THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE SYRIAN-I RAN IAN ALLIANCE

344 Pages·2014·12.67 MB·English

THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE SYRIAN-I RAN IAN ALLIANCE:
POWER POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1979-1989
Jubin Moazami Goodarzi
Department of International Relations
The London School of Economics
Thesis submitted in satisfaction of the full requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations
University of London
Summer Term 2002
1
UMI Number: U162952
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U162952
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Zt?T71+7^,
109
A
SZSJUJ-
THESIS ABSTRACT
Name of candidate Jubin Moazami GOODARZI
Title of thesis The Formative Years of the Syrian-lranian Alliance:
Power Politics in the Middle East 1979-1989
TEXT
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive account and detailed
analysis of the forces that led to the emergence and consolidation of the
Syrian-lranian alliance during a turbulent decade in the modern history of the
Middle East. The alliance between the two states, which has now lasted over
twenty years, has proved to be an enduring feature of the political landscape of
this troubled region. Moreover, since its inception, it has had a significant
impact in terms of moulding events and bringing about major changes in the
contemporary Middle East.
The thesis sets out to demonstrate that, contrary to prevailing views (due in
large part to the authoritarian nature of the Syrian and Iranian regimes and
their unpopularity in the West), the alliance between them has been essentially
defensive in nature. It emerged in response to acts of aggression orchestrated
by Iraq (1980) and Israel (1982), in both cases with the tacit support and prior
knowledge of the United States. As a result of the research undertaken for this
thesis, three distinct phases in the evolution and institutionalization of the
Damascus-Tehran axis can be discerned. One chapter is devoted to each of
these phases, constituting the three core sections of the thesis.
A brief introduction sets out to provide a conceptual framework for
understanding the genesis and evolution of the Syrian-lranian nexus. The first
core chapter, covering the emergence of the alliance between 1979 and 1982,
demonstrates that, while the initial impetus for the birth of the relationship came
from the overthrow of Iran's conservative, pro-Western monarchy in 1979, the
Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980 served as a major catalyst in bringing
Syria and Iran closer together, with Syria providing valuable diplomatic and
military assistance to help Iran stave off defeat. The second core chapter
covers the period between 1982 and 1985, when Israel launched an invasion of
Lebanon and challenged Syria in its backyard. Here, Iran lent its support to
Syria to drive out Israeli and Western forces during the period 1983-1985. The
third core chapter deals with a critical, and perhaps the most problematic,
phase in the development of the alliance. By the mid-1980's, both parties had
developed conflicting agendas, contributing to tensions between them.
However, continued consultations between the two allies, and their ability to
prioritize their respective interests and redefine the parameters for cooperation,
led by the late 1980s to the maturation and consolidation of their relationship.
Finally, the conclusion looks at the reasons why the alliance lasted beyond the
1980's.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements 4
Introduction 5
1. The Emergence of the Syrian-lranian Axis: 1979-1982 15
2. The Achievements and Limits of Syrian-lranian Power:
The Struggle for the Middle East 1982-1985 68
3. Intra-Alliance Tensions and the Consolidation of the Syrian-lranian Axis:
The Reversal of Fortunes 1985-1988 148
Conclusion: A Decade On, The Alliance Endures 325
Bibliography 333
3
Acknowledgements
There are a number of individuals to whom I am greatly indebted for their generous
support and input. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Fred
Halliday, for his encouragement, patience and constructive critique of the various
drafts that I submitted to him throughout the years. I am also grateful to Said
Goudarznia, Nasser Majd, Mehrdad Khonsari, Eberhard Kienle and Mahmoud
Delkhasteh for their guidance, and for enabling me to arrange several interviews. I
owe a debt of gratitude to Patrick Seale, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Ahmad
Mirfenderski, Richard Murphy and Ardeshir Zahedi for giving me their time, and
sharing their knowledge and experiences. Furthermore, I benefited from the
insight and information provided by Jafar Ra'ed, Abbas Sayghal, Hazim Sagiyeh,
Ahmed Hashim, Safa Haeri, Dilip Hiro and others who prefer to remain anonymous
due to the sensitive and controversial nature of my thesis topic. I am immensely
appreciative of Andrew Brookes' efforts and diligence for proof reading the entire
thesis. During my research, I profited from the newspaper archives at the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, and would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to the
library staff for their professionalism and kind assistance. Finally, I would not have
been able to complete this thesis had it not been for the unstinting support of my
dear mother and sister, and my beloved wife, who maintained their confidence in
me, and made the long and arduous process of completing this work much more
bearable.
