Reference and Referring

431 Pages·2012·2.239 MB·English

by  William P. Kabasenche, Michael O'Rourke, Matthew H. Slater

edited by
William P. Kabasenche, Michael O’Rourke,
and Matthew H. Slater
Reference and Referring
Topics in Contemporary Philosophy
Editors
William P. Kabasenche, Washington State University
Michael O’ Rourke, Michigan State University
Matthew H. Slater, Bucknell University
Editorial Board
Kent Bach, San Francisco State University
Michael Bratman, Stanford University
Nancy Cartwright, London School of Economics
Richard Feldman, University of Rochester
John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside
Nicholas F. Gier, University of Idaho
Philip J. Ivanhoe, City University of Hong Kong
Michael McKinsey, Wayne State University
John Perry, University of California, Riverside, and Stanford University
Stephen Schiffer, New York University
Harry Silverstein, Washington State University
Brian Skyrms, University of California, Irvine, and Stanford University
Holly Smith, Rutgers University
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame
Volumes in the Series
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Freedom and Determinism
Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’ Rourke, and David Shier, eds.
Law and Social Justice
Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’ Rourke, and David Shier, eds.
Causation and Explanation
Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’ Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, eds.
Knowledge and Skepticism
Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’ Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, eds.
Time and Identity
Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’ Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, eds.
Action, Ethics, and Responsibility
Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’ Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, eds.
Carving Nature at Its Joints
Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’ Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater, eds.
The Environment
William P. Kabasenche, Michael O’ Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater, eds.
Reference and Referring
William P. Kabasenche, Michael O’ Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater, eds.
Reference and Referring
edited by William P. Kabasenche, Michael O’ Rourke, and
Matthew H. Slater
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
© 2 012 M assachusetts Institute of Technology
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference (13th : 2010 : Pullman, Wash., and
Moscow, Idaho)
Reference and referring / edited by William P. Kabasenche, Michael O’ Rourke, and
Matthew H. Slater.
p. cm. — (Topics in contemporary philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 978-0-262-01830-2 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Reference (Philosophy) — Congresses. I. Kabasenche, William P., 1972– . II.
O ’ Rourke, Michael, 1963 – . III. Slater, Matthew H., 1977– . IV. Title.
B105.R25I55 2010
121 ′ .68 — dc23
2012014695

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
1 Reference and Referring: A Framework 1
Jessica Pepp
2 Descriptivism and the Representation of Spatial Location 33
Robin Jeshion
3 Empirical Data and the Theory of Reference 63
Genoveva Martí
4 Two Versions of Millianism 83
Scott Soames
5 Semantic Stipulation and Knowledge D e Re 119
Chris Tillman and Joshua Spencer
6 Hob, Nob, and Mythical Witches 149
David Braun
7 From Having in Mind to Direct Reference 189
Antonio Capuano
8 Necessity in Reference 209
Ori Simchen
9 Has the Theory of Reference Rested on a Mistake? 235
Mark Hinchliff
10 Referring to What Is and to What Isn’ t 253
Jody Azzouni
11 Reference and Jazz Combo Theories of Meaning 271
Kenneth A. Taylor
vi Contents
12 Quantification and Conversation 305
Chad Carmichael
13 < the , a > : (In)definiteness and Implicature 325
Laurence R. Horn and Barbara Abbott
14 Reference and Ambiguity in Complex Demonstratives 357
Geoff Georgi
15 Words Gone Sour? 385
Stavroula Glezakos
Contributors 405
Index 407
Acknowledgments
Earlier versions of the essays in this volume were presented at the thir-
teenth annual Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference (INPC), held from
April 30 to May 2, 2010, in Pullman, Washington, and Moscow, Idaho. We
are very grateful to Joseph Keim Campbell, Executive Director of the INPC,
for his work in support of that meeting and in support of the Topics in
Contemporary Philosophy series. For their financial and administrative
support of the conference, we thank the philosophy departments at Wash-
ington State University (David Shier, Chair) and the University of Idaho
(Douglas Lind, Chair); the College of Liberal Arts at Washington State
University (Douglas Epperson, Dean); the College of Letters, Arts & Social
Sciences at the University of Idaho (Katherine Aiken, Dean); the research
offices at both universities; and the administrative managers of both
departments, DeeDee Torgeson and Melissa Erwin. We are also grateful for
a grant from the Idaho Humanities Council, a state-based affiliate of the
National Endowment for the Humanities, to help fund the Public Forum.
All presenters at INPC 2010 were encouraged to submit their work for
publication in this volume and, after a process of peer evaluation, only a
few were selected. We regret that we had to turn down numerous quality
essays, owing to space limitations. We thank the following referees: Barbara
Abbott, Andrea Bianchi, David Braun, Anthony Brueckner, Fabrizio Cariani,
Mark Crimmins, Louis DeRosset, Michael Devitt, Kevin Falvey, Heimir
Geirsson, Michael Glanzberg, Delia Graff Fara, Laurence Horn, Paul Hovda,
Kepa Korta, Jason Leddington, Genoveva Mart í , Michael McKinsey, Marc
Moffett, Brendan Murday, Gary Ostertag, Michael Pelletti, Mark Phelan,
Marga Reimer, Andrea Sauchelli, Stephen Schiffer, Scott Soames, Arthur
Sullivan, and Tim Sundell. We also thank the members of the editorial
board of the Topics in Contemporary Philosophy series.
Finally, our special thanks to Chimena Kabasenche, Laura Lanwermeyer,
and Rebecca O ’ Rourke for their understanding and support.

1 Reference and Referring: A Framework
Jessica Pepp
Introduction
It is obvious, though quite remarkable upon reflection, that language is
significant. The noises, marks, and movements that we classify as linguistic
are not meaningless bursts of sound, ink stains on paper, or manipulations
of hands and fingers. Rather, they signify: they convey information, pose
questions, issue requests, express feelings, and the like. The topic of this
volume, reference, is a central aspect of this significance. When we refer
to particular objects, we provide subjects for our conversations, speeches,
written works, and other forms of discourse. We make our discourse
concern particular objects. Because of this, reference is often thought of as
the bond between language and the world, or between language and the
aspects of the world that language is used to talk about. Referring is often
thought of as the activity in virtue of which that bond holds. 1 A distinctive
question about reference and referring concerns what makes this bond
hold, or what the nature of this activity is: what is the mechanism by which
language is tied to the particular things that are its subjects? 2 I will call this
the “ mechanism question” about reference.
This very broad characterization of reference and referring is already
controversial.3 To formulate the mechanism question in a precise way
would require more controversial decisions about what the relata of the
reference relation are. Do linguistic expressions (i.e., words) refer, or is it
speakers who refer? 4 Must there be a real object that is referred to in order
for there to be reference, or is there also reference to nonexistent objects
such as Santa Claus? 5 Given the intricacies of these issues, a general framing
of the topic of reference and referring such as will be provided here would
prejudge too much by defining reference as a relation between one kind
of thing and another kind of thing. I will not attempt such definitions.
Instead, having gestured toward a broad linguistic phenomenon that I take