The Problem of Objectivity in Gadamer's Hermeneutics in Light of McDowell's Empiricism PDF
Preview The Problem of Objectivity in Gadamer's Hermeneutics in Light of McDowell's Empiricism
Contributions to Hermeneutics 1 Morten S. Thaning The Problem of Objectivity in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics in Light of McDowell’s Empiricism Contributions to Hermeneutics Volume 1 Series editors Jeffery Malpas, University of Tasmania, Tasmania, Australia Claude Romano, Universite´ Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, France Editorial board Jean Grondin, University of Montre´al, Canada Robert Dostal, Bryn Mawr College, USA Andrew Bowie, Royal Holloway, UK Franc¸oise Dastur, Nice, France Kevin Hart, University of Virginia, USA David Tracy, Univeristy of Chicago, USA Jean-Claude Gens, University of Bourgogne, France Richard Kearney, Boston College, USA Gianni Vattimo, University of Turin, Italy Carmine di Martino, University of Milan, Italy Luis Umbellino, University of Coimbra, Portugal Kwok-Ying Lau, Chinese University of Hong Kong, HK Marc-Antoine Valle´e, Fonds Ricœur, Paris, France Gonc¸alo Marcelo, University of Lisbon, Portugal Csaba Olay, University of Budapest, Hungary Patricio Mena-Malet, University Alberto Hurtado, Santiago, Chile Andrea Bellantone, Catholic Institute of Toulouse, France Hans-Helmuth Gander, University of Freiburg, Germany Gaetano Chiurazzi, University of Turin, Italy Anibal Fornari, Catholic University of Santa Fe, Argentina HermeneuticsisoneofthemaintraditionswithinrecentandcontemporaryEuropean philosophy,andyet,asadistinctivemodeofphilosophising,ithasoftenreceivedmuch lessattentionthanothersimilartraditionssuchasphenomenology,deconstructionor evencriticaltheory.Thisseriesaimstorectifythisrelativeneglectandtoreaffirmthe characterofhermeneuticsasacohesive,distinctiveandrigorousstreamwithincon- temporaryphilosophy. The series will encourage worksthat focus onthehistory of hermeneutics prior to the twentieth century, that take up figures from the classical twentieth-centuryhermeneuticcanon(includingHeidegger,GadamerandRicoeur,but alsosuchasStrauss,Pareyson,TaylorandRorty),thatengagewithkeyhermeneutic questions and themes (especially those relating to language, history, aesthetics and truth),thatexplorethecross-culturalrelevanceandspreadofhermeneuticconcerns, and that also address hermeneutics in its interconnection with, and involvement in, otherdisciplinesfromarchitecturetotheology.Akeytaskoftheserieswillbetobring intoEnglishtheworkofhermeneuticscholarsworkingoutsideoftheEnglish-speaking world,whilealsodemonstratingtherelevanceofhermeneuticstokeycontemporary debates.Sincehermeneuticscanitselfbeseentostandbetween,andoftentooverlap with,manydifferentcontemporaryphilosophicaltraditions,theserieswillalsoaimat stimulatingandsupportingphilosophicaldialoguethroughhermeneuticalengagement. ContributionstoHermeneuticsaimstodrawtogetherthediversefieldofcontemporary philosophical hermeneutics through a series of volumes that will give an increased focus to hermeneutics as a discipline while also reflecting the interdisciplinary and trulyinternationalscopeofhermeneuticinquiry.Theserieswillencourageworksthat focusonbothcontemporaryhermeneuticsaswellasitshistory,onspecifichermeneu- ticthemesandareasofinquiry(includingtheologicalandreligioushermeneutics),and onhermeneuticdialogueacrossculturesanddisciplines.Allbookstobepublishedin thisserieswillbefullypeer-reviewedbeforefinalacceptance. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13358 Morten S. Thaning The Problem of Objectivity in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics in Light of McDowell’s Empiricism MortenS.Thaning DepartmentofPolitics,ManagementandPhilosophy CopenhagenBusinessSchool Frederiksberg,Denmark ContributionstoHermeneutics ISBN978-3-319-18647-4 ISBN978-3-319-18648-1 (eBook) DOI10.1007/978-3-319-18648-1 LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015939580 SpringerChamHeidelbergNewYorkDordrechtLondon ©SpringerInternationalPublishingSwitzerland2015 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartof the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilarmethodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publicationdoesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexempt fromtherelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. Thepublisher,theauthorsandtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthis book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained hereinorforanyerrorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade. Printedonacid-freepaper Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) Contents 1 Introduction:ReconstructingPhilosophicalHermeneutics. . . . . . . . 