Studies in the History of Behaviour. Ape, Primitive, and Child.

259 Pages·1993·6.43 MB·English

by  L. S. Vygotsky

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STUDIES ON THE HISTORY
OF BEHAVIOR
Ape, Primitive, and Child
L. S. Vygotsky
A. R. Luria
edited and translated
by
Victor I. Golod
Harvard University
Jane E. Knox
Bowdoin College
with Introduction Jane Knox
by E.
LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOCIATES, PUBLISHERS
1993 Hillsdale, New Jersey Hove and London
Copyright © 1993 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in
any form, by photostat, microform, retrieval system, or any other
means, without the prior written permission of the publisher.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers
365 Broadway
Hillsdale, New Jersey 07642
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Vygotskii, L. S. (Lev Semenovich), 1896-1934.
[Etiudy po istorii provedeniia. English)
Studies on the history of behavior : ape, primitive, and child
I L.S. Vygotsky, A.R. Luria ; edited and translated by Victor I. Golod
and Jane E. Knox : with introduction by Jane E. Knox.
p. cm.
Translation of Etiudy po istorii povedeniia.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8058-1014-5 (cloth)
I. Psychology, Comparative. 2. Behavior evolution. 3. Genetic
psychology. I. Luria, A. R. (Aleksandr Ramanovich), 1902-1977.
II. Golod, Victor I., 1946-1991. III. Knox, Jane E., 1940- IV. Title.
[DNLM: I. Behavior. 2. Behavior, Animal. 3. Psychology. BF 121
V996s)
BF767.V9413 1993
156-dc20
DNLM/DLC
for Library of Congress 92-23404
CIP
Books published by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates are printed on acid-free paper, and their
bindings are chosen for strength and durability.
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Dedicated in loving memory of my friend and
guide to life, Victor Golod (1946-1991).
I.
Contents
Foreword ix
Preface xv
Translator's Introduction 1
Authors' Introduction 36
CHAPTER 1
Behavior of the Anthropoid Age 40
Three Stages in the Development of Behavior 40
Kohler's Experiments 45
The Law of Structure and Ape Behavior 55
Intellect and the Natural Experience of Apes 60
Intellect as the Third Stage in the Development of Behavior 66
Use of the Tool as a Psychological Prerequisite for Labor 72
CHAPTER 2
Primitive and His Behavior 79
Three Lines of Psychological Behavior 79
Three Theories of Cultural Historical Development 82
vii
Viii CONTENTS
Primitive Man as a Biological Type 88
Memory in Primitive Man 93
Thinking in Connection with the Development of Language in
Primitive Society 108
Numeric Operations and Primitive Man 121
Primitive Behavior 132
CHAPTERJ
The Child and Its Behavior 140
Approaches to the Psychology of an Adult 140
Adult and Child: The Principle of Metamorphosis 141
The Infant and His World 144
Primitive Perception 146
Primitive Thinking 150
Steps to Culture 167
Acquisition of Tools 171
Cultural Development of Special Functions: Memory 175
Cultural Development of Special Functions: Attention 186
Cultural Development of Special Functions: Abstraction 192
Cultural Development of Special Functions: Speech and
Thinking 199
The Stage of Cultural Development of a Child 206
Defectology and Psychology 213
Retardation and Giftedness 219
Evaluation of Giftedness and the Problems of Cultural
Development 228
References 232
Author Index 237
Subject Index 239
Foreword*
James V. Wertsch
Clark University
The theoretical perspective outlined by Lev Semenovich Vygotsky can be
understood in terms of three general themes that run throughout his
writings: (a) the use of a genetic, or developmental method; (b) the claim
that higher mental functioning in the individual emerges out of social
processes; and (c) the claim that human social and psychological processes
are fundamentally shaped by cultural tools, or mediational means. The
surge of contemporary interest in Vygotsky's approach has focused largely
on the second of these two themes, especially as it is manifested in his
notion of the "zone of proximal development" (e.g., Cole, 1985; Moll,
1990; Rogoff, 1990; Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984). In my view, the third theme
concerning mediation is the most interesting and uniquely Vygotskian of the
three, yet it is only beginning to receive the attention it deserves (e.g., Cole,
1990; Wertsch, 1991).
