The Machine Question: AI, Ethics and Moral Responsibility

104 Pages·2012·2.27 MB·English

AISB/IACAP World Congress 2012
Birmingham, UK, 2-6 July 2012
T M Q : AI,
HE ACHINE UESTION
E M
THICS AND ORAL
R
ESPONSIBILITY
David J. Gunkel, Joanna J. Bryson, and Steve Torrance
(Editors)
Partof
Publishedby
TheSocietyfortheStudyof
ArtificialIntelligenceand
SimulationofBehaviour
http://www.aisb.org.uk
ISBN978-1-908187-21-5
Foreword from the Congress Chairs
For the Turing year 2012, AISB (The Society for the Study of Artificial Intel-
ligence and Simulation of Behaviour) and IACAP (The International Associa-
tion for Computing and Philosophy) merged their annual symposia/conferences
to form the AISB/IACAP World Congress. The congress took place 2–6 July
2012attheUniversityofBirmingham,UK.
TheCongresswasinspiredbyadesiretohonourAlanTuring,andbythebroad
and deep significance of Turing’s work to AI, the philosophical ramifications of
computing, and philosophy and computing more generally. The Congress was
oneoftheeventsformingtheAlanTuringYear.
The Congress consisted mainly of a number of collocated Symposia on spe-
cific research areas, together with six invited PlenaryTalks. Allpapers other than
thePlenariesweregivenwithinSymposia. Thisformatisperfectforencouraging
newdialogueandcollaborationbothwithinandbetweenresearchareas.
Thisvolumeformstheproceedingsofoneofthecomponentsymposia. Weare
mostgratefultotheorganizersoftheSymposiumfortheirhardworkincreatingit,
attractingpapers,doingthenecessaryreviewing,defininganexcitingprogramme
for the symposium, and compiling this volume. We also thank them for their
flexibility and patience concerning the complex matter of fitting all the symposia
andothereventsintotheCongressweek.
JohnBarnden(ComputerScience,UniversityofBirmingham)
ProgrammeCo-ChairandAISBVice-Chair
AnthonyBeavers(UniversityofEvansville,Indiana,USA)
ProgrammeCo-ChairandIACAPPresident
ManfredKerber(ComputerScience,UniversityofBirmingham)
LocalArrangementsChair
Foreword for The Machine Question
One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is deciding who or what is
deserving of ethical consideration. Although initially limited to “other men,” the
practice of ethics has developed in such a way that it continually challenges its
own restrictions and comes to encompass what had been previously excluded in-
dividuals and groups—foreigners, women, animals, and even the environment.
Currently,westandonthevergeofanother,fundamentalchallengetomoralthink-
ing. Thischallengecomesfromtheautonomous,intelligentmachinesofourown
making,anditputsinquestionmanydeep-seatedassumptionsaboutwhoorwhat
constitutesamoralsubject. Thewayweaddressandrespondtothischallengewill
have a profound effect on how we understand ourselves, our place in the world,
andourresponsibilitiestotheotherentitiesencounteredhere.
We organised this symposium and the proceedings you find here because we
believeitisurgentthatthisnewdevelopmentinmoralthinkingbeadvancedinthe
light and perspective of ethics/moral philosophy, a discipline that reflects thou-
sands of years of effort by our species’ civilisations. Fundamental philosophical
questionsinclude:
• What kind of moral claim might an intelligent or autonomous machine
have?
• Is it possible for a machine to be a legitimate moral agent and/or moral
patient?
• Whatarethephilosophicalgroundssupportingsuchaclaim?
• Andwhatwoulditmeantoarticulateandpracticeanethicsofthisclaim?
TheMachine Question: AI,Ethicsand MoralResponsibilityseeksto address,
evaluate,andrespondtotheseandrelatedquestions.
