THE CONCEPT OF FINITUDE IN RENOUVIER

229 Pages·09.289 MB·English

by  CALDWELL, ELIZABETH FRY

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Xerox University Microfilms
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io?n Caldwell, Elizabeth Pry, 1909- 1
Z' The concept of finitude in.
0 3 Renouvi'er. New York, 19^9«»
v ili,2 l8 typewritten leaves0 29cm<
Thesis (PhoDo) - New York Univer­
sity, Graduate School, I9^0o
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THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
LIBRARY OP
HEW YORK UNIVERSITY
DHIVERSITT HEIGHTS
THE CONCERT 01' FlmlTUDE IN ttENOUVIER
ELlLAEETH FRY CalDWELL
A DISSERTATION
IN THE
DERAftTaEiYT OR PHILOSOPHY
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCE
OF
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
JMUar*949.
I
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2
table of .contents
Introductioni iv
Purpose of the study, iv .—its significance; Kenouvier as
link between oames and Kant, iv .—Defects and d ifficu lties /
of Kenouvier, v.—Available m aterial, v i.—Phases of
Renouvier’s philosophy, v ii—middle period most significant,
v iii.
Chapter 1 - Kenouvier ana ivant 1
Nature and extent of Kant’s influence over Kenouvier, 1.— -
Already apparent in early work, 2.—The ding an sich. 3. —
The antinomies, S.—Kenouvier’s view of Kant’s contribu­
tion, 9.—Epistemology key problem of modem philosophy,
10.—Kant’s solution, 11.—Kenouvier’s objections to
Kant. 18.—Results of these objections, 27.— D iffi­
culties of the position, 26.—Problem of Kenouvier’s
debt to Kant, 29.
Chapter 2 - The Mathematical Concept of Finitude 31
Kenouvier’s natural bent for mathematics, 31•—
D ifficulties of a total synthesis, 31.—Doctrine of
Substance, 32.—Law of contradiction, 34*—Daw of
number, 35.—Nature of definition, 35.—Subject and
object, 36.—Appearances are reality, 37.—Reality
is a relation, 38.—Disproof of the possibility of
an infinte number, 39.—Disproof of ding an sich. in
the object, 45.—In the subject, 53.—Results of
disproof of ding an sich.57.
Chapter 3 - Episteraological and Metaphysical Implications of
the ±v^athematicai Concept of Finitude: Law and
Function 61
Does the repudiation of the ding an sich result in
skepticisms? 61.—Kenouvier’s definition of reality,
62.—Definition of truth in terms of law, 63.—
Definition of aithing, 64.—Law as relation, 69.—
Function, 70.—D ifficulties of the position, 74*—Is
law like other relations? 76.—Can tnere be a relation
without terms? 77.—Absence of a principle of individua­
tion in Kenouvier, 79.—D ifficulties of causality on
these premises, 82.—D ifficulties of concept of function
with a doctrine of external relations, 84.—Kenouvier’s
position substantially identical with that of Hume, 88.
'lO \ 0 4 1
Chapter 4 - Epistemological and Metaphysical Implications of the
Mathematical Concept of finitude: The Categories
Definition of category, 90.--List of categories, 91.—Com­
pared with those of Kant, 91.—Tabulation of Categories
and sub-categories, 93.—The categorical proposition, 93.—
Relation, 95*—Number, 97.—Space, 98.—Time, 99.—Quality,
101.—Becoming, 102.—Causality, 102.—Teleology, 103.—
Personality,105.—D ifficulties of the derivation of the
categories, 106.—Possibility of the total synthesis, 112.—
The categories do not apply to the whole, 113.
Chapter 5 - Kenouvier's Value Theory
Based on Kant and Leibniz, 115.—Essentially psychological,
116.—Man as microcosm, 116.—Identical subject-matter of
psychology and logic, 118.—Identity of true and good, 118.
