Synthesis and Intentional Objectivity: On Kant and Husserl PDF
Preview Synthesis and Intentional Objectivity: On Kant and Husserl
SYNTHESIS AND INTENTIONAL OBJECTIVITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHENOMENOLOGY IN COOPERATION WITH THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGY Volume 33 Editor: lohn Drummond, Mount Saint Mary's College Editorial Board: Elizabeth A. Behnke David Carr, Emory University Stephen Crowell, Rice University Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University l. Claude Evans, Washington University lose Huertas-lourda, Wilfrid Laurier University loseph l. Kockelmans, The Pennsylvania State University William R. McKenna, Miami University Algis Mickunas, Ohio University l. N. Mohanty, Temple University Tom Nenon, The University of Memphis Thomas M. Seebohm, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz Elisabeth Ströker, Philosophisches Seminarium der Universität Köln Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University Scope The purpose of this series is to foster the development of phenomenological philosophy through creative research. Contemporary issues in philosophy, other disciplines and in cuIture generally, offer opportunities for the application of phenomenological methods that call for creative responses. Although the work of several generations of thinkers has provided phenomenology with many results with which to approach these challenges, a truly successful response to them will require building on this work with new analyses and methodological innovations. SYNTHESIS AND INTENTIONAL OBJECTIVITY ON KANT AND HUSSERL by NATHAN ROTENSTREICHt The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V. A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-90-481-4997-1 ISBN 978-94-015-8992-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-8992-5 Printed on acid-free paper All Rights Reserved Cl 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1998. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1998 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. TABLE OF CONTENTS Author's Note vii Introduction 1 Chapter I: Sensuality and Ideation 3 Chapter 11: Conditions and Foundations 25 Chapter ill: From Ideation to Constitution 41 Chapter IV: Fundamental Data and Their Exposition 59 Chapter V: From Exposition to Phenomenological Insight 81 Chapter VI: The Beginning and the Goal 101 Chapter VII: Science and Philosophy 117 Postscript 129 Index 131 Author's Note The analysis presented here is concerned with some major works by Kant and Husserl. The theme of the analysis is the variations on the position and essence of intuition - Anschauung. This theme has central significance in Kant's system because of his conception of the structure of knowledge as a synthesis of intuition and reason or understanding. It has central importance in Husserl's system because of the discernment of data through the medium of intuition. The topic calls attention to the similarities and differences between the two systems. We must make a point about terminology: Sinnlichkeit is translated both as sensuality and as sensibility. Both these terms are employed in this book because both are present in the literature in English. The frequent reference to the term Anschauung is caused by the fact that the term intuition has two meanings: immediate non-discursive knowledge and seeing. The term Anschauung refers primarily to seeing. This nominal aspect is significant for the interpretation of the two systems. The book tries to present a detailed analysis of the respective texts. This analysis has to be the basis for arriving at some systematic conclusions. Sometimes the original version of the quotations follows the reference to the English translation of the texts. This is done in order to preserve the nuances ofthe quotations for the reader. Parts of the book, which have been published before, have been rewritten. I wish to express my gratitude to the staff of Kluwer Academic Publishers for bringing this volume to press. In particular, I am indebted to Ms. Maja de Keijzer for all her help since the initial submission of the manuscript. I thank Mr. Sam Friedman for his work in editing the book. I am grateful to Ms. Naomi Gal who managed, early on, to transform my notes into a legible manuscript. With exemplary care to detail, Mrs. Esther Herskovics prepared a final camera-ready version of this manuscript. Last, my thanks to my colleague, Hayim Goldgraber, who contributed in innumerable ways to this project. Nathan Rotenstreich Jerusalem, 1992 viii Postscript: Professor Nathan Rotenstreich passed away in Oetober 1993. The rnanuseript of this book was left in his estate, fully prepared for publieation. We wish to thank again Kluwer Academic Publishers and the Editors of the Series on Phenomenology for their eontinuous interest and goodwill whieh enabled us to bring this book to print. The Rotenstreich Foundation Jerusalem, 1997 INTRODUCTION We shall be concemed in the following pages with some issues common to the systems of both Kant and Husserl. Given the structured nature of philosophical systems, however, the topics cannot be isolated from the systems in which they function, imbuing them in each case with a specific direction. An examination of the basic concept of Anschauung will indicate the difference between the two systems. To be sure, Anschauung points in both to the visual aspect of knowledge, an element inherent in the classical concept of theoria, which is related to the word horao, to see. In Kant, however, the visual aspect is not the highest component of cognition, since it is related to sensuality. Anschauung belongs to the synthesis and not the summit of knowledge. It is given before thinking, and is present in the ongoing search for relations between data. In Kant's understanding, pure reason can be related to data only through the medium of understanding. In this sense, we could say that Anschauung, being a variation of Schau, is that which can be perceived with the eyes. In Kant's system, it points to the presence of that which is given and thus to reception, whereas knowledge proper is a synthesis of reception and spontaneity . Husserl, by contrast, describes Anschauung as a categorial form related to what he calls "self-givenness." As such, it leads not to knowledge as construction, but to the identity between the content and that which is present or given. It is purely intuitive, referring to the essence and not to the sensuous datum, and it is inherent in ideation. 2 introduction Programmatically, Husserl views the logical concept as having its origin in Anschauung. Thus, he describes the primary synthesis as "ideative universality." In asense, Husserl returns to the concept of theoria; however, his ideative universality is grounded in ideas not as universal objects of knowledge, but as they are to be discerned in the subject or the ego, which for Husserl is the basic or primary stratum of knowledge. It is last from the point of view of our corning to it, but primary from the point of view of that which is the presupposition of all knowledge. To be sure, Kant introduces the concept of intellectual Anschauung, but the very presence of the adjective "intellectual" in this synthesis makes it manifest thatAnschau-ung as such does not have an intellectual connotation. He applies the same term to the "I" or to the intellectual substance as the soul or to freedom. These applications reflect the systematic notion that Anschauung as such has an empirical connotation. Thus, Kant's conjunction of "intellectual" and Anschauung is an additional expression of the direction of his system, again highlighting its distinctiveness from that of Husserl. The basic issue will become more explicit in the detailed analysis which folIows.
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