1 1 TheProblemofObjectivityinPhilosophicalHermeneutics. . . . . . 3 2 PerceptualExperienceandtheHermeneutics ofSelf-Presentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 Tradition,PracticalWisdomandtheHermeneuticConcept ofMeaning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 TheLackofObjectivityinPostmodernHermeneutics. . . . . . . . . . . 13 1 TheStatusofTranscendentalPhilosophyinGadamer’s Hermeneutics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2 Vattimo’sRejectionofaTranscendentalHermeneutics. . . . . . . . . 18 3 ACritiqueofVattimo’sConceptionofHermeneutics. . . . . . . . . . 24 4 Vattimo’sResponse:TheParadoxofInterpretation. . . . . . . . . . . . 28 5 GuidingThreadsfortheReconstructionofPhilosophical Hermeneutics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3 TheSocraticParadigmofObjectivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 1 TheSpaceofReasonsandtheFreedomofJudgement. . . . . . . . . . 41 2 TheMythoftheGiven. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 3 GadamerandtheSocraticParadigmoflogondidonai. . . . . . . . . . 51 4 PerceptualExperienceandtheOntologyofSelf-Presentation. . . . . 61 1 LanguageandtheWorld. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 2 TheProblemofPerceptualExperience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 3 KantianIntuitionsasConceptualShapingsofSensory Consciousness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4 TheUnityoftheFormsofSensibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 5 TheLapseintoSubjectiveIdealism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 6 TheHegelianEquipoise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 87 7 LimitsoftheKantianandHegelianParadigmofSubjectivity. . . . 92 v vi Contents 8 Self-PresentationintheAccountofArt andtheHumanSciences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 9 Self-PresentationasaTranscendental andOntologicalConcept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 10 RetainingtheEquipoise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 5 HistoricalandSituatedObjectivity:TraditionandPhrone¯sis. . . . . . 117 1 Gadamer’sConceptofTraditionandItsCritics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 2 TheEpistemologicalSignificanceofTradition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 3 TraditionandChange. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 4 TheOntologicalAspectofTradition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 5 AHermeneuticCritiqueofBrandom’sMethodologism. . . . . . . . . 142 6 ResponsibilityandHermeneuticVigilance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 7 PracticalWisdomandPerceptualExperience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 8 TheVisualLogos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 9 TheMisguidedDenunciationofPracticalWisdom. . . . . . . . . . . . 160 6 HermeneuticMeaningandApophanticAlienation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 1 TheInnerWordandtheModelofIncarnation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 2 TheApophanticAlienationofMeaning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 3 FoundationalismandSubjectivisminBeingandTime. . . . . . . . . . 184 4 Gadamer’sInterpretationofAssertion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 5 AvoidingBothApophanticismandtheMythoftheGiven. . . . . . . 