Space, Time, and Deity: The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow 1916–1918

841 Pages·1966·75.428 MB·English

by  S. Alexander (auth.)

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SAMUELALEXANDER
(1859-1938)
SPACE, TIME, AND DEITY
The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow
1916-1918
BY
s.
ALEXANDER
In Two Volumes
VOLUME I
With a New Foreword by
DOROTHY EMMET
Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester
Palgrave Macmillan
19 66
ISBN 978-1-349-81690-3 ISBN 978-1-349-81688-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-81688-0
Dorothy Emmet's Foreurord
Copyright © 1966 by Macmillan & Co. Ltd. and
Douer Publications, Inc,
Softcoverreprintofthehardcover1stedition1966978-0-333-07170-0
This book iscopyright in all countries which
are signatories to the Berne Convention
FirstEdition1920
Reprinted1927.1934
Reissued1966
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FOREWORD TO THE
1966 REPRINT EDITION
S afterthelast war the annual Joint Sessionofthe
H 0 RTLY
Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society met in
Manchester. A number of members were standing in a
circle looking at the Epstein bust of Samuel Alexander
whichstandsintheentrancehallofthe ArtsBuildingofthe
Universiry. Someone remarked: "Never in the history
of philosophydid somany logical positivists paytributeto
such a metaphysician." No doubt the temper ofAnglo
American philosophy has changed during the intervening
twentyyears, and fewwoulddescribe themselves as "logi
cal positivists" tout court. Nevertheless, the analytic and
empirical approach makes it difficult for philosophers of
a contemporary generation to appreciate, still less to
produce, metaphysical systems in the grand manner.
Yet interest in metaphysics is by no means dead; in a
chastened, critical, cautiousway it may even beincreasing.
A reprinting of Samuel Alexander's Space, Time and
Deity is thus to be welcomed, since on-any account it
surelyranks among the great ventures in systematicmeta
physics. It is a work which cannot be pinned down as
belonging to any clearly recognized school. "Realism,"
" Idealism," "Naturalism," "Materialism," "Evolution
ary Theism''-'-a case can be made for applying any of
theselabels, yet noneofthem fits. Alexanderhimselfwas
not interested in labels. "As to the terms idealism and
realism, I should be heartily glad if we might get rid of
them altogether: they have such shifting senses and carry
with them so much prejudice. They serve, however, to
v
DOROTHY EMMET
V1
describe a difference of philosophical method or spirit....
For the one, in some form or other, however much dis
guised, mind is the measure of things and the starting
point of inquiry. The sting of absolute idealism lies in
its assertion that the parts ofthe world are not ultimately
real or true but only the whole is true. For realism,
mind has no privileged place except in its perfection.
The real issue is between these two spirits of inquiry; and
it is in this sense that the following inquiry is realistic.
But no sane philosophy has ever been exclusively the one
or the other, and where the modern antithesis has hardly
arisen, as with Plato, it is extraordinarily difficult to say
underwhich headthe philosophyshould be classed."!
In his own person Alexander cut across ordinary dis
tinctions. There is an admirable account of his life,
drawn from his own reminiscences and those of other
people, in the Memoir written by John Laird, his literary
executor, and published at the beginning of Philosophical
and Literary Pieces, a posthumous collection of occasional
papers. I shall therefore only touch on certain facts and
stories. He was born in Sydney, Australia, in 1859,
educated at Wesley College, Melbourne, and came to
Oxford in 877, to sit for a scholarship at Ballio!. He
I
teIls how, while staying there for the examination, he
found hirnselfsitting next toan Eton boy, George Curzon
-George Nathaniel Curzon, later to be the "most
superior person" ofthe MasqueofBalliol and Viceroy of
India and Foreign Secretary. The"superior person"
said out loud, "I don't think Mr. Alexander is going to
getascholarship." He did, and Curzon did not. After
hehad taken his degree, for a time Alexander took pupils
in philosophy, Curzon being the first. Alexander evi
dently asked Curzon to write a statement in support of
hisapplication for the ChairofPhilosophy in Manchester,
since a letter from Curzon (12 February 1888) regrets
18pace, Time al1d Deity, vol, i, pp. 7-8.
FOREWORD TO 1966 EDITION Vll
that having been abroad at the time, he was unable to par
ticipate "in the agreeable composition you suggest,"
adding "that anything related to Philosophy and signed
by me would not have improved your chances. Do you
remember how backward I was?" The rude Eton
schoolboy had learnt whom to respect.
Alexander took Firsts not only in Classical Honour
Moderations and Greats, but also in Mathematical
Moderations, and regretted that he did not also take
Mathematical Greats. Reading mathematics was symp
tomatic of his interest in natural science, and his dis
satisfaction with the predominantly arts character of the
Oxford philosophy of the day. His earliest work, a T.
