Scepticism and the Foundation of Epistemology: A Study in the Metalogical Fallacies

390 Pages·1996·17.879 MB·English

by  Luciano Floridi

BRILL'S STUDIES
IN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
General Editor
A.J. VANDERJAGT, University of Groningen
Editorial Board
M. COLISH, Oberlin College
J.I. ISRAEL, University College, London
J.D. NORTH, University of Groningen
H.A. OBERMAN, University of Arizona, Tucson
R.H. POPKIN, Washington University, St. Louis-UCLA
VOLUME 70
SCEPTICISM
AND THE FOUNDATION
OF EPISTEMOLOGY
A Study in the Metalogical Fallacies
BY
LUCIANO FLORIDI
'68*'
EJ. BRILL
LEIDEN · NEW YORK · KÖLN
1996
The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the
Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library
Resources.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Floridi, Luciano.
Scepticism and the foundation of epistemology : a study in the
metalogical fallacies / by Luciano Floridi.
p. cm. — (Brill's studies in intellectual history, ISSN
0920-8607 ; v. 70)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 9004105336 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Knowledge, Theory of. 2. Knowledge, Theory of—History.
I. Title. II. Series.
BD161.F5 1996
121— dc20 96-26934
CIP
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufhahme
Floridi, Luciano:
Scepticism and the foundation of epistemology : a study in the
metalogical fallacies / by Luciano Floridi. - Leiden ; New York
; Köln : Brill, 1996
(Brill's studies in intellectual history ; Vol. 70)
ISBN 90-04-10533-6
NE: GT
ISSN 0920-8607
ISBN 90 04 10533 6
© Copyright 1996 by E.J. Bull, Leiden, The Netherlands
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written
permission from the publisher.
Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal
use is granted by E.J. Brill provided that
the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright
Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910
Danvers MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.
PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
To Eugenia Milani Floridi (1907-1995)

CONTENTS
Preface XI
I. The Object: On the Nature of Knowledges
1. Warburgian Microanalysis 1
2. Some Linguistic Preliminaries 2
3. "Knowledges" before Locke 4
4. The Disappearance of "Knowledges" after Locke 10
5. "Knowledges" in Late Scholastic Philosophy 16
6. Against Ockham's Eraser 24
7. Extensionalism and the Reinstatement of "Knowledges" 29
II. The Theory of the Object: On the Nature of Epistemology
1. From Mereology to Set-theory 33
2. Knowing and Knowledges 37
3. Expressions vs. Studies of Knowledge 39
4. On the Logical Nature of the Expressions of Knowledge 45
5. On the Logical Nature of the Studies of Knowledges 50
6. Five Features of Epistemology 54
7. Is Epistemology an a priori Study of Knowledge? 59
8. On the Relation between Epistemology and the Cognitive
Sciences 64
9. Towards the Problem of the Justification of a Philosophy of
Knowledge 68
III. The Problem with the Theory: a Historical Reconstruction
1. From Sets to Maps 71
2. The Sceptical Domain 73
2.1. Sextus Empiricus' Diallelus 73
2.1.1. The Problem of the Criterion 74
2.2. Mercier's Criteriologie 80
2.3. Montaigne's Rouet 82
2.4. Chisholm's Problem of Criterion 85
vm CONTENTS
3. The Cartesian Domain: Descartes' Circle 94
4. The Kantian Domain 104
4.1. Reinhold5's Elementarphilosophie 105
4.2. Hegel's "Scholasticus' absurd resolution" 108
4.3. Fries' TWlemma 112
5. An Overview 118
IV. The Problem with the Theory: a Morphological Analysis
1. Three Routes 121
2. A Hierarchy of Levels 122
3. The Morphology of the Problem 125
4. Diagnosis of the Problem 134
4.1. The Logical Structure of the Problem 134
4.2. The Metaepistemological Nature of the Problem 138
4.2.1. Being Justified and Being Able to Justify 140
4.2.2. The Sceptical Dynamics of Falsificationism 144
5. Features and Limits of Anti-sceptical Strategies 152
5.1. The Diallelus and the Fallacy of Secondary Effects 152
5.2. Husserl's erkenntnistheoretische Prinzip and the
Naturalistic Fallacy 155
V. The Solutions of the Problem: a Phenomenology
1. Apagogic Strategies 164
2. The Logical Roots of the Apagogic Solutions 165
3. On the Self-referential Nature of the Problem 167
3.1. Dogmatism 167
3.2. Cartesianism 170
4. On the Conditions of Possibility of the Problem:
Transcendentalism 173
5. On the Justificatory Nature of the Problem 177
5.1. On the Logic of Justification 178
5.1.1. Definition vs. Criteria of Justification 178
5.1.2. Justification as a Property 185
5.1.3. Justification as a Relation 197
5.2. Foundationalism 197