probabilistic aspects of the initiation of ammunition and explosives

29 Pages·2017·2.09 MB·English

by  Matthew Andrews

Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center
Supporting Member Nations in the Enhancement of their Munitions Life Cycle Safety
SupportingMunitions Safety
PROBABILISTIC ASPECTS OF THE
INITIATION OF AMMUNITION AND
EXPLOSIVES
Parari, 21-23 November 2017
Martijn M. van der Voort, Dr. Michael W. Sharp
TSO Munitions Safety, Storage and Transport +32.(0)2.707.54.26
[email protected]
MSIAC UNCLASSIFIED
Contents
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 Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC)
 Introduction
 Fault trees and probabilistic analysis
 Case study 1: Shock induced Detonation
 Case study 2: Inhabited Building Distance
 Conclusions
MSIAC UNCLASSIFIED 2
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History of NIMIC/MSIAC is linked to history of IM
• Need arose from horrific accidents of 1960 and 1970s
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MSIAC Unclassified
MSIAC
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Technical Information & Analysis Center Focusing on
Munitions Safety
– NATO Project Office
– Independently Funded by its Member Nations
MSIAC Strategic Goal:
Eliminate Hazardous Consequences due to Unintended Reactions of
Munitions and Energetic Materials Throughout their Lifecycle
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MSIAC Unclassified
MSIAC Governance
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• MSIAC Strategies, Policies, & Work Efforts Defined by a
Steering Committee (SC)
– 1 SC Representative per Member Nation, 1 Vote per Member Nation
– 1 Elected Chairman (non-voting) from a Member Nation
• 13 Members
• Poland is in the process of joining
• ROK joining in 2017
MSIAC Unclassified
MSIAC Staff
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PROJECT MANAGER
DrMichael Sharp
OFFICE MANAGER
IT SUPPORT
Diane Vanoverstraeten
TECHNICAL
SPECIALISTS
SYSTEM SUPPORT
Ermir Ismali
MUNITIONS SYSTEMS STORAGE & TRANSPORT
Martin Pope Martijn van der Voort
DATA SPECIALIST
Angeline Liekens
ENERGETIC MATERIALS WARHEAD TECHNOLOGY
DrMatt Andrews DrErnie Baker
Trainees Stokes Fellow
PROPULSION TECHNOLOGY MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY
ENSTA summer placements: (MSIAC Funded Training
Emmanuel Schultz Wade Babcock Maud Cheneau Fellowship)
Maxime Voisin Ben Keefe (UK)
Knowledge & Access to Community of Technical Experts Across our Member Nations
MSIAC UNCLASSIFIED
Supporting Munitions Safety
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MSIAC Unclassified
MSIAC Drivers
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• Want to minimise the risk from our own munitions
• Understand and demonstrate benefits of munitions safety throughout
the lifecycle
• Improve and standardise munitions safety risk assessment
methodologies
• Harmonize munitions safety policies to achieve greater sharing of
munitions safety evidence
• Standardise approach to safe storage and use of munitions in
operational theatres
• Access to world leading scientific and technical analysis, and advice
to support decisions on munitions safety and risk management
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Unclassified / Unlimited Distribution
NATO Policy
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 MSIAC support: Experimental and theoretical basis of current NATO standards
for safe storage of ammunition
Exterior QDs
Interior QDs
Inter Magazine Distance (IMD) Exposed Sites (ES)
Earth Covered
Magazine (ECM)
Heavy Structure
Potential Explosion Site
(PES) Light Structure
Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ, Q) Explosive Workshop Distance (EWD)
Intra Line Distance (ILD)
Maximum Credible Event (MCE)
Compatibility Group (CG)
A-N
Sensitivity Group (SG) Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD)
SG1-SG5
Hazard Division Inhabited Building Distance (IBD)
(Storage Subdivision)
HD1.1
HD1.2 (SsD1.2.1, SsD1.2.2, SsD1.2.3)
HD1.3 (SsD1.3.1, SsD1.3.2)
HD1.4 Site border
HD1.5
HD1.6
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NATO Policy
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Hazard Classification
AASTP-3
Explosives Safety and
Munitions Risk Management
(ESMRM)
Guidelines for safe storage of ammunition
ALP-16
AASTP-1 AASTP-5
e
l
p
m
i
S

Home country: Deployed operations: Hazard

Quantity Distances (QD) Field Distances (FD) Identification

If these cannot be met:
d Risk Tracking Risk Analysis
e
t
a
c Explosives Safety Risk Analysis
i
l
p
m Risk Control
Risk Approval
o AASTP-4 AASTP-5 Plan
C
Continuous process
To be conducted by ESO
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)
Detailed models Practical method Level of authority for risk approval