Soviet partisans in World War II

312 Pages·1964·2.121 MB·English

by  Armstrong, John Alexander

SOVIET PARTISANS IN WORLD WAR II
EDITED BY JOHN A. ARMSTRONG WITH A
FOREWORD BY PHILIP E. MOSELY
MADISON 1964 THE UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN PRESS

Copyright © 1964 by the Regents of The University of Wisconsin
Foreword
Soviet Partisans in World War II is a summation and an extension—both carried out with great
talent by Professor John A. Armstrong of the University of Wisconsin—of a postwar program of
research into the origins, doctrine, operations, and effectiveness of Soviet irregular warfare. The
volume can be read as an original and important contribution to the history of World War II and
to the study of the Soviet political system operating under extreme stress. Today, when Soviet
policy lays strong emphasis on "wars of national (or people's) liberation" and on Soviet backing
for them, these studies likewise provide a fresh examination of the most recent and intensive
Soviet experience in the waging of unconventional warfare.
Extreme claims have been made, as Professor Armstrong points out in his Introduction, about the
character and military value of the partisan movement in World War II, and official Soviet
appraisals have varied widely in the relative importance they ascribe to "spontaneous" and
patriotic reactions of the population, to the courage and organizing skill of local Communist
Party officials, and to the control and direction exercised from above by the central Party and
military authorities. This volume represents the first attempt to clarify these questions through a
systematic investigation of a vast amount of first-hand documentation, partly Soviet, mainly
German, which was captured at the close of World War II.
After the German invasion of June 1941, which brought a large part of the Soviet population
under Hitler's control, had been halted in the heroic defense of Moscow, Leningrad, and
Stalingrad (now Volgograd), a long road of suffering and sacrifice stretched out before the
invaders could be expelled from Soviet territory. How far did the partisan forces, operating in the
rear of Hitler's armies, weaken the German military effort and thus lighten the burden of the Red
Army? These studies suggest new and significant answers to this question and also to the
question of how the people in occupied areas reacted to the German presence and to the
prospective restoration of Soviet rule. It thus presents, as Professor Armstrong points out, a study
of "shadow" rule at a distance, in which the partisans served as a reminder of the impending or
eventual return of the Soviet system.
Finally, the partisan experience in World War II constitutes the largest single body of Soviet
experience in irregular warfare. That experience is embedded in the minds of many Soviet
leaders, of high rank and low; many of them, now active in Soviet policy or administration, were
closely concerned with the organization and direction of that arm of military and political action.
Soviet policy is actively concerned today with the prospect of new wars of "national liberation"
which, the leadership asserts, can bring important accretions of strength to the Communist bloc
while still holding the risks of general or nuclear war to an acceptable level. The expectations of
Soviet policy-makers about actual or prospective partisan wars, as one possible stage in any
struggle for "national liberation," are doubtless influenced by past Soviet experiences as well as
by current analyses of local factors that may favor or inhibit new revolutionary initiatives in
various continents. The factor of doctrinal and psychological continuity therefore makes it useful
for students of present-day Soviet policy to examine the experience of the Soviet partisan
movement in World War II, even though no firm conclusions can be drawn from it with respect
to future Soviet actions.
The studies that form the major part of Soviet Partisans in World War II were originally
prepared as part of Project Alexander, a research task which was undertaken by the War
Documentation Project (A.F. Contract 18[600]-1), under contract with the United States Air
Force. The research program was monitored by the Human Resources Research Institute of the
Psychological Warfare Division, particularly by Dr. Raymond V. Bowers, Dr. F. W. Williams,
and Dr. Charles E. Hutchinson. Special thanks go to these officials and likewise to Major
General James McCormack, Jr., USAF (ret), who was then Director of Research and
Development in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development.
Without the farsighted decision of officers and advisers of the United States Air Force to devote
a small fraction of its defense research funds to a systematic investigation of this problem, and to
open up the vast body of captured documents for investigation, the study could never have been
started, much less brought to successful completion. Great credit is also due to the Chief and
staff of the Departmental Records Branch, Advocate General's Office, Department of the Army,
who generously provided full cooperation and many facilities indispensable to the work of the
project. The work of the project benefited greatly from the advice and support of the Human
Resources Research Institute and from the suggestions of an interdepartmental committee
consisting of representatives of interested government agencies.
Project Alexander proceeded through several distinct research phases. In a first period of
planning and survey, the major research purposes were defined and a voluminous mass of source
materials was screened and sifted; a large part of the relevant materials was catalogued in an
extensive punch-card filing system. As the investigation proceeded, it drew more and more on
the records of corps, divisions, and even regiments, and therefore the process of identifying the
contents and research significance of additional bodies of records was continued on a reduced
scale throughout the remainder of the three and one-half years of the project.
