeingitself. Thomistsalsoarguethat,on
analysis,therecaninprinciplebeonlyonethingthatispureactualityandsubsistentbeing
itself. So,itisthesameoneconservingcausethatissustainingtheentirenaturalorderin
beingateverymoment.
11 Fordetailedexpositionanddefenseofthetheologicalideasdiscussedinthissectionandthenext,seechapter3of(Feser2009),andforanevenmore
detailedexpositionanddefense,see(Feser2017).
Religions2021,12,268 7of17
Thomistsalsoarguethatanythingthatispureactualityandsubsistentbeingitself
musthaveanumberoffurtherattributes. Forexample,itmustbeimmutable,giventhe
Aristotelian-Thomisticanalysisofchangeastheactualizationofpotentiality. Forsinceit
ispurelyactualandwithoutpassivepotentiality,itcannotbechanged. Similarly,itmust
be immaterial, given the Aristotelian-Thomistic analysis of matter as the potentiality to
takeonform. Itmustbeeternalinthesenseofbeingaltogetheroutsideoftime,givenits
immutabilitytogetherwiththeAristotelian-Thomisticanalysisoftimeasthemeasureof
change. Itmustbesimpleornon-compositegivenitspureactualitytogetherwiththefact
thatanythingcomposedofpartswouldhavepotentialityinneedofactualization(insofar
asitwouldnotexistunlessitspartsarecombined). Itmustexistofnecessityratherthan
contingentlygiventhatitispureactualityandsimpleornon-composite,togetherwiththe
factthatathingiscontingentonlyifithaspotentialityinneedofactualizationandpartsin
needofcombining.
A further Thomist thesis about the relationship between the natural order and its
conservingcauseisthattheformerdependsateverymomentonthelatterforitsoperation
nolessthanforitsexistence. Naturalsubstanceshavetheircausalpowerinasecondaryor
derivativeway—likeastickwhichcanmoveastoneonlyinsofarasitisusedbyahand
todoso,oranelectricmotorwhichcanmovethewheelsofacaronlyinsofarasitdraws
powerfromabattery. Hence,withoutdrawingcausalpowerfromtheirconservingcause
ateverymomentatwhichtheyoperate,naturalsubstanceswouldbeasinertasastick
thatthehandhasdroppedtothegroundorthemotorthathasbeendisconnectedfromits
battery. Sinceallpossiblecausalpowerderivesinthiswayfromtheconservingcauseof
things,thatcausecanalsobesaidtobeomnipotent.
WhatIhavebeensummarizingherearetheDoctrineofDivineConservation,according
to which the natural order could not continue in being for an instant without God’s
continuallysustainingit;andtheDoctrineofDivineConcurrence,accordingtowhichnatural
substancescannotexercisetheircausalpowerevenforaninstantwithoutGod’sconcurring
orcooperatingwiththatexercise. Itisonlyinlightofthesedoctrinesthatwecancorrectly
understandwhatThomists,andclassicaltheistsingeneral,meanwhentheycharacterize
GodasFirstCauseofthenaturalorder. Theydonotprimarilymean“first”inthetemporal
senseofhavinggottentheuniversegoingattheBigBang. Tobesure,mostclassicaltheists
thinkthatGoddidindeedcausetheworldtobeginatsometimeinthepast,butsome
thinkthattheworldhasalwaysbeenherewithoutbeginning. Allclassicaltheistsagree,
however,thatwhetherornotthenaturalorderhadabeginningintime,themoreimportant
pointisthatitcouldnotpersistinbeingwithoutdivineconservation,andthatthatisthe
fundamentalwayinwhichGodiscreatororcauseoftheworld. WhenspeakingofGod
asFirstCause,theyalsodonotmean“first”asopposedtosecond,third,fourth,etc. The
numberofmembersinacausalsequenceisnotwhatisatissue. Whattheymeanisthat
Godhascausalpowerinaprimaryratherthansecondaryway.Thatistosay,whereasnatural
substanceshavecausalpoweronlyinsofarastheyborroworderiveitfromsomethingelse,
Godhascausalpowerinabuilt-inorunderivedway. FortheThomist,onlywhatispure
actualitywithnopotentialityrequiringactualizationcanbesuchacauseinanabsoluteor
unqualifiedsense.
Because his causal power is of this unqualifiedly primary kind, and because he is
immutable,immaterial,eternal,andsimpleornon-composite,God’scausalityisradically
unlikethatofnaturalsubstances. Whenanaturalsubstancebringsanotherintobeing,it
doessobytransformingpreexistingmaterials. ButthatisnothowGodcausesthenatural
ordertoexist,becauseinthiscase,anythingthatcouldserveaspreexistingmaterialisitself
amongthethingsbeingcaused. Whenanaturalsubstancebringsaboutaneffect,itworks
throughparts(suchasthehandyouusetomoveastick)anditselfundergoeschangeover
timeasitdoesso(aswhenyourarmflexesandchangespositionwhenmovingthestick).
