The Causes Of The Second World War

335 Pages·1997·9.323 MB·English

by  Andrew J. Crozier

The Causes of the Second World War
History of the Contemporary World
Consultant Editors: Dr Peter Catterall &
Professor Lawrence Freedman
This series aims to provide students of contemporary history,
politics and international relations with concise, critical overviews of
the major themes and the development of key geographical regions
that have dominated discussion of world events in the twentieth
century. The emphasis in the regional histories will be on the period
since the Second World War, but coverage will extend to the earlier
twentieth century wherever necessary. The books will assume little
or no prior knowledge of the subject, and are intended to be used by
students as their first point of entry into a wide range of topics in
contemporary international history.
Published
The Causes of the Second World War
AndrewJ. Crozier
Forthcoming
South Africa in the Twentieth Century: From Empire to Nation
James Barber
The West and the Third World
D. K. Fieldhouse
Decolonization and its Impact
Martin Shipway
The Communist Movement since 1945
Willie Thompson
T h e C auses o f th e S eco n d
W o rld W ar
Andrew J. Crozier
BLACKWELL
P u blis hers
Copyright © Andrew J. Crozier, 1997
The right of Andrew J. Crozier to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 1997
Reprinted 1998
Blackwell Publishers Ltd
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UK
Blackwell Publishers Inc.
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in~Publication Data
Crozier, Andrew J.
The causes of the Second World War/Andrew J. Crozier
Including bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-631-17128-2 (alk. paper).—ISBN 0-631-18601-8 (pbk.: alk.
paper)
1. World War, 1939-1945—Causes. I. Title
D741.C77 1997
940.53T 1—dc20 96-39011
CIP
Typeset in 10 on 11.5pt Bembo
at The Spartan Press Ltd,
Lymington, Hants
Printed in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall
This book is printed on acid-free paper
Contents
Consultant Editor’s Preface vii
Preface and Acknowledgements ix
Maps xiii
Introduction 1
The Rise of Germany and Japan and the Decline of Britain 3
The Versailles System and the Powers 8
Hitler’s Foreign Policy 10
Appeasement 11
The Far Eastern Crisis 12
Britain’s International Commitments during the Inter-War Years
and their Implications for World War 13
1 The Powers in 1919 and After 17
The Victors 18
The Vanquished 28
The Ideological Divide 31
2 The Making of the Inter-War World, 1919-1923 37
The Versailles System 37
The Washington System 46
3 The Failed Peace, 1919-1933 49
Reparations 50
The Genoa Conference and the T reaty of Rapallo 54
The Occupation of the Ruhr 56
Locarno and the Illusion of Peace 62
France and European Union 68
The End of Reparations 69
Complications in the Far East 71
VI CONTENTS
4 The Challenge of Fascism and the Democratic Response 75
Italian Fascism 76
National Socialism 80
The Democratic Response 85
The Attitude of the United States 95
5 The International System Challenged, 1933-1936 97
German Rearmament and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland 100
The Italian Invasion of Abyssinia 105
The Reaction of Britain and France 110
6 The Deepening Crisis, 1936-1938 120
The Spanish Civil War and increasing Italo-German Solidarity 120
British Attempts to Secure a General Settlement 126
The Anschluß and the Munich Crisis 139
7 The Outbreak ofWar in Europe 146
Britain, Germany and September 1939 146
The Collapse of W estem Europe and the Isolation of Britain 159
The United States and the War 163
Barbarossa 169
The Atlantic War 172
8 Crisis in the Far East 176
Japan in the 1920s 176
The Manchurian Incident 187
The International Reaction 191
The Renewal of the Sino-Japanese Conflict 193
9 From War to World War 206
Japan and the Axis 206
Crisis in Europe and its Impact on the Far East 210
Into the Abyss of World War 215
10 Interpretation and the Changing View 226
The European Axis 227
The European Democracies 233
The Peripheral Powers and Japan 250
Conclusion 260
Appendix 1 Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and Finance
Ministers, 1918-1941 263
Appendix 2 Chronology of Events 269
Notes 277
Bibliography 304
Index 307
Consultant Editor’s Preface
The Second World War was the greatest conflict in history. Total casualties
will never be known, but an estimate of some 50 million, over ten million in
the Soviet Union alone, would not be unreasonable. It was a war which
unleashed unprecedented atrocities, its effect on thrones may have been less
marked and direct than that of 1914—18, though a number of monarchies
were extinguished in the communist dominance of Eastern Europe that
swiftly followed. Nor did it drastically reshape the map of the world,
although much redrawing has come in its wake; two long-term effects were
the gradual integration ofW estem Europe and the process of decolonization.
To some extent this demonstrated a reworking of mental maps in its
aftermath; the Federal Republic that emerged in West Germany, for instance,
no longer saw itself as the dominant factor in a now divided Mitteleuropa, but
as part ofW estem Europe.
The emergence ofa united Germany in 1870-71 had earlier undermined the
delicate power equilibrium in Europe. Both World Wars were, as Andrew
Crozier shows, at bottom Anglo-German wars to either maintain or
challenge that equilibrium; wars which ended, in 1945, with its replacement
by an entirely new balance of power for the ensuing fifty years, that between
the USA and the Soviet Union. This was arguably the main effect of the
Second World War, though it was not the object envisaged by any of the
protagonists, still less by Roosevelt or Stalin, in September 1939.
The European conflict that then began was, however, only one of several
that eventually became intertwined in the phenomenon known to history as
the Second World War. One of the principal achievements of this book is the
successful interweaving of these tensions and conflicts. It is the first book of
its kind to try and fully integrate events in the Far East and in Europe. In the
process Andrew Crozier shows how events elsewhere impacted upon
policymaking in particular theatres, particularly for Britain with its global
interests. Indeed, it is one of the principal theses of the book that it was
because of the global interests that Britain was seeking to defend, that the
European war that began against Germany in 1939 became a global war by
the end of 1941. The very real and sometimes underestimated problems of
viii CONSULTANT EDITOR’S PREFACE
British policymakers in the era of appeasement thus play an important part in
his story.
But they are by no means the whole story. The canvas painted on here is
