The Logical Status of ‘God’: Function of Theological Sentences

129 Pages·1973·12.551 MB·English

by  Michael Durrant (auth.)

New Studies in the Philosophy of Religion
General Editor: W. D. Hudson, Reader in Moral Philosoohy,
University of Exeter
This series of monographs includes studies of all the main
problems in the philosophy of religion. It will be of particular
interest to those who study this subject in universities or colleges.
The philosophical problems connected with religious belief are
not, however, a subject of concern only to specialists; they arise
in one form or another for all intelligent men when confronted
by the appeals or the claims of religion.
The general approach of this series is from the standpoint of
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written by a distinguished team of philosophers, all of whom
now teach, or have recently taught, in British or American
universities. Each author has been commissioned to analyse
some aspect of religious belief; to set forth clearly and concisely
the philosophical problems which arise from it; to take into
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phers have offered; and to present his own critical assessment
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and their proposed solutions.
In the main it is theism with which these monographs deal,
because that is the type of religious belief with which readers
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set themselves to clarifY the nature of religious belief in the light
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it which a reasonable man as such has to ask. How is talk of
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men engage, such as science, art or morality? Is this talk of
God self-consistent? Does it accord with other rational beliefs
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New Studies in the Philosophy of Religion
IN THE SAME SERIES
Published
D. Z. Phillips Death and Immortality
Richard Swinburne The Concept of Miracle
Vernon Pratt Religion and Secularisation
W. W. Bartley III Morality and Religion
Jonathan Barnes The Ontological Argument
Thomas McPherson The Argument from Design
T. R. Miles Religious Experience
Ninian Smart The Concept of Worship
Kai Nielsen Scepticism
Michael Durrant The Logical Status of 'God'
Humphrey Palmer Analogy
In preparation
D.]. O'Connor The Cosmological Argument
I. T. Ramsey The Problem of Evil
W. D. Hudson Wittgenstein' s Influence on the
Philosophy of Religion
The Logical Status of 'God'
and
The Function of Theological Sentences
MICHAEL DURRANT
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University College, Cardiff
Palgrave Macmillan
©Michael Durrant 1973
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1973
All rights reserved. No part of this publication
may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form
or by any means, without permission.
First published 1973 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Associated companies in New York Toronto
Dublin Melbourne Johannesburg and Madras
Library of Congress catalog card no. 73-93886
SBN 333 13347 1
ISBN 978-1-349-01414-9 ISBN 978-1-349-01412-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-01412-5
Contents
General Editor's Preface vn
Preface 1x
Some Notes on Technical Terms Introduced in this Essay xm
1 On Whether 'God' is a Proper Name
2 On Whether 'God', if not a Proper Name, Can
Introduce a Subject of Predication 29
3 On Whether 'God' is a Descriptive Predicable Term 4I
4 Some Possible Non-Propositional Accounts of the
Role of Sentences of the Form 'God is F' 8o
5 Some Attempted Conclusions I07
Notes and References I I I
v
General Editor's Preface
In contemporary philosophy of religion the central issue is
undoubtedly whether or not it makes sense to speak in terms of
God. This is the issue with which Mr Durrant's monograph is
concerned. Since the dawn of philosophy, men have always
argued as to whether or not religious beliefs are true; but in
recent times it has been recognised that there is an even more
fundamental problem, namely whether or not religious beliefs
can be meaningful. If they cannot, then of course the question
of their truth or falsity does not arise.
Mr Durrant, in this book, reviews with admirable clarity,
the work which philosophers have been doing in recent years
on this central issue and adds his own valuable contribution to
the discussion. He is alive to the extreme complexity of God
talk and his approach is the reverse of dogmatic or question
begging. University teachers and students, working in the
philosophy of religion will find this monograph most useful as
an introduction to the logical problems involved in religious
language; but a wider readership, consisting of all those who
wish to make up their minds about religion in the light of the
most recent philosophical reflection on this vital subject, will,
I think, find a careful study of this book most rewarding.
University of Exeter W. D. HuosoN
Vll
Preface
My concern in this essay is with the logical status of'God' in the
sense of an item of religious language with a view to determining
the function or possible functions of sentences of the form 'God
is F', where 'F', from the standpoint of grammar is an adjective
or adjectival expression which is such that the predicable
'--is F' (in Professor Geach's sense as introduced in Reference
and Generality, chapter 2) is able to yield true or false predica
tions of individual human beings as subjects. Examples of
sentences of such a form will be: 'God is loving'; 'God is wise';
'God is good'. In order to cater for some features of religious
language, it will also be necessary to consider sentences of the
form 'God is infinitely F', for in some cases God is 'spoken of'
not only in terms of being F but of being infinitely F (infinitely
loving, infinitely wise, infinitely good, etc.).
I shall first make the assumption that sentences of the form
'God is F' can be used and indeed are used to express true
propositions and hence I shall be concerned to investigate what
the form of such propositions so expressed might be. The
possible form of such propositions, however, crucially depends
upon the logical status of'God' as an item of religious language,
i.e. the role or roles which the sign "God" has in that language.
It depends upon whether 'God' as an item of that language is a
proper name, an abbreviated definite description either of the
form 'The God of A' (where 'A' is a proper name) or 'The one
and only F', a descriptive predicable term (Frege's Begriffswart),
a special kind of descriptive predicable term (general term)
such as Professor Geach's 'substantival general term' or an
abstract term.
In my first chapter I shall argue for the thesis that 'God' is
not a proper name and hence that on one count sentences of
the form I have introduced cannot be regarded as expressing
propositions of a subject-predicate type, since whilst it is not a
necessary condition of 'A' being able to occur as the logical
1X
subject of a proposition that 'A' should be a proper name, it is
a sufficient condition of'A' being so able to occur. In my second
chapter I shall raise the question as to whether 'God', if not a
proper name, can nevertheless stand as a logical subject, i.e.
whether 'God' as either a definite description of a certain form
or a substantival general term in Geach's sense can so stand.
This will involve a discussion of whether (a) definite descrip
tions of a certain form can (in general) so stand and (b) whether
general terms of a substantival type can so stand. My third
chapter raises a number of potential difficulties for the thesis
much advocated by Professor Geach, namely that 'God' is a
descriptive predicable term (Frege's Begri.ffswort). I maintain
that, in some types of occurrence at least, 'God' is not such,
but on the contrary is an abstract term. In the light of this
latter consideration I raise the question as to what form of
proposition sentences of the form 'God is F' can be said to
express, where 'God' is an abstract term. Having rejected
Strawson's thesis that 'anything whatever' can stand as a
logical subject and that abstract terms can so stand, I consider
various alternatives for the form of proposition which sentences
of the above form might be said to express, all of which I con
tend fail for differing and interesting reasons. In Chapter Four
I explicitly reject the assumption that sentences of the form I
have been considering are to be taken as expressing propositions
and consider some alternative accounts, viz. that they are to
be taken as expressing 'grammatical remarks' in Wittgenstein's
sense and that they are to be regarded as presenting 'pictures'.
I consider two recent attempts to develop this latter view. Both
types of account, I shall argue, break down in various ways for
different reasons.
It is my conclusion that it is not possible to offer a coherent
account of the logical status of 'God' as an item of Christian
language as a whole, since 'God' exhibits differing and indeed
incompatible status. Neither is it possible to offer a tenable
account of the function of sentences of the form I am considering
even if one rejects the contention that such sentences have a
proposition-expressing role. Indeed, I argue for the thesis that
such sentences must have a proposition-expressing role in at
least some types of case for their role in other types of case to be
intelligible. However, I am led to conclude that any attempt to
set out a scheme in which 'God' has a single logical status such
X
that a coherent and consistent account of the form of propo
sition expressed by sentences of the above form can be offered,
is doomed to failure. No such scheme can cope with the mani
fold and inconsistent logic of 'God'.
The problems and difficulties raised in this essay are prob
lems and difficulties which readily beset anyone who becomes
interested in religious language via an interest in problems in
Philosophical Logic at an elementary level, but this essay has
not been written solely with such persons in mind. Such prob
lems and difficulties need to be brought to the attention of
others for they are not problems and difficulties which any
serious-minded person honestly concerned with religious belief
can afford to ignore. There are those who will say: 'But one
should not be concerned with religious language but with the
reality which lies behind it'. However religious language is not
contingently related to the reality which it expresses and in
order to speak sensibly of 'the reality which lies behind
it', we must be able to express such reality. As Professor
Geach has rightly commented: 'A man may assert that God
is too high a subject matter for human argument: but having
said this he had best keep silence, for if he argues the matter he
at once contradicts himself' (God and the Soul, p. 105).
I am indebted to Mrs M. Rees for typing the manuscript of
this essay and to my wife for her persistent encouragement and
patience whilst I have been grappling with these problems.
Cardiff MICHAEL DuRRANT
March 1972
XI