The Argument from Hallucination

364 Pages·2016·2.26 MB·French

by  Roberta Locatelli

Relationalism in the Face of Hallucinations
Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne/University of Warwick

Thèse pour l’obtention du grade de docteur de l’université Paris 1
et de l’université de Warwick

présentée et soutenue publiquement par
Roberta Locatelli

RELATIONALISM IN THE FACE OF
HALLUCINATIONS

LE RELATIONNALISME FACE AUX
HALLUCINATIONS

Directeurs de Thèse :

Maximilian Kistler, Professeur à l'UFR de philosophie,
université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, IHPST,

Matthew Soteriou, Professeur à l’université de Warwick, Departement of
Philosophy
(maintenant muté a King’s College London)

Naomi Eilan, Professeur à l’université de Warwick, Department of
Philosophy

Composition du jury:

Fabian Dorsch (université de Fribourg, Suisse), Professeur
Jérôme Dokic (EHESS), Directeur d’Etudes
Matthew Nudds (university of Warwick), Professeur
Mark Kalderon (University College London), Professeur
Maximilian Kistler (université Paris 1), Professeur

Date de soutenance : 15 décembre 2016
1
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations

Content
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................... v
Declaration ................................................................................................ vi
Abstract .................................................................................................... vii

Introduction .................................................................................................. 1
Chapter 1: The Relational View of Perception........................................ 12
1.1 Trivial and Not So Trivial Claims about Experiences ................. 13
1.2 How Experience Strikes Us ........................................................ 21
1.3 Relational Views of Phenomenal Character ................................ 31
1.4 Open Questions and Terminological Distinctions ....................... 33
1.5 A Problematic Reasoning ........................................................... 39
1.6 The Relationalist’s Commitment to Disjunctivism ..................... 43
1.7 Sense-datum Theories, Representationalism, Qualia Theories .... 46
1.8 Conclusions ............................................................................... 51

Chapter 2: The Argument from Hallucination ....................................... 52
i
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations

2.1 The Base Case: Conflicting Appearances, Illusions and
Hallucinations .................................................................................. 55
2.1.1 Conflicting appearances and Paradigmatic Looks ............. 55
2.1.2 Optical Illusions and the Phenomenal Principle ................ 62
2.1.3 Hallucinations ..................................................................... 69
2.2. The Spreading Step ................................................................... 70
2.3 The Indistinguishability Principle ............................................... 75
2.4 Conclusions ............................................................................... 83

Chapter 3: How to Be Superficial ............................................................. 86
3.1 The Purported Infallibility of Introspection ................................ 88
3.2 Superficial Properties ................................................................. 96
3.3 Observational Properties .......................................................... 101
3.4 The Superficiality Constraint ................................................... 107
3.5 Impersonal Indiscriminability................................................... 112
3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................... 124

Chapter 4: Hallucinating, for Real ......................................................... 127
4.1 Instinguishable from What? ........................................................ 128
ii
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations

4.2 Hallucination: A Fuzzy Notion ................................................... 135
4.3 What Counts as Impersonally Indistinguishable from Perception 139
4.4 The Problem of Hallucination is Not a Phenomenological Problem
........................................................................................................ 145
4.5 Conclusions................................................................................ 150

Chapter 5: Philosopher’s Hallucinations ............................................... 152
5.1 A Metaphysical Possibility ......................................................... 154
5.2 Experiential Naturalism .............................................................. 162
5.3 Local Supervenience .................................................................. 167
5.4 Is there Empirical Support for Local Supervenience? ................. 179
5.5 The Causal Argument from Hallucination .................................. 185
5.6 Causation and Constitution ......................................................... 196
5.7 Where Does This Leave Us? ...................................................... 214
5.8 Conclusions................................................................................ 222

Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations ............................................... 224
6.1. An Invalid Argument? ............................................................... 226
6.2 The Reversed Causal Argument ................................................. 232
iii
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations

6.3 Attempts to Avoid the Screening Off Problem ............................ 240
6.4 The Negative Account of IIIHs................................................... 248
6.5 Objections and Clarifications ..................................................... 251
6.5.1 The Scope of the Negative Account .................................. 251
6.5.2 The Alleged Need for a Positive Account .......................... 254
6.5.3 Very Bad Cases and Unsophisticated Hallucinators ........ 257
6.6 The Phenomenal Character as a Ghost ........................................ 264
6.7 Introspecting .............................................................................. 275
6.8 Response to Critics and How to Preserve Superficiality .............. 280
6.9 Conclusions................................................................................ 285

Bibliography ............................................................................................. 293

Résumé de Thèse en Français………………………………………….305
iv
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to my supervisor Matthew Soteriou for his invaluable help and
advice throughout the writing of this thesis. I can’t imagine accomplishing this
work without his extremely generous and insightful guidance, challenging and
encouraging at once. Also thanks to my supervisor from Paris 1, Maximilian
Kiestler, who made the co-tutelle between Paris 1 and Warwick possible, and to
Naomi Eilan, who masterminded the delicate and laborious process of setting up
the co-tutelle in the initial and final stages, and whose warm welcome at
Warwick made me feel at home from day one.
I benefitted immensely from supervisions with Mike Martin and Paul
Snowdon during my research stay at the University of London (Institute of
Philosophy) before I enrolled at Warwick. Mike continued reading some of
my work afterwards, always providing sharp and penetrating comments.
I am grateful to Hemdat Lerman, who, with her astonishing eye for detail,
took the time to read and thoroughly discuss earlier drafts of some chapters; and
to Ivan Ivanov, for reading and commenting on some chapter drafts, and for
countless philosophical discussions. Joe Cunningham, Anna Savva Grinevich,
Nicole Osborne, Jack Shardlow, and Barnaby Walker read and commented on
chapters or sections of this thesis, and provided useful stylistic advice, which
helped to make this thesis a more pleasant read. The responsibility for any
inaccuracies or stylistic errors remaining herein is my own.
Thanks also to Bill Brewer, Wesley Chai, Tony Cheng, Tom Crowther, Joe
Cunningham, Jérôme Dokic, Juan Camilo Espejo-Serna, Craig French, Christoph
v
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations

Hoerl, Guy Longworth, Sofia Miguens, Matthew Nudds, Michele Ombrato,
Sebastian Sanhueza, Susanna Schellenberg, Irina Schumski, Maarten
Steenhagen, Charles Travis, Daniel Vanello, Alberto Voltolini, Barnaby Walker,
Sander Werkhoven, Keith Wilson, and Hong Yu Wong for their helpful
discussions, suggestions, and support along the way.
I would also like to express my gratitude to Paolo Spinicci and Clotilde
Calabi, from the University of Milan, who initiated me to the delights and pains
of the philosophy of perception, and to Jocelyn Benoist, who supported me in
many ways when he was my supervisor at Paris 1, before I crossed the English
Channel. Finally, thanks to Matteo Fiorillo for his loving patience, and to my
parents, for their abiding support.

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of original research carried
out by me while in candidature for a doctoral degree at the University of
Warwick and at the University of Paris 1 in the context of a cotutelle
agreement; that I am the sole author and researcher and that the work
presented herein is entirely my own; that no portion has been submitted for a
degree or qualification at this or any another university; and that all source
materials have been clearly and adequately acknowledged and cited.
vi
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations

Abstract
Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of perception is
constituted by the obtaining of a non-representational psychological relation to
mind-independent objects. Although relationalism provides what seems to be
the most straightforward and intuitive account of how experience strikes us
introspectively, it is very often believed that the argument from hallucination
shows that the view is untenable. The aim of this thesis is to defend
relationalism against the argument from hallucination. The argument claims
that the phenomenal character of hallucination and perception deserves the
same account, and that relationalism cannot be true for hallucinations,
therefore relationalism must be rejected. This argument relies on the
Indistinguishability Principle (IND), the claim that two experiences that are
introspectively indistinguishable from each other have the same phenomenal
character. Before assessing the plausibility of this principle, I first consider
and dismiss versions of the argument which wouldn’t depend on IND.
Although widely accepted, no satisfactory support for IND has been
presented yet. In this thesis I argue that defending IND requires that we
understand the notion of ‘indiscriminability’ employed in IND in an
impersonal sense. I then identify what underwrites IND: the intuition that, in
virtue of its superficiality, the nature of a phenomenal character must be
accessible through introspection, together with the claim that it is not possible
to deny IND without denying the superficiality of phenomenal characters too.
I argue that the relationalist can deny IND while preserving the
superficiality of phenomenal characters. This can be done by adopting a
negative view of hallucination and an account of introspection whereby the
phenomenal character doesn’t exist independently of one’s introspective
awareness of it and where having introspective access to our experience
depends on our perceptual access to the world.
vii
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations

Resumé

Le relationnalisme affirme que le caractère phénoménal de la
perception est en partie constitué par les objets que l’on voit. Malgré son
attrait intuitif, il est souvent rejeté en vertu de l'argument de l'hallucination.
L'objectif de cette thèse est de défendre le relationnalisme. L'argument fait
valoir que, puisque le relationnalisme ne peut être vrai pour les hallucinations,
il doit forcément être faux pour les perceptions aussi. En cela, l'argument
repose sur le principe de l’indiscernabilité (IND), affirmant que deux
expériences qui sont introspectivement indiscernables les unes des autres ont
le même caractère phénoménal. Je considère et rejette les autres versions de
l'argument qui ne reposent pas sur l'IND.
Bien que largement accepté, aucun support satisfaisant pour l'IND n'a
encore été présenté. Dans cette thèse, je soutiens que la défense de l'IND
requiert que l’on entende la notion d’indiscernabilité employée dans l'IND en
un sens impersonnel. Ensuite, j’identifie ce qui motive l'IND : l'intuition que,
en vertu de sa superficialité, la nature d'un caractère phénoménal doit être
accessible par l'introspection, de concert avec l’idée qu’il est impossible de
nier l'IND sans nier par là même la superficialité des caractères phénoménaux.
Je soutiens que le relationnaliste peut nier l'IND tout en préservant la
superficialité des caractères phénoménaux en adoptant une thèse négative de
l'hallucination et en reconsidérant la nature de la relation entre le caractère
phénoménal d’une expérience et l’accès introspectif qu'il peut y avoir.

viii
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations

Keywords:

Perception, Hallucination, Illusion, Disjunctivism, Naïve Realism,
Relationalism, Phenomenal Character, Introspection, Sense-data,
Representationalism, Philosophy of Mind, Psychopathology of Hallucinations,
Causal Argument from Hallucination, Local Supervenience, Superficial
Properties, Observational properties, Indistiguishability.

Mots Clés :

Perception, hallucination, illusion, disjonctivisme, réalisme naïf,
relationnalisme, caractère phénoménal, introspection, sense-data, philosophie
de l’esprit, indiscernabilité, representationnalisme, psychopathologies des
hallucinations, argument casuel de l’hallucination, survenance locale,
superficialité, propriétés observationnelles.

Ecole Doctorale de philosophie (ED 280) – IHPST (Institut d’histoire et de
philosophie des sciences et des techniques) UMR85590

Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick

ix