The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts

389 Pages·2011·1.08 MB·English

by  Rocco J. Gennaro

The Consciousness Paradox
Representation and Mind
Hilary Putnam and Ned Block, Editors
Representation and Reality , Hilary Putnam
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes , Fred Dretske
The Metaphysics of Meaning , Jerrold J. Katz
A Theory of Content and Other Essays , Jerry A. Fodor
The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind , Cora Diamond
The Unity of the Self , Stephen L. White
The Imagery Debate , Michael Tye
A Study of Concepts , Christopher Peacocke
The Rediscovery of the Mind , John R. Searle
Past, Space, and Self , John Campbell
Mental Reality , Galen Strawson
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind ,
Michael Tye
Representations, Targets, and Attitudes , Robert Cummins
Starmaking: Realism, Anti- Realism, and Irrealism , Peter J. McCormick
A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy , Hao Wang
Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds , Daniel C. Dennett
Realistic Rationalism , Jerrold J. Katz
The Paradox of Self- Consciousness , Jose Luis Bermudez
In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind,
Jerry Fodor
Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind–Body Problem and Mental Causation ,
Jaegwon Kim
The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way: T he Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology ,
Jerry Fodor
New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self- Knowledge , Susana Nuccetelli
C onsciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity , Michael Tye
Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge , Drew Khlentzos
Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Cora Diamond , Alice Crary, editor
Time and Realism: Metaphysical and Antimetaphysical Perspectives , Yuval Dolev
Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology, T erence E. Horgan and
Matjaž Potrcˇ
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts , Michael Tye
The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher- Order Thoughts ,
Rocco J. Gennaro
The Consciousness Paradox
Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher- Order Thoughts
Rocco J. Gennaro
A Bradford Book
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
© 2012 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any
electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information
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This book was set in Stone Sans and Stone Serif by Graphic Composition, Inc.
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Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Gennaro, Rocco J.
The consciousness paradox : consciousness, concepts, and higher-o rder thoughts /
Rocco J. Gennaro.
p. cm.—(Representation and mind series)
“A Bradford Book.”
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 978- 0- 262- 01660- 5 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Consciousness. 2. Concepts. 3. Thought and thinking. I. Title.
B808.9.G46 2012
126—dc22
2011011586
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To Deidra, Olivia, and Joseph

Contents
Acknowledgments ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 The Problem 1
1.2 The Plan 3
1.3 Some Terminology and Distinctions 5
2 In Defense of the HOT Thesis 11
2.1 Varieties of Representationalism 11
2.2 Defending Reductive Representationalism 15
2.3 Consciousness and Intentionality 21
2.4 HOT Theory: An Initial Defense 28
2.5 More on Mental Content 33
3 Assessing Three Close Rivals 39
3.1 First- Order Representationalism (FOR) 39
3.2 Dual-C ontent Theory 45
3.3 Higher- Order Perception (HOP) Theory 49
4 From HOT Theory to the Wide Intrinsicality View 55
4.1 A False Dilemma 55
4.2 Misrepresentation: A First Pass 59
4.3 The Problem of the Rock 70
4.4 The Hard Problem of Consciousness 75
4.5 Objections and Replies 88
5 Against Self-R epresentationalism 103
5.1 Three Views of State Consciousness 104
5.2 Against Pure Self- Referentialism 104
5.3 Another Approach: Peripheral Awareness 116
5.4 Three More Attempts and a Counterargument 126
viii Contents
6 In Defense of Conceptualism 135
6.1 What Is Conceptualism? 135
6.2 HOT Theory and Conceptualism 147
6.3 The Richness of Conscious Experience 161
6.4 Fineness of Grain 173
7 Concept Acquisition and Infant Consciousness 185
7.1 The Real Hard Problem 185
7.2 Innateness 186
7.3 Concept Acquisition 199
7.4 Conceptualism and Concept Acquisition 210
7.5 HOT Theory and Infant Consciousness 219
8 Animal Consciousness 229
8.1 Carruthers, Animals, and HOT Theory 229
8.2 Animals and I-T houghts 237
8.3 Lloyd Morgan’s Canon and Parsimony 252
8.4 An Aside on Autism 257
8.5 Animals and Conceptualism: The Continuity Argument 262
9 Into the Brain 269
9.1 The Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs) 269
9.2 How Global Is HOT Theory? 276
9.3 Parts, Wholes, and Feedback Loops 282
9.4 The Binding Problem and the Unity of Consciousness 291
9.5 Conclusion of the Book 302
Notes 305
References 329
Index 371
Acknowledgments
Most of this book is new material. Chapters 2, 3, 6, 7, and 9 are almost
entirely new. Some of chapter 8 is a much expanded version of Gennaro
2009, noted below. Sections 8.4 and 8.5 are entirely new. Larger portions
of chapters 4 and 5 have been previously published. However, in each case,
there is significant expansion, updating, reworking, and reorganization.
The previous publications in question are the following:
“Animals, Consciousness, and I-T houghts,” in P hilosophy of Animal Minds ,
ed. Robert Lurz (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 184–200.
“Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Expe-
rience,” Philosophical Studies 139 (May 2008): 39–56.
“Review of Peter Carruthers’ Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-O rder Per-
spective ,” Psyche 12 (August 2006), http://theassc.org/files/assc/2645.pdf.
“Between Pure Self- Referentialism and the (Extrinsic) HOT Theory of Con-
sciousness,” in Self-R epresentational Approaches to Consciousness , ed. Uriah
Kriegel and Ken Williford (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 221–248.
“The HOT Theory of Consciousness: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?”
Journal of Consciousness Studies 12, no. 2 (February 2005): 3–21.
“Higher-O rder Thoughts, Animal Consciousness, and Misrepresentation: A
Reply to Carruthers and Levine,” in Higher- Order Theories of Consciousness ,
ed. Rocco J. Gennaro (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2004), 45–66.
“Higher-O rder Theories of Consciousness: An Overview,” introduction to
Higher-O rder Theories of Consciousness, ed. Rocco J. Gennaro (Amsterdam:
John Benjamins, 2004), 1–13.
I thank Cambridge University Press, the MIT Press, John Benjamins Pub-
lishers, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Philosophical Studies , and P syche for
reprint permission.
Over the years, I have benefited greatly from discussions, in person and
via e-m ail, with many others, including Colin Allen, John Beeckmans,