Quantitative Assessment in Arms Control: Mathematical Modeling and Simulation in the Analysis of Arms Control Problems

471 Pages·1984·13.22 MB·English

by  Rudolf Avenhaus

QUANTITATIVE
ASSESSMENT IN
ARMS CONTROL
Mathematical Modeling and Simulation
in the Analysis of Arms Control Problems
QUANTITATIVE
ASSESSMENT IN
ARMS CONTROL
Mathematical Modeling and Simulation
in the Analysis of Arms Control Problems
Edited by
Rudolf Avenhaus
and
Reiner K. Buber
Federal Armed Forces University Munich
Neubiberg, Federal Republic of Germany
PLENUM PRESS • NEWYORK AND LONDON
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Quantitative assessment in arms control.
"Proceedings of a seminar on quantitative approaches to arms control, held April to
June 1983, at the Hochschule der Bundeswehr, Munich, Federal Republic of Germany"
-Copr. p.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Arms control-Research - Congresses. 2. Arms Control-Mathematical models
-Congresses. I. Avenhaus, Rudolf. II. Huber, Reiner K.
JX1974.Q36 1984 327.1'74'072 84-15971
ISBN-13: 978-1-4612-9727-7 e-ISBN-13: 978-1-4613-2805-6
DOl: 10.1007/978-1-4613-2805-6
Proceedings of a Seminar on Quantitative Approaches to Arms Control,
held April to June 1983, at the Hochschule der Bundeswehr,
Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
©1984 Plenum Press, New York
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1984
A Division of Plenum Publishing Corporation
233 Spring Street, New York, N.Y. 10013
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming,
recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher
PREFACE
This book originates in a series of contributions to the 1983
Systems Science Seminar at the Computer Science Department of the
German Armed Forces University Munich. Under the topic "Quantita
tive Approaches to Arms Control" that seminar attempted to review
the present state-of-the-art of systems analysis and numerate meth
ods in arms control. To this end, the editors invited a number of
experts from Europe, the United St~tes and Canada to share and dis
cuss their views and assessments with the faculty and upper class
computer science students of the university as well as numerous
guests from the defence community and the interested public.
In three parts, this book presents a selection of partly re
vised and somewhat extended versions of the seminar presentations
followed, in most cases, by brief summaries of the transcripts of
the respective discussions. In addition to an introduction by the
editors, part I contains six papers on the present state and prob
lems of arms control with emphasis on START (Strategic Arms Re
duction Talks), INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces negotia
tions), and MBFR (Mutually Balanced Force Reduction talks). The
seven contributions to part II are devoted to mathematical models
of arms competition and quantitative approaches to force balance
assessment of both, the static and dynamic variety. Part III pre
sents five papers which address technical and operational aspects
and legal implications of arms control negotiations and verifica
tion.
The selection of topics and papers as well as the compilation
of the discussion statements is the editor's responsibility. The
views expressed in the contributions are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the positions of the institutions of
their affiliation or of the editors.
v
The editors are deeply indebted to the German Society of Peace
and Conflict Research (DGFK) for its interest in the seminar and
the financial support provided to guest speakers and for the pre
paration of the manuscript of this book. Without the additional sup
port of the Federal Ministry of Defence the invitation of speakers
from overseas hardly would have been possible. Thanks are also ex
pressed to the commander of the student body of the German Armed
Forces University Munich for his friendly assistance in accommodat
ing some of the guest speakers. Mr. John Fichtner carried the brunt
of the organizational efforts throughout the seminar and the sub
sequent production of this book. Miss Marlies Sobottka diligently
typed many of the contributions. It is a pleasure to acknowledge
their efforts.
Last but not least, thanks are extended to the authors for
their contributions and their cooperation. Notwithstanding mani
fold professional obligations, they willingly took the burden upon
themselves of rewriting the papers for this publication. Also, we
are indebted to Plenum Publishing Company for its patience and help
fulness throughout the process by which this book was produced.