Nothinglikethishappenswithdivinecausality,sinceGodisnon-composite,immutable,
andeternal. Whenanaturalsubstanceexercisescausalpower,itdoessoinaccordance
withthelawsofnaturethatdescribeitscharacteristicmodeofbehaving. ButGodisnot
Religions2021,12,268 8of17
governedbylawsofnature,sincethoselawsarethemselvespreciselyamongthethingshe
causesincreatingthenaturalorderthatthelawsdescribe.
Forthesereasons,theThomistholdsthatthelanguageweusewhendescribingGod
andhiscausalrelationshiptotheworldmustbeunderstoodinananalogicalway,where
analogyisamiddlegroundsortofusagelyingbetweentheunivocalandequivocaluses
ofterms. Bywayofillustrationoftheidea,considerhowwespeakofthenumber3as
beinglargerthan2,asstandingbetween2and4,asnearerto1thanitisto10,andsoon. We
areusingtermsthatusuallydescribespatialrelationships,butwearenotusingthemin
thatsensewhendescribingnumbers,whichdonotexistinspace. Butwearenotusing
theminanentirelyunrelatedorequivocalwayeither. Though3’sstandingbetween2and
4isnotexactlythesamesortofthingasyourhouse’sstandingbetweenyourneighbor’s
houses,itisanalogoustothat. Notethatanalogicallanguageofthesortinquestionhereis
notmetaphorical. 3reallyisliterallybetween2and4. Itisjustthat“between”isnotused
inanidenticalorunivocalsensewhenwedescribenumbersandwhenwedescribehouses.
“Cause”andrelatedtermsare,fortheThomist,tobegivenananalogicalinterpretation
whenappliedtoGod. God’scausingthenaturalorderisanalogoustoahumanbeing’s
buildingahouseormakingasculpture,butitisveryfarfrombeingexactlythesamesort
ofthingasthat,givendivineimmateriality,immutability,eternity,simplicity,etc. Indeed,
muchofwhatwehavetosayaboutthedivinenatureisalongthelinesofapophaticor
negativetheology—sayingwhatGodisnot,howradicallyhediffersfromthenaturalorder
heconservesinbeing.
Now,manytheologicalerrors,notonlyonthepartofskepticsbutalsoonthepartof
naïvereligiousbelievers,derivefromafailuretokeepinmindpointsliketheonesIhave
beenmaking. Forexample,skepticsandnaïvebelieversalikeoftenconceiveofGodand
hisrelationtothenaturalorderonthemodelofa“godofthegaps.”Thatistosay,they
thinkthatthewayargumentsforGod’sexistenceworkisbyidentifyingsomeunusual
phenomenonforwhichwehavenotyetfoundanaturalexplanation,andthenappealingto
specialdivineactiontofillthisexplanatorygap. Thestandardcriticismofsucharguments
is to note that they stand at the mercy of scientific advance, with God having less and
lesstodothemoreexistinggapsinexplanationarefilledbyfurtherresearchinphysics,
chemistry,andsoon.
The“godofthegaps”approachisindeedfeeble,butithasnothingtodowiththe
argumentsofThomistsandotherclassicaltheists. Theyarenottryingtofillexplanatory
gaps within the natural order studied by science, but rather explaining what empirical
scienceitselfpresupposesbutcannotaccountfor—namely,thefactthatthereisanynatural
orderatallinthefirstplace. The“godofthegaps”approachislikesupposingthattosay
thatapaintingpresupposesapainteramountstopositinganas-yetunseenpersonlurking
somewhereintheimage(“Where’sWaldo?”style),orthattosaythatanovelpresupposes
anauthoramountstopositingacharacterinthestorywhosomehowescapedthereader’s
noticeonafirstreading. Itisacategorymistake,restingonaconflationoftheprimary
causalityuniquetowhatispureactualityandsubsistentbeingitselfwiththesecondary
causalitycharacteristicofnaturalsubstances.
4. DivineGoodness
Now,asimilarfallacy,Iamclaiming,underliestheso-calledlogicalproblemofevil.