In the first research phase the documentary raw material was tested by carrying out studies of
several major topics within defined chronological and geographical limits. In the second research
phase the inquiry widened its focus to embrace a full range of functional subjects, but was held
to manageable proportions by limiting the studies to selected geographic areas or individual
partisan organizations. Special attention was given to the "classic" partisan areas in western
Russia, Belorussia, and northern Ukraine. In the selection of regions for study, the main purpose
was to make sure that the case studies would represent a wide diversity of geographic and natural
conditions, ethnic composition, social and economic situations, and methods of partisan
operations. As a safeguard against excessive concentration on the "classic" areas, two additional
studies were made of partisan movements in the central Ukraine and the north Caucasus. In a
third research phase the findings of geographical studies were collated and compared to produce
a series of functional studies; among them were the role of airpower in partisan warfare,
organization and control of the partisan movement, composition and morale of the movement,
and partisan psychological warfare among the German-occupied population.
Credit for this difficult and comprehensive research effort belongs first of all to the talented and
devoted scholars who constituted the staff of Project Alexander: John A. Armstrong, Alexander
Daliin, Kurt DeWitt, Ralph Mavrogordato, Wilhelm Moll, Eric Waldman, Gerhard L. Weinberg,
Earl Ziemke. Each of them brought long experience, fresh insights, and great devotion to this
task, and it was these qualities that made the effort possible and fruitful.
Fritz T. Epstein served in the first stage as Director of Research; after he was called to other
duties, Hans J. Epstein became Director of the Project, and Alexander Dallin served with great
talent as Director of Research. Philip E. Mosely, then Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia
University, served part-time as senior consultant on research and Chairman of the Standing
Committee of the War Documentation Project. The contract was administered through the
Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, and Dr. Charles Y. Glock, then
Director of the Bureau, and his staff did a great deal to facilitate the smooth operation of the
project.
From the beginning the scholars engaged in the project and the officers and officials who sought
and found modest support for it believed that its findings should eventually be made available to
the public, and I take pleasure in expressing, on their behalf, our deep appreciation to the
Department of Defense for making this possible. Professor John A. Armstrong, who had been
author or co-author of several of the most important studies, then undertook, at a considerable
sacrifice to his other research interests, to prepare this volume for publication. Because of the
overlapping of the successive research stages, as outlined above, it was necessary to combine
and condense the individual studies, in order to eliminate repetition and bring out those findings
that are of central significance. Since a good deal of new Soviet information has become
available in recent years, it would have been desirable, ideally, to rework all the studies.
However, a sampling of the new materials, derived from Soviet official histories and memoirs,
made it clear that the new data, in turn, would have to be checked against the original records, at
great cost in time and with only slight scholarly gain for the final product. Only minor
corrections, apart from condensation, have therefore been made in the studies as completed in
1953 and 1954.
Instead, Professor Armstrong has prepared, in his Introduction, a comprehensive review of the
partisan movement, based on a wide range of new Soviet materials, on the Alexander studies,
and on his own continuing researches into these problems, parts of which have been published in
his Ukrainian Nationalism (second edition, 1963), The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite (1959), and The
Politics of Totalitarianism (1961). The Introduction serves a dual function: it sums up with
masterly sweep and clarity Professor Armstrong's many years of research into the partisan
movement and its role in Soviet political strategy; it also sets the background for the more
specific studies of the experience and significance of the Soviet partisan movement in World
War II and for the selection of original documents in translation. Through his double
contribution, as author and editor, to making possible the publication of these studies, John
Armstrong has again placed the scholarly community under great debt.
Philip E. Mosely
Editorial Preface
This book is based primarily on a group of studies prepared by the War Documentation Project
for the United States Air Force. Since the total length of the studies was far too great for a single
printed volume, it was necessary to leave out much of the original material. Three analytic
studies of social and political aspects of the Soviet partisan movement in World War II were
retained substantially intact as Chapters II, III, and IV. Two analytic studies which dealt with
intelligence and air power aspects of partisan warfare now constitute Chapters V and VI. These
studies were somewhat condensed to eliminate material of a technical nature which now has only
historical interest. Five case studies of special geographical areas of partisan activity are now
Chapters VII through XI. All of these studies were considerably shortened to eliminate material
which has been summarized in substance in the analytic chapters. In the Appendix of Selected
Soviet Sources, 69 of the 125 documents originally translated have been retained; five additional
documents formerly appended to individual studies have been added. The documents which were
omitted for the most part contain material of a technical nature or material which is essentially
similar to that in documents which have been retained. Two special War Documentation Project
studies on the partisans have been omitted altogether. The "History of the First Belorussian
Partisan Brigade" appeared to have rather limited interest. "The Soviet Partisan Movement in
World War II: Summary and Conclusions" has been omitted also, but much of the data presented
in this study has been incorporated in Chapter I. Wherever feasible the original source references
for specific data of major importance derived from the "Summary and Conclusions" have been
indicated in Chapter I. The Selected Bibliography contains a considerable amount of material
appearing in the original, but has been thoroughly revised to eliminate several relatively
insignificant items and to incorporate many new items. The Glossary is substantially the same as
the original.
