REHUMANIZING LAW - Edinburgh Research Archive - University of PDF
Preview REHUMANIZING LAW - Edinburgh Research Archive - University of
REHUMANIZING LAW: ANARRATIVE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY Randy Gordon Ph.D.,Law TheUniversityof Edinburgh 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract and Declaration.....................................................................................ii Acknowledgements............................................................................................iv Introduction.........................................................................................................1 I. Law and Narrative: Reexamining the Relationship........................................8 1. Describing Law in Terms of Autonomy.............................................13 2. Narrative as the Basis of Law and the Humanities...........................17 3. Shelley’s Case, Part 1: Law of The Jungle......................................27 4. Shelley’s Case, Part 2: Silent Spring...............................................42 5. What Is Narrative?............................................................................49 6. How Narratives Interact to Influence Legislation...............................59 7. What’s Truth Have to Do with It?......................................................66 8. Whose Story to Believe? ..................................................................70 II. Institutionalizing Narratives..........................................................................73 1. Narrative and the Normative Syllogism.............................................73 2. The Narrative Nudge........................................................................76 3. When Narratives Clash.....................................................................82 4. Changes in Narrative, Changes in Law............................................87 5. Law’s Constraints: Generic or Precedential?.................................103 6. Novelizing Law................................................................................112 7. Resisting Narratives: Keeping the Outside Out .............................116 8. Absorbing Narratives: Letting the Outside In.................................132 9. What Law Can Learn from Literature (and History)........................141 III. Law, Narrative and Democracy................................................................159 1. The Rule of Law and Its Limits........................................................161 2. Toward a Democratic Rule of Law..................................................170 3. The Jury as a Structural Safeguard of Democracy.........................177 4. The Democratic Role of Interpretive Communities.........................184 5. A Study in Contrasts: The Rodney King and O.J. Simpson Juries........................................................................................204 6. Is Jury Nullification Democratic and Within the Rule of Law?.........219 7. Some Thoughts on Democratic Interpretation................................225 IV. Narrative and Legal Pedagogy.................................................................239 1. The “Discipline” of Law Schools......................................................242 2. The Problem with Appellate Practice and Appellate Opinions....................................................................................258 3. (Re)Introducing Narratives in the Classroom..................................261 4. Democratic Education and the Law................................................274 A Conclusion of Sorts.....................................................................................277 Bibliography....................................................................................................283 iii Acknowledgements I’vebeenthinkingabout aspects ofthis workforovertwentyyears, so properlyacknowledgingeveryone whohas helped mebringit tofruitionis at oncea dauntingand futiletask. But Imust try,so let me beginwithan