Reasonable Self-Esteem PDF
Preview Reasonable Self-Esteem
Reasonable Self-Esteem This page intentionally left blank Reasonable Self-Estetetm RICHARD KESHEN McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo © McGill-Queen's University Press 1996 ISBN 0-7735-1372-8 (cloth) ISBN 0-7735-1373-6 (paper) Legal deposit first quarter 1996 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. McGill-Queen's University Press is grateful to the Canada Council for support of its publishing program. Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Keshen, Richard, 1946- Reasonable self-esteem Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-1372-8 (bound) - ISBN 0-7735-1373-6 (pbk.) 1. Self-esteem, 1. Title. BF697-5.546x47 1996 179 C96-900689-3 Typeset in Palatino 10/12 by Caractera inc., Quebec City To Mary Ellen (lucky man I) This page intentionally left blank Contents Preface xi Acknowledgments xiii PART ONE REASONS FOR SELF-ESTEEM 1 Self-Esteem and the Reasonable Person 3 The concept of a reason for self-esteem is defined. Six guidelines for rationally scruti- nizing reasons are described. The Reasonable Person, or RP, is defined as a person who cares about following these guidelines. The connection between self-esteem and motiva- tion is analysed. 2 Reflected Reasons 20 The impact of others' evaluations on our self-esteem is analysed. The concept of a reflected reason is defined. The reflected reason is shown to underlie the trait of other-dependency. The RP rejects reflected self-evaluations as out of keeping with her nature and in the process, inhibits other- dependency in herself. The RP finds that autonomy is in keeping with her nature. 3 Competitive Reasons 35 Competitive reasons for self-esteem are anal- ysed and shown to underlie envy. The RP viii Contents rejects competitive reasons as out of keep- ing with his nature and so inhibits envy in himself. Self-evaluations involving adjec- tives such as "poor," "good," and "excel- lent" are shown to be distinct from competitive self-evaluations. 4 Identification Reasons 50 Reasons for self-esteem grounded in social relationships are analysed. Self-evaluations which imply that an agent has less moral status than another entity are shown to be out of keeping with the RP'S nature. Her ambivalent relationship to group member- ship is described. 5 Inherent Reasons 69 Reasons for self-esteem involving qualities we conceive as issuing from ourselves are analysed. Such qualities are the basis for what I call inherent reasons for self-esteem. The notion of "issuing from ourself" is anal- ysed. It is shown that appreciation of what has intrinsic worth can be as much the basis for an inherent reason as voluntary acts. The trait of attaching importance to one's being a unique person is analysed. It is shown that the RP is disposed to have this trait. PART TWO ELEMENTS IN A WAY OF LIFE 6 Finding Meaning in Reasonableness 91 Self-respect is distinguished from self-esteem. It is argued that being a self-respecting teacher, carpenter, etc., involves attributing positive worth to a tradition or quasi-tradition. It is shown that reasonableness, as I define it, can be thought of as a tradition. Hence, the RP can have the benefit of seeing herself as self-respecting qua RP. It is argued that part of the tradition of reasonableness includes science. It is shown how the RP of a certain temperament has meaning added to her life through contributing to science, either by being a scientist herself or by being a genuine appreciator of science. ix Contents 7 Egalitarian Respect 115 The attitude of treating people as equals, or egalitarian respect, is interpreted. Egalitarian respect is bifurcated into two further atti- tudes: the belief that one does not count for less than others, which is the attitude of egalitarian self-respect, and the belief that one does not count for more than others, which is the attitude of other-respect. These atti- tudes are analysed in terms of five criteria. It is argued that neither Kantian nor utilitar- ian strategies can be successful in justifying egalitarian respect in such a way that the attitude can be deeply anchored in our personalities. 8 "I Do Not Count for Less ..." 135 This chapter argues that the RP, on account of her nature, is particularly suited to having egalitarian self-respect. 9 "I Do Not Count for More ..." 146 This chapter argues that the RP'S nature is congruent with other-respect. Other-respect, in its fullest sense, is grounded in perspective- creating experiences, that is, experiences which cause us to see any other person as an equal. Two such experiences are discussed: (a) our common mortality and (b) our common sub- jection to fortune. It is argued that the RP'S nature dismantles barriers in himself which often cause people not to take such experi- ences to heart. It is then argued that the guidelines dispose the RP to give expression to egalitarian perceptions. For these reasons, other-respect has expressive significance for him and so is integrated into his self-esteem. Notes 173 Bibliography 193 Index 201
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