—Divisions of Renouvier's psychology, 121.—Nature of
consciousness, 121.—functions of man are the categories in
action, 124.—Will as fundamental human function, 125.-^
Freedom, 127.—Freedom and certainty, 130,-lPhiJosophy of
history, 134.—Nature of m orality, 133.—The categorical
imperative, 134-—The postulates of practical reason, 137.—
Monaaology, 136.—Problem of the value theory, 145.
Chapter 6 - Renouvier and James
James's personal debt to Renouvier., 146.—Correspondence
with and about him, 149*—Comparison of James and Renouvier,
151.—James and Peirce, 153.—Two major aspects of James's
thought, 154.—Kant the pioneer of pragmatism, 158.— In­
fluence of Kant on Peirce, 159.—Con£>arison of Peirce and
Renouvier, 159.—Relative influence of Peirce and Renouvier
on James, 162.—Relation of Renouvier's position to prag­
matism, I64.—historical significance of Renouvier, 165.
Chapter 7 - The Finite God
Resemblance and difference with Kant. 168.—Phases of
Renouvier's concept of God, 169, 169.—The Last Philosophy,
169.—Middle period important one, 171.—Refutation of
cosmological argument, 171.—James's concept of finite God,
172.—God not a creator, 172.—Gad is a person, 174*—God
is fin ite, 175.—Polytheism, 177.—Logical result of philo­
sophy of finitism , 180.—Last philosophy motivated by dis­
like of Catholicism, 181.—Essential differences between
middle and late period, -182.—Differences between James
and Renouvier, 183.—God in Peirce, 184.—The finite God
in Brightman, 185.—Montague also has a finite God, 186.—
Prometheus, the muthological symbol of the finite God, 187.—
Problems of the fin ite God, 188.
iii.
Chapter 8 - Evaluation 190
C lassification of criticism s of Kenouvier, 190.--
Im possihility of Kantian phenomenalism without dink an
sich. 190.—P ossiility of elim inating noumena in genera}.,
19-4.—logical d ifficu lties of categorical imperative
without ding an sich. 196.— God is not an appearance,
197.—Confusion of in fin ite with infinitesim al, 198.—
Class theory of number, 198.—Cantor and transfinite
numbers, 200.—Infinite d iv isib ility prerequisite to
fin ite division, 202.—Boyle's law, 203.—The ellipse
and the hyperbola, 203.—Significance of the minus sign
in the equation of the hyperbola, 204.—The fin ite-
infinite, 205.—The concrete universal, 206.—D ifficulties
of empirical aesthetics,. 207.—Renouvier has no aesthetics,
209.—Ean as concrete universal, 209.—Jesus, the mytho­
logical symbol of the fin ite-in fin ite or concrete universal
210.—Doctrine cf the T rinity, 212.—Emotional inadequacy
of the fin ite God, 213*—Logical objections to the position
summed up, 214-•
Bibliography 216
THE CONCEPT OF FINITUDE IN RENOUVIER
INTRODUCTION
_ • ^
The purpose of this study is to examine the concept of finitude
in metaphysics, with special reference to the philosophy of Renouvier, and
with major emphasis on the concept of the fin ite ^od. Renouvier*3 entire
logical structure is based upon "the determinate law of number," and a ll
his value theory and concept of God follow from it. although he usee ^ant
as a point of departure, his mature statements of his philosophy is more
than Neo-Kantianism. The exposition, commencing with the debt to Kant and
the elucidation of the law of number, w ill place main emphasis on value
theory and the fin ite God. Some criticism of finitude, especially in value
theory and religion, w ill then be attempted.
The significance of this study is mainly h isto rical, since it
consists in the focusing of attention upon a hitherto neglected link in
the development of thought. In a sense, Renouvier, although practically
unknown in th is country, is the most important of the successors of % t , .
since he is indispensable to the line of force connecting Kant with
pragmatism. Ag w ill be indicated in the pages that follow, Kant can with
great justice be called the father of pragmatism, although there is an
evident gap between his thought and that, for instance, of James. The
connection is there, but, without Renouvier, it is rather a tantalizing
V
suggestion that an explicit development. SShen, however, we insert into
the historical chain the system of Renouvier, avowedly stemming from Kant
and avowedly influencing James, the nature of the transition becomes evi­
dent and the origin of pragmatism in Kant unquestionable.
