Practice of Death

131 Pages·1975·27.618 MB·English

by  Eike-Henner W. Kluge

THE
PRACTICE
OF
DEATH
Eike-Henner W. Kluge
New Haven and London, Yale University Press,
1975
GaliewG hiordis book t8r~~ te besorg vE5r of
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Copyright © 1975 by Yale University. 23. AUG. 1976
All rights reserved. This book may not be
-7. SEP. 1976
reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form
28. SfP. 1976
(except by reviewers for the public press),
without written permission from the publishers.
Library of Congress catalog card number: 74-14498
International standard book number: 0-300-01806--1
Designed by John O. C. McCrillis
and set in Times Roman type.
Printed in the United States of America by
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Published in Great Britain, Europe, and Africa by
Yale University Press, Ltd., London.
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~"r. ~~_-,~;;" '7Q;
Contents
Preface vii
'I Abortion 1
. Suicide 101
(j,;EuthanaSia 1t""1''' 31 l'
4 Infanticide 182
5 Senicide 210
6 Morality and the Practice of Death 226
Index 245
(
Preface
We live in a time of profound moral CrISIS. Traditionally ac
ce a enets are no Imrg~=creemeo immune from analytic
questioning, and the doubts and vacillations in moral praC'fiCe
thirtl n_vafllrbtycrttern:l usk-a-prQ'Ci ave as yet n.QL)'le e -
"-a
c?Eerent solution. -~f anything;-cUITe~tions on morality
are more confused-even contr~qictor)'-th~ny other .time
in history. ------
Nor are the moral uncertainties confined to those areas tra
ditionally covered by the term 'morality': sex, marriage, and
related concerns. Quite the contrary: The spirit of the "new
morality" manifests itself in every area of human interaction.
And the challenge it poses is the more profound, as it goes to
the very heart of moral theory itself: It questions the 'very
legitimacy of moral judgments. It suggests that moral theories
and tenets as traditionally understood are nothing more nor less
than codifications of historically determined and culture-bound
codes of behavior; that therefore these cannot lay claim to uni
versal validity, but are mere expressions of pro and con atti
tudes; and that consequently those preeminently moral epithets,
'good' and 'bad', do no more than indicate purely personal eval
uations relative to a given situation and point of view.
Such a challenge to morality itself could be borne with equa
nimity, were it confined to the sphere of theory alone. But such
is not the case. This attitude on morality has begun to effect
changes in current moral attitudes and practices. In the fore
front stand changes in the attitudes and practices dealing with
life and death. Abortion, suicide, euthanasia, infanticide, and
senicide have seen the impact of these changed attitudes, and
the shibboleth "Do your own thing!" has become the password
even here.
I,
1. Cf. Germain G. Grisez, Abortion: The Myths, the Realities, and the
Arguments (New York and Cleveland: Corpus Books, 1970), pp. 270 If.,
vii
viii PREFACE PREFACE ix
Once more, this situation could be viewed without qualms, low~ logically from such a premise that, all other things being
were the relevant practices and attitudes based on a reasoned equal, the deliberate destruction of what has absolute value is
understanding of the issues involved, were the fundamental a morally reprehensible act. Consequently, I deem the destruc
assumptions on which this reasoning is based sound, and were tion of human beings as centers of such awareness to be immoral
the reasoning itself consistent. After all, the fact that a moral in all except the rarest of circumstances.
a
tenet is traditional makes it neither correct nor sacrosanct. Un Having confessed to such bias, let me hasten to add that
fortunately, however, the conditions just mentioned are not met this book is not written with the purpose of urging upon the
-sometimes not even in the slightest degree. In fact, if there is reader this point of view. For, I must confess to an even more
one thing that characterizes the current moral scene, it is the fundamental bias, a bias going back to Socrates: The unexam
abandonment of deliberate reason in favor of unreasoned per ined life is not worth living. The purpose of this book, therefore,
sonal preference. is ,analytical. I propose to present and examine critically the
It is this lack of reasoned understanding that prompted the more representative positions currently subsumed under the
present investigation into the moral attitudes currently sur heading of life and death: topics such as abortion, infanticide,
rounding the issues of life and death. It is my opinion that be suicide, senicide, and so on. The aim of this analysis will be to
cause of this lack of reason, our society has failed to understand expose the structure of these various positions and, if need be,
the moral nature and consequences of the actions variously ad to point up their incoherence. But this work itself would be
vocated; and that as a result of this, it is presently embarked guilty of pragmatic inconsistency if it subjected only the various
upon a course of action that is dangerous. Dangerous not merely variants of the new morality to such an analysis. I have there
in the practical sense that what is done touches the life of every fore divided each chapter into four parts. In the first, the prob
individual within society; but dangerous also in a moral sense, lem itself is stated; in the second, the traditional stance on the
in that what is condoned and advocated in the name of personal problem is illustrated by representative arguments and is ana
freedom and the new morality is frequently morally evil. And lyzed; in the third, the new morality is given its say, once more
as philosophers, it is our duty to point this out. by means of representative arguments, and is treated to a sim
With these last statements, I have of course betrayed my own ilar analysis. In the final section of each chapter, I attempt in
fundamental position on the issues at hand: I am opposed to the an explicit manner to disentangle and present coherently the
course so frequently advocat'ed by the proponents of the new various aspects of the issue.