Toseehow,though,alittlemorestage-settingisrequired. Letusnotefirstthat,despite
everythingsaidsofaranddespiteDavies’aptemphasisondistinguishingclassicaltheism
fromwhathecalls“theisticpersonalism,”Thomistsandotherclassicaltheistsdonotregard
Godasimpersonal. Onthecontrary,Thomistsandmostclassicaltheistswouldattribute
intellectandwilltoGod,andthesearethepropertiescharacteristicofpersons. Forthe
Thomist, whatever is in an effect must in some manner preexist in its cause, and since
Godisthecauseofanypossiblerealityotherthanhimself,theessencesornaturesofall
thepossiblethingshemightcreatemustinsomewayexistinhim. Thetraditionalway
classicaltheistshaveunderstoodthisisintermsofthethesis—famouslyassociatedwith
Religions2021,12,268 9of17
St. Augustine and adopted by Aquinas—that such essences exist in God in a manner
analogoustohowideasorconceptsexistinanintellect,andfunctionasthearchetypes
byreferencetowhichGodcreates. GiventhefurtherThomisticthesisthatwillfollows
uponintellect,ifthereissomethinginGodanalogoustointellect,theremustalsobeinhim
somethinganalogoustowill.
Hereaselsewhere,though,itisabsolutelycrucialtokeepinmindtheThomistview
thatthetermswepredicateofGodmustbeunderstoodinananalogicalratherthanunivocal
way. God’s intellect and will are no more like ours than his causality is like ours. For
example,Goddoesnotcometoknowthingsorengageinanysortofreasoningprocess,
becausethatwouldentailchange,andheisimmutableandeternal. WhatGodknowshe
knowsinasingleeternalact;andsinceheispurelyactualandthuswithoutpotentiality
needingactualization,hisknowledgeandwisdomareperfect. God’smannerofknowing
thenaturalorderdoesnotinvolveanysortofobservationofit,becausehedoesnotneedto
be(norindeedcanbe,givenhisimmutability)affectedbyanythingdistinctfromhimselfin
ordertoknowit. Rather,heknowsthenaturalorderbyknowinghimselfasthecauseofit,
justasanauthorknowsthestoryhehaswrittenbyvirtueofknowinghisownmind. Given
divinesimplicity,wecannotattributedistinctthoughtstoGod;rather,whatheknowshe
knowsinsomethinglikeasingleintellectualact. Andsoon. Godisnotimpersonal,but
neitherishelikeahumanperson.
ThetroublewithwhatDaviescallstheisticpersonalismisthatitmodelsGodprecisely
onhumanpersons,insomethinglikethewaythat“godofthegaps”theoriesmodelGod
onsecondarycausesoperatingwithinthenaturalorder. ItconceivesofGodasundergoing
changeandthereforebeingintime,ascausallyaffectedbythenaturalorder,ascoming
to know that order by observing it, and so on. To be sure, like classical theism, it also
thinks of God as immaterial and omnipotent. But given its deviations from classical
theism,itneverthelessreducesGod’spowerandindependencefrommattertosomething
comparabletowhatweseeinthegodsoftheancientpantheons. GodbecomeslikeZeus
orOdin,orlikeacharacterfromamodernsuperherocomicbookormovie. (DavidBentley
Hartaptlycharacterizestheisticpersonalismas“monopolytheism”—committedtoaview
of the divine nature that differs little from that of polytheists except that it reduces the
membership of the pantheon down to one.12) Theistic personalism unwittingly makes
ofGodjustanotherpartofthenaturalorder,albeitthemostpowerfulpart—notlikean
author at all, but merely a character in the novel who has superpowers, and not like a
painterbutmerelythemoststrikingimageinthepainting.
ThisisthecontextwithinwhichtounderstandthesenseinwhichGodisgood,and
Davies’objectiontocharacterizingGodasa“moralagent.”13Thefirstthingtosayisthat
theThomistcertainlydoesconceiveofGodasgood,indeedassupremelygood. ForasI
haveindicated,goodness,fortheThomist,istobeanalyzedintermsoftheactualizationof
thepotentialsthatathing’snaturedirectsittowardactualizing,andbadnessintermsof
thefailuretoactualizethem. ButGodispureactuality,withnounactualizedpotentiality.
Hence,heisperfectlygood.Tobesure,unlikeotherthings,heisalsodevoidofpotentialities
thatwouldhaveneededactualizationinthefirstplace,butthatentailsmoreinthewayof
goodnessratherthanless. IfitisgoodtoactualizeapotentialforX,itisbetterstillneverto
havebeenmerelypotentiallyX,butalwaystohavebeenactuallyX.
AsBarryMillerhassuggested,adivineperfectionasclassicaltheismunderstandsitis
tobeunderstoodasakindoflimitcaseratherthanalimitsimpliciter.14 Alimitsimpliciter
differsonlyindegreefromotherinstancesofthattowhichitisthelimit. Forexample,the
speedoflightisthefastestspeedatwhichaphysicalobjectcantravel,butitdiffersonlyin
degreefromlowerspeeds. Bycontrast,alimitcasediffersabsolutelyfromtheinstancesto
whichitisalimit,ratherthanindegree. Forexample,aspeedof0km/sisnotalowest
12 (Hart2013,p.127).