The Machine Question was one of three symposia in the Ethics, Morality, AI
andMindtrackattheAISB/IACAP2012WorldCongressinhonourofAlanTur-
ing. The ethics track also included the symposia Moral Cognition and Theory of
MindandFrameworkforResponsibleResearchandInnovationinArtificialIntel-
ligence. Wewouldliketothankallofthecontributorstothissymposium,theother
symposia, the other symposia’s organisers and the Congress leaders, particularly
John Barnden for his seemingly tireless response to our many queries. We would
also like to thank the keynote speakers for the Ethics track, Susan and Michael
Anderson,whosetalkTheRelationshipBetweenIntelligent,AutonomouslyFunc-
tioning Machines and Ethics appeared during our symposium, for agreeing to
speakatthecongress.
The story of this symposium started a little like the old Lorne Greene song
Ringo,exceptinsteadofanyonesavinganyone’slife,JoannaBrysonloanedDavid
Gunkel a laundry token in July of 1986, about a month after both had graduated
withfirstdegreesintheliberalartsandindependentlymovedintoTheGrandeur,
a cheap apartment building on Chicago’s north side. Two decades later they dis-
covered themselves on the opposite sides of not the law, but rather the AI-as-
Moral-Subjectdebate,whenGunkelcontactedBrysonaboutachapterinhisbook
ThinkingOtherwise. Theclimacticshoot-outtookplacenotbetweentwoisolated
people, but with the wise advice and able assistance of our third co-editor Steve
Torrance, who brought our symposium the experience of running many previous
AISB symposia, and between a cadre of scholars who took time to submit to, re-
vise for and participate in this symposium. We thank every one of them for their
contributionsandparticipation,andyouforreadingthisproceedings.
DavidJ.Gunkel(DepartmentofCommunication,NorthernIllinoisUniversity)
JoannaJ.Bryson(DepartmentofComputerScience,UniversityofBath)
SteveTorrance(DepartmentofComputerScience,UniversityofSussex)
Contents
1 Joel Parthemore and Blay Whitby — Moral Agency, Moral Responsi-
bility,andArtefacts 8
2 John Basl — Machines as Moral Patients We Shouldn’t Care About
(Yet) 17
3 Benjamin Matheson — Manipulation, Moral Responsibility and Ma-
chines 25
4 AlejandroRosas—TheHolyWillofEthicalMachines 29
5 KeithMiller,MartyWolfandFrancesGrodzinsky—BehindtheMask:
MachineMorality 33
6 EricaNeely—MachinesandtheMoralCommunity 38
7 MarkCoeckelbergh—WhoCaresaboutRobots? 43
8 DavidJ.Gunkel—AVindicationoftheRightsofMachines 46
9 Steve Torrance — The Centrality of Machine Consciousness to Ma-
chineEthics 54
10 RodgerKibble—CananUnmannedDroneBeaMoralAgent? 61
11 Marc Champagne and Ryan Tonkens — Bridging the Responsibility
GapinAutomatedWarfare 67
12 JoannaBryson—PatiencyIsNotaVirtue: SuggestionsforCo-Constructing
anEthicalFrameworkIncludingIntelligentArtefacts 73
13 JohnnySøraker—IsThereContinuityBetweenManandMachine? 78
14 DavidDavenport—Poster: MoralMechanisms 83
15 Marie-des-NeigesRuffo—Poster: TheRobot,aStrangertoEthics 87
16 Mark Waser — Poster: Safety and Morality Require the Recognition
ofSelf-ImprovingMachinesasMoral/JusticePatientsandAgents 92
17 DamienP.Williams—Poster: StrangeThingsHappenattheOneTwo
Point: The Implications of Autonomous Created Intelligence in Specu-
lativeFictionMedia 97
Moral Agency, Moral Responsibility, and Artefacts:
What Existing Artefacts Fail to Achieve (and Why), and
Why They, Nevertheless, Can (and Do!) Make Moral
Claims Upon Us
JoelParthemore1andBlayWhitby2
Abstract. This paper follows directly from our forthcoming pa- enoughonourusagethatanagentdoestheappropriatethings:i.e.,
