Studies in Medieval Philosophy

308 Pages·2018·5.114 MB·English

by  John F. Wippel

Studies
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Volume 17
Studies in Philosophy
and the History of Philosophy Volume 17
StudiinMe esd ieval
Philosophy
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THEC ATHOLUINCI VERSOIFTA YM ERICPAR ESS
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Copyright C 1g87
The Catholic University of America Press
All rights reserved
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING·IN·PUBLICATION DATA
Studies in medieval philosophy.
(Studies in philosophy and the history of philosophy;
v. 17)
Includes index.
1. Philosophy, Medieval. 1. Wippel,John F.
11. Series.
B21.s78 vol. 17 [B721] 100 s [189] 86-23282
ISBN 978-0-8132-3082-5
Contents
Introduction vn
1. ELEONORE STUMP, Boethius's In Ciceronis Topica and
Stoic Logic 1
2. THERESE-ANNE DRUART, Al-Farabi and Emanationism 23
3. ARTHUR HYMAN, Maimonides on Creation and Emanation 45
4. GEORG WIELAND, Plato or Aristotle-a Real Alternative
in Medieval Philosophy? 63
5. JAMES MCEVOY, The Divine as the Measure of Being
in Platonic and Scholastic Thought 85
6. JOHN F. WIPPEL, Thomas Aquinas and Participation 11 7
7. BERNARD RYOSUKE INAGAKI, Habitu.s and Natura
in Aquinas 159
8. JAMES F. Ross, Aquinas on Annihilation 177
9. CALVIN G. NORMORE, The Tradition of Mediaeval
Nominalism 201
10. MARILYN MCCORD ADAMS, William Ockham: Voluntarist
or Naturalist? 219
11. STEPHEN F. BROWN, Ockham and Final Causality 249
12. EDWARD P. MAHONEY, Themes and Problems in the
Psychology of John of Jandun 273
Index of Authors 289
.Index of Subjects 294
V
Introduction
The following essays originated from papers presented in the fall of
1984 as part of the Catholic University of America lecture series in
medieval philosophy. The medieval period in the history of philoso­
phy ranges over many centuries, and some indication of that range is
evident from the titles of these essays. In organizing them I have fol­
lowed a roughly chronological plan. This was possible only up to a
point; for while some of the lectures concentrate on one figure from
the medieval period, others consider the development of a particular
theme or concept in different thinkers. Thus in Chapter 4 Georg
Wieland attempts to identify the intellectual conditions in the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries (as distinguished from the mere availability
of newly translated texts) which account for the favorable reception of
Aristotle in the thirteenth century. In Chapter 5James McEvoy traces
the notion of measure (mensura), especially in its application to the di­
vine, from Greek philosophy into the high Middle Ages. And in Chap­
ter g Calvin Normore attempts to cast some light on the meaning of the
term "nominalism" in its application to both twelfth-and fourteenth­
century thinkers. This being so, I have used such essays as "bridge ar­
ticles," as it were, in moving from chapters dealing with one particular
thinker to those which take up another.
Medieval philosophical thought was by no means limited to the
Latin West. Arabic and Jewish philosophy are represented in this vol­
ume by Therese-Anne Druart's treatment of emanation in Al-Farabi
and by Arthur Hyman's examination of creation and emanation in
Moses Maimonides. Since these two medieval thinkers both flourished
before the Western "triumph" of Aristotelianism in the thirteenth
century, it seemed appropriate to consider them in Chapters 2 and 3.
The volume begins, therefore, with Eleonore Stump's treatment of
a work by Boethius (In Ciceronis Topica) and an examination of the
light it may cast on a difficult point in the history of Stoic logic. As
indicated, this is followed by chapters dealing with Al-Farabi and
Moses Maimonides, and then by the transition pieces by Georg Wie­
land and James McEvoy. In Chapter 6 I concentrate on a rather non-
vii
viii Introduction
Aristotelian aspect of Aquinas's metaphysics-participation. In Chap­
ter 7 Bernard Inagaki considers Aquinas's treatment of habitus in
order to cast some light on his understanding of nature, especially
human nature. James Ross directs Chapter 8 to Aquinas's views con­
cerning annihilation, especially as these are presented in the De poten­
tia. As already noted, in Chapter g Calvin Normore attempts to come
to terms with the meaning of nominalism in the medieval period.