apologytoanyone whoseinfluenceandassistance Ihaveoverlooked. Sincethis bookis about narrative, Ithinkit onlyfittingtoordermythanks accordingtomyownpersonal narrative,but withatwist: told(mostly)backwards chronologicallyandanchored byplace. InEdinburgh. Iresearchedandwrotethebulkof what follows duringa delightful yearinEdinburgh. Professors Zenon Bankowski andNeil MacCormick have givenmeindispensableadviceat everystep ofthedraftingprocess,from concept tocompletion. Iam greatlyintheirdebt andwouldneverhavefinishedthis project without their generous guidance. Havingsomewhereto read, write andjust contemplatewas also important tomywork, andforthat Iam grateful tothe Institutefor AdvancedStudies intheHumanities, where Iwas housed as a Faculty FellowduringmytimeinEdinburgh. Inespecial, Ithankthe Institute’s Director, ProfessorSusanManning,andherveryhelpful staff,includingMs.AntheaTaylor, towhom Ioweaspecial debt forfindingmea flat! Ialso received considerable moral support whileinEdinburgh, andforthat IthankTheSocietyofWriters toHer Majesty’s Signet andits CEO,Mr.Robert Pirrie, andthelawfirm of Dundas & Wilson, particularlyMr. DavidHardie andMr.Jim Moser. InDallas andother points south. Icouldnot have undertakenthis work—or spent thetimeinEdinburgh—without the generous institutional support ofmy colleagues at GardereWynne. I’ve also benefited from mylongassociations with iv SouthernMethodist University(andits law-school dean,ProfessorJohnAttanasio) andtheDallas InstituteofHumanities andCulture (andits director,Dr. Larry Allums). Ihavelearned muchfrom mystudents at SMUandfrom myfellow Fellows at theDallas Institute—Ithankboth groups forlisteningtoandimproving myideas. Imust also thankmyfriendandoccasional collaboratorProfessorNancy Rapoport (formerlyoftheUniversityofHouston, nowoftheUniversityof Nevada, Las Vegas)forsoundingout myideas oninterdisciplinarylegal studies. InKansas. Myinterest inhumanistictheorystretches backtomygraduate- student days at theUniversityofKansas, where Ihadthe goodfortuneto come underthe guidanceofProfessorG.Douglas Atkins, asteadfast mentor and now friend. Sinequanon. Ialso oweadebt toProfessorAmyDevitt,withwhom Ihave collaboratedoverthe years andfrom whom Ihave learnedmuch,particularlywith respect to genretheory. Environmental historianProfessorDonaldWorsterpointed metoanumberofimportant resources concerningRachel Carson andherlegacy. I also thankProfessors VictorBaileyandMichael Hoeflichfor givingmehelpful adviceonstudyinginthe UK. Althoughit is toolongago formetorememberwith certainty, Ithinkthat someofthecases andconcepts that arethreadedthroughthis workfirst cametomyattentionviaafirst-yearcourseinlegal methodthat Itook from Professor L.Ali Khanat Washburn LawSchool—thanks forthememories. Beforeleavingthis Kansas section, Imust thank myparents—James andRosemary Gordon—forindulgingmymyriad youthful interests inall things literary. InNew York. Myfirst serious forayintolegal theorycameinaseminarthat Itookfrom ProfessorKent Greenawalt at Columbia LawSchool. Inadditionto providingmewithasolidintroductiontolegal philosophy,he—andother members v oftheclass—helpfullysharpenedmythinkingabout therelationshipbetweenlegal andliteraryinterpretation. Around thehouse. Aboveall others listedabove, Ithankmywife, Lori,for allowingmetorunoffto Scotlandwhilewestill hadtwoteenagers inthehouse. Onceshe got past the“Have youlost yourmind?”phase,she gavemeall thesupport Ineeded. Thanks, too,toBreckandConnor: tobothforbeinggoodsports inmy absence, andtoBreck for graduatingearlyfrom highschool, enrollingat the UniversityofEdinburgh, andeatingmycookingwithout complaint onmanyadark Scottish night! vi Introduction “Law is institutional normativeorder.”1 Nothingabout this statement seems controversial. Indeed,it is hardtoimagine anythree-worddefinitionof“law”that wouldbemoreaccurate. But eachofthosethree words carries asecond-order connotationthat reveals as muchabout law’s natureas its first-orderdenotation. To wit: Institutions havewalls—sometimes literal,sometimes figurative—that keep things out. Norms