per in International Journal of Machine Consciousness, where we producesthecorrectconsequences.Itmustdosofortheappropriate
discusstherequirementsforanartefacttobeamoralagentandcon- reasonsandusingtheappropriatemeans.Otherwise,itmaybeappro-
cludethattheartefactualquestionisultimatelyaredherring.Aswe priate–evenmorallyrequiredinsomecircumstances(seeSection5)
didintheearlierpaper,wetakemoralagencytobethatconditionin –totreattheagent,atleasttosomelimitedextent,asif itwerea
whichanagentcan,appropriately,beheldresponsibleforheractions moralagent/possessedmoralagency;nevertheless,thatagentwill
andtheirconsequences.Wesetanumberofstringentconditionson notbeamoralagent.Thisalignmentofmotivations,means,andcon-
moral agency. A moral agent must be embedded in a cultural and sequencesforattributingmoralagencymatchesanalignmentofmo-
specificallymoralcontext,andembodiedinasuitablephysicalform. tivations,means,andconsequenceswesee(pacetheutilitariansand
It must be, in some substantive sense, alive. It must exhibit self- mostotherconsequentialists)asessentialto“doingthemorallyright
conscious awareness: who does the “I” who thinks “I” think that thing”–thoughanyfurtherdiscussionofthatlastpointisnecessarily
“I” is? It must exhibit a range of highly sophisticated conceptual beyondthescopeofthispaper.
abilities,goingwellbeyond whatthelikelymajorityofconceptual In[28],wesetoutanumberofconceptualrequirementsforpos-
agentspossess:notleastthatitmustpossessawell-developedmoral sessingmoralagencyaswellasgroundsforappropriatelyattributing
spaceofreasons.Finally,itmustbeabletocommunicateitsmoral it,asawayofaddressingtheclaimsandcounterclaimsoverso-called
agencythroughsomesystemofsigns:a“private”moralworldisnot artificialmoralityand machine consciousness. Ourconclusion was
enough.Afterreviewingtheseconditionsandpouringcoldwateron thatconcernsoverartefactualmoralagencyandconsciousnesswere
anumberofrecentclaimsforhavingachieved“minimal”machine usefulforinitiatingdiscussionbutultimatelyadistractionfromthe
consciousness,weturnourattentiontoanumberofexistingand,in biggerquestionofwhatittakesforanyagenttobeaconsciousmoral
somecases,commonplaceartefactsthatlackmoralagencyyetnev- agent.
erthelessrequireonetotakeamoralstancetowardthem,asif they Section Two summarizes the requirements for possessing moral
weremoralagents.Finally,weaddressanotherclassofagentsraising agencyandtherequirementsforattributingitappropriately.Section
arelatedsetofissues:autonomousmilitaryrobots. Threesummarizesourproposalfrom[28]foroperationalizingthose
requirementsand“mapping out”themoralspace,asanalternative
toanylitmustestformoralagency, suchastheMoralTuringTest
1 INTRODUCTION
proposedbyAllenandcolleagues[2].SectionFourintroduces,and
debunks,anumberofrecentclaimsforhavingachieved“minimal”
Asamoralcommunity,humansdooftenconcedethatother
machine consciousness (since consciousness isone ofour require-
creatureshavesomelevelofethicalstatus,andtheydoso(at
mentsforpossessingmoralagency).SectionsFiveandSixintroduce
leastinpart)becauseoftheirpossessionofcognitiveandphe-
twogroupsofexistingartefactsthat,webelieve,raiseimportantcon-
nomenologicalcapacitiesinvaryingdegrees[47].
cernsrelatingtomoralagency:onethatpeopleshouldtakeamoral
stance toward (even though they often do not!), and one that they
In talking of ethical status, Steve Torrance’s concern includes
shouldnot(eventhoughtheyoftendo!).SectionSevensummarizes
(thoughisnotlimitedto)whatwearecallingmoralagency.Heex-
thetake-homemessage.
plicitlyintendstoincludeartefacts.Itfollows:what“cognitiveand
phenomenologicalcapacities”arerequired?