4
INTRODUCTION
The study of alliances is central to the analysis of international relations. The formation of alliances
among tribes, clans and small communities for security purposes dates back to the dawn of
civilization. As several of the earliest civilizations emerged in the Fertile Crescent and the Nile River
Valley, alliances have been a common feature on the political landscape of the Middle East for
thousands of years, starting with the ancient empires of the Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians and
Persians.1 The recurrent struggles involving the various regional powers, and later extra-regional
actors such as the Greeks, Romans and Mongols determined the course of Middle East history for
more than two millennia until the rise of modem nation-states in the region during the early half of
the twentieth century.
In the decades preceding and following the Second World War, the rise of modem
nationalism in the region, the gradual retreat of Britain and France and the onset of the Cold War
ushered in a period of intense political and ideological rivalry among the various radical and
conservative states in the Middle East. The Arab defeat in the 1948-49 Palestine War at the hands
of the newly-created state of Israel, the appeal of radical Arab nationalism and archaic political
systems only served to exacerbate and polarize the situation. Furthermore, the region's vast oil
reserves, and its geopolitical importance - lying at the crossroads between Europe, Africa, Asia, and
the Indian subcontinent - increased the significance of the Middle East in the eyes of the
Superpowers, leading to continued outside interference in the area. Concomitantly, many regional
actors were eager to cultivate close ties with the Superpowers and to exploit the bipolar system in
order to jockey for influence and aid to boost their own power and position, both in regional and
international terms. Besides allying themselves with either Washington or Moscow, many states
tried to enhance their security by forging alliances with other regional actors, at times to minimize
foreign penetration of the Middle East.
In his landmark study on alliance theory and alliance formation in the Middle East, The
Origins of Alliances (1987), Stephen M. Walt identified 33 different alignments in the region from
1955 to 1979 alone.2 The general trend has been that regional actors have primarily aligned
themselves in order to diminish a threat posed by another regional power or alliance. They have for
the most part overcome ideological differences in recent decades to ally themselves if an immediate
threat exists. Ideological factors assume some significance if they are not confronted with a major
security challenge. In addition, the record clearly shows that they will align themselves with extra-
regional actors that are willing to support their political objectives. Interestingly enough, ideological
factors have been more salient in alliances between Middle Eastern states and their Superpower
patrons - as the record during the Cold War era clearly demonstrated.
In the 1950's and 1960's, for the most part, conservative, pro-Western monarchies formed
defense pacts to strengthen their position vis-a-vis radical, nationalist, republican governments which
emerged in Syria, Egypt and Iraq. The latter prematurely attempted to form political unions and
assumed a confrontational stance against Israel and its allies. However, the Arab defeat in the 1967
5
Six-Day War discredited the radical camp, diminishing the importance of ideology and regime
structure in alliance formation, and eventually giving way to more pragmatic alignments against
common threats. This was epitomized by the formation of the shortlived "Arab Triangle" consisting
of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in the early 1970's, and its bid to demonstrate Arab dissatisfaction
with the post-1967 status quo and US policy, by launching the 1973 October War. However, one of
the most fascinating and enduring examples over the past two decades has been the emergence
and evolution of the Syrian-lranian alliance in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Subsequent to the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy, the new revolutionary Islamist regime and the
secular, Arab nationalist government in Syria cultivated close bilateral relations and eventually
aligned themselves with each other in response to direct challenges posed to them by Iraq, Israel
and the United States in the Levant and Persian Gulf between 1980 and 1988.
The genesis and evolution of the Syrian-lranian axis during its first decade was one of the
most intriguing developments in modem Middle East politics. During the turbulent decade of the
1980's, the nature and longevity of the Tehran-Damascus partnership baffled many scholars and
observers. Many were quick to write it off as a short-term, opportunistic alignment, or describe it as a
marriage of convenience that would dissolve rapidly. Pointing to many differences in their
respective ideologies, as well as their social and political foundations, most analysts expressed
surprise as to how a revolutionary, pan-lslamic theocracy such as Iran could ally itself with a secular,
pan-Arab socialist republic like Syria.3 Moreover, while Bathi Syria claimed to be an ardent
supporter and the rightful leader of the pan-Arab cause, revolutionary Iran advocated Islamic
univeralism, and during the Khomeini era rejected the concept of the nation-state.4 In addition, in the
sphere of relations with the Superpowers, although Syria traditionally maintained strong ties with the
Soviet Union, and was a primary recipient of Soviet military assistance in the 1980's, Moscow's
relations with Tehran's ruling clerics were strained intermittently after the establishment of the Islamic
Republic.5
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a detailed analysis of the forces that led to the
emergence and consolidation of the Syrian-lranian alliance during a turbulent decade in the modem
history of the Middle East. The alliance between these two states, which has now lasted over twenty
years, has proved to be a persisting feature on the political landscape of this troubled region.
Moreover, since its inception, it has had a significant impact in terms in terms of moulding events
and bringing about major changes in the contemporary Middle East.
This thesis sets out to demonstrate that, contrary to prevailing views (due in large part to the
authoritarian nature of the Syrian and Iranian regimes, and their unpopularity in the West and in
certain parts of the Arab world), the alliance between them has been essentially defensive in nature,
and emerged in response to acts of aggression orchestrated by Iraq (1980) and Israel (1982), in both
cases with the prior knowledge and tacit support of the United States. As a result of the research
undertaken for this study, three distinct phases in the evolution and institutionalization of the
Damascus-Tehran axis can be discerned. One chapter is devoted to each of these stages,
constituting the three core sections of the thesis.
6
This brief introduction sets out to provide a general conceptual framework for understanding
the genesis and longevity of the Syrian-lranian nexus. The first chapter, covering the emergence of
the alliance between 1979 and 1982, seeks to demonstrate that, while the initial impetus for the birth
of the relationship came from the overthrow of Iran's conservative, pro-Western monarchy in 1979,
the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980 served as a major catalyst in bringing Syria and Iran
closer together, with Syria providing valuable diplomatic and military assistance to help Iran stave off
defeat. The second core chapter covers the period between 1982 and 1985, when Israel launched
its second invasion of Lebanon and challenged Syria in its backyard. Here, Iran lent its support to
Syria, in part by mobilizing Lebanon's Shi'ites, to drive out Israeli and Western forces during the
period 1983-1985. The third core chapter deals with a critical, and perhaps the most problematic
phase in the development of the alliance. By 1985, the two allies had developed conflicting
agendas, therefore contributing to tensions between them. However, continued bilateral
consultations, and their ability to prioritize their respective objectives (without impinging on the
interests of the other), and to redefine the parameters of cooperation, led to the maturation and
consolidation of their relationship by the late 1980's. Finally, the conclusion looks at the reasons why
the alliance has lasted beyond the 1980's.
Although two studies in recent years, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, by Hussein J.
Agha and Ahmad S. Khalidi (1995), and Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional
System, by Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch (1997) shed light on certain
aspects of the alliance between the two countries, they focus primarily on its continued importance in
the post-Cold War era, and provide a general overview of the formative years of the Tehran-
Damascus nexus. This thesis aims to serve as an in-depth study, tracing the origins and
development of the strategic partnership between Damascus and Tehran from the toppling of
Mohammad Reza Shah in eariy 1979 to Syrian-lranian intercession to halt Amal-Hezbollah clashes
in Beirut and the end of the First Persian Gulf War in mid-1988. Besides putting forth an empirical
survey with a chronology of events, the analytical content is intended to distinguish the three phases
in the evolution of the alliance and their significance, in terms both of how they affected bilateral
relations between the two states, and of their regional implications in the volatile environment of
1979-1988.