Neubiberg Rudolf Avenhaus
February 1984
Reiner K. Huber
vi
CONTENTS
Introduction ••••••••••••••••••.•••.•.•••.•.•••••••••.•••••.•• 1
Rudolf Avenhaus and Reiner K. Huber
Part I
STATE AND PROBLEMS OF ARMS CONTROL TODAY
Arms Control and European Security: An Overview of START,
INF, MBFR and CSCE/CDE •••••••••••••••••.••••.••••.•••.•••••.• 13
David S. Yost
German Views on Armaments Control Issues and Negotiation
Approache s •••••••.••.•••.••.•••••.•.•.•••••••.•••••••.•••.••. 49
Lothar Riih1
Strategic Arms Control and Military Security of Western
Europe •.••••••••.•••..•.•••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••.••••••• 67
Hubert M. Feig1
MBFR: Problems and Lessons •••••.••••.•••••.••••.•••••.•..••.• 93
Reinhard Mutz
Aspects of the MBFR Negotiations ••••••.•.•••••..•.•••.....•.. 129
Walter Boss
Part II
MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF ARMS BUILD-UP
AND QUANTITATIVE FORCE BALANCE ASSESSMENT
A Review of Richardson Models ..•••........••...•..•........•. 143
Rudolf Avenhaus and John Fichtner
vii
Empirical Validation of Richardson Models of Arms Races .....• 179
Hans Rattinger
Analysis for Force Balance Assessment •.......•..•..••...••••• 205
Reiner K. Huber and Bernt-E. Wobith
Arms Control and Quantitative Measures of the Strategic
Balance ..•••.••.•..••••.•...•••••••••••..•..............•.•.• 243
Francis P. Hoeber
Lessons and Problems of SALT; Perspective of START •.•.••.•... 259
Alfred Lieberman
The Analytic Hierarchy Process: Decision-Making in Complex
Env ironmen ts .•.••.••••.••.•.........••.•..•••••......•....... 285
Thomas L. Saaty
Impact of Disarmament Nuclear Package Reductions ....•••.....• 309
Thomas L. Saaty
Part III
LEGAL ASPECTS, VERIFICATION, NEGOTIATIONS
Legal Aspects of Arms Control and Disarmament ...•.•••.••..... 337
Armin A. Steinkamm
Proposals and Technology for Arms Control Verification -
A Survey .••.•.••..•.•.••....•.•••••..• ,...................... 359
F. Ronald Cleminson and Ernest Gilman
Verification of MBFR-Agreements - A System Analysis ••..•...•. 383
Reimar Wittekindt
Soviet Violations of Existing Arms Control Treaties May
Make Future Treaties Ineffective ••..•..••••••••.•..••.•••••.. 413
Steve Symms and David Sullivan
Information Management in Arms Control Negotiations •••..•.••• 445
John D. Kettelle
About the Authors............................................. 463
Index ......................................................... 473
viii
INTRODUCTION
Rudolf Avenhaus and Reiner K. Huber
Institut fur Angewandte Systemforschung
und Operations Research
Fachbereich Informatik
Hochschule der Bundeswehr Munchen
Measured in terms of concluded agreements, the state of world
wide arms control seems increasingly bleak. While a series of agree
ments had been successfully negotiated in the sixties and seven
ties*, the recent half decade is characterized by a conspicuous
absence even of marginal progr0.ss. On the contrary, despite on
going international and bilateral negotiations aimed at enhancing
international security and a political modus vivendi between East
and West, there was a not insignificant build-up of conventional
armaments and nuclear capabilities by the Soviet Union. This and
the ensuing Western reactions contributed to the widely held per
ception of an ongoing "arms race."
It is not the purpose of this book to provide an analysis of
the reasons for this situation. Nor is it attempted to make pre
dictions on the future of arms control. However, with a view to the
possibly decisive role of arms control in assuring mankind's sur
vival, these authors are convinced that there is a need for better
understanding its underlying principles and methodological foun
dations. This is because a lack of such knowledge may have con
tributed perhaps significantly to the present stagnations as well
as to public confusion. Moreover, the study and discussion of more
rigidly structured approaches to and models of arms control issues
*
E.g.: Antarctic Treaty (1959), Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963),
Outer Space Treaty (1967), Establishment of a direct communica
tion link (1967), Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), ABM-Treaty
(1972), SALT I (1972), Threshold Teft Ban Treaty (1974), SALT II
(1979,not ratified). See also SIPRI •
might not only provide new insights. It is also considered a pre
requisite to a rational debate of arms control issues and proposals
among negotiators and in the public.