morality. But I a:m not opposed to it on the grounds of tradition It goes almost without saying that I hope that in the end the
-on the grounds of established custom and hallowed philo reader will come to share my own position. To this end-and it
sophical belief. I am opposed to it on the basis of the reasoned would be dishonest to pretend otherwise-I have devoted the
conviction that there exists something of absolute and intrinsic last chapter to an explicit discussion of what I take to be some
value in the universe, namely, rational consciousness or aware of the more fundamental moral views involved and have given
ness; and that human beings-although not human beings alone what I myself take to be the correct answer. But I shall not
-are the centers of such awareness. I am convinced that it fol- judge the success or failure of this investigation by the ratio of
conversions to my point of view. My major purpose will be
served if, because of having read these analyses, the reader will
for a discussion of what she calls the "subjective :view." See also Daniel
have gained a deeper understanding of the implications of the
Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality (New York: Macmillan.
1970). various positions currently held on this most fundamental ques
tion of all: Who shall live?
---_._. . - ----- --
1
Abortion
THE PROBLEM
Ours has been described as an "abortifacient" society. The rea
son for this is not entirely clear. Certainly, abortions have been
performed prior to the present era-in fact, have been performed
since antiquity and even prehistoric times.! Doubtlessly, also,
they will continue to be performed in times to come. So, the
mere fact that abortions are performed cannot be the reason for
this epithet. Why, then, is our society called abortifacient?
The reason must be sought not in the mere fact of abortions.
Instead, it is to be found in the relative ease with' which abor
tions can presently be procured. And once again, not merely in
this relative ease of procurement, but also-and perhaps mainly
,""in the relative lack of legal sanctions attaching to abortions2
and the increasingly widespread disregard of the moral issues
that are involved. Those who describe the present society as
I should like to thank my colleague, John Woods, for acting as a
foil for many of the ideas and arguments expressed in this book. With
out his constructive criticism, it would read much worse.
1. For a good but brief account of the history of abortion and the law,
see Bernard M. Dickens, Abortion and the Law (London: MacGibbon
and Kee, 1966), chap. 1.
2. Cf. U.S. Supreme Court decision on state abortion laws handed down
on January 22, 1973, opinion in the Texas case Roe v. Wade and the
Georgia case Doe v. Bolton, when that court declared unconstitutional the
Texas and Georgia abortion laws. These laws ruled abortion permissible
only when deemed necessary to save a woman's life, as in Texas, or when
required by her health to prevent the birth of a deformed child or when
the pregnancy resulted from rape, as in Georgia. This ruling implied that
similarly restrictive abortion laws in other states are also unconstitutional.
2 THE PRACTICE OF DEATH ABORTION
3
abortifacient use the term in a pejorative sense: For them, it
analysis will therefore be confined to these extreme sides of the
contains a value judgment, namely, that such a state of affairs
controversy. Nor will it be possible to reproduce and analyze
is morally undesirable and therefore ought not to be condoned.
all the arguments that both sides adduce in support of their re
But our society has also been described as liberated. The rea
spective positions. But there are several key lines of reasoning
sons for this are somewhat more apparent. Current moral theory
that are characteristic of the one side or the other. These will be
as well as practice is in the process of emancipating itself from
presented and analyzed in some detail.
what are sometimes called the shackles of tradition. Human
However, prior to doing this, the term itself must be clarified.
egalitarianism has become the password of the avant-garde as
What, precisely, is an abortion? How are we to understand that
well as of the broad masses. Nor is it merely an empty shibbo
term? Is an abortion any termination of a pregnancy prior to
leth; for the efforts to realize this ideal are all around us: in the
the birth of a child? Or does the term refer only to an artificial
area of interrace relations, in the domain of civil liberties, as
termination of a pregnancy prior to its natural termination in
well as--or especially- in the arena of women's rights. Here,
the natural course of events? If the latter, is an artificial ter
too, the word 'abortifacient' has currency. But as used by those
mination an abortion irrespective of the intentions and aims of
who are in the vanguard of women's liberation, it has a com
the people involved? After all, some artificially induced ter
pletely different meaning. Instead of being pejorative, it is con
minations are the result of accidents and, as such, are wholly
sidered laudatory: It describes the liberation of women from the
unintentional. Further still, does it matter at what time the
state of being brood animals-of having as their primary func
pregnancy is terminated? Say, the second, the third, or the
tion the bearing of children. Once more, the term connotes a
fourth month of the gestation period? Or is this sort of consid
value judgment-this time, however, of an opposite sense.
eration irrelevant? Also, what of the development of the fetus:
The battle lines are thus drawn: tradition versus the new
Is this a relevant criterion? Is the termination of pregnancy an
morality.3 The controversy that currently rages over the permis
abortion only after a heartbeat has been heard? Or, after the
sibility of abortions can be seen as a confrontation between
"quickening in the womb"? and so on. Finally, there is the
these positions. To be sure, there are splinter groups on both
phrase 'spontaneous abortion': How does this fit into the whole
sides; and equally as certainly, there are various middle posi
picture?
4
tions. However, like almost any attempt to maintain a middle
We are thus faced with a whole host of problems before we
ground, the latter are essentially efforts at compromise, and as
have even begun the discussion proper; and we might therefore
such trade on the arguments adduced by both sides. Therefore,
be tempted to abandon the whole enterprise at the very outset:
they generally add nothing new to the controversy and in fact
to leave it safely within the ambiguous and comfortingly imper
tend to obscure the real issue, for the heart of the matter is
sonal domain of common practice. However, to do so is neither
foun,SYln this opposition between the two extremes. The present
necessary nor morally defensible. Unexamined and unreflective
acquiescence in current practice-whatever that practice may
3. These distinctions will be refined in a moment. For an analogous di
be-,is fraught with moral danger. What is currently accepted
vision of positions, see Roger Wertheimer, "Understanding the Abortion
Argument," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1971): 67-97, and may in fact be morally wrong. And as moral beings, we cannot
Michael Tooley, "A Defense of Abortion and Infanticide," Philosophy afford that risk. For, if abortion in fact is murder, as some of
and Public Affairs 2, no. 1 (1972): 37-65. However, neither Wertheimer
nor Tooley share the particulars of the present analysis or its conclusions.
4. For a discussion similar to this one, see Grisez, Abortion, pp. 7 if.
~- - ---
4 THE PRACTICE OF DEATH ABORTION 5
its opponents claim, then the mere fact that we acquiesce in tential for survival, especially in the last stages of pregnancy
common practice will not detract from the gravity of the moral say, in the fifth month or later. If the entities that are aborted
charge. at that stage were to be given intensive care, at least some of
Therefore we should press on. And here the phrase 'sponta them would survive; and in their case, certainly, we should
neous abortion' suggests at least the beginnings of an operative ordinarily not want to say that an abortion had been performed.5
definition around which the following discussion can be or In other words, it emerges from the foregoing deliberations that
ganized. the concept of an abortion seems to include as an essential and
indeed central constituent the concept of the death of whoever
DEFINITION 1. An abortion is the artificially and intention
or whatever is aborted. And this, in turn, suggests the following
ally engendered termination of a pregnancy prior to its
emendation of the definition:
natural termination in the course of events.
