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384 Pages·2001·1.134 MB·English
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Problematic Sovereignty This page intentionally left blank Problematic Sovereignty Contested Rules and Political Possibilities STEPHEN D. KRASNER, EDITOR ColumbiaUniversityPress newyork ColumbiaUniversityPress PublishersSince1893 NewYorkChichester,WestSussex Copyright(cid:1)2001ColumbiaUniversityPress Allrightsreserved. LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Problematicsovereignty/StephenD.Krasner,editor p.cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN0–231–12178-4(cloth:alk.paper)—ISBN0–231–12179–2 (pbk.:alk.paper) 1.Sovereignty.I.Krasner,StephenD.,1942– KZ4041.P762000 327.1(cid:2)01--dc21 00-064426 (cid:1) CaseboundeditionsofColumbiaUniversityPressbooks areprintedonpermanentanddurableacid-freepaper. PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 p 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 CONTENTS StephenD.Krasner Preface vii AbouttheAuthors xi StephenD.Krasner 1 ProblematicSovereignty 1 AbrahamD.SofaerandThomasC.Heller 2 Sovereignty:ThePractitioners’Perspective 24 JohnBoli 3 SovereigntyfromaWorldPolityPerspective 53 MichelOksenberg 4 TheIssueofSovereigntyintheAsian HistoricalContext 83 JamesMcCallSmith 5 OneSovereign,TwoLegalSystems:ChinaandtheProblemof CommitmentinHongKong 105 v vi CONTENTS RobertMadsen 6 TheStruggleforSovereigntyBetween ChinaandTaiwan 141 MichaelMcFaul 7 TheSovereigntyScript:RedBookfor RussianRevolutionaries 194 CoitBlackerandCondoleezzaRice 8 BelarusandtheFlightfromSovereignty 224 SusanL.Woodward 9 CompromisedSovereigntytoCreateSovereignty:IsDayton BosniaaFutileExerciseoranEmergingModel? 252 ShibleyTelhami 10 TheRoadtoPalestinianSovereignty:ProblematicStructuresor ConventionalObstacles? 301 StephenD.Krasner 11 ExplainingVariation:Defaults,Coercion, Commitments 323 PREFACE E thnicwars,transnationalconcernsforhumanrights,theInter- net, financialcrises,multinationalcorporations,international trade,andmoregenerally,globalizationhavegivenrisetothesentimentthat sovereigntyasithasbeenconventionallyunderstoodiserodingorevenwither- ing away. This conclusion has been reached without much sense of the extent to which the present is different from the past, and without much systematicthoughtabouthowtheconceptofsovereigntymightbeunderstood andhowtherulesofsovereigntyhaveactuallyfunctionedintheinternational environment. Many recent discussions about the status of sovereignty have addressed economicquestions—especiallythepossiblelossofstateregulatorycapacity. However, this volume addresses different and possibly more consequential issues: namely, the way in which basic rules regarding mutual recognition and the exclusion of external authority, what are termed in this study inter- national legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty, are influencing, fa- cilitating, or impeding the resolution of difficult political and economic is- sues.Therulesassociatedwithsovereignty,likeanysetofrules,maybemore or less functional—more or less able to facilitate the realization of political, economic, security, or ideologicalobjectivesthatarepursuedbyactors.The conventional rules of sovereignty—that is, to recognize juridically indepen- dent territorial entities and exclude external sources of authority from do- mesticterritory—havebeenwidelyrecognizedatleastsincetheearlypartof thenineteenthcentury.Theserules,whichoriginatedinEurope,havespread vii viii PREFACE toallpartsoftheglobe,displacingotherinstitutionalformssuchastheChi- nese tributary state system or the Moslem practice of dividing the world be- tween Dar al-Islam, the House of Islam or the civilized world, and Dar al- Harb,theHouseofWarinhabitedbyinfidels.Formanypurposessovereignty ruleshavebeenattractiveandstabilizing.Theyhaveestablishedthepolitical equivalentofpropertyrights.Theyhavefacilitatedtheconclusionoftreaties— contractsamongstates.Theyhavemadeiteasiertodefinetransgressions. The contemporary international environment is, however, complex. It would be surprising if one set of rules were optimal for all situations. Prob- lematic sovereignty refers not only to the violation of conventionalrulesbut alsotothefactthatsuchrulesmightnotprovideactorswiththebestpossible ways to realize their economic, political, and ideological objectives.China, for instance, wants both juridical control over and internationalrecognition forHongKong.ThemajorWesternpowerswantfullysovereignstatesinthe Balkansbutareatthesametimepreparedtoviolatethedomesticautonomy ofthosestatestoprotectandpromotetherightsofminorities.Theleadersof Russia followed the script of sovereignty in supporting the breakup of the SovietUnionbutwouldpreferthatatleastsomepartsoftheirformerhome- landremain functionallysubordinateeveniftheyareformallyindependent. TheleaderofBelaruswouldliketheoptionofbecomingtheleaderofsome larger entity that would include Russia. Taiwan wants internationalrecogni- tion but does not want to declare its formal independence fromChina.Pal- estinians want a sovereign state but the Israelis will not accept a Palestinian statethathasfullcontroloveritsownsecuritypolicies. What happens in cases where the conventional rules of sovereignty do notprovideoptimaloutcomes?Cantherulesbebent?Cantheyberewritten? Can new rules be invented? These are the questions addressed in this vol- ume.TheformerSovietUnion;partsofChinaincludingHongKong,Tibet, and Taiwan; Bosnia; andPalestineallpresentsituationsinwhichtheinter- ests of actors might be better served if they could find alternativestosover- eignty.Insomecasessuchalternativeshavebeendeveloped.Inothersthey have not. Thefundamentalconclusionofthisstudyisthattherulesofsovereignty are not absolutely constraining. They are not taken for granted. New rules can be written; conventional ones can be ignored. Innovation is, however, possible only if actors can reach voluntary agreements or if some powerful statesarewillingtoengageincoercion.Absentcontractingorcoercion,con- ventionalsovereigntyrulesarethedefault. PREFACE ix This project could not have been completed without the support of the InstituteforInternationalStudiesatStanford.Theinstitute,likesomeofthe casesinthisvolume,defiesconventionalrules.Itsactivitiesinvolveanumber of different substantive issue areas and engage the worlds of both academia andpublicpolicy. Mywife,Patricia,inthis,asinallthings,hasbeenunfailinglylovingand supportive despite my complaints aboutlostreferencesandothermorecon- sequentialissues. StephenD.Krasner Stanford,California

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