Forourpurposes,amoralagentisanagentwhomoneappropri- 2 THEREQUIREMENTSOFMORALAGENCY
ately holds responsible for itsactions and their consequences, and
TheSemioticHierarchy... distinguishesbetweenfourma-
moral agency is the distinct type of agency that agent possesses.
jorlevelsintheorganizationofmeaning: life,consciousness,
Contra the usage of someone like Wendell Wallach [49], it is not
signfunction,andlanguage,whereeachofthese,inthisorder,
1 Centre for Cognitive Semiotics, University of Lund, Sweden; email: bothrestsonthepreviouslevel,andmakespossibletheattain-
[email protected]. mentofthenext[56,p.169].
2 Centre for Research in Cognitive Sciences, University of Sussex, UK;
email:[email protected]. Moralagencydepends,atitsfoundations,onmoralmeaning:hold-
ing an agent to account for her actions assumes that those actions ...One needs a clear way of characterizing what distin-
aremorallymeaningfulbothtotheagentandhercommunityofob- guisheslivingsystemsfromnonlivingones.Suchacharacteri-
servers. Moral meaning is one instance of a much broader notion zationcould... serveasastandardorcriterionforrecognizing
ofmeaning,whichischaracterizedbythesalience-ladeninteraction lifeelsewhereonotherplanets,orfordeterminingwhetherany-
betweenagent(s)andenvironment(cf.[55,p.258]). thingwemightsomedaysynthesizeartificiallywouldqualifyas
In setting out the requirements of moral agency, this paper pro- living[45,p.95].
poses a nested succession of dependencies very much like Jordan
Zlatev’s semiotic hierarchy [56, 55], with a few additional steps. Moralagencypresupposesanumberofthingsthatarenot,directly,
In establishing life (Section 2.2) as the foundation for meaning, partofitsdefinition.DrawinginspirationfromtheworkofFrancesco
Zlatevassumesasprerequisitesbothembeddednessandembodiment VarelaandHumbertoMaturana[22]andEvanThompson,andeven
(Section2.1).Wechoosetospellthatout.Meanwhile,forourpur- moredirectlyfromZlatev’ssemiotichierarchy,weclaimthatamoral
posesweneedtodistinguishdifferentlevelsofconsciousness:non- agentmustnecessarilybealive,bysomedefinitionof“life”–even
reflectivefrom pre-reflective from“full” self-conscious awareness; though, forourpurposes, the agentneed be neitherconventionally
wherealllevelsofconsciousnesspresupposeconceptuallystructured biologicallyformulatednornaturallyevolved.Indeed,althoughhis-
thought,andconceptuallystructuredthoughtpresupposesconscious- toryiscriticalforallmannerofpracticalreasons,theagentcould–at
ness.ThisallowsustodiscussconceptswhereZlatevtalksofcon- leastinprinciple–haveahighlynon-standardhistoryase.g.Swamp
sciousness (Section 2.3), with full self-consciousness as a distinct Man(apositionthatZlatevexplicitlyrejectsin[54]andevenmore
levelthattransformsandextendsconceptualabilities(Section2.4). stronglyin[56]).Autopoiesis–intended,atleastinitsorigins,asex-
Finally,whileZlatevplaceslanguageatthetopofhishierarchy,we pressingboththenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforlife–offers
areabletostopatthesignfunction(Section2.5),because,although aconvenientwayoutofanyoverlynarrowbiologicalperspectiveas
themoralagentmustbeabletocommunicateevidenceofhermoral e.g.JohnSearle[39]mightbeaccusedof.
