Primitive Colors Primitive Colors A Case Study in Neo-pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception Joshua Gert 1 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©JoshuaGert2017 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2017 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2017930582 ISBN 978–0–19–878591–0 Printedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY To my wife Victoria who brings not only color to my life but value as well Contents Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 1. AnUnmysteriousColorPrimitivism 9 2. ColorPrimitivismandNeo-pragmatism 38 3. ARealisticColorRealism 56 4. AHybridView 87 5. ColorConstancy 125 6. RivalViews:EndowingObjectswithManyColors 145 7. FriendlierRivals:MakingColorExperienceMoreComplex 173 8. RepresentationalismandtheTransparencyofExperience 192 SummaryandConclusion 218 References 227 Index 233 Acknowledgments A number of chapters of this book are modified versions of papers that have appearedelsewhere.ChapterOneislargelytakenfrom“WhatColorsCouldNot Be:AnArgumentforColorPrimitivism,”whichappearedinJournalofPhiloso- phy 105, 3 (2008), 128–57. ChapterThree is a modified version of “A Realistic ColorRealism,”whichwaspublishedinAustralasianJournalofPhilosophy84,4 (2006),565–89.ChapterFivewasfirstpublishedas“ColorConstancy,Complex- ity, and Counterfactual,” in Noûs 44, 4 (2010), 669–90. And the first part of ChapterSix is a modified version of “Crazy Relations,” which appeared in the CroatianJournalofPhilosophy12,36(2012),315–30.Iamgratefultotheeditors ofallthesejournalsforpermissiontoreusethismaterialhere. Many of the chapters—including those mentioned above—benefitted greatly from comments I received at conferences, from referees, and from other people who did me the favor of reading drafts. With apologies to those who I am forgetting, thanks to: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Cohen, Victoria Costa, Heather Gert, C. L. Hardin, David Hilbert, Mark Kalderon, Mohan Matthen, Michael McKenna,PaulKay,andMichaelWatkins.SpecialthankstoDerekBrownandto KeithAllen,whosegenerousandcharitablecommentsonthewholemanuscript significantly improved the final version. And thanks to Angela Mele, the artist responsibleforthecover,forputtingupwithmyfussiness. I am very grateful for the generous financial support I received from the National Endowment for the Humanities. And, finally, I want to thank Joseph Plumeriforhisremarkablecommitmentto,andencouragementof,thefacultyof WilliamandMary.
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