Marilyn McCord Adams devotes Chapter 10 to an extensive investiga­
tion of the meaning of the term "voluntarist" in its application to the
thought of William Ockham. Another facet of Ockham's thought is
examined by Stephen F. Brown in Chapter 11, concerning the causa­
tion which he assigns to the final cause. This leads Brown to take up
certain issues touching on the authenticity of some of Ockham's works.
The volume concludes with Edward P. Mahoney's examination of the
psychology of John of Jandun.
Because the contributors to this volume come from various coun­
tries and widely divergent backgrounds, I have not attempted to im­
pose a rigidly uniform reference system on all of the contributions.
What I have aimed for is consistency within each essay.
Funding for the 1984 lecture series and partial funding for this vol­
ume was provided by the Exxon Foundation. Since without that series
the present volume would not have come into being, we are doubly
indebted to the Exxon Foundation, that is, for the lecture series itself
and for the resulting publication.
Finally, I would like to take this occasion to thank Jude P. Dough­
erty, Dean of the School of Philosophy at Catholic University, for his
gracious and efficient organization and management of the original
series of lectures, and for accepting this volume for Studies in Philoso­
phy and the History of Philosophy. The various contributors share
this sentiment, as many have already indicated to me. I would espe­
cially like to thank each of them both for their original lectures and
for the challenging essays they have now submitted for publication.
J.F.W.
1 Boethius's ICni ceTroopniicsa
and Stoic Logic
ELEONORE STUMP
INTRODUCTION
Boethius's In Ciceronis Topica is one of two treatises Boethius wrote
on the subject of the Topics or loci. The other treatise is De topicis dif­
ferentiis, 1 one of the last philosophical works he composed.2 Together
these two treatises present Boethius's theory of the art of discovering
arguments, a theory which was enormously influential in the history
of medieval logic.3 De topicis differentiis is a fairly short treatise, but it is
Boethius's advanced book on the subject; it is written in a concise, even
crabbed, style, and it clearly presupposes acquaintance with the sub­
ject matter. In contrast, In Ciceronis Topica is Boethius's elementary
treatise on the Topics. It was written shortly before De topicis diffe­
rentiis 4 and is a commentary on Cicero's Topica, though it is a much
larger and more comprehensive work than the Topica; and it is more
than twice as long as the more tightly knit De topicis diffe rentiis.
Cicero's treatise Topica, on Cicero's own account, 5 is his attempt to
explain to his friend Trebatius what he himself takes to be Aristotle's
system for discovering arguments. There is some mystery about this
1. An edition of this text can be found in J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina (PL), vol. 64
(Turnholt: Brepols, n.d.), 1174-1216. For a translation and notes, see Eleonore Stump,
Boethius's De topicis dijferentiis (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978).
2. L. M. de Rijk, "On the Chronology of Boethius' Works on Logic II," Vivarium 2
(1964), pp. 159-60.
3. Cf. Stump 1978, and Stump, "Topics: Their Development and Absorption into
Consequences," The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretz­
mann et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 273-99. Cf. also Niels J.
Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages (Munich: Philosophia Ver­
lag, 1984).
4. De Rijk 1964, pp. 159-61. For an edition of this text, see Ciceronis Opera, ed.J. C.
Orelli (Zurich: Fuesslini, 1833), vol. 5, pt. i; for the same text in the PL, see PL 64:
1039-1174.
5. Cicero, Topica l.1-5, and The Letters to His Friends, trans. W. G. Williams, Loeb
Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1928), vol. II, VII, xix.
2 ELEONORE STUMP
claim of Cicero's because, as has been recognized not only by modern
scholars 6 but even by Boethius, 7 there is a vast difference between
what Aristotle presents in his Topics as an art for the discovery of argu­
ments and what we read in Cicero's Topica. Aristotle's system of discov­
ery was transmitted and developed both by rhetoricians and by com­
mentators on Aristotle, including, for example, Theophrastus, Eude­
mus, and Strato. 8 What we find in Cicero's Topica is an art of discovery
which reflects the alterations and adaptations of Aristotle made by
generations of such rhetoricians and commentators in the three inter­
vening centuries.