13 (Davies2006,p.92).
14 (Miller1996,pp.7–10).
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speed,becauseitisnotaspeedatall. Still,thewaysthatthedifferentdegreesofspeed
areorderedpointtothislimitcase. Divinegoodnesstoocanbethoughtofasalimitcase
(though,unlikeaspeedof0km/s,asamaximumratherthanaminimum). Thedegreesof
goodnesstobefoundinthenaturalorderpointtoit,notasahighestdegreeintheseries,
butratherassomethingoutsidetheseriesonwhichtheseries’membersconvergeandcan
onlyeverapproximate.
Alternatively,divinegoodnesscanbethoughtofasakindofparadigmcase.Aparadigm
caseisnotmerelyoneinstanceofakindamongothers,butratherthestandardbyreference
to which something counts as a member of the kind. For example, the standard meter
in Paris was not merely one meter alongside the others, but the standard by reference
towhichanythingelsecountedasameter. Or,totakeabetterexample(becauseitdoes
notinvolvehumanconvention),Plato’sFormoftheGoodisnotmerelyoneinstanceof
goodnessalongsidetheothers, butratherthestandardbyreferencetowhichanything
countsasgood. Fortheclassicaltheist,divinegoodnessislikethat. Itnomoremakessense
tothinkofGodaslessthanperfectlygoodthanitdoestothinkoftheFormoftheGoodas
lessthanperfectlygood,ortothinkofthestandardmeteraslessthanameterlong.
Now, this is one obvious respect in which divine goodness is not like the moral
goodnessexhibitedbyhumanbeings,whichdoescomeindegrees. Butthereareother
respects. For example, human goodness involves possession of moral virtues such as
courage,whichisthedispositiontodotherightthinginthefaceofdanger,andtemperance,
whichinvolvesmoderationinindulgenceofone’sappetites. SinceGodcannotpossibly
beindangerandhasnoappetites, hecannotintelligiblybesaidtopossessvirtueslike
courageandtemperance. Moregenerally,Godisnotsubjecttothenaturallaw,anymore
thanheissubjecttophysicallaws. Thenaturallawisgroundedinhumannature, just
asphysicallawsaregroundedinthenaturesofphysicalsubstancesmoregenerally. As
thecauseofhumanbeingsandofphysicalsubstancesingeneral,andthusasthecauseof
theveryexistenceofthenaturallawasoftheexistenceofphysicallaws,hecanhardlybe
governedbyit.
By no means does this entail, however, that God could by fiat make just anything
morallyobligatory,suchastorturingbabiesforfun. For,again,whatisgoodorbadfor
humanbeingsisdeterminedbytheiressenceornature. Giventheessenceofhumanbeings,
it cannot possibly be good for them to torture babies for fun, so a world in which this
ismorallyobligatoryislikeaworldwithroundsquares—notonethatevenGodcould
create. (PerhapsGodcouldmakecreaturesofsomekindforwhichtorturingbabiesfor
funwouldbegood,buttheywouldnotinthatcasebehuman,becausesuchathingcould
notbegoodforsomethingwithournature.) So,tosupposethateitherthereexistssome
moralstandardindependentofGodthathedidnotcreate,orhecouldcommandjustany
oldthingbyfiat—thestandardEuthyphrodilemmascenario—is,fortheThomist,afalse
choice. Nothingatallcanexist,includingthenaturallaw,unlessGodcreatesit. Butatthe
sametime,if hecreateshumanbeings,andthusthenaturallawthatgovernsthem,then
whathecommandsisconstrainedbywhatitistobeahumanbeing.
SinceGodjustissubsistentbeingitselfandthelawofnon-contradictionis,forthe
Thomist,simplyareflectionoftheverynatureofbeing,God’screatingthingsinaccordance
withthislawisultimatelytobeanalyzedasamatterofhiscreatinginaccordancewithhis
ownnature. Andhisdoingsoentailsthatthereisasenseinwhichhecreateswithperfect
justice,thoughthereisanothersenseinwhichtheconceptofjusticenomoreappliesto
Godthanthenotionsofcourageortemperancedo. Traditionally,adistinctionisdrawn
betweentwomaintypesofjustice. Commutativejusticehastodowithjusticeintheways
thatmembersofacommunitydealwithoneanotherwithregardtorespectingproperty
rights,honoringcontracts,andthelike. Distributivejusticehastodowiththewaythata
rulerensuresthatthosewhoareunderhisorherauthorityreceivewhatisduetothem.
Now,asAquinasargues,thenotionofcommutativejusticedoesnotatallapplytoGod,