In the end, however, our understanding of the second and third themes is
limited until we have a more elaborated notion of his genetic method
because all three themes were interdefined in Vygotsky's thinking. There­
fore, an account of each depends on advances in our understanding of the
others. This interconnectedness should not be underestimated. In my own
writings (e.g., Wertsch, 1985, 1991), I have differentiated the themes in an
attempt to introduce Vygotsky's approach, but I have also noted that, in the
end, the meaning of each can be understood only by understanding its
relationship to the others. It is worth noting that Vygotsky himself never
outlined his approach by laying out these three discrete themes.
*The writing of this foreword was assisted by the Spencer Foundation. The statements made
and the views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
ix
X FOREWORD
Studies on the History of Behavior: Ape, Primitive, and Child is one of
the most important documents we have for understanding Vygotsky's
claims about a genetic or developmental method, the theme in his approach
that has probably received the least attention. Although this volume was
co-authored with Vygotsky's student and colleague Aleksandr Romanovich
Luria, Vygotsky's guiding voice emerges clearly throughout the text. This is
not surprising as it was written at a time when he was in the midst of his
short, yet prolific career and when Luria was heading a research team. This
in no way detracts from the brilliant contributions Luria made to other
areas of psychology ranging from neurolinguistics to cross-cultural psychol­
ogy; it is more in the spirit of recognizing the relationship that existed
between Vygotsky and Luria in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
The ideas sketched out in Vygotsky's and Luria's introduction and then
elaborated in the following three chapters present the most extensive single
view we have of their general developmental method. Their starting
assumption is that any adequate account of human behavior must be
grounded in genetic analysis. In this view, a developmental or genetic
approach is not just one among many methods, rather it grounds all others.
Vygotsky made this point in other works such as Mind in Society (1978),
where he argued that "the historical [that is in the broadest sense of
'history'] study of behavior is not an auxiliary aspect of theoretical study,
but rather forms its very base. As P .P. Blonsky has stated 'Behavior can be
understood only as a history of behavior' " (p. 65).
With this general commitment to genetic method as a starting point,
Vygotsky and Luria went on to identify "three main lines in the develop­
ment of behavior-evolutionary, historical, and ontogenetic." By incorpo­
rating all three lines, or "genetic domains" (Wertsch, 1985, 1991) into their
approach, Vygotsky and Luria outline vision that differs markedly from
that of most contemporary scholars under the rubric of developmental
psychology.
Today, the term developmental psychology is applied almost exclusively
to the genetic domain of ontogenesis, and typically even more narrowly to
the periods of childhood and adolescence. In contrast to this narrowed
focus, Vygotsky and Luria argue that a thorough genetic analysis must
address the ways in which knowledge about all three genetic domains
contributes to our understanding of behavior and mental functioning.
Therefore, in addition to considering how a particular form of mental
functioning reflects the ontogenetic transitions leading up to it, one must
also take into consideration the forces of phylogenesis and sociocultural
history that have shaped it. In this respect, the genetic method outlined here
parallels, in many ways, other genetic theorists such as Werner (1926),
whom Vygotsky frequently cited.
In mapping out the domains of phylogenesis, sociocultural history, and
ontogenesis, Vygotsky and Luria take a very strong anti-recapitulationist
FOREWORD Xi
position. They reject claims about simple parallels between genetic domains
in the developmental processes at work. In their introduction, they argue
that each domain represents a new era in the evolution of behavior: "one
process of development dialectically prepares for the next one, trans­
forming and changing into a new type of development." The key to this is
their recognition of "changes in the type of developmental itself," a claim
that precludes any notions of straightforward parallelisms, positing instead
that different principles of development are at work in different domains.
With this in mind, Vygotsky and Luria focus on the critical turning points
in the development of behavior. In their view, these were "for the behavior
of apes-the use of tools, for the behavior of man-labor and the use of
psychological signs, and for the behavior of the child -the split of the
developmental line into natural psychological and cultural psychological."