agency,sheneednotnecessarilydosothroughlanguage. Maturana and Varela define an autopoietic system as a type of
homeostaticmachine;specifically:
2.1 Themoralagentmustbeembeddedand
...Amachineorganized(definedasaunity)asanetwork
embodied.
ofprocessesofproduction(transformationanddestruction)of
components thatproducesthecomponents which:(i)through
There isno brain in a vat – to make reference toHilary Putnam’s
theirinteractionsandtransformationscontinuouslyregenerate
classicthought experiment [31]–and thereisno moralagentina
andrealizethenetworkofprocesses(relations)thatproduced
moralvacuum.Moralagencydepends,critically,ontheexistenceof
them;and(ii)constituteit(themachine)asaconcreteunityin
othermoralagentsandasharedspaceofmoralreasoninginwhich
thespaceinwhichthey(thecomponents) existbyspecifying
itisembedded.Evenifsomepartofitis,insomesense,privateto
thetopologicaldomainofitsrealizationasanetwork[21,pp.
theindividual,someotherpartisintrinsicallyapartofsocialcogni-
78-79].
tion:indeed,thekindofsocialcognitionthatPierreSteinerandJohn
Stewarthaveidentified[44]3asnotbeginningwithorreducingtoan
In their choice of terminology, Maturana and Varela quite deliber-
agglomerationofindividualsbutsocialfromthebeginning.
atelywanttoavoidprejudicingmatterstowardthoselivingsystems
Moralagentsarenotjustembedded intherightkindofphysical
we happen currently to be familiar with, all of which are based
andculturalenvironment;theyareembodied inasuitablephysical
on DNA, organized into cells either with (eukaryotic) or without
formthatallowsthemtocarryouttheactionsforwhichoneholds
(prokaryotic)nuclei,reproduce eithersexuallyorasexually,andso
themaccountableandgiveevidenceforwhyoneshouldholdthem
on. Both allopoietic artefacts and autopoietic organisms are ma-
accountable.WhenPeterGärdenforsdefinesembodiedmeaningby
chines:bywhichMaturanaandVarelameanthattheyaredefinedby
writingthat“meaningisnotindependentofperceptionorofbodily
theirabstractorganization,notbytheirconcretephysicalrealization.
experience”[16,p.160],heclearlymeanstoincludemoralmeaning.
“...Theorganizationofamachineisindependentoftheproperties
In the spirit of the enactivist philosophers, we would like to go
of its components which can be any, and a given machine can be
beyond embeddedness andembodimentbystressingthecontinuity
realizedinmanydifferentmannersbymanydifferentkindsofcom-
betweenthemoralagentandhermoralenvironment4:betweenher
ponents”[21,p.77].
personalmoralspaceandthesharedmoralspaceinwhichshemoves.
Autopoietic systems define their own (selectively permeable)
ToparaphraseEvanThompson:“therootsofmorallifelienotsimply
boundary; allopoieticsystems have theirboundary setfor themby
inthebrain,butramifythroughthebodyandenvironment”(cf.[45,
some observer5. Autopoietic systems are organizationally closed:
p.ix]).TostealalinefromPutnam,“moralityain’t(just)inthehead”
i.e.,theyarefar-from-equilibriumsystemswhosestructureisdeter-
(cf.[30,p.227]).
mined and maintained solely by processes located within the sys-
tem;allopoieticsystemsareorganizationallyopen.Autopoieticsys-
2.2 Themoralagentmustbealive. temsare autonomous in astrong sense: they are “continually self-
producing”[22,p.43]andadaptive[13];allopoieticsystemsgiveat
...Alllivingsystemsandonlylivingsystemsarecapableof mosttheappearanceofautonomy(seeSection6).
meaning.Thisissobecauselifeimpliesthepresenceofintrin-
sicvalue,whichconstitutesthenecessaryandsufficientcondi- 5Thedistinctionhereisactuallyquitesubtle:forbothtypesofsystem,the
boundarycanonlybeidentifiedbyanobserver(seee.g.[20,p.30]forwhy
tionformeaning[55,p.256].
theobserverisindispensable); andforboth,theboundarymasksanun-
derlyingcontinuity:i.e.,bothautopoietic andallopoietic systemsexist–
3Forasimilarview,see[18]. orcanbeviewed–aspartsoflargerallopoieticsystemsthatare,insome
4Cf.thediscussionin[26,p.89]. substantivesense,primary.
