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Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. The Letort Papers In the early 18th century, James Letort, an explorer and fur trader, was instrumental in opening up the Cumberland Valley to settlement. By 1752, there was a garrison on Letort Creek at what is today Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In those days, Carlisle Barracks lay at the western edge of the American colonies. It was a bastion for the protection of settlers and a departure point for further exploration. Today, as was the case over two centuries ago, Carlisle Barracks, as the home of the U.S. Army War College, is a place of transition and transformation. In the same spirit of bold curiosity that compelled the men and women who, like Letort, settled the American West, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) presents The Letort Papers. This series allows SSI to publish papers, retrospectives, speeches, or essays of interest to the defense academic community which may not correspond with our mainstream policy-oriented publications. If you think you may have a subject amenable to publication in our Letort Paper series, or if you wish to comment on a particular paper, please contact Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Director of Research, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. The phone number is (717) 245-4058; e-mail address is [email protected]. We look forward to hearing from you. The Letort Papers SOME OF THE BEST WEAPONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENTS DO NOT SHOOT Eric T. Olson October 2010 The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Depart- ment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Gov- ernment. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose clas- sified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepre- sent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sec- tions 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copy- righted. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard cop- ies of this report may also be obtained free of charge by plac- ing an order on the SSI website. 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ISBN 1-58487-466-x ii CONTENTS Foreword ........................................................................v About the Author …................................................... vii Summary .......................................................................ix Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................1 Chapter 2: Reconstruction in Times of War: A History ….................................................................11 Chapter 3: A Doctrinal Review ................................. 37 Chapter 4: Conducting Reconstruction in Counterinsurgency—An Exercise ....................... 55 Chapter 5: A Framework for Reconstruction in Counterinsurgency …........................................77 Chapter 6: Enhancing Army Capabilities for Reconstruction in Counterinsurgency ...............109 Chapter 7: Conclusions ….........................................135 iii FOREWORD The American military’s attitude towards reconstruction has been ambivalent, to say the least. In the aftermath of World War II, the successful rebuilding of Western Europe that was the result of the careful- ly crafted and skillfully executed Marshall Plan was one of the most significant achievements of the 20th century. But in the wake of the Vietnam experience, reconstruction became an undertaking to be avoided at almost any cost. “Nation building” became a pe- jorative expression in the lexicon of the military and policymakers. All that seems to have changed since the attacks of September 11, 2001. The experience on the ground gained by Army forces in two major counterinsurgency operations has proved that reconstruction designed to win the support of a population away from the en- emy is an integral part of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. The publication of new Army doctrine followed and codified this reshaping of our thinking about reconstruction and its relationship to counterinsurgency warfare. But the matter of maximizing the effectiveness of a reconstruction effort undertaken as part of a counterinsurgency campaign is still very much at issue. It is not clear from our doctrine that we really have a clear concept for how to undertake reconstruction, nor do we have a common understanding across the force of what its component activities are, who should be responsible for them, or what specific capabilities need to be resident in our Army units to accomplish the necessary component tasks. v In this monograph, Eric T. Olson first provides some historical context, tracking the role that reconstruction has played in military operations from the War in the Philippines to the conflicts that are ongo- ing today. This is followed by a doctrinal treatment that lays the ground work for an analysis of how we think about reconstruction, the way that we execute it, and the challenges that we face in doing so. Mr. Olson concludes his discussion with recommendations for enhancing the Army’s ability to realize the full poten- tial of reconstruction as a critical contributing factor in a larger counterinsurgency campaign. There seems to be no end in sight to the long war in which the Army currently finds itself taking part. To the degree that battles of this war will be fought as counterinsurgencies, this monograph establishes an important starting point for discussions about how to conduct the campaign more effectively. DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute vi ABOUT THE AUTHOR ERIC T. OLSON, was the Deputy Director of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, Civil-Mili- tary Affairs in the U.S. Embassy, Baghdad from 2006- 07. Following that, from 2007-08 he served as the Chief of Staff and Principal Advisor to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. An Army officer for 34 years, he commanded infantry units at all levels from platoon to division, achieving the rank of major general and serving his last 3 years as the Com- manding General of the 25th Infantry Division (Light), which included duty as the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-76, during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan (2004-05). vii