The Ontology of Well-Being in Social Policy and Welfare Practice

270 Pages·2022·6.35 MB·English

by  Steven R. Smith

Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 18
Steven R. Smith
The Ontology
of Well-Being in
Social Policy and
Welfare Practice
Library of Public Policy and Public
Administration
Volume 18
Series Editor
Michael Boylan, Department of Philosophy, Marymount University,
Arlington, VA, USA
Editorial Board Members
Simona Giordano, Reader in Bioethics, School of Law, Manchester University,
Manchester, UK
David Koepsell, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Director of Research
and Strategic Initiatives at Comisión Nacional de Bioética (CONBIOETICA),
Mexico
Seumas Miller, Research Fellow, Charles Sturt University, Australia and Delft
University, The Netherlands, Australia
Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez, Professor and Chair Philosophy, Youngstown State
University, Youngstown, OH, USA
Wanda Teays, Professor Philosophy, Mount St. Mary’s University, Los Angeles,
CA, USA
Jonathan Wolff, Professor of Political Philosophy, Blavatnik School of
Government, Oxford University, UK
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Steven R. Smith
The Ontology of Well-Being
in Social Policy and Welfare
Practice
Steven R. Smith
Faculty of Business and Creative Industries
University of South Wales
Treforest, UK
ISSN 1566-7669
Library of Public Policy and Public Administration
ISBN 978-3-031-18141-2 ISBN 978-3-031-18142-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18142-9
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Acknowledgements
Just under 24% of this book has been published previously, but with none of the
chapters here being wholly taken from these pre-published sources. Instead, those
chapters which use these sources have developed in considerably more detail, the
original ideas and arguments. Moreover, these developed ideas and arguments have
now been thoroughly incorporated into The Ontology of Well-Being Thesis
(TOWT), defended throughout the book, and which is a thesis that is first named
and explicitly identified here.
Despite these provisos, it is important to acknowledge the support given via these
earlier publications. So, a considerable debt of gratitude is owed to the editors and
referees of these sources, whose suggestions very much improved the original ideas
and arguments. Specifically, the origins of Chap. 3 can be found in a contribution
made to Kathleen Galvin’s edited collection, published by Routledge in 2018. The
title of the contribution is ‘Well-being and self-interest: Personal identity, Parfit, and
conflicting attitudes to time in liberal theory and social policy’, and the title of the
book is Routledge handbook of well-being. The origins of Chap. 4 can be found in
an article which appeared in the journal Ethics and Social Welfare, published by
Taylor and Francis in 2013. The title of the article is ‘Liberal ethics and well-being
promotion in the disability rights movement, disability policy, and welfare prac-
tice’. The origins of Chap. 5 can be found in an article which appeared in The South
African Journal of Philosophy, for a special issue on ‘Happiness’, edited by Isabelle
Wienand and Vasti Roodt, also published by Taylor and Francis in 2014. The title of
the article is ‘Melancholy and happiness’. The origins of Chap. 7 can be found in a
contribution made to Richard Williams, Verity Kemp, Alexander Haslam, Catherine
Haslam, Kamaldeep Bhui, and Sue Bailey’s edited collection, published by
Cambridge University Press in 2019. The title of the contribution is ‘Six features of
the human condition: The social causation and social construction of mental health’.
The title of the book is Social scaffolding: Applying lessons of contemporary social
science to health and healthcare. Elements of Chap. 9, notably Sects. 9.5 and 9.6,
contain extracts from a monograph published by Policy Press/University of
Bristol Press in 2011. The title of the book is Equality and diversity:
vii
viii Acknowledgements
Value incommensurability and the politics of recognition, and the extracts used from
this book are mainly taken from Chap. 2.
Earlier and later versions of the above chapters and articles were also presented
to academic conferences and other colloquiums. Again, a considerable debt of grati-
tude is owed to the contributors to these events, whose questions and suggestions
again very much improved the original ideas and arguments. So, some of the key
arguments of Chap. 3 were presented to the University of Cardiff’s and Trinity St
David’s (Lampeter) Philosophy Seminars, both held in 2016; and to the Welsh
Centre for Crime and Social Justice (WCCSJ) annual conference, held at Gregynog
Hall, Wales, in 2017. Key arguments of Chap. 4 were presented to the Social Policy
Association annual conference, held at the University of Lincoln in 2011; and to the