areabstractions, distillations, andpurifications that leavethings out. Orders aresystems, andsystems seal things out. What arethese“things”that windupoutsidethelaw(or,perhaps moretothepoint,must fight toget in)? There aremanypossibleanswers, but theonethat Iam concernedto examineinthis work arises from narrative, which is oneofthemost fundamental modes ofhuman expression. Bykeepingnarratives at adistance or delay,lawloses someof its essential humanity. Myproject is, then,anattempt toexplaintherelationship betweenlawandnarrative,and—intheend—tosuggest ways to(re)humanizelaw by(re)connectingit toits narrative roots andcertaincognates inthehumanities. Theprocess ofpackaginglawinbundles ofrules is anexerciseinrelentless reduction. Bythetimea common-lawruleis statedorastatuteis codified, it’s impossibletotell from thefaceofthat ruleorstatutewhat went intothemixthat createdit. What that mixincludes, Isubmit,is ahealthydoseofnarrative. Thus, anyaccount oflawthat ignores orskims overthis fact is neitherwhollyvalidnor completelyaccurate. Thecontentionthat Iwill advanceis designedtofill this lacuna,not toupendorsupplant otherdescriptions ofthelawandits operation. In 1NEILMACCORMICK,INSTITUTIONSOFLAW: ANESSAYINLEGALTHEORY 1 (2007). essence, Iintendtodonothingmorethanpeel backlaw’s normativeveneer just far enoughto reveal its narrativefoundation. Todothis, Ioffer fourrelated(and ultimatelyconverging)propositions. First,althoughlawis oftenpositedtobe “autonomous,”that autonomyis not necessarilyabsolute,thoughit is quitepotent. It is, therefore,aforce requiringactiveresistance. Second,narratives often standin theformativebackgroundoflaws. This is trueforstatutoryandcommonlawalike. Third,theabilityof alegal system toabsorb anddigest extra-systemicnarratives serves democratic ends. Fourth,educatinglawyers tothinkoflaw“narrativistically” (i.e.,as somethingmorethanasystem ofrules tobeextractedfrom texts)canhelpto amelioratethedehumanizingeffect oftheRuleof Law’s inherent driveto universalizeall that comes beforeit. This is thecasethat Ihopetomakethroughout theremainderofthis book,whichis brokenintofourparts, eachofwhich engages oneofthefourcentral themes. Thefirst threeparts areessentiallydescriptiveand designedtoshowdifferent aspects oftherelationshipbetweenlaws, legal actors, and ordinarycitizens anddemonstratethesignificanceofthis relationshipfor bothlaw anddemocracy. Thefourthis prescriptiveandsuggests ways toimprovelegal educationand,thereby,theentirejusticesystem. Part Onebegins withalookacross thespectrum betweenfull-blowntheories oflegal autonomy(likeautopoiesis)andhumanities-based accounts (likePercy Shelley’s beliefthat legislationhas aliterarybasis). Althoughit is impossiblefully toreconcilethetwo extremes, narrativeis apossiblebridgebetweenthem because both lawandthehumanities oftentake astorytellingform. Toillustratethis point, I offer areadingofCamus’TheStranger. TakingShelleyas acue, Inext consider whetherliteraturecanin fact prompt legislation. Iconcludethat it can,but the 2 process is neither as simplenoras direct as Shelleywouldhaveit. BytracingUpton Sinclair’s TheJungleand Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring throughlegislative history, Iam abletoshowthat literaryworks canfigurein theadoptionofimportant legislation. Ithentakethefirst steptowards explainingtheprocess ofliterature- becoming-lawbylookingat anelaborationofMargaret Somers’seminal workon theinteractionofpersonal narratives withhigher-order,publicnarrative forms. This feeds intoadiscussionof narrativeinteractionbased,once again,on TheJungleand Silent Spring andthehistorical recordsurroundingtheprincipal actors (e.g., Teddy Roosevelt)involvedinthelegislativeoffshoots of thetwoworks. AlongthewayI stoptoconsiderwhether the“factual”versus “fictional”natureofanarrativeis conclusiveas toits potential toimpact law-making. (It is not.) Part Twofirst considers BernardJackson’s narrativisticaccount ofrule formationandobserves that account at workinspecificcaselaw. Ifollow that discussionwithareadingofAntigonethat cautions against dominant public narratives that—thoughconsistent