This ju stifies the study of Renouvier despite the many defects
which even a cursory examination of his system reveals. Even though his
contribution had to be reworked by James in order to become philosophically
viable, it remains both interesting and valuable as a study of the process
of the struggle of the in tellect in freeing itse lf from a priorism into
pragmatism. As a pioneer effort to develop the notions of voluntarism, of
freedom, of a synthetic and dynamic experience freed from the trammels of
traditional concepts, the system must be of lasting interest and significance
It bears, however,, the marks of the struggle. It is verbose, disproportion
ed, ponderous, obscure, and, above a ll, abstract. Concrete illu stratio n s to
clarify the concepts must inevitably be conjectures, since, in the entire
lengthy and involved exposition, not a single one is given. In attempting
to ascertain the meaning in terms of every day objects and notions, one
can only proceed by what seems to be reasonable inference that, translated
into terms of men and things, the sonorous abstractions must mean something
like th is. In attempting this sort of analysis, the work of «>ames has
proved an invaluable guide, offering, as i t does, a much simpler and clearer
version of a comparable point of view. It remains true, however, that the
commentator can only hope not to have done undue violence to the text with
the attempted glosses upon it. Again the historical development must be
relied upon heavily as a clue in the interpretation of obscure passages,
and we must look first back to Kant and then ahead to James in order to ob­
tain a notion of the shade of meaning intended.
Very few commentaries upon •Kenouvier exist, and none in English.
✓
Gabriel Seailles has w ritten, in La Philosophie de Charles Renouvier, a
readable, but lamentably uncritical, resume of the development of Renouvier's
thought, ^he main merit of this work lies in the fact that it is a faith­
ful and admiring epitome of the position, divested of the difficulties of
Renouriver's crabbed and d ifficu lt style. Hamelin's Le aysteme de kenouvier.
which is a series of lectures which he delivered on Kenouvier at the t>or-
bonne, is again illum inating by virtue of its sim plification of the m aterial,
but is also rather a summary that an interpretation or critique, oince
neither these yolumes nor Renouriver's om writings have been translated,
with the exception of a brief selection from the beginning of the first
Essai by Benjamin Rand for his volume, Modern Classical Philosophers•
translations appearing in the text are my own. Owing to the involved style
and the obscurity of the tex t, idiometie English has in every case been
sacrificed to fidelity to the original. It has / been said that there are
two ways to translate: word for word and sense for sense. xhe latter makes
for the mare literary and readable resu lts, but, in many passages, a
vii
translation sense for sense ran the risk of being an interpretation and
was, accordingly, rejected.
The philisophy of Renouvier passed through three well-defined
phases, designated by Seailles and Hamelin the F irst Philosophy, the Second
Philosophy, and the Last Philosophy. Since these three positions are not
only disparate, but, in important respects, irreconcilable, it is impossible
to synthesize them into one self-consistent whole. The F irst Philosophy
was influenced mainly by Descartes, whose mathematical method appealed to
Renouvier, but there were also Kantian elements in it. In this phase, the
creative philosophy is not yet full-fledgea and one is frequently reminded
of the early, so-called Socratic dialogues of Plato, in which the master is
much, in evidence and the flights of independent thought are brief and
tentative. Essentially, it is an irrational philosophy in which contra­
diction is taken to be the basic characteristic of reality . The validity
of the law of contradiction is denied, and philosophy regarded as one colos­
sal antimony. The works of this period, from 1832 to 1854, are, apart
from the exposition of the philosophy of contradiction, devoted to the
history of philosophy and to the analysis tf the contribution of Descrates,
and not particularly original.
The great period of the Second Philosophy extends from 1854 to 1897
and represents the complete and definite development of the two concepts of
finitism and freedom into a genuine philosophical system,culminating in the