The Arsenal Ship Acquisition Process Experience : Contrasting and Common title: Impressions From the Contractor Teams and Joint Program Office Leonard, Robert S.; Drezner, Jeffrey A.; author: Sommer, Geoffrey publisher: RAND isbn10 | asin: 0833026909 print isbn13: 9780833026903 ebook isbn13: 9780585243498 language: English United States.--Navy--Procurement, United States.--Navy--Weapons systems--Costs, subject Warships--United States--Design and construction, Shipbuilding--United States. publication date: 1999 lcc: VC263.L42 1999eb ddc: 359.6/212/0973 United States.--Navy--Procurement, United States.--Navy--Weapons systems--Costs, subject: Warships--United States--Design and construction, Shipbuilding--United States. Page i The Arsenal Ship Acquisition Process Experience Contrasting and Common Impressions from the Contractor Teams and Joint Program Office Robert S. Leonard Jeffery A. Drezner Geoffrey Sommer Prepared for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency National Defense Research Institute Approved for public release; distribution unlimited Page ii The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. DASW01-95-C-0059. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Leonard, Robert S. the arsenal ship acquisition proscess experience : contrasting and common impressions from the contractor and joint program office / Robert S. Leonard, Jeffery A. Drezner, Geoffrey Sommer. p. cm. "prepared for the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) by RAND's National Security Research Division" "MR-1030-DARPA." Includes bibliographical references (p. ). ISBN 0-8330-2690-9 1. United States. NavyProcurement. 2. United States. Navy Weapons systemsCosts. 3. WarshipsUnited StatesDesign and construction. 4. ShipbuildingUnited States. I. Drezner, Jeffrey A. II. Sommer, Geoffrey, 1957- . III. United States. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. IV. National Defense Research Institute (U.S.), V. Title. VC263.L42 1999 359.6' 212 ' 0973dc21 98-52862 CIP Page iii Preface Assimilating the experiences of acquisition programs is an important element of process improvement. What is learned from programs using nontraditional acquisition strategies is especially important. One such program was the Arsenal Ship, a joint DARPA/Navy program managed by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency). The objective of this research is to understand the Arsenal Ship program management experience and to distill lessons from it in order to improve the management of similar innovative acquisition programs, and to disseminate those lessons to the broader acquisition community. This report should interest DoD officials concerned with weapon system acquisition processes. This study covers the duration of the Arsenal Ship program, from March 1996 through December 1997. The plans for the entire program, the events of the first two acquisition phases, and the circumstances leading to the program's cancellation near the end of Phase II are documented. This research was sponsored by the Arsenal Ship Joint Program Office in DARPA. It was conducted by the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies. Page v Contents Preface iii Figures ix Tables xi Summary xiii Acknowledgments xxiii Acronyms xxv Chapter One 1 Introduction Motivation Behind the Arsenal Ship Concept and 2 Program Approach Research Approach and Objectives 3 Organization of This Report 4 Chapter Two 7 Arsenal Ship Program Overview Program Definition 7 Phase I Solicitation and Description 8 Phase II Solicitation and Description 12 Phase III Solicitation and Description 15 The Balance of the Program Plan 16 Program Funding 17 Chapter Three 23 Aresenal Ship Acquistion Process Weapon System Specification 24 Page vi Contractor Design Responsibility 25 Small Joint Program Office 26 Unit Sailaway Price, Nonrecurring Funding, and Small 28 Crew Integrated Product and Process Teams 30 Section 845 Other Transactions Authority 31 Why Not an Advanced Concept Technology 33 Demonstrator? Chapter Four 35 A Contrast of Acquisition Approaches The Traditional Navy Process 35 Arsenal Ship Process Differences 37 Schedule Comparison to the DDG 51 Program 38 Chapter Five 41 Acquisition Program and Process Impressions Interviews 41 Organization of Material 42 Section 845 OTA and Acquisition Waivers 44 Phase I 45 Phase II 45 Performance Requirements and Contractor Design 46 Responsibility Phase I 46 Phase II 47 Program Structure: Development Phases Funding and 49 Schedule Phase I 49 Phase II 50 Unit Sailaway Price 51 Phase I 51 Phase II 51 Contractor Teaming and Business Arrangements 53 Phase I 53 Phase II 53 Interactions Between the Contractor Teams, ASJPO, and 55 Other Government Offices Phase I 55 Phase II 57 Page vii Overall Impressions 58 Phase I 58 Phase II 58 Chapter Six 61 Program Issues Resulting from the Acquisition Process MK 41 VLS 62 Interactions with the NSWC Labs and Navy PARMS 64 NSWC Labs 64 Navy PARMs 66 Following the "Program Of Record" 68 Lockheed Martin's Proposed Merger with Northrop 71 Grumman Insufficient Developmental Funding 72 Irrevocable Offer and Fixed Priced Development 74 Irrevocable Offer 74 Fixed Price Development 75 Conversion of the Demonstrator 76 Chapter Seven 79 Observations and Conclusions The Underfunding Tale 80 Underfunded from the Beginning 80 Why No One Made an Issue of It 81
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