H. Green Prize Essay in moral philosophy, subsequently
published as Moral Order and Progress, indeed shows the
influence ofthe idealist ethics dominant in Oxford at the
time. But his mind was turning towards an approach to
philosophy which could be related to the empirical sei
ences, and particularly to psychology and biology.
Psychology was hardly a university subject in England at
the time. Alexander was later to introduce it into the
University of Manchester by appointing T. H. Pear to
the staff of his department of philosophy. The serious
ness of his interest is evidenced by the fact that in spite of
having obtained a Fellowship at Lincoln College in 1882
J
-the first ew to be elected a fellow of an Oxford or
Cambridge college-he resigned it in 1888 in order to
study psychology. At first he worked privately in
London, and then, in orderto aquaint hirnselfwith experi
mental work, spent the winter of 1890-91 in Hugo
M ünsterberg's laboratory in Freiburg-im-Bresgau.
He continued in privatestudyuntil his election in 1893
to the Sir Samuel Hall Chair of Philosophy in the Uni
versity of Manchester, where he spent the rest of his life,
retiring in 1924 but continuing to live in Manchester
until his death in 1938, a beloved figure around whorn
legends collected, both in the university and city. One
DOROTHY EMMET
V1l1
such, for which we have Alexander's own testimony,
concerns his interview for the Chair, when his rival candi
date was G. F. Stout. "Now Mr. Stout, in the days
before he came under the control of Mrs. Stout, was
negligentofhis appearance, and he came to the final inter
view with the Council with his neck-tie riding half-way
up his collar. I told hirn he would never be taken in that
condition and set his neck-tie right; but apparently
thinkingit unfair to take advantageoftheofficesofa rival,
he deliberately tore it back to its old place, and this act
cost hirn the election. The Council rightly decided that
its professorofphilosophyshouldset an examplein awell
dressed university."! Mrs. Stout, when told this story,
is said to have commented, "The impudence of hirn
talking about well-dressed men." This is as it may be.
At any rate he knew what clothes were proper to what
occasion, if we may trust the story (of which there are
variants) ofhow he once bicycled overto Liverpool to give
a lecture which was to be followed by a dinner. He was
asked where his dress suitwas-those were formal days
and pointing to his Norfolkjacket he said "Underneath."
As he was staying the night, he was asked if he had any
pyjamas. Pointing to his dress suit, he said "Under
neath" again.
In Manchester, Alexanderthrew hirnselfinto theaffairs
of a growing civic university. In particular he be
friended the right of women to their place in it; he was
honorary secretary of Ashburne Hall, the first women's
hall ofresidence, and is said to have been the only man to
be made an honorary Old Ashburnian. For some years
he wrote little except occasional papers and an admirable
small book on John Locke. He had cut hirnselfofffrom
Oxford philosophy, and had not allied hirnself with
the new realism of Moore and Russell; he was seeking
1 Philosophica/and Literary Pieces.P:27 (Macmillan & Co.,London,
1939)·
FOREWORD TO 1966 EDITION IX
ways of trying to transpose some of the philosophy of
Bradleyand Bosanqueton to a realist basis, and relate it to
a strong interest in experimental psychology and neur
ology.
The Libraryofthe UniversityofManchester possesses
a large collection of letters to Alexander and some of his
own letters, written throughout the period from his arri
val in Manchester to his death. He overcame his partial
isolation in Manchester by carrying on an extensive
correspondence with many of the main figures in British
philosophy-A. C. and F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosan
quet, Bertrand Russell, G. F. Stout, H. Joachim, H.
Wildon Carr, F. C. S. Schiller, H. W. B. Joseph, R. G.
Collingwood, James Ward, and, ofa yet older generation,
Herbert Spencer and Leslie Stephen; among physiolo
gists there are letters from C. Lloyd Morgan and Sir
Charles Sherrington. Thecollection would be ofinterest
to anyoneconcernedwith the historyofBritish philosophy
between, say, 19°4 and 1924 (by which time most ofthe
people to whom copies of Space, Time and Deity had been
sent on its publication in 1920had got round to reading it
and writing their comments). The earler (1909) letters
from F. H. Bradley contain a baffied seriesof comments
on Alexander's epistemology. In the mannerofthetime,
Alexander was trying to givean accountofa "mentalact"
and its relation to its object, Physically, he thought, such
an act was a neural reaction, which had acquired con
sciousness, and was"compresent"withan object. Com
presenceofobjectswith oneanotherwas ageneral relation
throughout nature; in this respect minds had no privi
leged status. He protested that this was not a be
haviourist or even epiphenomenalist view; minds as con
scious "contemplate" the objects to which they react, and
they also have an internal awareness oftheir own reaction,
a kind ofknowing called "enjoyment." Bradley did not
know what to make of this. He writes, "You tell your
audience at Glasgow to observe a perceiving act. By all