With regard to the research methodology and material used, this thesis relies primarily on
secondary sources (books, periodicals, newspapers), along with transcripts of radio broadcasts,
official government statements, and also on personal interviews with former government officials
and Middle East experts. In view of the closed and often secretive nature of the Syrian Bathi and
Iranian Islamist regimes and their decision making, coupled with the importance and sensitivity of
cooperative ties between them, it is highly improbable that responsible officials would have engaged
in frank discussions on these matters or provided first-hand knowledge about their bilateral relations.
Indeed, inaccessibility to primary sources and interviews with current government officials in
Damascus and Tehran continue to be the main obstacles to providing a complete and accurate
picture of the nature and extent of Syrian-lranian collaboration during the first decade of the alliance.
7
The opacity of political decision making among key figures and bodies in the Syrian and Iranian
regimes, including the role, importance and views of the various leaders and councils, along with
limited information on their bilateral consultations, pose a formidable challenge to any outsider
attempting to understand the inner workings of these two authoritarian governments and the Syrian-
lranian relationship. Due to the aforementioned problem, this study tries to compensate for this
serious limitation through an exhaustive survey and analysis of the available secondary sources, and
also attempts to fill in some of the apparent gaps and clarify certain inconsistencies by obtaining first­
hand information from former senior government officials. These include former Iranian President
Abolhassan Bani-Sadris account of the extent of Syrian military assistance to Iran in the eariy years
of the Iran-lraq hostilities (1980-1981) and Tehran's policy toward the Syrian Muslim Brethren, and
former US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy's insight on the degree of Syrian-lranian
involvement in attacks on American assets in Lebanon between 1983-1984.
Since this study focuses primarily on the genesis and development of the Tehran-Damascus
nexus during its first decade, one may come away with the impression that the maintenance and
augmentation of their strategic bilateral links was the first and foremost foreign policy consideration
on the minds of Syrian and Iranian leaders between 1979-1989. In some respects and in certain
instances, this was definitely the case for both partners, especially for Iran. The seizure of the
American embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants in 1979 (which plunged US-lranian relations into an
abyss and led to Iran's international isolation), and the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 meant that
Ayatollah Khomeini's regime was extremely dependent on Hafez Assad’s diplomatic and military
support. This was needed in order to stave off defeat and to avoid regional isolation at a time when
Saddam Hussein held the initiative, occupying large swathes of Iranian territory and trying to depict
the war as an Arab-Persian conflict. With the expulsion of Iraqi forces from most of the areas they
held in Iran by mid-1982 and the concurrent Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the pendulum swung the
other way, with Syria requiring Iranian assistance to keep Iraq in check and mobilize Lebanon's
Shi'ites to expel Israeli and Western forces from its backyard between 1982-1985. As the Israeli
threat receded with the withdrawal of Tel Aviv's troops to the self-declared security zone by mid-1985
and Arab disenchantment grew due to Iran's persistence in continuing the Gulf War, Iran once again
became more dependent on Syrian cooperation and goodwill in order to maintain its foothold in the
Levant and avoid total regional isolation. This continued to be the case until the cessation of
hostilities with Iraq in 1988. Overall, Tehran valued its strategic alliance with Syria more between
1979-1982 and 1985-1988, particularly in the backdrop of the poor state of US-lranian relations
throughout the 1980's and the erratic nature of its ties with the Soviet Union and Western Europe
during this period. For Syria, the three years from 1982 to 1985 represented the height of its reliance
on Iran in order to undo the achievements of its foes in Lebanon. Concomitantly, on the international
level, Syria continued to put great emphasis on its close links with the Soviet Union during the first
half of the 1980's due to the tetter's Superpower status and in its capacity as the primary provider of
military and economic assistance to Syria. However, with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and
the gradual cooling of Soviet-Svrian relations in the second half of the 1980's, a subtle shift occurred
8