In this view, developmental processes in each genetic domain are governed
by forces and properties unique to that domain. For example, Darwinian
evolutionary principles apply to phylogenesis, whereas a version of La­
marckianism accounts for the transitions of sociocultural history.
As others have noted (e.g., Wertsch, 1985), the boundaries between
genetic domains are, in fact, not so neat as Vygotsky and Luria assumed.
Recent findings in physical anthropology and archaeology indicate that
hominidization involved an extended period of overlap (something on the
order of 2 million years) between phylogenesis and sociocultural history.
This contrasts with the view generally accepted when Vygotsky and Luria
were writing. In their view, phylogenesis is assumed to have culminated with
a final qualitative transition giving rise to the organism of homo sapiens,
and this, in turn, allowed sociocultural history to begin. The massive
overlap now generally accepted as existing between these two genetic
domains means that cultural or proto-cultural development provided part
of the context for, and hence influenced organic evolution during homini­
dization. This upating of Vygotsky and Luria's perspective, however, in no
way refutes their general claims about the differences .in developmental
processes at work in the various genetic domains, which disallow reductio­
nistic or recapitulationistic assumptions that still continue to creep into
psychology and related disciplines.
Other aspects of the argument Vygotsky and Luria propose in this volume
are dated as well. For example, many advances have been mode in cultural
and social anthropology since 1930, and some current findings would chal­
lenge many of the particulars of their argument. The fact that we now know
a great deal more than was known in 1930 about languages of the world, for
example, indicates that some of the authors' generalizations about levels of
linguistic complexity are no longer accepted. The same critique applies to
many of their general statements about cultural complexity as well.
In addition to advances, there are simply differences between 1930 and
today that count as legitimate and interesting areas of inquiry. There has
Xii FOREWORD
been something of a paradigm shift away from evolutionary approaches
toward cultural analyses, and from linguistic analysis toward linguistic and
cultural relativism. Figures such as Boas (1916, 1966), Sapir (1921, 1931),
and Whorf (1956) led the way in rejecting the kind of evolutionary ranking
of languages and cultures that plays such an essential role in the authors'
argument. In the end, however, this shift is not simply in the form of some
progression toward an ultimate truth (a claim that would be difficult for a
relativist to defend in any case). Instead, it represents a paradigm shift
associated with structuralist analyses, which are notoriously difficult to
reconcile with accounts of cultural and psychological change.
Thus, although some of the specifics of the claims of Vygotsky and Luria
about culture may be outdated, this does not call into question the basic
genetic approach that they were seeking to outline. We still have not come
to grips with how one accounts for the complex structural properties of
cultures and language on the one hand, and genetic transitions on the other.
For example, as Wertsch and Tulviste (in press) note, there is very little
attention paid in contemporary developmental psychology to historical
factors and historical change. One manifestation of this general state of
affairs is that, at a time of increasing traffic between psychologists and
anthropologists, there still continues to be little productive contact between
psychologists and historians. For all of these reasons, the attempt by
Vygotsky and Luria to outline a "new genetic psychology" touching on
multiple domains of development retains great contemporary relevance.
This book is a critical text for understanding these and a host of other
issues. By making such a work by two of the 20th century's greatest
psychologists available to readers of English, the translators and editors
have made a major contribution. Furthermore, it should be noted that this
is no ordinary translation. The knowledge of languages and the material
that Golod and Knox brought to bear in completing their work make this
book one of the best translations we have of Vygotsky's and Luria's
writings. This is more than an accurate translation, it is an elegant one that
retains much of the feel of the authors' own styles. Furthermore, thanks to
their energetic and ingenious bibliographic sleuthing, Golod and Knox have
provided us with insights into the sources of the authors' ideas that come to
light here for the first time. Some of these findings are reviewed in Knox's
introduction, and others are in evidence throughout the text. This under­
taking has resulted in an accurate, complete, and elegant translation of a
very important work in psychology and its related fields.
REFERENCES
Boas, F. (1916). The mind of primitive man. New York: Macmillan.
Boas, F. (1966). Introduction. In, F. Boas (Ed.), Handbook of American Indian Languages
(pp. 1-79). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.