Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory

512 Pages·16.84 MB·English

by  Joel Watson

Title Page Page: i
Table of Contents Page: vii
Preface Page: xiii
Introduction Page: 1
Part I: Representations and Basic Assumptions Page: 7
Chapter 2: The Extensive Form Page: 9
Chapter 3: Strategies and The Normal Form Page: 22
Chapter 4: Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs Page: 37
Chapter 5: General Assumptions and Methodology Page: 42
Part II: Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings Page: 47
Chapter 6: Dominance and Best Response Page: 49
Chapter 7: Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance Page: 67
Chapter 8: Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest Page: 78
Chapter 9: Nash Equilibrium Page: 95
Chapter 10: Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting Page: 113
Chapter 11: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Page: 132
Chapter 12: Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies Page: 148
Chapter 13: Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings Page: 154
Part III: Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings Page: 173
Chapter 14: Detailes of the Extensive Form Page: 175
Chapter 15: Sequential Rationality and Subgame Perfection Page: 183
Chapter 16: Topics in Industrial Organization Page: 204
Chapter 17: Parlor Games Page: 224
Chapter 18: Bargaining Problems Page: 230
Chapter 19: Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games Page: 244
Chapter 20: Games with Joint Decisions: Negotiation Equilibrium Page: 259
Chapter 21: Unverifiable Investment, Hold up, Options, and Ownership Page: 274
Chapter 22: Repeated Games and Reputation Page: 291
Chapter 23: Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill Page: 311
Part IV: Information Page: 325
Chapter 24: Random Events and Incomplete Information Page: 327
Chapter 25: Risks and Incentives in Contracting Page: 336
Chapter 26: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability Page: 350
Chapter 27: Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation Page: 360
Chapter 28: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Page: 378
Chapter 29: Job-Market Signaling and Reputation Page: 392
Appendices Page: 407
Index Page: 477