Unlike Aristotle's treatment of the Topics, Cicero's is neither highly
philosophical nor tied to the nature of the predicables (genus, prop­
erty, definition, and accident); and the tools for aiding the discovery
of arguments-the so-called Topics-are not a host of general prin­
ciples, as they are in Aristotle, but rather a small set of classifications
or differentiae for such general principles. In his Topi,ca Cicero is at­
tempting to teach Trebatius, in a brief and summary fashion, how to
use these Topics, these diffe rentiae of general principles, to generate a
great variety of arguments which will be useful to him in arguing
cases in courts of law. Because his Topica is an abbreviated treatment of
the subject, Cicero does not spell out the way in which he expects the
Topics to aid in the discovery of arguments; but Boethius in his lei­
surely and extensive commentary does. Consider, for example, the
following passage.
Marriage by purchase was carried out by established ceremonies. The parties
being married by purchase asked one another questions; the man asked
whether the woman wanted to be a materfa milias, and she answered that she
did. In the same way, the woman asked whether the man wanted to be a pater­
!a milias, and the man answered that he did. In this way, a woman came under
the authority of her husband, and the marriage was called marriage by pur­
chase. The woman was a materfa milias to her husband and had the status of a
daughter of his. Ulpian describes this ceremony in his Institutes. Now a certain
man in his last will bequeathed to his wife Fabia all his silver on the condition
that Fabia would be not only his wife but in fact a definite species of wife,
namely a materfa milias. The question is whether the silver was bequeathed to
the wife Fabia. The wife Fabia is the subject; bequeathed silver is the predicate. So
I ask myself what argument I can take from the things presented in the ques­
tion, and I see that there are two kinds inhering in wife: one is only a wife and
6. For bibliography on this long-standing scholarly discussion, see H. M. Hubbell,
trans., CiceroT'opicsa ,Lo eb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 196o), p. 380; and Stump 1978, pp. 20-21.
7. Detop . diff. 1195c and 12oocff.; and InC iceronTisopic a (ICT), pp. 280-83 (PL
1051-54).
8. Stump 1978, pp. 2o8ff.
Boethius's In Ciceronis Topica 3
the other is a materfa milias, a status brought about by coming under the au­
thority of the husband. If Fabia did not come under the authority of her hus­
band, she was not a wife, that is, she was not that species of wife to whom all
the silver was bequeathed. Consequently, since what is said of one species is
not appropriately said of another, and since Fabia is not included in that spe­
cies of wife which has come under the authority of the husband (that is, the
species which is a materfamilias) but her husband bequeathed the silver to a
materfa milias, it appears that the silver was not bequeathed to Fabia. So the
question, as was said, is whether all the silver was bequeathed to the wife
Fabia. The subject is the wife Fabia; the predicate is bequeathed silver. The argu­
ment is taken from something which is in the thing asked about, that is, from
something which is in wife, which is being asked about; for a species of wife is
in wife, which is being asked about, namely, that species which has not come
under the authority of the husband. And this is related to wife, for every spe­
cies (that is, every kind) is related to its genus. The argument is therefore
made from something which is in the thing at issue, namely, from related
things-from a kind belonging to a genus. The maximal proposition is 'what
is said of a single species is not appropriate for another'. 9
The argument in this case apparently has the following structure.
( 1) The silver was bequeathed to a woman who was materfa milias.
(2) The wife Fabia is not materfamilias.
(3) Materfamilias is a species of wife.
(4) MP What is said of a single species 1s not appropriate for
another.
(5) Therefore, the silver was not bequeathed to the wife Fabia.
9. ICT, p. 299 (PL 1071). All Latin quotations of this work are from the Orelli edi­
tion. My annotated translation of ICT is forthcoming. "Coemptio vero certis sollem­
nitatibus peragebatur, et sese in coemendo invicem interrogabant, vir ita: an sibi mulier
materfamilias esse vellet? Illa respondebat, velle. Item mulier interrogabat: an vir sibi
paterfamilias esse vellet? Ille respondebat, velle. ltaque mulier viri conveniebat in
manum, et vocabantur hae nuptiae per coemptionem, et erat mulier materfamilias viro
loco filiae. Quam sollemnitatem in suis institutis Ulpianus exponit. Quidam igitur ex­
tremo iudicio omne Fabiae uxori legavit argentum, si quidem Fabia ei non uxor tantum,
verum etiam certa species uxoris, id est, materfamilias esset. Quaeritur, an uxori Fabiae
legatum sit argentum. Uxor Fabia subiectum est, legatum argentum praedicatum. Quaero
igitur, quodnam ex iis argumentum sumere possim, quae in quaestione sunt posita, ac
video, uxori duas inesse formas, quarum una tantum uxor est, altera materfamilias,
quae in manum conventione perficitur. Quod si Fabia in man um non convenit, nee ma­
terfamilias fuit, id est, non fuit ea species uxoris, cui argentum omne legatum est.
