The Development Of The B-52 And Jet Propulsion: A Case Study In Organizational Innovation

126 Pages·1998·1.8 MB·English

by  Mandeles, Mark David

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Mandeles, Mark David, 1950-

The development of the B-52 and jet propulsion : a case study in organizational innovation /

Mark D. Mandeles.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Aeronautics, Military-Research-United States-History. 2. B-52 bomber- Research- History.

3. Jet propulsion-History.

I. Title.

UG643.M35 1998 98-14703
358.4070973-dc21 CIP
Printed March 1998
Digitize Copy from March 1998 Printing November 2002 NOTE: Pagination changed
DISCLAIMER
This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the
interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The
views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy
or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.
This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared
for public release.
ii
Contents
Page
Disclaimer........................................................................................................................ ii

Foreword......................................................................................................................... xi

About the Author .......................................................................................................... xiii

Acknowledgments......................................................................................................... xiv

Chapter 1 Introduction ......................................................................................................1

Chapter 2 Innovation and Military Revolutions ..............................................................4

Chapter 3 Logic and Procedure of Analysis ..................................................................17

Chapter 4 Prelude: Jet Propulsion and the Air Force.....................................................29

Chapter 5 The Introduction of Jet Propulsion into the B-52..........................................54

Chapter 6 Conclusion.....................................................................................................99

Table 1 USAF Engine Development Time....................................................................42

Table 2 B-52 TimeLine..................................................................................................56

Table 3 Maximum Takeoff Weights and Combat Radii................................................66

Table 4 XB-52 Performance Requirements...................................................................75

Table 5 Boeing Company Comparison of Basic Turbopropand

Basic Turbojet Models ...................................................................................................87

Appendix XB-52 Program Select Senior Personnel ....................................................115

v
Foreword
The B-52 and Jet Propulsion: A Case Study in Organizational Innovation is a coherent and
nonpolemical discussion of the revolution in military affairs, a hot topic in the national security arena.
Mark Mandeles examines an interesting topic, how can the military better understand, manage, and
evaluate technological development programs. We see Murphy’s Law (anything that can go wrong, will
go wrong) in operation. No matter how carefully the military designs, plans, and programs the process
of technological development, inevitably, equipment, organizations, and people will challenge the
desired expectations. Mandeles argues convincingly that recognizing the inevitability of error may be
the single most important factor in the design of effective organizations and procedures to foster and
enhance innovative technology and concepts.
The book focuses on the introduction of jet propulsion into the B-52. This case study illustrates the
reality that surprises and failures are endemic to development programs where information and
knowledge are indeterminate, ambiguous, and imperfect. Mandeles’ choice of the B-52 to illustrate this
process is both intriguing and apt. The military had no coherent search process inevitably leading to the
choice of a particular technology; nor was decision making concerning the B-52 development program
coherent or orderly. Different mixtures of participants, problems, and solutions came together at various
times to make decisions about funding or to review the status of performance projections and
requirements.
Three aspects of the B-52’s history are striking because they challenge conventional wisdom about
rationally managed innovation. First, Air Force personnel working on the B-52 program did not obtain
the aircraft they assumed they would get when the program began. Second, the development process did
not conform to idealized features of a rational program. While a rationally organized program has clear
goals, adequate information, and well-organized and attentive leadership, the B-52 development process
exhibited substantial disagreement over, and revision of, requirements or goals, and ambiguous,
imperfect, and changing information. Third, the “messy” development process, as described in the book,
forestalled premature closure on a particular design and spurred learning and the continuous introduction
of new knowledge into the design as the process went along.
Military innovations involve questions about politics, cooperation and coordination, and social
benefits, and like other development efforts, there appears to be no error-free method to predict at the
outset the end results of any given program. This study offers a major lesson to today’s planners:
improving the capacity of a number of organizations with overlapping jurisdictions to interact enhances
prospects to innovate new weapons and operational concepts. We can mitigate bureaucratic pathologies
by fostering interaction among government and private organizations.
xi
The B-52 and Jet Propulsion integrates a detailed historical case study with a fine understanding of
the literature on organization and innovation. It is a story of decision making under conditions of
uncertainty, ambiguity, and disagreement. I have seen such stories unfold many times in my work on
technological development projects. In the pages that follow those who plan, manage, and criticize
technological development programs will find new insights about the process of learning how to make
new things.
DOV S. ZAKHEIM

CEO, SPC International Corporation

xii
About the Author
Mark D. Mandeles won research and university fellowships from the University of California, Davis,
and Indiana University. In 1982 he won the USAF Dissertation Fellowship in Military Aerospace
History, and subsequently received a doctor of philosophy degree in political science from Indiana
University. He also earned a master of arts degree in political science from the University of California,
Davis, and a bachelor of arts degree in political science (with honors) from the University of California,
Berkeley.
For the last 15 years, he has been an analyst or consultant for government and private analytical
firms, including the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of the Air Force's Gulf War Air Power Survey, the Air Staff (Office of Long-Range Planning), Institute
for Defense Analyses, Center for Naval Analyses, US General Accounting Office, Office of Chief of
Engineers (US Army Corps of Engineers), Center for Air Force History, Science Applications
International Corporation, OC Inc., ANSER, and Delex Systems. He founded the J. de Bloch Group, a
research and analysis firm, in 1993. Currently he is analyzing structures of future military organizations
for the Office of Net Assessment.
His published research and reviews (in Security Studies, Naval War College Review, American
Political Science Review, National Defense, Military Affairs, Journal of America's Military Past, and
Middle East Insight) include essays on the revolution in military affairs, weapons acquisition, innovation
in naval aviation, and ballistic missile and nuclear weapons proliferation. He coauthored Managing
"Command and Control" in the Persian Gulf War (Praeger, 1996), and The Introduction of Carrier
Aviation into the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy (Naval Institute Press, forthcoming).
Dr. Mandeles lives in Alexandria, Virginia, with his wife, Laura, and children, Samantha and Harry.
xiii
Acknowledgments
I have had outstanding help from knowledgeable, kind, and gracious colleagues in preparing this
manuscript, including Thomas C. Hone, Laura L. Mandeles, Andrew W. Marshall, Jacob Neufeld, and
Jan M. van Tol. Of course, I alone am responsible for any errors they were unsuccessful in persuading
me to remove. I also wish to thank the wonderful staff of the John Marshall branch of the Fairfax
County (Virginia) Public Library for securing many books through interlibrary loan and Col Allan W.
Howey, director of Air University Press, and the AU Press editorial team, Emily Adams and Lula
Barnes.
xiv
To

Martin Landau

and

Andrew W. Marshell