Social Functions in Philosophy; Metaphysical, Normative, and Methodological Perspectives

2020·4.07 MB·english

by  Rebekka Hufendiek & Daniel James and Raphael van Riel

Social Functions in Philosophy
Social functions and functional explanations play a prominent role not
only in our everyday reasoning but also in classical as well as contempo-
rary social theory and empirical social research. This volume explores
metaphysical, normative, and methodological perspectives on social
functions and functional explanations in the social sciences. It aims to
push the philosophical debate on social functions forward along new
investigative lines by including up-to-date discussions of the metaphysics
of social functions, questions concerning the nature of functional expla-
nations within the social domain, and various applications of function-
alist theorizing. As such, This is one of the first collections to exclusively
address a variety of philosophical questions concerning the nature and
relevance of social functions.
Rebekka Hufendiek is an Assistant Professor at the University of Basel.
Her research interests lie in philosophy of mind and philosophy of sci-
ence, particularly in empirical and ideological dimensions of research
on cognitive and behavioral features. Her book Embodied Emotions:
A Naturalist Approach to a Normative Phenomenon (Routledge 2015)
provides a noncognitivist theory of emotions.
Daniel James is a Postdoc at Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf. His
historical research concerns the intersection of Hegel’s metaphysics with
his political philosophy. With a view to contemporary debates in social
philosophy, he is interested in the concept of social power and its fruit-
fulness for social-scientific inquiry, as well as in social dispositions and
their connection to social-structural explanation.
Raphael van Riel holds a position as a Senior Lecturer at the University
of Duisburg-Essen, where he directs a research group that focuses on
theories of explanation. In his book The Concept of Reduction (2014),
he offers a novel explication of reduction claims in the philosophy of
mind and the philosophy of science.
Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy
128 Naturalism, Human Flourishing, and Asian Philosophy
Owen Flanagan and Beyond
Edited by Bongrae Seok
129 Philosophy of Logical Systems
Jaroslav Peregrin
130 Consequences of Reference Failure
Michael McKinsey
131 How Propaganda Became Public Relations
Foucault and the Corporate Government of the Public
Cory Wimberly
132 Philosophical Perspectives on Contemporary Ireland
Edited by Clara Fischer and Áine Mahon
133 Inference and Consciousness
Edited by Anders Nes with Timothy Chan
134 The Complex Reality of Pain
Jennifer Corns
135 Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell
Corijn van Mazijk
136 Social Functions in Philosophy
Metaphysical, Normative, and Methodological Perspectives
Edited by Rebekka Hufendiek, Daniel James, and
Raphael van Riel
For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.
routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-in-Contemporary-Philosophy/
book-series/SE0720
Social Functions in
Philosophy
Metaphysical, Normative, and
Methodological Perspectives
Edited by
Rebekka Hufendiek,
Daniel James, and
Raphael van Riel
First published 2020
by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an
informa business
© 2020 Taylor & Francis
The right of Rebekka Hufendiek, Daniel James, and
Raphael van Riel to be identified as the authors of the editorial
material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has
been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted
or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from
the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be
trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for
identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this title has been requested
ISBN: 978-1-138-35132-5 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-43539-3 (ebk)
Typeset in Sabon
by codeMantra
Contents
Preface vii
Introduction 1
REBEKKA HUFENDIEK, DANIEL JAMES, AND
RAPHAEL VAN RIEL
1 The Empirical Issues in Functional Explanations in the
Social Sciences 18
HAROLD KINCAID
2 Do Organizations Adapt? 28
DANIEL LITTLE
3 Social Dysfunctions 45
HEINER KOCH
4 In Search of the Missing Mechanism. Functional
Explanation in Social Science 70
RAPHAEL VAN RIEL
5 From Natural Hierarchy Signals to Social Norm-
Enforcers. What Good Are Functional Explanations of
Shame and Pride? 93
REBEKKA HUFENDIEK
6 What Explains Social Role Normativity? 122
CHARLOTTE WITT
7 The Social Function of Morality 135
ANDREAS MÜLLER
vi Contents
8 The Function of Gender as a Historical Kind 159
MARI MIKKOLA
9 Function Without Intention? A Practice-Theoretical
Solution to Challenges of the Social Domain 183
AMREI BAHR
10 Revealing Social Functions through Pragmatic