In the ten years that have elapsed since the War Documentation Project studies were prepared,
many important publications on the partisans have appeared in the Soviet Union. Ideally, one
might have preferred to incorporate information from these works in each of the relevant
chapters of this book. However, many of the Soviet works—especially those relating to
particular geographical areas of partisan activity—are not available outside the USSR.
Furthermore, complete revision of the studies included in this book would have been wholly
unsatisfactory unless one could have compared the new material to the original German
documentary sources; but the great bulk of these are still under security classification.
Consequently, a page-by-page revision of the original studies did not appear to be feasible.
Instead, the studies (apart from the deletions described above) have been presented very nearly
as they were written. The only substantial changes are in such items as personal names,
population data, and specific organizational features which have proved to be inaccurate. On the
other hand, a great deal of new information from Soviet sources has been incorporated in
Chapter I, which was written specifically for the present book. The Soviet material is interesting
not only because of the new light it throws on the partisan movement, but because it indicates
how a careful reading of published Soviet descriptions tends to corroborate most of the findings
derived from the wartime German and Soviet documents.
The arrangement of the materials in this book is designed to facilitate an analytical
understanding of the partisan movement rather than to present a chronological history.
Consequently, Chapter I presents an interpretation and a summary which, it is hoped, will
provide the reader with a general understanding of the subject. Chapters II-VI contain more
detailed analyses of specific aspects of the partisan movement, while the case studies in Chapters
VII-XI (which constituted the basis for many of the generalizations presented in the earlier
chapters) are intensive examinations of all aspects of specific groups of partisans. The Appendix
of documents enables the reader to catch at first hand some of the flavor of the partisan
movement and, to some extent, to make his own evaluations.
The principal credit for this work, as Philip E. Mosely points out in his Foreword, should go to
the devoted research team of the War Documentation Project, and to the many persons in
Government agencies and elsewhere who assisted it. I want to add that Dr. Mosely himself
played an indispensable part in initiating the Project, supervising its research, and, more recently,
in making this book possible. I am especially grateful to him, to Alexander Dallin, and to
Gerhard L. Weinberg, for advice on aspects of the editing. At the same time, I want to make
clear that 1 am wholly responsible for the entire contents of Chapter I, and for the deletions and
minor substantive revisions in the rest of the volume. I only hope that my changes and additions
have not seriously distorted the work of the original authors. Finally, I wish to express my thanks
to the National Security Studies Group of the University of Wisconsin, and its director, Bernard
C. Cohen, for financial support for the expensive process of revision.
J.A.A.
August, 1963
Contents
Foreword
Editorial preface
List of figures
I. Introduction by John A. Armstrong
§I. The significance of the Soviet partisan experience
The objectives of the antagonists—The relevance of the Soviet partisan experience
§II. Soviet partisan operations as unconventional warfare
The origin and tasks of the partisans—The environment of partisan operations—The partisan
response—Antiguerilla warfare—Evaluation
§III. The partisans and the totalitarian system
Maintaining the Soviet presence—Pressure on the peasant—The partisans and the Soviet
control apparatus—The extension of the Communist system—The partisans in the postwar USSR
PART I: ANALYTIC STUDIES
II. Organization and control of the partisan movement by John A. Armstrong and Kurt DeWitt
§I. Introduction
§II. The first efforts of partisan organization
The prewar Soviet concept of partisan warfare—The territorial organization—The partisan
movement and the Red Army—The fate of the territorial partisan organization
§III. Expansion and reorganization of the partisan movement, 1942-44
The revival of the partisan movement, early 1942—The development of the partisan band—The
Central Staff—The front staffs—The territorial staffs—The intermediate partisan command
structure—Distribution of command functions—Implementation of control in the partisan
movement—Summary §IV. Conclusion
III. Composition and morale of the partisan movement by Earl Ziemke
§I. Composition of the Soviet partisan movement
Distinctive component groups—Shifts in composition—Nationalities— Age groups
§II. Conditions of partisan life