Quocirca quoniam id, quod de alia specie dicitur, in aliam dici non convenit, quumque
Fabia praeter earn speciem sit, quae in manum convenerit, id est, quae materfamilias sit,
et vir matrifamilias legaverit argentum, non videtur Fabiae esse legatum. Quaestio igitur,
ut dictum est, an uxori Fabiae omne argentum legatum sit; subiectum uxor Fabia,
praedicatum vero legatum argentum. Argumentum ab eo, quod est in ipso, de quo quae­
ritur, id est, ab eo, quod est in uxore, de qua quaeritur. Est autem in uxore, de qua
quaeritur, species uxoris, ea scilicet, quae in manum non convenit, quae ad earn affecta
est. Omnis enim species ad suum genus refertur, id est, omnis forma. Factum est igitur
argumentum ab eo, quod est in ipso, ab affectis, a forma generis. Maxima propositio
est: Quod de una specie dicitur, idem in alteram non convenire."
4 ELEONORE STUMP
The Topic for this argument is kind, or species; and it has a double
role in the argument. First, it serves to suggest a class of middle terms
which can unite or disjoin the subject and predicate terms of the ques­
tion (the wife Fabia and bequeathed silver) and which thus provide the
argument needed to prove the conclusion. In this case, the Topic gives
rise to premiss (3) and the general strategy of the argument. And sec­
ond, it is a differentia for a genus of general principles, picking out
those generalizations or maximal propositions which concern species.
In this way the Topic helps to discover the general principle, premiss
(4), which in some sense warrants the argument. A great deal more
could and should be said about Boethius's theory of discovery in gen­
eral and about this argument in particular, but for my present pur­
poses I want just to show briefly how Boethius intended his art of dis­
covery to work and what sort of example he used to illustrate it.
Although the scholastics made extensive use of Boethius's works on
the Topics, they relied on De topicis diffe rentiis much more than on In
Ciceronis Topica. That relative neglect is also characteristic of contem­
porary historians of medieval philosophy, who have in general con­
centrated on De topicis dijfe rentiis more than on In Ciceronis Topica. I do
not mean to suggest that In Ciceronis Topica was not influential in the
scholastic period or that its influence is not currently recognized.
Abelard, for example, used In Ciceronis Topica in his Dialectica; 10 and,
as far as we know, there are 30 manuscripts of it extant from the tenth
to the fifteenth centuries.11 But there are 170 manuscripts of De topicis
dijfer entiis from the same period, 12 and that greater number is indi­
cative of the greater use made of it. Part of the reason that more at­
tention has not been paid to In Ciceronis Topica by contemporary
historians of philosophy (and perhaps this is even true of scholastic
philosophers) is that by the standards of scholastic philosophical Latin,
its Latin is difficult, certainly more difficult than that of Boethius's
other philosophical treatises. But even more of an obstacle is the na­
ture of the many examples which Boethius discusses in great detail.
Because Cicero is writing for a lawyer, he deliberately tries to make
the bulk of his examples legal issues; and because Boethius is writing a
commentary on Cicero, he takes over the legal examples he finds in
Cicero's text and labors to explicate them as well as the more theoreti­
cal portions of the Topica. It is unlikely that the technical terminology
of these examples would have been very familiar to scholastic philoso­
phers. The laws involved in Cicero's examples were designed to regu-
10. Cf., e.g., Petrus Abaelardus. Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum,
1970), pp. 449.34-450.2, 459.26, 561.16-19, 582.8-10.
11. De Rijk 1964, p. 151, n. 2. 12. Ibid., p. 153, n. 1.