2.3 Themoralagentmustbeasophisticated tureofherthoughts,allofwhichareprerequisitetoanyimplicitun-
conceptualagent. derstandingofthesystematicity,productivity,compositionality,etc.,
ofhermoralthoughts.Shemusthaveapractical,knowing-how-type
Onourview,conceptsandconsciousnessaretwosidesofonecoin: understandingoftheconnectionbetweendoingxiswronganddoing
noconceptswithout(somelevelof)consciousness;noconsciousness yiswrong,wherex y;orbetweenydoingxtomeiswrongand
⊂
without (some level of) conceptually structured thought. However mydoingxtoyiswrong.Shemustbeabletoproceed,byinduction,
preciselyonedefinesconsciousness,thereisanimplicitassumption fromdoingwiswrong,doingxiswrong,anddoingyiswrongto
thatconsciousthoughtissystematically,productively6,andcompo- doingZiswrong,wherew,x,y Z.
sitionallystructured7,andundertheagent’sendogenouscontrol[29, ⊂
p.197]. 2.4 Themoralagentmustbeactivelyself-aware.
Likewise,conceptsandconceptualabilitiesaretwosidesofacoin,
depending on whether one’s attention is more on knowing that or Themostobvious selfconsciousness isn’tjustconscious-
knowinghow[37].Tosaythatanagentpossessesandsuccessfully ness, it’s consciousness of the self, something that obviously
employscertainconceptsistosaythatthatagenthascertaincorre- requiresacapacityforconsciousnessandaconceptofself[9,
spondingabilities;tosaythatanagenthascertainconceptualabilities p.17].
istosaythatthatagentpossessesandsuccessfullyemployscertain
Keytoanyconceptualagent’sconceptualabilities–webelieve–is
concepts.Notethat,dependingonthelevelofitsconceptualabilities,
anatleastimplicitconceptofself.Inthesimplestcase,thiscanbe
agivenconceptualagentmayormaynotmakesuchadistinctionit-
nomorethanwhatZlatev[54,p.173],followingUlricNeisser[23],
self.Someconceptual agents’ conceptual abilitieswillbemore on
callstheecologicalself:an“initialself-awareness”,which“actshere
theknowinghowsideoftheledger,withlittleifanyreflectiveaware-
andnow...butremainsunreflectedupon”;orwhatAntonioDamasio
nessofthoseabilities.(Thatistosay,theknowingthatsideofthe
[10]termsthecoreself.Theconceptofselfislikeandyetdifferent
ledgermayonlybeevidenttoobservers.)Ontheotherhand,human
fromalltheotherconceptsaconceptualagentpossesses,inthatthis
beings, as sophisticated conceptual agents, can – and, we believe,
concept applies to the agent herself: it is intimately and uniquely
cannothelpbut–makethedistinction.
self-referential.Thisspecialstatusgivesitacertainpriority–even,
Finally,forourpurposes,andfollowingdirectlyfromthetheoryof
perhaps, a kind of authority – over all the agent’s other concepts.
conceptsunderlyingourdiscussions–theunifiedconceptualspace
Callitthekeystone:theconceptthatallowsalltheotherconceptsto
theorydiscussedin[27,25,28]–types(abstract)andtokens(con-
functionastheydo.
