The Geopolitics of Intervention: Asia and the Responsibility to Protect

112 Pages·2014·3.183 MB·English

by  Yang Razali Kassim (auth.)

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Yang Razali Kassim
The Geopolitics
of Intervention
Asia and the
Responsibility
to Protect
123
SpringerBriefs in Political Science
For furthervolumes:
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Yang Razali Kassim
The Geopolitics of
Intervention
Asia and the Responsibility to Protect
123
YangRazali Kassim
NanyangTechnological University
Singapore
Singapore
ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic)
ISBN 978-981-4585-47-7 ISBN 978-981-4585-48-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-981-4585-48-4
Springer SingaporeHeidelberg New YorkDordrecht London
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2013958149
(cid:2)TheAuthor(s)2014
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Preamble
The turn of the twenty-first century has been accompanied by the growing para-
mountcyofthehumanconditionorwhatisincreasinglybeingreferredtoashuman
security. The post-Cold War peace has been interrupted by turmoil, while the
paradigmofthenation-statehascomeunderunprecedentedpressureinthefaceof
the increasingly borderless nature of the globalised world. As inter-state conflicts
recede to the background, intra-state tensions have increased, triggered by such
post-moderncrisesasweakgovernance,weakstatesandfailingstates.Atthesame
time,thewell-beingoftheindividualhascomeunderseverestress,aggravatedby
the growing disruption in the cosmic order and the balance of nature, caused in
large part by destructive human activity. All in all, there is growing primacy of
humansecurityasthedegeneratingconditionoftheindividualputsunprecedented
pressure on the state to protect the well-being of the people under its care.
Attheinternationallevel,thepushfortheprotectionoftheindividualhastaken
on the form of a new norm in support of humanitarian intervention called the
responsibilitytoprotect(R2P).ButwhiletheUnitedNationshasadoptedR2Pasa
principle, many member-states, especially those from the global South, still har-
bourseriousreservations.OneofthemostcriticalattitudesistheviewthatR2Pis
butadoctrinepushedbytheWestortheindustrialisedNorthunderthecloakofthe
UNtoadvanceitshegemonyofthepost-ColdWarinternationalorder.Proponents
of this view refers to such assertiveness as ‘new interventionism’.
Such critiques have been vociferously dismissed and counter-argued by the
advocates of R2P who say there is a crucial, and nuanced, difference between
interventionism—including humanitarian interventionism—and R2P. While
interventionism justifies the use of force by the international community on
‘humanitarian grounds’, R2P supports the use of force only as a last resort, and
even so, only with the unanimous endorsement of the United Nations Security
Council in strictly four specific cases of mass atrocity crimes—genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
But the outbreak of the game-changing people power revolts throughout the
MiddleEastandNorthAfricasinceDecember2010—referredtopopularlyasthe
ArabSpringbutineffectawaveofuprisingsorpeoplepowerrevolutions—hasput
R2Ptotallyonthedefensive.Thisishappeningevenasthenewnormwasforthe
first time successfully, though controversially, applied by the international com-
munity over Libya. The backlash on R2P has given rise to sharper accusations of
v
vi Preamble
neo-imperialism by the West and consequently a countervailing push in the form
ofthe idea oftheresponsibilitywhile protecting (RWP).Since its emergence, the
newinternationaldebateisshapingaroundwhetherRWPisanalternativenormto
R2P, or whether it marks the implementing phase in the evolution of the doctrine
of international protection.
Regardless,RWPmarkstheglobalpushandpullovertheideaofhumanitarian
intervention. Significantly, this tussle—which is at once intellectual, diplomatic
and geopolitical—was being played out in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, beginning with Tunisia and quickly spreading to neighbouring
countries Egypt and Libya like a domino until it hovered over Syria. It is over
Syria that the international community has been locked in an excruciating stale-
mate overwhetherandhow toprotect Syriancivilianstrapped inapoliticalcrisis
between an increasingly unpopular regime and a revolting population. This book
serves to capture the current geopolitics of international intervention and its
relationship with the fledgling doctrine of R2P.
ThisbooklooksatthethemeinthecontextofAsiawhichisbroadlydefinedas
stretching from West Asia to East Asia. West Asia includes the Middle East,
which is approached in the context of the Arab Uprisings or what is popular
referredtoasthe‘ArabSpring’,thustouchingNorthernAfrica.Asiaalsoincludes
sub-continental Asia, the biggest part of which is India. East Asia in turn
encompassestheswatheoflandfromRussianAsiainSiberia,China,Japan,South
Korea to Southeast Asia and Australia and Oceania. This conceptual definition of
Asia coincides with the one used by Chandra Muzaffar in his book ‘‘Whither
WANA?’’ReflectionsontheArabUprisings.HeprefersWANAwhichstandsfor
West Asia and North Africa to MENA or the Middle East as WANA describes a
geographical region that embraces almost the whole of the Arab world and other
countries in that space such as Iran and Turkey. Because it is geographical, he
says, it is ideologically neutral (Muzaffar 2013).
This brief also serves as an observation of the attitudes and policies of the key
countriestowardsR2Pandhumanitarianinterventionbroadlydefinedasthethreat
or use of force in the international arena to alleviate human suffering, besides
assessingthepossiblefutureofthenormofcivilianprotection.Giventheongoing
crisissurroundingR2Pandhumanitarianintervention,morewillcertainlybeheard
in the future about this increasingly significant but controversial theme.
Yang Razali Kassim
Reference
Muzaffar, C. (2013). Whither WANA? Reflections on the Arab Uprisings. JUST
International. Retrieved December 30 2013, from http://issuu.com/juste-books/
docs/whither_wana_reflections_on_the_ara/1
Contents
1 Rise of the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP). . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 New Era of Humanitarian Intervention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Responsibility While Protecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Beyond R2P?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Geopolitics of RWP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.1 Rise of BRICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Genesis and Debates on R2P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.1 Humanitarian Intervention and R2P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 The Arab Uprisings and the P5 Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1 R2P’s Tussle Over Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 R2P, Realpolitik and Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 The Arab League and R2P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Future of R2P in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3 China as a P5 Player. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1 China and the Arab Uprisings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1.1 China’s Stance Over International Humanitarian
Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.2 Evolution of China’s Non-intervention Policy. . . . . . . . . 34
3.1.3 Schools of Thought on China’s Attitude Towards
Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 Impact of China’s Evolving Stance on Intervention. . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 China’s Middle East Policy Towards the Arab Uprisings. . . . . . 40
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4 China, India, Japan and an Emerging Eastphalian Order? . . . . . . 43
4.1 The Rise of Eastphalia? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 India and Eastphalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.1 India’s Position on Non-intervention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.2 Domestic Criticisms of India’s Stance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.3 India’s Strategic Thinking on Intervention. . . . . . . . . . . 47
vii
viii Contents
4.2.4 India’s Place in Eastphalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3 Japan and R2P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3.1 Four Contesting Perspectives on R2P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3.2 The Conservative View. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3.3 Revisionist View. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3.4 The Liberal View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3.5 The Peaceniks View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3.6 Japan, R2P and Natural Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5 ASEAN and R2P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.1 Malaysia’s Unusual Interventionist Stance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2 R2P-Like Situations in Southeast Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.3 Rohingya: New Test Case of R2P in Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . 61
5.4 ASEAN’s Attitude Towards R2P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.5 ASEAN’s Doctrine of Non-interference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.6 Reconciling Sovereignty and Humanitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.7 Typology of R2P Positions in ASEAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.8 Promoting R2P in Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.9 CSCAP Study on R2P 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6 Critiques and Critics of R2P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.1 ‘New Humanitarianism’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.2 Five Major Critiques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.3 The Future of Humanitarian Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7 Geopolitics of Intervention: Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.1 Small Five Versus P5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.2 Origin of S5: Responsibility Not to Veto (RN2V). . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.3 Reforming the Veto System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.4 Genesis of R2NV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.5 Beyond UN Reform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.6 New Politics of Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.7 R2P, the Emerging Global Order and Eastphalia. . . . . . . . . . . . 94
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
8 Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.1 International Intervention: A Turning Point?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.1.1 International Intervention Without International Law?. . . 102
8.1.2 Saudi-US Relations: Intervention
and Geopolitical Reconfiguration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Chapter 1
Rise of the Responsibility While
Protecting (RWP)
Abstract The outbreak of a wave of people power revolts, starting in Tunisia in
December 2010 and spreading quickly throughout the Middle East and North
Africa, caused unprecedented instability in a politically sensitive region. Like a
sudden volcanic eruption, the conflagration was as stunning as it was surprising,
triggeringmajorsocietalupheavalsfromLibyaandEgypttoYemen,Bahrainand
Syria, apart from leading to political changes in other regional states such as
Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Lebanon and Oman. The revolts or the Arab
Spring, as they are popularly referred to in the media, are in effect the Arab
Revolution and one of modern history’s unexpected political phenomena. They
alsoputtoseveretesttheUnitedNations’experimentinthefledglinginternational
relations doctrine known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), adopted by the
world body just 5 years earlier in 2005. R2P was designed to bridge the gulf
between naked unilateral international intervention as in the US-led invasion of
Iraq in 2003, on the one hand, and international helplessness in the face of mass
atrocity crimes within the borders of sovereign states, on the other. R2P would
permitandjustifyinternationalinterventiononlyasalastresort—whenstatesfail,
areunwilling,orareevenbreachingtheirresponsibilitytoprotecttheirownpeople
throughstate-inducedmassatrocitycrimes. R2Pwasinvokedforthefirsttimeby
theUNduringtheArabUprisings,butquicklybecamecontroversialforleadingto
regimechangeinLibya.ThesubsequentbacklashagainstR2Psawmanycountries
opposed to its application in Syria and is widely seen as the key cause of the
currentpoliticalstalemateintheUN.Attemptstounblockthediplomaticlogjamat
theUNhasgivenrisetoanewinitiativeknownas‘responsibilitywhileprotecting’
(RWP).ButisRWPacounter-response torollback R2P,orisitamovetobetter
implement R2P as the new doctrine to resolve the international community’s
dilemma over human suffering?
Keywords Responsibility while protecting (RWP) (cid:2) Responsibility to protect
(R2P) (cid:2) Humanitarian intervention (cid:2) Sovereignty (cid:2) BRICS (cid:2) UN security council
resolutions 1970 and 1973
Y.R.Kassim,TheGeopoliticsofIntervention,SpringerBriefsinPoliticalScience, 1
DOI:10.1007/978-981-4585-48-4_1,(cid:2)TheAuthor(s)2014
2 1 RiseoftheResponsibilityWhileProtecting(RWP)
1.1 New Era of Humanitarian Intervention
In 2011, 6 years after the United Nations overwhelmingly adopted the concept of
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the world body invoked it twice to protect
civilians in Libya from the onslaught of their own government in the wake of the
Arab uprisings that swept through the Middle East and North Africa. By way of
twoSecurityCouncilresolutions,UNSC1970andUNSC1973,theUNimposeda
no-fly zone to prevent the Gaddafi regime from bombing its own citizens and
authorised ‘all necessary measures’ to protect ordinary Libyans who had risen up
against their longstanding ruler, inspired by the dethronement of other
authoritarian leaders first in Tunisia and then in Egypt. The political convulsions
had a knock-on effect and spread to other countries in the region specifically
YemenandBahrain—convulsionsthatcontinuetoreverberateinSyriaevenatthe
time of writing.
WhilstthepoliticalupheavalsinTunisiaandEgyptthatbroughtdownPresident
Zine al-Bidin and Hosni Mubarak did not lead to international humanitarian
intervention,theupheavalinLibyadidbringworldattention,partlybecauseofthe
brutalityinflictedbytheGaddafiregimeontheLibyanprotesterswhowerelargely
helplessinthefaceoftheregime’satrocities.Yet,thefallofGaddafiunleasheda
ragingcontroversyintheinternationalcommunity,especiallyattheUN,precisely
because the international humanitarian intervention under R2P had led to regime
change—which was never the purpose of R2P. Indeed, a fundamental principle
separating R2P from its predecessor conception of humanitarian intervention was
thatR2Pwouldstopshortofregimechange.Thisdistinguishingtenetwascentral
to the idea of R2P when it was first advanced by its conceptualisers in the 2001
report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS), primarily to assuage its detractors that R2P was not a post-Cold War
version of Western neo-imperialism in disguise.
The fall of Gaddafi not only contravened that principle but proved the worst
fears of its critics while shaking the confidence of the many fencesitters on the
intellectual divide over R2P, especially in the developing world, but also two
major veto-wielding powers in the Security Council—Russia and China. The
critical impact of this mishandling of R2P in Libya caused a serious setback for
UNinterventionwhentheArabuprisingsspreadtoSyriainthesameyearandthe
Assad regime responded with armed aggression against a largely defenceless
civilianpopulationwhohadalsorisenupagainsttheregime.Amajorcauseofthe
setbackwasthedouble-vetobyRussiaandChinawhowereconvincedbynowthat
interventionwouldonlyservetheagendaoftheWestandwerethereforestrongly
againstaWestern-sponsoredinitiativetopassanR2P-likeresolutionontheAssad
regime.Atthetimeofwriting,theUNwasstillsorelyinastalemateoverSyria.It
was against this backdrop that an unlikely player—Brazil—initiated the move to
bridge the gulf between the proponents and detractors of R2P.