195 Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Chapter 1 Introduction: Reconstructing Philosophical Hermeneutics Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is developed as a dialogical form of thought. He is a philosophical ventriloquist, one who articulates his thoughts through the prominent figures of the tradition rather than attempting to develop a system of his own. In the decades after the publication of Truth and Method,Gadameralsoengagedinintensedialoguewithprominent,contemporary philosophicalfiguresinordertodefendanddevelophishermeneutics.Thedebates with Ju¨rgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida are perhaps the most memorable examplesofsuchencounters.1 There’s no doubt that the dialogical form of Gadamer’s thought is in part an expressionofhispersonalpropensity.Butitalsoconnectedwithaguidingthought inphilosophicalhermeneutics,namelythatunderstandingofacomplexproblemis bestachievedbyarticulatingitasacommonsubjectmatterthroughdialogue.The followinginvestigationemploysthisapproachinrelationtoGadamer’sphilosoph- icalhermeneutics.Itaimstodevelopandreassesshisphilosophybybringingitinto a dialogue with John McDowell’s minimal empiricism. In accordance with Gadamer’s own dialogue with the philosophical tradition, the intention is not to use McDowell in order to work out a historical reconstruction of philosophical hermeneutics.Rather,thegoalistopresentahermeneuticconceptionofobjectivity and experience in light of McDowell’s empiricism that avoids the potential prob- lemstowhichGadamer’scriticshavepointed.Asitwillbecomeclear,thisreading ofphilosophicalhermeneuticsalsoreflectsuponourunderstandingofMcDowell’s thinking. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics belongs in the Continental tradition of phenomenology.Heviewshimselfaspartofwhathetermsthephenomenological 1Grondinliststhemostimportantpapersfromthesedebates.Cf.Grondin,J.2000.Einfu€hrungzu Gadamer.Tu¨bingen:J.C.B.Mohr(PaulSiebeck). ©SpringerInternationalPublishingSwitzerland2015 1 M.S.Thaning,TheProblemofObjectivityinGadamer’sHermeneutics inLightofMcDowell’sEmpiricism,ContributionstoHermeneutics1, DOI10.1007/978-3-319-18648-1_1 2 1 Introduction:ReconstructingPhilosophicalHermeneutics movement, originating in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology.2 Within this tradi- tion, Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology is undeniably the position that exercises the most important influence on his thinking. McDowell’s philoso- phy, on the other hand, is part of the analytic tradition shaped by such figures as GottlobFrege,LudwigWittgenstein,DonaldDavidsonandWilfredSellars.Under- lyingtheseverydifferentinfluences,wefindacommoninterestinancientphilos- ophy. Both Gadamer and McDowell published some of their first work on Plato and, for both, an early engagement with Aristotle’s practical philosophy played a decisive role in shaping their thought. Moreover, McDowell shares Gadamer’s philosophicalventriloquism.Theybotharticulatetheirthoughtsthroughprominent figures of the tradition, and therefore understanding their original contribution requiresstudyofmanyclassicalauthorsinordertocriticallyevaluatehowGadamer andMcDowellapplytheirthoughtsinamoderncontext. InMcDowell’sMindandWorld,wefindanumberofreferencestoGadamerthat may initially seem scattered and of limited relevance to the general thrust of the book.3 However, a central purpose of the following investigation is to show that thereis,atadeeperlevel,asubstantialandphilosophicallyfruitfulaffinitybetween the two philosophers.4 By investigating this, it becomes possible to develop and strengthenbothapproaches,whileatthesametime,thedoubleperspectivemakesit possible to articulate a clearer diagnosis of the potential problems in both Gadamer’sandMcDowell’spositions. More specifically, the aim is to show that McDowell’s empiricism can help articulate hermeneutic concepts of objectivity and experience. Conversely, the investigation demonstrates that a hermeneutic account of meaning can support and develop McDowell’s recent attempt to avoid an objectifying conception of thecontentofourexperience. 2Cf. Gadamer, H.-G. 1999. Die pha¨nomenologische Bewegung [1963]. Gesammelte Werke 3, 105–146.Tu¨bingen:J.C.B.Mohr(PaulSiebeck). 3McDowellmakespassingreferencestoGadamerinMindandWorldconcerningtheconceptof thefusionofhorizons(Horizontverschmelzung),thedistinctionbetweenworld(Welt)andenvi- ronment(Umwelt),andthenotionoftradition(McDowell,J.1996.MindandWorld,35f.,115ff., 125. Cambridge: Harvard University Press). In ‘Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism’,hedefendsGadameragainstthechargeofrelativismandemploysthehermeneutic conceptoftradition inacritique ofDavidson(McDowell, J. 2009.Havingthe WorldinView: EssaysonKant,Hegel,andSellars,134–151.