The size of the movement—Recruitment—Training—Equipment and food supply—The camp—
Terrain and climate—Medical services
§III. Group characteristics
Influence of the officers—Influence of the Communist Party—Morale in general—Discipline in
general
§IV. Conclusion
IV. Partisan psychological warfare and popular attitudes by Alexander Dallin, Ralph
Mavrogordato, and Wilhelm Moll
§I. Organization and technical aspects of partisan psychological warfare
Organization of partisan psywar—Technical aspects of partisan printed propaganda
§II. Partisan psychological warfare directed at German personnel
The problem—Direct and verbal propaganda—Nonverbal psychological warfare—
Provocation—Treatment of prisoners of war—Conclusion
§III. Partisan psychological welfare directed at Axis troops
§IV. Partisan psychological warfare directed at collaborators
Military—Civilian—Vlasov and the partisans
§V. Partisan propaganda aimed at the local population
Introduction—Targets—Media—Partisan leaflets—Partisan rumors—Partisan psychological
warfare
§VI. The partisans as the long arm of the Soviet Regime
Introduction—Local government—Party and Komsomol—Soviets—Judiciary and executive—
Anti-Fascist committees—Administrative measures—Home guard—Recruitment—
Requisitions—Cash and state loan collections—Agriculture—Summary
§VII. The population between Germans and partisans
First phase of the occupation—Early stage of the partisan movement— Effects of changes in
German tactics—Summer 1942 to Fall 1943— 1943-44—Demographic changes under the
occupation—Motives behind popular attitudes—Conclusions
V. The partisans in Soviet intelligence by Kurt DeWitt
§I. Relations between the partisans and Soviet intelligence
§II. Intelligence assignments of the partisans
Partisan intelligence activities for the Red Army—Political and economic intelligence—
Concluding remarks
§III. Intelligence operations of the partisans
VI. AlRPOWER IN PARTISAN WARFARE by Gerhard L. Weinberg
§I. The role of airpower in the formation and control of partisan units
§II. Supplies and reinforcements
Military supplies—Food—Clothing
§III. Special aspects of air support
Tactical air support of partisan operations—Limitations imposed by air support—German
efforts to counter air support
§IV. Airpower in antipartisan warfare
Reconnaissance—Communication—Supply—Bombing and strafing in antipartisan operations—
Bombing and strafing partisan-held areas—Distribution of leaflets—Fly-over effect of
airpower—Partisan efforts to counter German air operations—The potential of airpower in
antipartisan warfare
PART II: CASE STUDIES
VII. The Yelnya-Dorogobuzh area of Smolensk Oblast by Gerhard L. Weinberg
§I. The Yelnya-Dorogobuzh area, 1941
The area and the war in 1941—Partisan organization in the Smolensk area before 2 October
1941—The Vyazma pocket, October-November 1941— The partisan movement, October-
December 1941
§II. The Soviet breakthrough and the organization of a large-scale partisan movement, January-
March 1942
The Soviet breakthrough and its implications—The formation of a large-scale partisan
movement
§III. The first German efforts to destroy the partisans
Initial German reactions—Operation "Munich"
§IV. The local population between partisans and Germans
Partisan political and administrative activity—The "bandits"—The attitude of the local
population
§V. The partisan movement, June 1942 to September 1943
The German offensive—Partisan reactions to the German offensive—German efforts to prevent
the revival of partisan activity—Soviet efforts to revive the partisan movement—The fate of the
partisan movement, June 1942 to September 1943
VIII. The Bryansk area by Kurt DeWitt and Wilhelm Moll
§I. Summary and conclusions
1941 Military events and initial occupation—Early manifestations of partisan warfare—
Intensification and growth of the partisan movement—The final phase and the German retreat—
Conclusions
§II. Institutional characteristics of the partisan movement
Organization—Direction and control
§III. Operational characteristics of partisan warfare
Disruptive activity in the German rear—Antipartisan warfare—Collaboration with the partisans
IX. The Polotsk lowland by Ralph Mavrogordato and Earl Ziemke
§I. Geographic, economic, and ethnographic character of the region
Topography—Military geography—Economy—The people
§II. Summary of historical events
Military events, 1941, and initial occupation—Early manifestations of partisan warfare—
Intensification of partisan warfare—German antipartisan operations, 1942-43—Final stages of
partisan warfare and the German retreat
§III. Institutional characteristics
The brigade commander—The officers—The commissar
X. The North Caucasus by Alexander Dallin
§I. Background
The area and the problem—The campaign and the objectives—Soviet policy in the Caucasus,
1941-1942—German policy in the North Caucasus—The Germans and the indigenous
population
§II. The Caucasus partisans: Two case studies
The Yegorov complex—The Kalmyk area
§III. Organization and control
