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The Dilemma of the Commoners: Understanding the Use of Common Pool Resources in Long-Term Perspective PDF

226 Pages·2015·3.58 MB·English
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THEDILEMMAOFTHECOMMONERS One of the classic problems in social science is known as ‘the dilemma of the commons’, in which land, water, and other resources held jointly by social or economic segments tend to be depleted sooner and to a greater extent than privatelyheldassets.Duringtheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,manyaspects of western European society changed fundamentally, including the abolition of common-property rights, which in itself was related to social, political, and eco- nomicshiftsinthatsamesociety.Thisbookintendstoputthedebateoncommons, commoners,andthedisappearanceofboththroughoutearlymodernandmodern northwestern Europe in a new light, through new approaches and innovative methodologies.TineDeMooraimstolinkthehistoricaldebateaboutthelong- termevolutionofcommonstothepresent-daydebatesoncommon-poolresources, aswellastouchinguponvariousdisciplineswithinthesocialsciencesthatworkon commonsissues. Tine De Moor is Professor of Institutions for Collective Action in Historical PerspectiveatUtrechtUniversity. Shehaspublishedinvarioustopjournalsona varietyoftopicsinsocialandeconomichistory,butmostextensivelyoncommons innorthwesternEurope.Shehaswonseveralprizesforherresearch,includingthe prizeforthebestdissertationinthecategory‘MedievalandEarlyModernPeriod’ oftheInternationalEconomicHistoryAssociation.SheisalsocurrentlyPresident (2015–2017) of the International Association for the Study of the Commons andtheco-founder,formereditor-in-chief,andmemberoftheeditorialboardof theInternationalJournaloftheCommons. POLITICALECONOMYOFINSTITUTIONSANDDECISIONS SeriesEditors StephenAnsolabehere,HarvardUniversity JeffryFrieden,HarvardUniversity FoundingEditors JamesE.Alt,HarvardUniversity DouglassC.North,WashingtonUniversityofSt.Louis OtherBooksintheSeries AlbertoAlesinaandHowardRosenthal,PartisanPolitics,DividedGovernmentandthe Economy LeeJ.Alston,ThrainnEggertsson,andDouglassC.North,eds.,EmpiricalStudiesin InstitutionalChange LeeJ.AlstonandJosephP.Ferrie,SouthernPaternalismandtheRiseoftheAmerican WelfareState:Economics,Politics,andInstitutions,1865–1965 JamesE.AltandKennethShepsle,eds.,PerspectivesonPositivePoliticalEconomy JosephineT.Andrews,WhenMajoritiesFail:TheRussianParliament,1990–1993 JeffreyS.BanksandEricA.Hanushek,eds.,ModernPoliticalEconomy:OldTopics,New Directions YoramBarzel,EconomicAnalysisofPropertyRights,2ndedition YoramBarzel,ATheoryoftheState:EconomicRights,LegalRights,andtheScopeofthe State Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian DevelopmentinKenya JennaBednar,TheRobustFederation:PrinciplesofDesign CharlesM.Cameron,VetoBargaining:PresidentsandthePoliticsofNegativePower Kelly H. Chang, Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the UnitedStatesandtheEuropeanMonetaryUnion Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, eds., Structure and Policy in Japan and the UnitedStates:AnInstitutionalistApproach GaryW.Cox,TheEfficientSecret:TheCabinetandtheDevelopmentofPoliticalPartiesin VictorianEngland GaryW.Cox,MakingVotesCount:StrategicCoordinationintheWorld’sElectoralSystem Gary W. Cox and Jonathan N. Katz, Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander: The Electoral ConsequencesoftheReapportionmentRevolution RaymondM.DuchandRandolphT.Stevenson,TheEconomicVote:HowPoliticaland EconomicInstitutionsConditionElectionResults JeanEnsminger,MakingaMarket:TheInstitutionalTransformationofanAfricanSociety DavidEpsteinandSharynO’Halloran,DelegatingPowers:ATransactionCostPolitics ApproachtoPolicyMakingunderSeparatePowers Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, The Transformation of Property Rights in the Gold Coast: An EmpiricalStudyApplyingRationalChoiceTheory ClarkC.Gibson,PoliticiansandPoachers:ThePoliticalEconomyofWildlifePolicyinAfrica Daniel W. Gingerich, Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America:StealingfortheTeam continuedaftertheIndex THE DILEMMA OF THE COMMONERS Understanding the Use of Common-Pool Resources in Long-Term Perspective Tine De Moor UtrechtUniversity,TheNetherlands 32AvenueoftheAmericas,NewYork,NY10013–2473,USA CambridgeUniversityPressispartoftheUniversityofCambridge. ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof education,learning,andresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence. www.cambridge.org Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781107022164 ©TineDeMoor2015 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublished2015 PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica AcatalogrecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData Moor,Tinede. Thedilemmaofthecommoners:understandingtheuseofcommon-poolresources inlong-termperspective/TineDeMoor. pages cm.–(Politicaleconomyofinstitutionsanddecisions) 1. Cooperation–Europe–History. I. Title. HD3484.A4M56 2015 333.2–dc23 2014048656 ISBN978-1-107-02216-4Hardback CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof URLsforexternalorthird-partyInternetWebsitesreferredtointhispublication anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchWebsitesis,orwillremain, accurateorappropriate. ForKaat Underwhatconditionswillcooperationemerge inaworldofegoistswithoutcentralauthority? Thisquestionhasintriguedpeopleforalongtime.Andforgoodreason. Weallknowthatpeoplearenotangels, andthattheytendtolookafterthemselvesandtheirownfirst. Yet we also know that cooperation does occur and that our civilization is baseduponit. But,insituationswhereeachindividualhasanincentivetobeselfish, howcancooperationeverdevelop? (Axelrod1984,3)

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