broad, involving detailed analysis of the policymaking processes in their
domestic contexts of all the main combatant powers. In doing so, Andrew
Crozier provides a clear and in-depth assessment of the causes that led to the
series of conflagrations that became the Second World War.
This book marks the first in a new series examining the History of the
Contemporary World. The aim of this series is, using the latest published
research, to provide new, detailed and comprehensive guides to major events
in recent history. The result is a key new textbook analysis which offers fresh
new insights into perennial problems; such as the weaknesses of the Versailles
system, the nature of Hitler’s foreign policy, the character of appeasement,
the extent of American isolationism or the drive behindjapanese expansion­
ism.
Peter Catterall
Institute of Contemporary British History
Preface and Acknowledgements
The events relating to the outbreak of the several wars in Europe and Asia
that culminated in 1941 in a war of truly global dimensions are not easily
narrated and analysed within a single volume. Quite apart from the complex
nature of the subject, the limitations of space in a book intended for both
undergraduate and sixth form audiences make the author’s task even more
awesome. One very clear problem that presents itself at the outset relates to
the structure that should be imposed on a book of this nature: should the
author attempt an integrated, chronological narrative in which the events in
both Europe and Asia are treated side by side, as, arguably, they would have
appeared to contemporary foreign ministers and diplomats; or should the
author adopt a geographical framework in which the deep origins of the
European and Far Eastern Wars are treated as distinct series of events until
they merged between September 1940 and December 1941 ? There is no easy
answer to this dilemma. The writer has, however, after considerable
thought, and despite what some may argue is the essential conventionality of
the approach, elected to employ the geographical method.
There are a number of reasons for this. First, this book is intended as a
simple introduction to the subject and not as a major work of scholarly
exegesis. In this connection, it is the simplicity of the geographical approach
that proves attractive. To blend the events that occurred in Europe and the
Far East too intimately in too limited a space might make an already complex
story even more convoluted, resulting in a situation in which the beginner in
the subject might well easily become confused. Secondly, there are practical
considerations to be borne in mind. As this book is certainly aimed in part at a
sixth form audience, it should be constructed in such a way as to make it
relevant to what will be the overriding concern of such a readership, namely,
the A Level Examination. The author has had considerable examining
experience with three A Level Boards and has some idea of the range and
capabilities ofthe average candidate and the sort of question with which he or
she will be confronted. Because A Level candidates still sit papers on variants
of British and European History, questions relating to die origins of the
Second World War will inevitably focus on Europe and candidates will
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
X
respond appropriately. This book should cater for that. In view, however, of
Japan’s rise to prominence in the twentieth century, sixth formers and
undergraduates should undoubtedly learn more about her past and that of the
Far East in general. It is also unquestionable that there is a pressing need for
British youth and the public at large to understand more about the interaction
between Europe and Asia in the twentieth century. I would hope, therefore,
that this volume will contribute to such an understanding and that in due
course A Level syllabi and examinations will reflect the need for it.
There are, though, other considerations. It has never been established that
extensive reference to Far Eastern factors is a categorical imperative in respect
of an accurate analysis of the origins of the Second World War in Europe. On
the contrary, one of the most distinguished modem international historians.
Professor Akira Iriye, has unequivocally stated that ‘it is quite possible to
discuss the origins of the European war without paying much attention to
Asian factors . . Z1. It would, however, be wrong to ignore Far Eastern
events altogether with regard to the origins of the European war and they will
be referred to as necessary in the sections of the book principally devoted to
the breakdown of the Versailles System. They will, of course, be considered at
greater length in the sections dealing with the origins of the War in the Far
East and Pacific.
While objection to a geographical structure might be made on the grounds
that it lends an artificial quality to the history of the period, in that events will
not be presented in the integrated way they were to contemporary policy­
makers, it can equally be contended that too rigorous a chronological
approach might give rise to the impression that the dangers in the Far East
represented from the point of view of European powers a menace equal to
those arising in the continent of Europe itself. This too would represent a
misleading and artificial version of history. As one eminent student ofBritish
foreign policy in the twentieth century has pointed out:
. . . there is no need to strain too much to view the European and Asian crises in
their precise relation to each other. Almost certainly the British Government’s
policies towards Europe would have been what they were even if the Japanese
had got on with their silk-worming, instead of building aircraft-carriers.
Nothing exemplifies this more strikingly than the fret that Alexander Cadogan,
as Permanent Head of the Foreign Office, was only dimly aware of the Tientsin
crisis of June 1939 — certainly the relevant papers were not put on his desk for
attention.2
Finally, the geographical structure is better suited to the main thrust of the
argument that will be deployed in this book. It will be argued that the collapse
of the Versailles System in Europe became inevitable once Germany was
dominated by a government whose foreign policy was a phased programme
of almost limidess expansion. This certainly meant that war would at least
break out in Europe at some point; that such a war would become a truly
global conflict was implicit in the decision of the British government to resist
Germany’s further advance in 1939. Britain at this time was still the major
world power with interests in the Mediterranean, Near East, Africa and Asia;
her ally, France, had a similar, if lesser range of world interests. The