withanarrowdefinitionoftheRuleof Law—do not offerpaths alongwhichnewnarrativematerial canbe absorbedintothe system. Ithenmovetoaconcrete applicationofmytheoretical observations andshowhow personal narratives canbecomeinstitutionalizedas new(ormodifications ofold) rules. Thecases that Iexaminetodemonstratethis process ultimatelysuggest alink toRonaldDworkin’s chainnovel metaphorandStanleyFish’s attackonit. I concludethat—although Dworkin’s metaphoris not acompletedescriptionofrule- buildinginall cases—it holds inat least somecases. But Fish is correct as well: lawis aconservativeinstitution—andonepacked withgenericconstraints that cause it tolagbehindotherinstitutions inthefaceofchange. We canseethis at a 3 linguisticlevel bylookingat howslowlyScots lawanglicizedcomparedtoother genres intheSixteenthandSeventeenthCenturies or,morerecently,howscientific evidence gainedcurrencyinlegal proceedings muchlaterthanwhenit was considered conclusivein otherspheres. This elides intothequestionofwhat it means to“findfacts,”and IturntoRobert Browning’s TheRingandtheBookas a tool foransweringthat questionandtherelatedquestionofwhat it takes to“justify” adecision. Part Threeis concerned withtherelationshipbetweenlaw anddemocracy. It begins withan explorationoftwoconcepts that areoftenlinkedinbothpopularand theoretical discussions: “democracy” andthe“Ruleof Law.” Toshowthat the latteris not sufficient totheformer, Ioffera readingofMelville’s BillyBudd that demonstrates theproblematicnatureoflegal rules untemperedbynotions of proportionality,mitigation,andalargersenseof morality. This leads toan articulationofwhat ademocraticRuleof Lawmust entail andhowthat canbe achieved. For general insight, IinvokeJürgenHabermas’discoursetheoryof democracyandshowhowthat “discourse”cantakeanarrativeform. Specifically, I showhowtheAmerican jurysystem adds ademocraticdimensiontothelegal system byassuringthat non-elites participateinmatters ofpublicimport. Stanley Fish’s theoryof “interpretivecommunities”provides thetheoretical backdropfor this discussion,whichisfocusedonthe famedO.J.Simpson andRodneyKing cases. This Part concludes withobservations on“objectivity”intheinterpretationof legal narratives andhow aproper conceptionofobjectivitycan havepro-democratic consequences. 4 Part Fourspins togethertwostrands generallyrelatedtoeducation,onebeing thepopularnotionthat educationshouldservedemocraticends, theother beingthe moreparticularobservationthat Americanlegal educationsuffers from adearthof imagination. Tohelpconceptualizethediscussion, Iask us toreconsiderthemyth ofBellerophon’s tamingofPegasus andits suggestionthat taming(i.e.,educating) canbe eitheraprocess of bindingonetoademocraticsocial orderoraninstrument ofstrangulation. Ithenanchorthediscussionbyexaminingsomeoftherecurring criticisms lodgedagainst legal education(e.g.,thoseraisedintherecent Carnegie Report). Iattendinparticulartothecasebookmethodofinstructionandidentifya paucityofnarrativeinthat methodas aserious deficiency. But this deficiencyis not oneuniquetolegal education; infact,it arises not from lawschools perse but from theirprimaryobject ofstudy: theappellateopinion. Bystudyingappellate opinions—whichbydesignalreadysqueezenarratives beyondrecognition—to extract rules, lawstudents aretrainedtoread(and think)inanarrowlyinstrumental way. Idemonstratethis pedagogical defect at workthrough aclose readingof cases andseveral casebooks. Iconcludewithapractical (andrelativelysimple) suggestionfor amelioratingthis problem andspeculatehowthesolutionwill not onlyimprovelegal educationbut strengthendemocraticinstitutions. This, inoutline,is theaccount oflawthat Iwill offerinthis work. Istake no claim toaGrandUnified Theoryofeitherlawor humanities, but Idobelievethat storytelling—when consideredas amethodofarguing—canexpandour understandingofhowsomelaws cometobe,otherlaws cometobe changed,and howmanylaws comeintodemocraticinstitutions inways that strengthenand perpetuatethoseinstitutions. But stories arenot everything. Althoughtheyhelpus 5
Description:The list of books you might like