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress).However,he doesnotexploretherelationbetweenhisminimalempiricismandphilosophicalhermeneuticsas such.Indeedattheendofthementionedpaper,hewritesthathehas‘barelyscratchedthesurface ofGadamer’sthinkingaboutlanguage’(ibid.:151). 4Tomyknowledge,therelationbetweenGadamerandMcDowell’sphilosophyhassofarnotbeen examined in detail, although several commentators have pointed to this relation as a fruitful avenue of research (e.g. Wachterhauser, B. 2002. Getting it Right: Relativism, Realism, and Truth. In The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, ed. Robert, J. Dostal, 52–78. New York: Cambridge University Press; Ramberg, B. and Gjesdal, K. 2009. Hermeneutics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/hermeneutics. AccessedSeptember5,2014). 1 TheProblemofObjectivityinPhilosophicalHermeneutics 3 1 The Problem of Objectivity in Philosophical Hermeneutics The relevance of McDowell’s thinking for developing philosophical hermeneutics becomesclearifwetakeourpointofdeparturebothinGadamer’srejectionoftheidea ofanultimatefoundationforourunderstanding,andinhisalternative,theideathatour understandingisalwayshistoricallysituated.Eventhoughthisrejectioniscrucialto hisprojectandhasinspiredphilosophersindiversetraditions,ithasalsooccludedthe factthatwhatisatstakeforphilosophicalhermeneuticsinunderstandingandinter- pretation is the experience of truth. That is to say, even though Gadamer takes exceptiontotheambitionsoftraditionalphilosophyinadecisiveway,hesharesits conviction that any understanding that truly deserves its name is objective, in the minimalsensethatitisconstrainedbyitsrelationtoitssubjectmatter(Sache).Since the status of objectivity is never sufficiently clarified in Gadamer’s thinking, the strengths of his philosophical hermeneutics – the rejection of the conviction that philosophy’s task is to provide an ultimate foundation for understanding; and the ‘elevation of the historicity of understanding to a hermeneutic principle’5 – have become precisely its weakness in the dominant reception of this thinking.6 Gianni Vattimo’s constructivist appropriation of hermeneutics, for example, attempts to articulate the presuppositions of Gadamer’s approach to objectivity, but thereby endsupinaformofscepticism.InChap.2,IwillexamineVattimo’sinterpretation anddescribehowitsuntenablenaturepointstotheneedforanalternativeaccountof objectivityinphilosophicalhermeneutics.ThediscussionofVattimoalsomakesclear thatsuchanaccountisboundtohavetranscendentalimplications.Vattimorejectsthe ideathatphilosophicalhermeneuticsisaformoftranscendentalphilosophybecause hethinksthisisequivalenttoaproblematicmeta-theoryofobjectivity.Hetherefore ignores Gadamer’s repeated but also vague remarks concerning a transcendental dimensionofhermeneutics.IthinkthatVattimoisrighttowarnagainstatranscen- dental hermeneutics in the sense of a meta-theory. But since his own account is indistinguishablefromscepticism,heindirectlypointstowardsadifferentconception ofatranscendentalhermeneutics,onedevelopedfromwithintheorderofrepresenta- tion.IncontrasttoVattimo,suchanapproachwouldgiveproperconsiderationtothe first-person or experiential perspective. It is from this perspective that we should addressthenatureofobjectivitybyattemptingtodescribehowourunderstandingor interpretationcanbenormativelyguidedbyitssubjectmatter.Vattimoisawarethatif wewanttodojusticetoourexperiencethatourunderstandingismoreorlessadequate –andinsomecases,evenfailscompletely–thisrequiresthatwemakesenseofthe 5Cf.thetitleofoneoftheimportantchaptersofGadamer,H.-G.2004.TruthandMethod,268– 306.LondonandNewYork:Continuum;Gadamer,H.-G.1990.WahrheitundMethode,270–312. Tu¨bingen:J.C.B.Mohr(PaulSiebeck). 6ThisisalsoFigal’sdiagnosisinGegensta€ndlichkeit(Figal,G.2006.Gegensta€ndlichkeit.Tu¨bingen: J.C.B.Mohr(PaulSiebeck)).Fromthispointofdeparture,Figaldevelopsaconceptionofherme- neuticsthatdecisivelyandprogrammaticallyleavesbehindGadamer’sphilosophicalhermeneutics.
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