Ideals and Reality in Social Ethics conference, hosted by the Social Ethics Research
Group, and the University of Wales, Newport, held in 2012. Key arguments of Chap.
5 were presented to the Association of Legal and Social Philosophy annual confer-
ence, held at the University of Amsterdam in 2015; and to Trinity St David’s
(Lampeter) Philosophy Seminar, held in the same year. Some of the key arguments
of Chap. 7 were presented to the Manchester Political Theory Conference
(MANCEPT), workshop on well-being, held at the University of Manchester in
2012; and to a workshop on well-being organised by the University of South Wales
(USW) and the Wales Institute for Social and Economic Research and Data
(WISERD), held at USW in 2014.
Finally, a considerable debt of gratitude is also owed to the editorial and produc-
tion team at Springer, and to two anonymous referees of an earlier draft of the book.
Their comments were not only very supportive and encouraging, but also incisive
and constructively critical, encouraging a clearer identification of some of the
book’s main arguments and suggesting further literatures which were incorporated
within the central themes of the final manuscript. These comments also offered
important philosophical insights concerning the character of TOWT, which helped
to further establish and develop the main arguments and themes underpinning
this thesis.
Contents
1 The Politics and Philosophy of Human Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Blurred Distinction Between Objectivity and Subjectivity
and the Ontology of Well-Being Thesis (TOWT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 The Inadequacy of GDP for Measuring Social Progress
and Societal Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Philosophical Controversies When Promoting Well-Being
for Social Policy and Welfare Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Measuring Subjective Well-Being for Social Policy
and Welfare Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.6 Philosophical Ambiguities and Indeterminacies
in Pluralistic Understandings of Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.7 Philosophical Ambiguities and Indeterminacies When
Comparing the Quality of Lives Led . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2 Well-Being and the Human Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2 Atomism v Holism in Theories of Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3 Six Ontological Features of the Human Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4 Some Uneven Philosophical Terrains, and Some Implications
for Social Policy and Welfare Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3 Well-Being, Pain and Parfit: Time, Self- Interest
and Pensions Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2 Liberal Accounts of Self-Interest and Well-Being,
and the Problem of Irrationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3 Parfit’s View of Identity and Some Problems for Reductionism . . . 69
ix
x Contents
3.4 Non-Reductionism v Reductionism and Subjectivity
v Objectivity: False Dichotomies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5 Questions of Identity and Biased Experiences of Time:
Well-Being and Pensions Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4 Well-Being and Finiteness: Agency, Self- Acceptance,
and Disability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2 The Liberal ‘Ethic of Agency’ and Well-Being Promotion . . . . . . . 95
4.3 The Liberal ‘Ethic of Self-Acceptance’ and Well-Being
Promotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4 The Social Model of Disability and the Ethics of Agency
and Self- Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5 Well-Being, Melancholy and Happiness: Bitter-Sweet
Emotions and Sober Self-Reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.2 Negative and Positive Conceptions of Melancholy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.3 Two Themes When Ignoring Melancholy in Discussions
of Happiness and Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.4 Melancholy, Authentic Happiness, and the Fulfilment
of Informed Desires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.5 Melancholy, Self-Acceptance and Emotional Connectedness
with Loss and Pain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.6 Melancholy and the ‘Here-and-Now’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6 Well-Being, Sociability, and False Consciousness:
Radical Politics, Disability, Self-Knowledge, and Subjectivity
v Objectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.2 Two Conflicting Interpretations of False Consciousness . . . . . . . . . 147
6.3 Two Contrasting Interpretations of the Social Model
of Disability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.4 Facilitating Creative Conflict Within the Principles
of Co-Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167