crete)aretwosidesofacoin:everytypeisaspecifictokenofsome
Themoralagentmustpossessaconceptofselfonawholeother
moregeneraltype,andeverytokencan(withinthelimitsofacon-
level:notjustanimplicitconceptofselfasawhole,withnorequired
ceptualagent’sconceptual abilities)bethetypeforsomeyetmore
distinctionofmindorbody,butanexplicitconceptofself-as-myself,
specific tokenings. Meanwhile, concepts both abstract away from
asanintentionalanddistinctivelycognitiveentity.Onecannothold
the particulars of any given context and yet are always applied in
an agent morally responsible forher actions ifshe has no concept
aspecificcontext.
thatsheis(orcouldbe)theoneresponsiblefortheactionsandtheir
Moralagents,asasub-categoryofconceptual agents,mustpos-
consequences –andnotthepersonoverthere.Shemustbeableto
sessanumberofconcepts/conceptualabilitiesthatgowellbeyond
hold herself responsible: and that she cannot do without full self-
whatthevastmajorityofconceptualagentslikelypossess–atleast
conscious awareness. She must, so to speak, be able to recognize
ifoneisinclined,asweare,toextendconceptualabilitiestoanum-
herselfinamentalmirror.
berof non-human species (seee.g.[1,24]).Most importantly, she
must possess a concept of morality as both type and token: both
a general category within itsconceptual knowledge, constituting a 2.5 Themoralagentmustbeasignconsumerand
moralspace ofreasoning, and aspecificinstance ofmore founda- producer.
tionalintersubjectiveunderstanding;bothageneralguidetohowto
...Culturalcategoriesinvolvetheabilitytouseandinter-
be a moral agent and a specific guide on how to act in any given
pret conventional signs, in the semiotic sense of the word,
circumstances;bothasetofabstractprinciplesandasetofconcrete
wherearelativelyconcreteexpression(e.g.,ahandshake,ages-
percepts(“thoushaltnotkill”).
ture,aword)representsarelativelylessconcreteconcept(e.g.,
The moral agent must possess an explicit concept of morality:
friendship)forthemembersofacommunity[55,p.259].
whatitmeans,toher,tobeamoralagent;andanexplicitconcept
ofself:whoandwhatshethinkssheis(seeSection2.4).Shemust
Finally, an agent cannot be held morally responsible unless she is
also–andprobablymostcontroversially–possessanatleastimplicit
abletocommunicateevidenceforhermoralresponsibilitythrough
conceptofconceptitself.
some conventionalized channel. Sheneed not be alinguisticagent
Caremustbetakenhere:afterall,manypeoplehaveonlyavague
(thepeakofZlatev’ssemiotichierarchy),butshemustpossess–and
explicit understanding of what a concept or notion or idea is. The
beabletouseappropriately–thesignfunction,justbelowlanguage
pointisthatamoralagentmustbeabletorefocusherattentionfrom
inthehierarchy.Shemustbeabletocommunicatethroughe.g.ges-
the usual objects of her thoughts to the thoughts themselves. She
turesorpictures,ifnotlanguage.
mustbeabletoreflectontherightnessandwrongnessofherthoughts
Weintendsignasitisusedinsemiotics,butcaremustbetaken,
anddeeds.Todothis,shemustbesensitiveto–implicitlyawareof–
assignisusedbydifferentpeople–and,sometimes(thinkinghere
thesystematically,productively,compositionally,etc.structuredna-
oftheearlyversusthelateCharlesSandersPeirce)thesamepeople
–inbroaderornarrowerways.Soe.g.weintendsigninthepresent
6SystematicityandproductivityarecoveredunderGarethEvans’Generality
contextinanarrowerwaythanSaraLenninger,who,echoingFer-
Constraint:[14,pp.100-104].
7“Conceptsaretheconstituentsofthoughtsand,inindefinitelymanycases, dinand de Saussure’s expression/content distinction [11],describes
ofoneanother”[15,p.25]. signmeaningsas: