The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Proposal

239 Pages·1988·23.535 MB·English

by  Ingemar Lindahl (auth.)

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NORDIC
NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE-ZONE PROPOSAL
Northern Europe
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lf]lr&l Warsaw Pact
The Soviet Union and
the Nordic Nuclear
Weapons-Free-Zone
Proposal
Ingemar Lindahl
Ana(yst, Swedish National Defense Research Agenry, Stockholm
Foreword by Vojtech Mastny
Professor of Politics, Boston Universiry
M
MACMILLAN
PRESS
©Ingemar Lindahl 1988
Foreword© Vojtech Mastny 1988
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1st edition 1988
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First published 1988
Published by
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Companies and representatives
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Lindahl, N. Ingemar.
The Soviet Union and the Nordic nuclear
weapons-free-zone proposal.
I. Nuclear weapon-free-zones-Scandinavia
2. Scandinavia-Foreign relations-Soviet
Union 3. Soviet Union-Foreign relations
-Scandinavia
I. Title
363.3'5 JXI974.74.S34
ISBN 978-1-349-09322-9 ISBN 978-1-349-09320-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-09320-5
To Dr and Mrs Douglas Lindahl
Contents
Foreword by Vojtech Mastny x
Acknowledgements xi
A Note on Terminology xn
1 Introduction: Two Political Cultures 1
1.1 The Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone
Proposal 1
1.2 Two Cultures 2
1.3 Scandinavian Escapism and its Restraints 5
1.4 The Other Culture: Soviet Power Politics 8
1.5 Nuclear Arms and Moral Responsibility 11
2 The Soviet Union and the Post-war Security
Pattern in Scandinavia 14
2.1 The Soviet Posture in the Nordic Area after
the Second World War 14
2.2 Scandinavia in between East and West 18
2.3 The Nordic Balance - Static or Dynamic? 23
2.4 The Soviet Union and the Nordic Balance 28
3 The Soviet Union and Scandinavian Neutrality 32
3.1 The Soviet View of Neutrality 32
3.2 The Soviet Union and the Nordic Neutrals 37
4 The Nukes, the Nordics and their Neighbour 47
4.1 The Birth of the NWFZN proposal 47
4.2 The Early Soviet Campaign for a NWFZN 52
4.3 The NWFZN plan in Soviet
Historiography 57
4.4 The Scandinavian Countries and the
Nuclear Option 59
5 Scandinavian Zone Proposals 67
5.1 The Unden Plan 67
5.2 The Kekkonen Plan 73
5.2.1 Background 73
5.2.2 The First Kekkonen Plan 77
5.2.3 Nordic reactions 81
5.2.4 The Soviet response 83
Vll
Vlll Contents
6 The Finnish Paradox and the Nordic Balance 87
6.1 Kekkonen's Preventive Foreign Policy and
the NWFZN proposal 87
6.2 The Soviet Union and the Definition of
Finnish Neutrality 93
6.3 Finland Between Scandinavia and the
USSR 98
7 The Kekkonen Plan Relaunched 106
7 .I The NWFZN Proposal on the
International Scene 106
7.2 The Regional Resurrection of the
Kekkonen Plan 112
7.3 Repercussions 115
8 The Search for a Sanctuary 125
8.1 Norway: From the Evensen Campaign to
Parliamentary Compromise 125
8.2 Sweden: Between the Zone and the
Submarines 134
8.3 Finland: Exit Kekkonen 146
8.4 Denmark: The NWFZN and the 'Footnote
Alliance' 151
9 The Soviet Union and the NWFZN Proposal
in the 1980s 159
9.1 The Soviet Peace Programme and
Scandinavia 159
9.2 The Soviet Union and the Evensen
Campaign 163
9.3 The Heyday of the NWFZN Proposal 166
9.4 The Struggle for the Zone 170
9.5 Setbacks for the NWFZN plan 173
9.6 After the Andropov Initiative 180
10 Conclusion 185
10.1 The Political Impact of the Increase of
Soviet Power in the Nordic Area 185
10.2 The NWFZN in Soviet Peace Policy 188
10.3 The Effects of the NWFZN 'Pill' 190
Contents
IX
10.3.1 A NWFZN would create a
sanctuary in the event of a nuclear
conflict 190
10.3.2 A NWFZN would reduce tension in 191
Northern Europe and possibly have
effect on East-West efforts to reduce
nuclear arms in Europe
10.3.3 Political will of the Nordic
Governments is sufficient for the
realisation of a protective NWFZN 192
Notes and References 195
Select Bibliography 214
Index 218
Foreword
The problem of Nordic security that has imposed itself with
growing persistency since the 1970s cannot be reduced simply to
the deterrence of a possible attack by the rapidly expanding
Soviet forces in the area. Worrisome though that expansion is, it
has not made such an attack more likely than before. Instead, it
has dramatised the importance of security short of the military
confrontation that deterrence is designed to prevent. Yet this
subject has been sadly neglected in the Western strategic debate,
excessively preoccupied with extreme scenarios which are
possible but hardly probable.
For several reasons, theN ordic region is particularly well suited
to enhance our sensitivity to the deeper meaning of security. It
has been a region whose strategic importance began to rise at the
very time the political detente between East and West flourished.
It has also been an area in which five different concepts of
national security have been harmonised in the remarkably stable
'Nordic balance'. Finally, because of its singularly successful
blend of freedom, democracy, and material well-being, Scandi
navia is the quintessential West. And since this impressive
achievement has been made in the immediate Soviet vicinity in a
physical environment comparable to Russia's, the European
North is the frontier where the conflicting values most conspi
cuously clash.
Ingemar Lindahl is exceptionally well attuned to these crucial
realities of Nordic security. A Swede, a diplomat, and a poet, he
knows the region intimately, grasps the essence of its relations
with the outside world, and adds that special insight into the
workings of human mind which writers on security matters
usually lack. Convinced about the indispensability of power,
includi11g military power, he is not tender-minded in his critique
of the folly of the current Nordic nuclear-free zone-proposal. Yet
he calls for a mainly political response to the Soviet challenge.
His analysis deserves to be read widely not only by experts but
also by ordinary citizens on whose will to defend the values that
unite Scandinavia with the rest of the Western world the security
of the common heritage ultimately rests.
Center for International Relations VOJTECH MASTNY
Boston University
X