It is important to realize that this definition does not presume, DEFINITION 2. An abortion is an artificially engendered ter
nor indeed does it imply, that all pregnancies would normally mination of a pregnancy prior to its natural termination in
and naturally terminate with a birth at the end of roughly nine the course of events, where this termination is effected with
months. It is perfectly natural-that is, perfectly possible in the the express purpose of bringing about the death of the en
course of nature-that some pregnancies should not come to tity!; that is aborted, and where this intention is actually
realized.
full term. These are what are called cases of spontaneous abor
tion. (They are spontaneous not in the sense that they have no
With this as a working definition, we can once more address
cause, but in the sense that their cause is not to be sought in the
the essential question: Is abortion murder? As stated in the
intentional interference of man.)
beginning, positions on this issue divide into two opposed
. This last consideration raises a further point vis-a-vis Defini
camps: into what I have called the traditional stance on the one
tion 1: a point that is best brought out by considering the notion
hand, and the position of the new morality on the other. The
of a spontaneous abortion more closely. It is a common assump
tion that when we talk about an abortion's having taken place,
that this abortion resulted in the death of the fetus. However, 5. On this point, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1971): 47-66. This author main
this need not be the case. As is apparent from the case of spon
tains that establishing the moral permissibility of an abortion is one thing,
taneous abortions, some occur at such a late stage of the preg
establishing the right to bring about the death of the entity aborted is an
nancy that the fetus is viable and indeed, when given intensive other, and that the first does not entail the second. However, the author
care, does survive. To be sure, such cases we no longer call differs from the view presented here in maintaining that cases where both
spontaneous abortions. We call them premature births. But this were not secured nevertheless are cases of abortion. Callahan, however, in
Abortion (p. 497), favors the present definition, going so far as to say that
is a difference of terminology only and, consequently, can be
"abortion is an act of killing, the violent, direct destruction of potential
disregarded.
human life already in the process of development." While I differ from
The point, then, is that not all spontaneous abortions result Callahan on the notion of potentiality, I agree with him on the issue of
in the death of a fetus. To make these considerations germane intended death as essentially involved in abortion.
to the present discussion, we need only point out that the same 6. I employ this terminology so as to avoid prejudging the issue of
whether or not 'what is aborted is a human being. Cf. Norman St. John
thing holds true for abortions as they have just been defined
Stevas, The Right to Life (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1963), p. 32
above: Some of the beings that are thus aborted have the po-
and passim. See also Callahan, Abortion, p. 377.
"to; _ __
6 THE PRACTICE OF DEATH ABORTION
7
former holds, by and large, that abortions are murderous, neither ovum nor sperm is a potential person. Each lacks
whereas the latter maintain the contrary. Let us examine each the requisite genetic information or makeup to develop into
position in turn.
a person, even if conditions of development should prove
to be optimal. Consequently, the death of such an entity,
THE NEGATIVE ARGUMENT
even if it should be brought about intentionally, cannot
The traditional stance generally holds that to perform an abor possibly be considered murderous.
tion is to commit a murder;7 that to request an abortion is to However, matters stand otherwise in the case of a fer
demand a murder; and, consequently, that to be involved with tilized ovum. It does contain the necessary genetic infor
an abortion is to be an accessory to the fact. Nevertheless, this mation to develop into a human being, given only adequate
general agreement hides a disagreement of some importance. time, nourishment, and barring accidents. Therefore, a fer
Not all traditionalists maintain that, no matter what, an abortion tilized ovum is a potential person. Consequently, the act of
constitutes a. murder. Some traditionalists maintain that the time destroying such an entity with full intent and purpose, in
at which the abortion is performed and, above all, the stage of full knowledge of what is being done-in short, the act of
fetal development are considerations of paramount importance.8 abortion as we have defined it-is an act of murder.
Thus these-let us call them moderate traditionalists to distin
guish them from the extreme traditionalists of the first sort This argument rests on one fundamental assumption, namely,
would maintain that only' after the "child has quickened in the that potential persons have the same moral status as actual per
womb," "has acquired a soul," and so on can we speak of sons-that in a very clear and definite moral sense an entity
murder. Extreme traditionalists, of course, are more severe. which in the course of time would become a person has the
Again, let us consider these positions in turn. same rights and privileges as someone who already is a person.
From this assumption the argument deduces--quite correctly
The Extreme Traditionalist
that therefore acts dealing with potential persons receive the
The argument underlying the extreme traditionalist's position is same moral evaluation as acts dealing with actual persons. In
relatively simple and straightforward. It centers around the no particular, it goes on to conclude that one particular kind of act
tion of the rights that accrue to a person and goes something -that of premeditated killing by means of an abortion-has the
like this:9 same moral nature as an act of killing an actual person "with
I
malice aforethought." In short, that it constitutes an act of mur
The death of either ovum or sperm is not the death of a
der.