§IV. Soviet agents and the partisan movement
§V. Summary and conclusions
XI. The Dnepr bend area by John A. Armstrong
§I. Geographic, economic, and ethnographic character of the region
§II. Summary of historical developments
§III. Evaluation
APPENDIX Selected Soviet sources on the World War II partisan movement
§I. The organization of the partisan movement in 1941
Basic directive on organization of partisans—Basic directive on organization and tactics of
partisans—The partisan oath—Report on partisan groups at Northwest Front—Report on
partisan groups in Poltava area of the Ukraine—Life history of Ukrainian Staff Chief Strokach
§II. Soviet directives to partisans
Covering letter to Document 8—Order No. 0018 demanding increase in sabotage—
Establishment of training courses for partisan officers—Demand for prompt reports—Order
concerning collaborators—Communist work plan for occupied territories
§III. Partisan tactics
List of essential elements of information—Manual for political reconnaissance—Instructions for
inspector of partisan intelligence activities
§IV. Partisan reports
Activity report of a "troika"—Report of the Morogov group for part of 1942—Report of the
Morogov group for May 1941—Records of the Morogov group—Protocol of a Komsomol
meeting—Komsomol activity in Drissa Rayon in August 1942—Covering letter criticizing
Executive Committee of Drissa Rayon—Report on a staff conference in the Falalayev Brigade—
Report that the commander of the Falalayev Brigade substituted another name for that of the
man who was to replace him
§V. Appeals to collaborators
To Soviet nationals serving with the German Army—To members of the Weise Ukrainian
Regiment near Bryansk—To policemen and village mayors working with the Germans—To
auxiliary police in Smolensk area—By Political Section of Northwest Front to all
collaborators—To collaborators, attacking General Vlasov—By former members of a
collaborator unit urging desertion to partisans—By former members of auxiliary police urging
desertion to partisans—To an officer in auxiliary police urging desertion—To a member of
auxiliary police urging support of partisan activities—To head of a labor section—To members
of a Lithuanian police unit organized by the Germans
§VI. Partisan propaganda and relations with the local population
Poster answering a German appeal to villagers—Leaflet left in a village south of Minsk—
Warning to villagers not to help Germans—Excerpts from newspaper The Partisan of Gomel
Oblast—Curfew and traffic regulation in a partisan area—Order for turning over weapons and
state-owned supplies in a partisan area—Brigade order forbidding felling of trees and delivery
of food for the Germans—Order forbidding voluntary labor service in Germany and food
deliveries to the Germans—Rights and duties of a village commandant in partisan areas—Soviet
leaflet of Northwest Front describing partisan killing of a German official—Soviet or partisan
leaflet directed at peasants
§VII. The Grishin Regiment
Rating of Grishin by Communist party in Smolensk—Excerpts from regimental operation
reports—Intelligence reports of battalions of the Grishin Regiment—Order for execution of a
scout—Disciplinary order concerning relations with women—Punishment for looting—
Execution for leaving post and exhibiting cowardice—Order establishing section for agitation
and propaganda—Order concerning planned movement through the front to the Red Army—
Grishin's appeal to troops to hold out until arrival of the Red Army—Order to Grishin to
coordinate sabotage activities with Red Army offensive—Order to Grishin concerning treatment
of American aviators—German interrogations of former members of Grishin Regiment—
Organizational chart of the Grishin Regiment
§VIII. The Kovpak Regiment
Appeal to members of the Komsomol in the Kovpak Regiment—Order for execution of an officer
in the Kovpak Regiment—Order concerning relations with Polish population and Ukrainian
nationalists—Procedure in case of encounters with Ukrainian nationalist partisans—
Recruitment of Poles into the regiment—Punishment for partisan looting of Polish population—
Telegram for help from the regiment commissar when the regiment was surrounded by Germans
§IX. Partisan Diaries
Of a young partisan concerning personal and combat activities—Of a company politruk
containing information on airpower and problems facing the political officer of a small partisan
unit
§X. List of Sources
Glossary and key to abbreviations used in the text
Selected bibliography
List of Figures
1 Generalized structure of the partisan brigade
2 Staff of the partisan movement of the Ukraine
3 Operative group in the rear of the enemy
4 Cooperation between partisans and Soviet intelligence
5 The Yelnya-Dorogobuzh area of Smolensk Oblast
6 The front situation in the Yelnya-Dorogobuzh area, 1941-42
7 The area around Yelnya
8 The German offensive in the Yelnya-Dorogobuzh area, May 1942
9 Bryansk encirclement battles, 1941