The Fabric of Character. Aristotle's Theory of Virtue

229 Pages·1989·4.97 MB·English

by  Nancy Sherman

The focus of this book is Artistotle's theory of
virtue. Unlike traditional accounts of Aristotelian
virtue, Nancy Sherman claims that excellence of
character is not a merely habituated, affective
state, but a state constituted by the operations of
practical reason. In particular, she considers four
aspects of practical reason as they relate to
character: namely, moral perception,
choicemaking, collaboration, and the
development of those capacities in moral
education. The inclusion of moral perception as a
moment of practical reason suggests that an
adequate account of practical reason begins not
with the question, how should I act given some
end, but rather with the acknowledgement that
some end is here and now relevant to the
particulars. Composing the scene is thus as much
a part of the projection of character as deciding
how ultimately to act. And this, Sherman argues,
has been ignored in traditional accounts of the
practical syllogism. In both deciding what to do
and how to construe circumstances, our
capacities are enlarged by the collaborative
efforts of others with whom we share a life. This
social dimension has a place in moral education,
but more generally, in the planning and living out
of a good life. Finally, the account of character
has implications for Aristotle's theory of moral
education. Contrary to the popular interpretation
in which ethical habituation is non-rational,
Sherman's claim is that the cognitive skills
requisite for mature character are cultivated
earlier on as a part of the shaping of emotions and
desires.
Throughout the arguments of this book, the
author is sensitive to contemporary moral
debates, and indicates the extent to which
Artistotle's account of practical reason provides
an alternative to theories of impartial reason.
Nancy Sherman is Associate Professor of
Philosophy, Yale University.
Jacket illustration by Meryl Friedman Blinder
THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER

The Fabric of
Character
ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF VIRTUE
N aney Sherman
CLARENDONPRESS·OXFORD
1989
Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
Oxford New York Toronto
Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi
Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo
Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town
Melbourne Auckland
and associated companies in
Berlin Ibadan
Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press
Published in the United States by
Oxford University Press, New York
© Nancy Sherman 1989
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without
the prior permission of Oxford University Press
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Sherman, Nancy
Thefabric of character: Aristotle's
theory of virtue.
I. Ethics. Theories of Aristotle, 384-322
B.C.
1. Title
170'.92' 4
ISBN 0-1,)-824451-7
Library of Congress Catliloging in Publication Data
Sherman,Nancy,I951-
Thefabric of character: Aristotle's theory
of virtue I Nancy Sherman.
Includes index.
I. Aristotle-Ethics. 2. Virtue-History.
3. Character-History.
1. Title.
B491. V57S52 1989 171'.3-dc19
88-29109 CIP
ISBN 0-19-824451-7
Set by Oxford Text System
Printed in Great Britain
at the University Printing House, Oxford
by David Stanford
Printer to the University
For M arshall

PREFACE
ARISTOTLE'S ethical theory has enjoyed a resurgence of
interest of late. The ancient idea that ethical theory is about
how to lead a good life, and that such a life will express
the emotions as well as reason, has found a sympathetic ear
in many. I am among these, and the aim of this work is to
capture the way in which the sentiments and p.ractical
reason together constitute character. The work, in some
sense, began life as a thesis submitted for my Ph.D. at
Harvard in 1982. At the time, I was struck by the fact that
discussions of Aristotle's theory of virtues often side-stepped
an account of their acquisition, Two notable exceptions
were articles by Burnyeat and Sorabji,l but on the whole
the idea of moral habituation as a kind of non-cognitive
practice was unquestioningly accepted. The aim of the
thesis was to debunk this view, both as an interpretation of
Aristotle and as a plausible theory in its own right. Little
of the thesis survives in this present book, but the motivating
idea, to demonstrate that character is inseparable from the
operations of practical reason, remains.
In writing a book on Aristotle, I have felt acutely the
problem of Aristotle's inherent sexism, and have struggled
with the awkward issue of just how to allow women into
the ranks of the decent and wise. I have not come to any
ready solution, and, perhaps with some anachronism, have
in the end allowed myself to use women as well as men as
the subjects of my examples, moving freely between the
masculine and feminine pronoun. For my own process of
writing and interpretation, this seemed to be necessary and
crucial for sympathetic appreciation of the theory. If not
1 Myles Burnyeat, 'Aristotle on Learning to be Good', in A. O. Rorty (ed.),
Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (University of California Press, 1980), 69-92; Richard
Sorabji, 'Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue', Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 74 (1973-4), 107-29, repr. in Rorty, 201-19.
Preface
VU1
abetted by Aristotle, it seems at least within his own dictum
of allowing time to be a co-partner in and co-discoverer of
the details of his theory (NE I098a22). Where appropriate,
I have examined in some detail Aristotle's position on
women, and, especially in the case of their role as moral
tutors within the family, have pointed to inconsistencies in
his views.
MallY people have helped at different stages in the growth
of this book, and to all of them I owe my gratitude. My
deepest debt is to Martha Nussbaum. As a teacher and
thesis supervisor at Harvard she was everything a graduate
student could want, and more. Her interest never flagged,
and her vigilant supervision at all stages of the thesis was
incomparable. At later stages of the book, too, she was
a careful critic. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine
acknowledging my debt to her in any brief space. For
coming to understand Aristotle's place in the larger sweep
of moral philosophy, I owe deep appreciation to my
second thesis supervisor, John Rawls. His writing, and his
remarkable lectures in moral philosophy, have remained the
foundation of my own education in that subject. His force
ful defence of Kantian ethics compelled me then (and now)
to take seriously the challenge Kant poses to Aristotelian
theory. Many thanks are also due to Steven Strange, who
read the thesis, and who offered helpful criticisms along
the way.
The book began life again at Yale, and benefited from
the various seminars at which its ideas were developed. To
the many students whose discussions helped to shape this
book, I am most grateful. I also owe thanks to my Yale
colleagues for their encouragement and support of my work.
John Fischer's careful reading of earlier drafts of two
chapters led to substantial improvements, and conversations
with Sarah Waterlow Broadie clarified my own thinking
about difficult issues in Aristotle's theory. Both R. 1. G.
Hughes and Giovanni Ferrari read and commented on
several chapters of the book, and I am thankful for their
interest. To Ruth Marcus, for her steady encouragement
and warmth over the past six years, I owe special thanks.