person. It is not even the death of a potential person, for
Undeniably, this train of argument has great emotional ap
pe~1; and, so it must be admitted, it is difficult to see at first
7. This emerges clearly from several traditional discussions. Cf. St.
Joh'n-Stevas, The Right to Life, chaps. 1 and 2; Grisez, Abortion, esp. glance how the cogency of its reasoning could be faulted. Never
chap. 6. theless, closer consideration raises grave doubts as to its accept
8. Cf. Wertheimer, "Understanding the Abortion Argument," on what ability. For the acceptability of its conclusion-as indeed that
he calls the conservative view. See also Callahan, Abortion, esp. chap. 10,
of any other argument~depends not merely on the validity of
pp.384-90.
the reasoning employed to reach it, but also on the truth of the
9. Cf. Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," for a similar presentation of
the traditional position; see also Wertheimer, "Understanding the Abor premises from which the reasoning starts. In this particular case,
tion Argument," on what he calls the "extreme conservative" position. however, more careful consideration of the argument reveals
8 THE PRACTICE OF DEATH ABORTION
9
that the conclusion touted as the outcome of the reasoning is
this context, is to beg the question. The logical transition from
jeopardized on both counts. As to the truth of the premises, one
(1) to (2), therefore, is guilty of a nonsequitur.lO
of them is open to doubt: namely, that a potential human being
This particular argument against abortion, therefore, is in
has the same moral status as an actual person. That is, we may
valid and must be rejected. However, there are several subsid
grant that, all other things being equal, a fetus is a potential
Iary arguments that frequently are adduced to buttress the con-
human being. We may also grant that a fertilized ovum is a
lusion. Of these subsidiary arguments, the following three are
potential human being. We may even grant that the intentionally
oncountered most frequently and seem to have the greatest in
caused death of a fertilized ovum, no matter what its stage of
tuitive appeal. They are what I shall call the argument from
development, is the death of a potential human being. How
valuation, the argument from the principle of helplessness, and
ever, we need not and indeed should not conclude from this that
the argument from the principle· of gradation.
therefore the intentional killing of a fertilized ovum or of a fetus
The argument from valuation goes something like this: 11 It is
is an act of murder. That conclusion requires another premise,
a plain matter of fact that we value potential beings just as much
namely, that a potential human being has the same moral status
- or at least almost as much-as we value actual beings. The
as an actual person. Only if this assumption is granted, will the
instance of a pregnant cow is here a case in point. If someone
conclusion follow. But as stated a moment ago, that particular
willfully caused the cow to abort its calf, the owner of the cow
premise is certainly questionable.
could, with all the justification in the world, go to the courts to
As to the cogency of the reasoning itself, its shortcomings can
seek redress. And assuredly, he would be successful in his claim.
be summed up quite simply: The transition from the first to the
The offender would be obliged to pay damages of an amount
second step in the argument is logically unacceptable. A brief
equal to the value of the calf had it been born. Nor is this an
restatement of the relevant aspects of the argument will show
isolated case. In any situation involving living things, where
how this is the case:
what is destroyed is not yet an actual but a potential being, if
omeone destroys it, he will be held guilty of an act whose mQral
(1) A fertilized ovum contains the necessary genetic in
and legal gravamen is at least as great as that attaching to the
formation for developing into a human being, given
act of destroying the fully actualized being. Nor is this sort of
only adequate time, nourishment, and barring acci
consideration confined solely to the context of animal hus
dents.
bandry. It extends even to tbe human sphere. As evidence of
(2) Therefore a fertilized ovum is a potential person.
this, we may cite the recent public outcry and ultimate legal
decisions dealing with the deformation of babies due to the fact
It is this transition from being a fertilized ovum having a certain
genetic structure to being a potential person that is logically
10. Grisez, Abortion, is guilty of a similar move, e.g. pp. 277, 306 if.,
questionable. That is to say, the transition from (1) to (2)
and passim. See also Callahan, Abortion, chap. 11, pp. 378-83, for a dis
involves the tacit assumption that "potential human being" and
cussion of a similar genetic position. Callahan does not, however, agree
"potential person" mean one and the same thing; that to be a with the present analysis.
member of the species homo sapiens is the same thing as to be 11. Cf. Callahan, Abortion, pp. 458-60, for discussion of a similar ar
a person. As it stands, however, that is not at all clear. Indeed, gument. As Callahan notes, the moral framework of the argument is de
B:
rived from R. Perry, A General Theory of Value (Cambridge: Har
it is one of the very things in doubt. Merely to assume it, as in
vard University Press, 1926).
~M'7---