It is for these reasons that this book tries to provide an
introductory review of the basic quantitative approaches in the anal
ysis and assessment of arms control problems. It originates in a
series of contributio'ns to the 1983 Systems Science Seminar on
"Quantitative Approaches to Arms Control" at the Computer Science
Department of the German Armed Forces University Munich. Supported
by the German Society of Peace and Conflict Research (DGFK) that
seminar attempted to determine the present state-of-the-art of
numerate methods in arms control. To this end, a number of experts
from Europe and the United States were invited to share and discuss
their assessments and research with the faculty and the upper class
computer science students of our university. The papers in this
book represent partly revised and somewhat extended versions of the
respective presentations in the seminar sessions followed, in most
cases, by brief summaries of the transcripts of the respective
discussions.
What do we mean by "Quantitative Approaches to Arms Control"?
They certainly include not only methods for the collection and proc
essing of numbers of items and parameters such as soldiers, tanks
and aircraft; range, throw-weight and accuracy of missiles and many
others that are somehow indicative of the armaments or disarmaments
efforts of nations or alliances. In a much more general sense, the
term "quantitative" implies the employment of formal models to
provide numerate information for the investigation of questions
like
- What mutual armaments states represent equilibria?
- How stable are those equilibria?
- Which armaments and arms control strategies enhance stability?
- Are there possibilities to eventually attain stable equilibria
without a temporary destabilization during the implementation
of the respective systems?
With regard to the last question one might consider the pro
posal made by president Reagan in his "Star Wars Speech" to develop
defensive weapons using directed radiation energy as a kill mech
anism2• It is based on the vision of an ultimately stable arma
ments state of the world in which the level of the (strictly de
fensive) armaments efforts of antagonists would be essentially
immaterial to their security and the military stability of the
world. However, irrespective of the desirability of such a state,
doubts have been raised as to whether there exists an implementation
strategy that would not destabilize the system, at least temporar
ily, so that the associated risks become unacceptable. Of course,
the respective arguments all assume that the Soviet Union has
2
accepted the West's notion of strategic stability as reassurance
derived from the mutual acceptance of specific vulnerabilities. If
she has not, the implementation of an effective ABM capability might
indeed be a viable possibility to maintain some strategic stability.
This leads to the further question whether arms control objectives
can at all be attained through unilateral measures such as, e.g.,
an appropriate structuring of the military forces that would reduce
one's own offensive capabilities while simultaneously forcing the
antagonist into having to spend a significant level of his resources
on purely defensive systems. As Avenhaus, Fichtner and Huber3 have
shown, such force structures are theoretically feasible, at least
in the context of theater forces.*
Thus, in the context of arms control we consider formal models
lastly as an instrument to provide data for the test of stability
hypotheses that are forwarded within any set of environmental con
ditions. To this end, these models are used to perform thought
experiments on virtual conflicts. Their mathematical structure per
mits to reproduce these thought-experiments under varying sets of
environmental assumptions in a "what-if" manner through computa
tional experiments.
In order to illuminate the role of formal models in the arms
control analysis process the reader is referred to the Mathematica
Inc. contract work for ACDA5 where the authors distinguish between
a "mathematical" and a "political" style in the analysis of veri
fication strategies:
"The mathematical style modeUzes the questions of in
spection effort~ cheating strategies~ effectiveness
within a given~ closed~ fully delineated set of con
ditions. These questions are studied~ as a quantifiable
relationship between the number of opportunities to vio
late and the number of inspections allowed. The poli
tical style examines the psychological and political
milieu within which the decisions to cheat or comply
*
Their implementation strategy would have to be a gradualistic one
designed to maintain mutual security at least on the pre-imple
mentation level while gradually increasing stability in a series
of unilaterally implemented small steps to each of which the anta
gonistic side would have to reciprocate prior to the implementa
tion of the next step. In a recent working paper Huber4 outlines
the basic design of such a zero-risk implementation strategy which
requires, of course, that the other side does not perceive the
temporary introduction of additional (purely defensive) force ele
ments as a threat to its security. Whether Soviet ideology ever
permits such a requirement to be satisfied is an open question.
3