The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration

248 Pages·1997·0.84 MB·english

by  Robert Axelrod

THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION
princeton studies in complexity
editors
Philip W. Anderson (Princeton University)
Joshua M. Epstein (The Brookings Institution)
Duncan K. Foley (Barnard College)
Simon A. Levin (Princeton University)
Gottfried Mayer-Kress (University of Illinois)
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THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION
A G E N T- B A S E D M O D E L S O F
C O M P E T I T I O N A N D
C O L L A B O R AT I O N
Robert Axelrod
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY
Copyright(cid:1) 1997 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,
Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Chichester,
West Sussex
All Rights Reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Axelrod, Robert M.
The complexity of cooperation:agent-based models of competition
and collaboration / Robert Axelrod.
p. cm. — (Princeton studies in complexity.)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-691-01568-6 (cloth:alk. paper). — ISBN 0-691-01567-8
(pbk.:alk. paper)
1. Cooperativeness. 2. Competition. 3. Conflict management.
4. Adaptability (Psychology) 5. Adjustment (Psychology)
6. Computational complexity. 7. Social systems—Computer
simulation. I. Title. II. Series.
HM131.A894 1997
302(cid:1).14—dc21 97-1107 CIP
This book has been composed in Sabon
Princeton University Press books are printed
on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines
for permanence and durability of the Committee
on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity
of the Council on Library Resources
Printed in the United States of America by Princeton Academic Press
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
(Pbk.)
To Amy, Lily, and Vera
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Contents
List of Tables and Figures ix
Preface xi
Introduction 3
1. Evolving New Strategies 10
2. Coping with Noise 30
3. Promoting Norms 40
4. Choosing Sides 69
5. Setting Standards 95
6. Building New Political Actors 121
7. Disseminating Culture 145
Appendixes
A. Replication of Agent-Based Models 181
B. Resources for Agent-Based Modeling 206
Index 223
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Tables and Figures
Tables
1-1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 16
1-2 The Basic Simulation 19
3-1 Example of Payoffs in the Norms Game 49
4-1 The Two Configurations Predicted for the Second
World War in Europe 85
5-1 The Two Nash Equilibrium Configurations 113
5-2 Analysis of Variation in Rivalry Parameters around the
Base Case 114
5-3 Extended Analysis of Variation in Rivalry Parameters 115
6-1 Commitments Forming a Proximity Pattern 136
6-2 Commitments Forming Pattern of Two Clusters 136
6-3 Development of Clusters of Commitments 137
7-1 A Typical Initial Set of Cultures 155
7-2 Average Number of Stable Regions 160
7-3 An Illustration of Social Influence between Dialects 164
A-1 Average Number of Stable Regions 191
A-2 Axelrod’s Work Log 199
A-3 Axtell’s Work Log 200
Figures
1-1 Prisoner’s Dilemma in an Evolving Environment 23
2-1 Performance as a Function of Noise 36
2-2 Ecological Simulation 37
3-1 Norms Game 49
3-2 Norms Game Dynamics 51
3-3 Metanorms Game 53
3-4 Metanorms Game Dynamics 54
4-1 A Landscape with Two Local Optima 77
6-1 Wealth of Each Actor over 1,000 Years (Population 1) 132
6-2 Fights and Population Wealth in Population 1 133
6-3 Wealth of Each Actor over 1,000 Years (Population 2) 134