Genealogies 200
MATTHIEU QUELOZ
11 Social Organisms. Hegel’s Organizational View
of Social Functions 219
DANIEL JAMES
Notes on Contributors 247
Name Index 249
Subject Index 253
Preface
This book is the result of seven years of ongoing philosophical exchange
between philosophers interested in such diverse areas as social philoso-
phy, philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of biology, philosophy of
mind, metaphysics, philosophy of language, ethics, feminist philosophy,
and Marxism. The book was motivated by the hunch that social func-
tions play an important role in many social theories but are strangely
undertheorized at the same time. Furthermore, existing reasoning about
social functions can be found in such different places as functionalism
in the social sciences, analytic Marxism, and debates on explanations in
the philosophy of science. Our idea, therefore, has been to bring together
philosophers with expertise in the relevant subfields and organize an
ongoing discussion on the normative, metaphysical, and methodolog-
ical questions that can be asked about social functions. The German
Research Foundation generously funded the research network “Social
Functions. Normative, ontological and explanatory aspects of functions
in social philosophy” between 2015 and 2019. During this period, mem-
bers of the network – Amrei Bahr, Miguel Hoeltje, Rebekka Hufendiek,
Daniel James, Heiner Koch, Mari Mikkola, Andreas Müller, Raphael
van Riel, and Markus Wild – were able to meet on a regular basis. More-
over, members of the network organized a lecture series and three inter-
national conferences on the topic. Many of the invited speakers, friends,
and colleagues provided feedback and inspiration over the years. We
would like to thank all those who contributed in one way or another
to the project and this volume, in particular: Johannes Achatz, Brian
Epstein, Sally Haslanger, Frank Hindriks, Wybo Houkes, Ludger Jan-
sen, Daniel Little, David Livingstone Smith, Beth Preston, Peter Railton,
Hans-Bernard Schmid, and Tommie Shelby for the talks they delivered
during workshops and conferences organized by the network; Kai Ploe-
macher and Christoph Thies for their proofchecking and formatting un-
der stressful conditions (needless to say: all remaining errors are the sole
responsibility of the editors); and in particular: Miguel Hoeltje, Mari
Mikkola, and Markus Wild for intense discussions and feedback at ev-
ery step of the project.
Berlin/Bern 12.2019
Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com
Introduction
Rebekka Hufendiek, Daniel James,
and Raphael van Riel
Why Social Functions Matter
When we talk about an object’s function, we usually have in mind a
particular type of effect of an event the object is involved in, which is
beneficial in some way, either for the object itself or for something else.
Social functions are effects that are beneficial at a societal level. Social
functions thus appear to differ from paradigmatic functions of human
artifacts, or functions of human organs, whose effects are located at
the individual level. Eating, watching television, or doing sports seem
to serve some individual needs. But they may also have some social
f unction – like maintaining society as a whole or contributing to the
well-being of the public.
Typically, however, when we consider social functions, we consider
not only functions whose effects concern the societal level, but, rather,
functions whose bearers are social objects, or at least involve some social
dimension. Classifying social objects in terms of their functions plays
a crucial role for our conceptualization of social reality. It is common
wisdom that the function of schools and universities is to educate, that
the function of money is to serve as a means of exchange, and that the
function of newspapers is to distribute information. Prima facie, it seems
that many ordinary conceptions of social reality involve function as-
criptions. At least sometimes, we classify things in terms of the social
functions they have or are believed to have (think of the various institu-
tions and procedures in a democracy which are involved in an electoral
system; or the mechanisms of state intervention in market economies).
An investigation into the nature of social functions may thus inform us
about some aspects of our ordinary conception of social reality, but also,
to the extent that this conception gets it right, about social reality itself.
An important idea in the history of the social sciences, and also in
philosophy, has been that some alleged social functions need to be un-
covered. It need not be an a priori matter that the function of schools
is to educate, but it is not some deeply hidden fact about social reality
either. Whereas some alleged functions of institutions seem to be due
to explicit intentions of those who “designed” these institutions, some